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792. Getting Off the Back Foot: Guiding Principles for a Proactive Western Strategy on Belarus
- Author:
- Artyom Shraibman
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- For decades, the West has been unable to build an effective strategy on Belarus due to the country’s limited geopolitical importance, an inexorably deeper dependence on Moscow, and the glaring absence of leverage over Minsk’s strategic decisionmaking. This paper proposes a different paradigm for approaching the issue. Instead of passively reacting to Minsk’s actions, the West should broaden its planning horizon and create more specific incentives for Belarus to follow a different trajectory in the future. The overriding goal of a more proactive Western strategy should be the eventual emergence of a democratic Belarus that is no longer fully dominated by Moscow in the military and political realms. Such an ambitious goal would have tangible and lasting benefits for the new European security landscape amid the prospect of a long war in Ukraine. Skepticism in Western policy circles about the viability of such a scenario is entirely understandable. Yet it is not entirely clear whether Western policymakers have registered the significant differences between Russia and Belarus at the societal level and divergent strategic interests of the Russian and Belarusian regimes. At the same time, it is essential for Western policymakers to keep their expectations in check and to avoid an overestimation of their capabilities. The Belarusian crisis cannot be resolved in the foreseeable future by Western efforts alone. Moreover, there should be no illusions about the fact that Belarus, much like Ukraine, holds a special place in the worldview of the Russian ruling elite and President Vladimir Putin personally. The Kremlin’s long-standing obsession with keeping the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) away from Russia’s borders plays into the same attachment to keeping the Belarusian regime in as tight an embrace as possible. Therefore, until Moscow either changes its foreign policy priorities under a new leadership or simply becomes unable to keep Minsk under its control, it would be naïve to expect that the Russian leadership will simply offer any Belarusian government greater leeway to shift its geopolitical orientation. At the same time, it is conceivable that a qualitative increase in military assistance to Ukraine and a more effective economic pressure campaign against Russia could disrupt Belarus’s trajectory and make Minsk more amenable to the incentives that the West can already offer. But an overnight breakthrough seems highly unlikely. This paper, therefore, focuses on more realistic recommendations with longer-term effects.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Economics, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eastern Europe, and Belarus
793. Emerging Powers and the Future of American Statecraft
- Author:
- Christopher S. Chivvis and Beatrix Geaghan-Breiner
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- The structure of international politics is changing in ways that are not fully appreciated in Washington. The United States has paid a great deal of attention to the rise of China in the last decade but much less to emerging powers whose rise will also shape the operating environment for American statecraft. No single emerging power will have an impact tantamount to China’s, but they will have a significant impact collectively due to their geopolitical weight and diplomatic aspirations. America has limited ability to influence the trajectory of these emerging powers, identified in this report as Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, and Türkiye. They have taken stances that contrast or directly clash with U.S. positions on China and on Russia over the past few years. Nearly all have voiced concerns about Washington’s approach to the war in Ukraine, even as they criticized Moscow’s invasion. Almost none would line up with the United States in a confrontation with China. Instead, they are likely to pursue highly self-interested foreign policies. Washington should expect that they will increasingly challenge some of its policies, sustain relationships with its adversaries, and press their own agendas on the global stage. The emerging powers’ statecrafts are shaped in large part by their drive for economic security. But their geographies, different preferences for world order, domestic politics, and defense relationships also play a role. Concerns about the strength of democracy in other countries, which has played an animating role in U.S. foreign policy for decades, are a lower priority for them, no matter how democratic they are. It will be a mistake for the United States to frame its relations with these emerging powers primarily as part of a competition for influence with China and Russia, however tempting it may be to do so. These powers are not swing states that will tilt decisively toward either side in a global great power competition. Most will resist any efforts to bring them into a U.S.-led camp as in the Cold War. Trying to make them do so would also risk strategic overreach by embroiling the United States too deeply in the emerging powers’ domestic politics or by expending its resources in pursuit of building ties that never materialize. A better approach for the United States would be to focus on negotiating interest-based deals with emerging powers while cordoning off areas of disagreement. These might include tailored market access and investment agreements, agreements on technology manufacturing, energy transition initiatives, efforts to combat deforestation, efforts to build public health infrastructure, and infrastructure investments. It would be wasteful of the United States to offer these countries security guarantees, but in some cases providing security assistance can serve its interests. Washington should accept that most of these countries will maintain close diplomatic, economic, and sometimes security relationships with China and probably Russia. Over the longer term, it will serve U.S. interests to strengthen the sovereignty of emerging powers when possible and cost-effective to do so. This will provide a bulwark against the undue expansion of China’s power and influence and help ensure that, even if they do not side with the United States, they are not drawn closely into the orbit of its major geopolitical competitors. Strengthening emerging powers’ sovereignty will also help boost their development as constructive powers with a stake in sustaining a peaceful world order conducive to global economic growth.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, Strategic Competition, and Emerging Powers
