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17381. From the Publisher

Author:
Larry Greenfield
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of International Security Affairs
Institution:
Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
Abstract:
No abstract is available.

17382. What Lies Beneath the "Arab Spring"

Author:
Reva Bhalla
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of International Security Affairs
Institution:
Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
Abstract:
More than a year has passed since the fall of the region's most stalwart Arab leader unleashed a current of dissent throughout the Arab world. That unrest, which spread from the Maghreb to the Arabian Peninsula, was simplistically treated in the media as an organic expression of liberal democracy that seemingly had the power to knock off Arab authoritarians one by one. Today, however, the initial euphoria over the so-called “Arab Spring” has predictably given way to disillusionment. After sacrificing the Ben Ali regime, Tunisia's army and security establishment stand ready to intervene should the country's Islamist-filled legislature overstep its boundaries in challenging the relics of the ancien régime. In Egypt, many forget (or fail to realize altogether) that the military establishment exploited the demonstrations to destroy Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's dynastic succession plan. Even as it seeks more creative maneuvers to rule behind what is expected to be an enfeebled parliament, the Egyptian military elite will remain the ultimate arbiter of the state for the foreseeable future. In Libya, after a rare NATO-led military intervention played the instrumental role of driving Gaddafi and his family from power, the once-celebrated rebel forces are again being viewed as a ragtag assortment of militias vying for the spoils of war in the absence of a legitimate, much less democratic, political authority. In Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh has given up his presidential title for now under a Saudi-mediated power-sharing agreement with his rivals. Still, there is little to hide the fact that Saleh's regime, now led by his close family members, remains entrenched in the security, political and economic spheres of the state. Meanwhile, embattled Arab leaders are thankful for the distraction Syria has created as the latest flashpoint in the Middle East. Just as the Assad regime has proven unable to stamp out its domestic opposition, so too have Syria's still fractious, outgunned and outnumbered opposition forces been unable to overwhelm a largely united Alawite-dominated security and intelligence apparatus. Barring a foreign military intervention—something that no military power, particularly the United States, seems keen on—the Syrian regime can endure for some time to come, even as it becomes all the more dependent on Iran for its survival. The mainstream narrative regarding the Arab unrest has by and large failed to anticipate these developments. There is little predictive value in starting with an assumption that all demonstrations will lead to revolutions, and all revolutions to liberal democracies. Geopolitical context must also be applied. In particular, there are three underlying trends that began developing well before the start of the Arab unrest—and which can help to explain what has happened over the past year, and what to expect going forward.
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Arabia, Syria, Egypt, and Arabian Peninsula

17383. Morocco's Momentum

Author:
J. Peter Pham
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of International Security Affairs
Institution:
Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
Abstract:
Amid the upheaval that swept across the Middle East and North Africa since the dramatic December 2010 suicide of Mohamed Bouazizi, a 26-year-old Tunisian street vendor, ignited long pent-up frustration with the regimes across the region, Morocco has stood out as an exception. Not only has the kingdom avoided both revolutionary tumult and violent repression, but while their neighbors were still struggling to come to terms with the so-called “Arab Spring,” Moroccans adopted a new constitution and elected a new government (albeit one led for the first time in the country's history by an Islamist party). The question now is whether this extraordinarily peaceful transformation is sustainable, and, if it is, what the implications might be for the region as a whole. Given the material reasons its people might have for grievance, Morocco was—at least superficially—a likelier candidate for revolutionary upheaval than its North African neighbors. In fact, on certain indices, Moroccans were indeed worse off than the citizens of any other country in the Maghreb. At the beginning of 2011, GDP per capita (purchasing power parity) in the kingdom was, respectively, just under half of what it was in Tunisia, three-fourths of what it was in Egypt, one-third of what it was in Libya, and two-thirds of what it was in Algeria. While the literacy rate in Morocco has been improving substantially in recent years, it still hovers at just above 50 percent, with women making up an overwhelming majority of those unable to read or write. Overall, the average Moroccan woman can expect to have six fewer years of schooling than her Tunisian sister and two years less than her Egyptian sister. Additionally, Morocco has a higher infant mortality rate and a lower life expectancy than any of the other four North African states.1 So why didn't Moroccans revolt against a system that has so clearly left them behind their neighbors? It was not that they were unaware of the protests: satellite dishes are ubiquitous even in the poorest areas, virtually every Moroccan adult has a mobile phone, and the country has one of the most technologically advanced Internet services, both cable and wireless, in Africa. Rather, other factors were at play.
Political Geography:
Middle East, Spain, North Africa, and Morocco