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Russia, China, Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and United States of America
794. Charting the Radical Right’s Influence on EU Foreign Policy
- Author:
- Rosa Balfour and Stefan Lehne
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- The political landscape in the European Union (EU) is changing rapidly. For decades, the traditional mainstream parties of the center right and center left have been losing ground, while antiestablishment parties have been gaining support. According to research by the University of Amsterdam, 32 percent of voters opted for antiestablishment parties in 2021, up from 12 percent in the early 1990s.1 Radical-right parties make up about half of this share, and their support has risen faster than that of any other group. Many of the fourteen parties examined in this study have achieved vote shares of 20 percent or more. The radical right is now in government, or supports the government, in Finland, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, and Sweden. In the Netherlands, it is likely that Geert Wilders’s Party for Freedom (PVV) will be part of a governing coalition. In other countries, these parties have become the leading opposition groups. In France, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN) has been carefully preparing to win the 2027 presidential election. Setbacks for the radical right in Poland and Spain in the second half of 2023 have shown that the relentless rise of these parties is not a foregone conclusion. However, current polling for several national elections and the June 2024 European Parliament elections indicates a strong likelihood of their continuing electoral success.2 Chega (Enough), a recently established party that shot to 18 percent of the vote in Portugal’s March 2024 election, ended the country’s exceptionalism as one of the few European nations without a right-wing populist party.3 The June 2024 Belgian federal election may see the Flemish nationalist party Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest), which so far has been strong in Flanders but kept out of national politics, break through at the federal level. Polling for Austria’s September 2024 parliamentary election suggests a surge in support for the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ).4 In contrast with populism, which has a thin ideology focused mainly on fomenting the anger of the so-called pure people against corrupt elites and which has risen on both the left and the right of the political spectrum, the radical-right parties of the 2020s have a more distinct ideological profile.5 All have national specificities, such as rural origins in Northern Europe or ethnonationalism in Central Europe. Several parties are rooted in postwar fascism, such as the FPÖ, RN, Brothers of Italy (FdI), the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (AUR), and the Sweden Democrats (SD). For some groups, strong connections with society and well-developed party structures compensated for their marginal impact in national politics. Before its landslide victory in Italy’s 2022 parliamentary election, support for FdI hovered at around 5 percent, as it did for the party’s predecessor throughout the period since World War II.6 Other parties, such as Hungary’s Fidesz, gained ground as classic populist or even mainstream parties and benefited from an aura of respectability even as they shifted toward ethnonationalist or nativist positions. Since the 1990s, liberal-democratic parties have started to adopt some of the ideas of the radical right while keeping the parties themselves out of government. In the 2000s, the radical right became normalized, in some countries becoming part of the political mainstream. During this process, as political scientists Cas Mudde and Jan-Werner Müller have argued, liberal-democratic parties have shifted toward the radical right in the hope—mostly in vain—of keeping their traditional electorates. Yet, in practice, this approach has led voters to prefer the real radical right to its imitators. In other words, the tactic of chasing the radical right has not paid off electorally. Voters have moved toward the radical right as a consequence, not as a cause, of liberal-democratic parties’ attempts to contain it.7 Today, the far right is dominated by the radical right, which, unlike the extreme right, accepts the essence of democracy but rejects its liberal elements: minority rights, the rule of law, and the separation of powers.8 The radical-right parties selected for this study all share deep antimigration sentiments, often determined by race or religion; a nationalism that makes these parties Euroskeptic and opposed to what they see as a Brussels-based dictatorship; and skepticism of climate change policies. Many of these parties also espouse deeply conservative family values that go against women’s and LGBTQ rights. Foreign policy is usually not the strong suit of these parties, apart from their keen interest in the external dimension of migration policy. These parties pay close attention to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine but are sharply divided on this issue, with positions ranging from deep mistrust of Russia to close alignment with the Kremlin’s arguments. A future Donald Trump administration could lead to new divisions in the EU, as some member states are likely to align with the United States under any circumstances. This would mean that many of the EU’s current foreign policy positions, such as support for Ukraine, would come to an end. As radical-right parties rise to prominence at the national and the EU level, they are developing views on a range of foreign policy issues, building increasingly influential international networks and think tanks, and learning from each other’s successful tactics in solidifying their control of the state and propagating their values.9 For some radical-right parties that have been established in government, such as Fidesz and, until October 2023, Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) party, the upgrading of foreign policy on their political agendas can be inferred by the fact that all diplomatic postings in the EU are political appointments. Hungary’s foreign policy machinery is under the direct control of the prime minister.10 Diplomatic colleagues of the Hungarian representatives in Brussels know that the country’s negotiating positions are micromanaged in Budapest.11 Other countries, such as Italy and Finland, have chosen to rely on the credibility of career diplomats to navigate the Brussels machinery, preferring compromise over confrontation and isolation. For a long time, European politicians and EU institutions have assumed the radical right could be contained. Now, the challenge of the radical right needs to be addressed more seriously. Just as this phenomenon has eroded democracy and the rule of law in some EU member states, so foreign policy may become affected at a time when collective action is most needed to address international issues. As the radical right challenges the EU’s attempts to navigate a dangerous world, European politics can no longer afford complacency.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Migration, European Union, Democracy, and Far Right
- Political Geography:
- Europe, France, and Germany
795. Exploring Law Enforcement Hacking as a Tool Against Transnational Cyber Crime
- Author:
- Gavin Wilde and Emma Landi
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- In terms of revenue, 2023 will go down as a record-breaking year for ransomware, with over a billion dollars in payments going to hackers.1 The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reports a record $12.5 billion lost to cyber crime more broadly over the course of that year.2 As the quantities of affected users and organizations, payoff amounts, critical services, and pilfered sensitive data continue to rise, Western capitals have in recent years come to treat transnational cyber crime as a major national security concern. Because cyber criminals often operate from third countries where prosecution or extradition are unlikely, policymakers often look to military and intelligence services as the best (or only) entities capable of operationally disrupting cyber crime syndicates. Yet another growing trend challenges this notion: Western law enforcement agencies (LEAs) also have been expanding their own abilities to cross both technical and national boundaries to take on cyber criminals. This trend is creating new opportunities and challenges for both domestic and international cyber policy.
- Topic:
- Crime, Science and Technology, Law Enforcement, and Cybersecurity
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
796. South Africa’s Cyber Strategy Under Ramaphosa: Limited Progress, Low Priority
- Author:
- Joe Devanny and Russell Buchan
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- During the decades of apartheid, South Africa was an international pariah. Since the country transitioned to majority rule in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) has dominated politics, and the ANC has itself transitioned from a national liberation movement to a party of government. Domestically, South African cyber strategy should be seen as part of the ANC’s wider political challenge of trying to deliver economic growth, development, and prosperity. Over thirty years, the ANC has struggled to deliver on this agenda in a profoundly unequal society with infrastructure and institutions that have weakened particularly over the past fifteen years. Alongside confronting domestic challenges, the ANC has also tried to reshape South Africa’s global role. This was perhaps most visible under its first president, Nelson Mandela (1994–1999), but it was arguably pursued most systematically under Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki (1999–2008). This reorientation of South Africa in the world was an ambitious and complex project, the foundations of which were the country’s leading role in its region and continent as well as its ties within the wider Global South. The project entailed tensions between the progressive promotion of human rights and freedoms, on the one hand, and the cultivation of instrumental relations with authoritarian and repressive states, on the other. These tensions continue to affect South African foreign policy, including its cyber diplomacy. South Africa identifies cybersecurity as a key national priority and has to this end adopted a national cybersecurity strategy and established a military Cyber Command. The reality, however, is that other issues have been consistently ranked above cybersecurity, such as addressing corruption, poverty, racial and social injustice, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Cybersecurity has therefore not been seen as a high priority by successive South African governments. This has left Cyber Command underresourced and unmotivated. This deprioritization means that South Africa is unlikely to emerge as a prominent military or intelligence cyber power anytime soon. The wider lack of national prioritization will also make it harder for so-called like-minded states—which are bound together by a mutual respect for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law—to