17384. Egypt's Perfect Economic Storm

Author:
David P. Goldmann
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of International Security Affairs
Institution:
Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
Abstract:
A year after the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak, Egypt's economic crisis has become a uniquely severe event. Markets are now forecasting a devaluation of Egypt's currency by about two-thirds, as capital flight and an enormous structural trade deficit exhaust the country's foreign exchange reserves. With perhaps half of Egypt's population living on $2 per day, a major devaluation would price basic necessities out of the reach of tens of millions of people, despite the country's extensive (if inefficient) system of subsidies. The crisis seems uncontainable; Egypt's central bank appears to have exhausted its capacity to borrow from the domestic market, and is at odds with prospective foreign donors. As a result, Egypt now faces a financial collapse similar to those in over-indebted Latin American countries during the 1980s and 1990s, except with a crucial difference: the Latin Americans are all food exporters, while Egypt imports half its domestically consumed foodstuffs. The difference between Egypt and a Latin American banana republic is the bananas. This is an unprecedented state of affairs, a perfect economic storm. Egypt imports half its caloric consumption and is the world's largest importer of wheat. Economic collapse will “transform a peaceful revolution into a hunger revolution,” the second-in-command of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood warned on February 3rd.1 After months of refusing to bargain with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Egypt's government has begun negotiations for a $3.2 billion loan, or less than the amount of capital flight in December alone. But the involvement of the IMF has done little to reassure Egyptian investors. And on February 11, 2012, Egypt's Finance Minister said that his country would need $11 billion in external aid.2 Moreover, as of this writing, Egypt's insistence on prosecuting American democracy activists threatens to shut off American aid at a critical moment. It is possible that Egypt's leaders have abandoned hope of forestalling the crisis and are directing their energies instead toward finding a foreign entity to blame. Even under the most benign political conditions, though, it is unlikely that the West or the Gulf States would offer Egypt aid on the scale required to prevent a crisis. Unlike other countries threatened by famine, Egypt's requirements simply are too great for the rest of the world to shoulder for an extended period of time. Its governance, moreover, is so corrupt that its capacity to use foreign aid is in doubt. The most likely outcome is a humanitarian catastrophe too large for the rest of the world to ameliorate, and a political outcome too chaotic to permit large-scale humanitarian intervention, like Somalia. An implicit assumption of public policy is that all problems have solutions. Egypt appears to be an outstanding exception, a major nation in existential crisis for which no solution will be found.
Topic:
Markets
Political Geography:
America, Latin America, Egypt, and Somalia

17385. Assad's Cruel Calculus

Author:
Yehuda Blanga
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of International Security Affairs
Institution:
Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
Abstract:
On January 31, 2011, at the height of the protests in Egypt, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad gave an interview to the Wall Street Journal. He spoke of how he was reading his country's political map correctly. He said he would soon announce reforms—because, in this day and age, Arab leaders must match their aspirations to the will of the people. Assad also declared that Syria was different from Egypt, and that, thanks to his anti-American and anti-Israeli stance, his position was better than Mubarak's. His policy, the Syrian president said, brought him the support of the Arab street in general and of the Syrian street in particular. Though the interview was clearly detached from reality, Assad was correct in one respect: Syria is not Egypt. February 2012 marked the first anniversary of the protests and popular uprising in Syria, and yet the conflict between Assad and his own people rages on with no end in sight. So why has the Assad regime managed to weather the sustained domestic uprising of the past year—and so successfully thwarted the discontent that claimed its counterparts in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya? The answers lie in the unique dynamics of Syrian society, and the vested political stakeholders now working diligently to preserve the Assad regime's grip on power.
Political Geography:
Syria, Egypt, and Tunisia