form an effective partnership with South Africa on the topic of cybersecurity. South Africa’s approach to international cyber governance debates has been cautious and noncommittal, reflecting cyber diplomacy’s relatively low priority in its national strategy. What position South Africa takes in cyber debates is, however, of keen interest to the international community. An important question is whether South Africa will support the existing multistakeholder approach to cyber governance that is championed by like-minded states or join China and Russia in their efforts to recalibrate this approach and push for greater state control over cyberspace. Indeed, under President Cyril Ramaphosa, South Africa has not yet published its national position explaining how international law applies to cyberspace. A related question is whether South Africa will join like-minded states in elaborating how existing international law applies to cyberspace or side with China and Russia to campaign for new, bespoke international law (for example, treaties) to regulate this domain. When examining these questions, it is important to recognize the context of the ANC’s long-standing ties with Russia, both during its thirty years in government and in its previous decades struggling for national liberation. This is helpful for understanding South Africa’s interactions with Brazil, Russia, India, and China (which form the BRICS bloc with South Africa) and forecasting its future positions in cyber governance debates. For example, South Africa has been reluctant to unambiguously condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and it appears to have supported Moscow by covertly supplying it with weapons. In the longer term, South Africa’s positions in cyber diplomacy debates will likely be shaped by trends in both domestic politics—such as the ANC’s waning electoral performance—and the success of digital development. In this context, it is perhaps advisable for like-minded states, such as the United States, to focus on cyber capacity-building assistance and ensure that these efforts play into the wider development agenda in South Africa.
- Topic:
- Corruption, Poverty, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Democracy, and Racial Justice
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Iran, and South Africa
797. The Buildup to a Crisis: Current Tensions and Future Scenarios for Tunisia
- Author:
- Ishac Diwan, Hachemi Alaya, and Hamza Meddeb
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- Tunisia has been living beyond its means since 2011. External support and credit flowed into the country after the 2010–2011 uprising to support its nascent democracy, but this funding ended up largely financing a consumption boom that is unsustainable. To make matters worse, macroeconomic and political instability have begun to deeply harm the country’s productive capacity. The risk of a serious financial crisis has risen and corrective action is needed to ward it off. Tunisia’s political system should be able to avoid such catastrophic outcomes. Most reasonable people agree that the risks are rising and that something needs to be done. However, the disagreement is over magnitude, timing, and the type of program required to address the country’s problems. A hard economic adjustment risks unleashing a sociopolitical crisis. Not engaging in a correction, however, may well engender a future economic meltdown. Buying time is easiest politically, but it often means only postponing the crisis, leading to an even larger explosion. The challenge is to find the narrow path to escape a crisis by generating confidence in a national program that is politically acceptable and that can lead to a brighter future. Faced with these negative dynamics—the lack of sustainability and economic regression—economic agents might not merely adjust to the new normal. Instead, they might try to push the burden elsewhere in the economy and by so doing unleash more destructive forces. Think of society, with its networked organizations, as a hydraulic system. As pressure mounts, weaker parts of the network are at risk. Pushing pressure out from one part, instead of addressing the root cause of the problem, only leads to more pressure on other parts. Ultimately, the system will burst at its most vulnerable point. Typically, deterioration is not linear. Pressure builds up in invisible ways until the system explodes in a generalized crisis. There are several ways in which this can happen: foreign exchange reserves are used up slowly until a run takes place and the currency collapses; financing the state’s losses drains the private sector, reducing investment, until there is a collapse in growth; taxes are raised or services reduced, or both, leading to a social explosion; fiscal losses are financed with new loans (or arrears) until creditors dry up, and printing money remains the only solution, leading to hyperinflation; or banks keep lending to the state until depositors lose confidence in the banking sector and there is a bank run. What is destroyed will have to be rebuilt from scratch at great cost. It is in this context that Carnegie’s new Tunisia Sustainability Lab is beginning its work. The objective is twofold. First, the lab will monitor the risks ahead and alert the public about developments. It will do so by preparing a regular scorecard of Tunisia’s economic, financial, fiscal, external, and sociopolitical domains. Second, the lab will track proposals advanced by national and international parties on possible pathways to progress, reporting on and analyzing initiatives to avoid the worst of them. So far, several International Monetary Fund (IMF) proposals have been rejected by the Tunisian authorities. There are alternative proposals, some outlined by civil society actors, but they have not materialized. To support social dialogue, we will highlight the various initiatives and try to evaluate their impact. We will also develop scenarios to assess macroeconomic trends, which we will update over time.
- Topic:
- Crisis Management, Macroeconomics, IMF, and Economic Crisis
- Political Geography:
- North Africa and Tunisia
798. Tracing the Roots of China’s AI Regulations
- Author:
- Matt Sheehan
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- In 2021 and 2022, China became the first country to implement detailed, binding regulations on some of the most common applications of artificial intelligence (AI). These rules formed the foundation of China’s emerging AI governance regime, an evolving policy architecture that will affect everything from frontier AI research to the functioning of the world’s second-largest economy, from large language models in Africa to autonomous vehicles in Europe. U.S. political leaders often warn against letting China “write the rules of the road” in AI governance. But if the United States is serious about competing for global leadership in AI governance, then it needs to actually understand what it is competing against. That requires examining the nuts and bolts of both China’s AI regulations and the policy process that shaped them. This paper is the second in a series breaking down China’s AI regulations and pulling back the curtain on the policymaking process shaping them. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese government started that process with the 2021 rules on recommendation algorithms, an omnipresent use of the technology that is often overlooked in international AI governance discourse. Those rules imposed new obligations on companies to intervene in content recommendations, granted new rights to users being recommended content, and offered protections to gig workers subject to algorithmic scheduling. The Chinese party-state quickly followed up with a new regulation on “deep synthesis,” the use of AI to generate synthetic media such as deepfakes. Those rules required AI providers to watermark AI-generated content and ensure that content does not violate people’s “likeness rights” or harm the “nation’s image.” Together, these two regulations also created and amended China’s algorithm registry, a regulatory tool that would evolve into a cornerstone of the country’s AI governance regime. Contrary to popular conception in the rest of the world, China’s AI governance regime has not been created by top-down edicts from CCP leadership. President Xi Jinping and other top CCP leaders will sometimes give high-level guidance on policy priorities, but they have not been the key players when it comes to shaping China’s AI regulations. Instead, those regulations have been the product of a dynamic and iterative policymaking process driven by a mix of actors from both inside and outside the Chinese party-state. Those actors include mid-level bureaucrats, academics, technologists, journalists, and policy researchers at platform tech companies. Through a mix of public advocacy, intellectual debate, technical workshopping, and bureaucratic wrangling, these actors laid the foundations for China’s present and future AI regulations. This paper traces the progression of these regulations through the “policy funnel” (see figure 1) of Chinese AI governance. For both recommendation algorithms and deep synthesis rules, the initial spark for the regulation came from long-standing CCP concerns about the creation and dissemination of online content. For the former, the rise of the algorithmically driven news app Toutiao threatened the CCP’s ability to set a unified narrative and choose which stories are pushed to readers. In the case of deep synthesis, online face swap videos grabbed the attention of the Chinese public and led government regulators to consider the threat of deepfakes. Over the course of 2017–2020, these concerns made their way through China’s bureaucracy. Regulators took a series of stopgap measures in specific applications, while also tasking policy analysts and government-adjacent technical organizations with exploring different regulatory interventions.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Governance, Regulation, and Artificial Intelligence
- Political Geography:
- China, East Asia, and Asia
799. The risk of artificial intelligence: China edition
- Author:
- Filip Jirouš
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for the Opening and Development of Latin America (CADAL)
- Abstract:
- We should be worried about China’s AI capacities, not only because it enhances the powers of the Party-state, but also because it is exporting its population control technology and policy abroad.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Governance, Authoritarianism, Surveillance, Artificial Intelligence, Social Control, and Threat Assessment
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
800. “Condemned to Sacrifice” in the Shadow of Argentina’s Vaca Muerta
- Author:
- Patricia Rodríguez
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
- Abstract:
- From Patagonia, an environmental activist discusses her community’s struggle against a new oil pipeline and the threats of expanding extractivism in their territory.
- Topic:
- Environment, Oil, Pipeline, and Activism
- Political Geography:
- Argentina, South America, and Patagonia