17386. Flunking the Syria Test

Author:
Matthew RJ Brodsky
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of International Security Affairs
Institution:
Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
Abstract:
With the Syrian uprising now past its one-year anniversary, it's long past time to take stock of the carnage. More than 7,000 people have been killed to date by the Assad regime, as it has unleashed war on its own people. The spark that lit the fire was an errant one. On March 6, 2011, state security forces arrested 15 teenagers for spray painting anti-regime graffiti on a wall in the southern city of Deraa. Their continued detention sparked massive demonstrations in the city, and in turn were met by the regime's brutal crackdown using live fire and tear gas. By the time the teenagers were released, the flashpoints between the Syrian security services and the protesters had already claimed many lives. This began the cycle of funerals which became rallying points for further protests—and further regime violence. The anti-regime opposition began as a peaceful protest against a dictatorship. President Bashar al-Assad's brutal response—including the arrest and torture of regime opponents, the indiscriminate shelling of cities, and the cutoff of escape routes to Turkey and Lebanon for civilian refugees—has pushed the opposition to respond with force. Meanwhile, conventional wisdom in Washington and in European capitals is that the Syrian regime is doomed and that it is only a matter of time before Assad is removed from power. But these optimistic assessments are dangerously flawed. Despite Western sanctions and other punitive measures levied to date, the Assad regime as of this writing continues to maintain its grip on the four pillars of Syrian power: the unity of the Alawites; supremacy of the Ba'ath Party; supremacy of the al-Assad clan; and Alawite dominance over the military and intelligence apparatus.
Political Geography:
Syria

17387. Rise of the Maliki Regime

Author:
Joel D. Rayburn
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of International Security Affairs
Institution:
Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
Abstract:
One year into the “Arab Spring,” it must be said that Iraq has bucked the prevailing trend in the Arab world. While grassroots movements in half a dozen other Arab countries have dismantled or shaken authoritarian regimes, a new one is being built in Iraq. During the revolutionary year of 2011, the government of Prime Minister Nuri Maliki consolidated its power, violently suppressing a popular protest movement and cracking down on political rivals at home, while intervening in two “Arab Spring” crises abroad. In doing so, the Maliki government has created a high risk of blowback from its foreign policy initiatives, while doing little to address the underlying causes of domestic Iraqi unrest, which will continue to fester. In Iraq today, it is increasingly appropriate to speak not of the Iraqi government, or of a Shi'a-dominated government, but rather of a Maliki regime. The “Malikists”—or, in Arabic, the “Malikiyoun”—are the newly-dominant force in Iraqi politics, an analog to the “Saddamists” or “Saddamiyoun” that Iraqis once knew. These are the officials and operators who have enabled Prime Minister Maliki to consolidate control of state power and gradually marginalize other major political blocs while doing so. On an individual level, the Malikiyoun do not really represent Maliki's Da'wa party. In the innermost circle, the Malikiyoun are instead composed of Maliki's family and personal advisors, both official and unofficial. Those Malikiyoun who do hail from Da'wa tend to be “orphans”: Da'wa members who have no independent base of their own in the party or in the larger movement that spawned it. The Malikiyoun also include a sizeable contingent of former Ba'athists, some of whom once worked directly for Saddam or other senior leaders in the old regime. These Ba'athists-turned-Malikiyoun are especially common in the intelligence services and among Maliki's political generals, who were almost all formerly high-ranking officers in Saddam's army. In sectarian terms, the Malikiyoun are majority Shi'a, and exhibit clear favoritism toward their sect along with extreme distrust, sometimes crossing into paranoia, toward Sunnis and the Ba'ath. But they are not driven first and foremost by Shi'a sectarian interests. In fact, they include Sunnis, Kurds, and a few other minorities among their ranks. Though the Malikiyoun will certainly play the Shi'a sectarian card when it serves their political purposes, they are just as ready to suppress Shi'a opponents as Sunni ones. Nor are the Malikiyoun Iranian puppets, though they are, for the present, aligned with the Iranian regime's foreign policy in the region. As a result, the Maliki regime behaves as a Shi'a sectarian power in the broader region to a greater extent than they do inside Iraq. At the same time, the Malikiyoun are distrustful of Iranian intentions toward Maliki and his government, and this has led them to try to preserve a relationship with the United States, in order to balance what would otherwise be dominant Iranian influence. The Malikiyoun are not motivated by a shared ideology. They are driven, instead, by the acquisition and holding of power, and above all are deeply committed to keeping Prime Minister Maliki in power. The common characteristic among all Malikiyoun is that their power derives entirely from their association with Maliki. If he were to fall from power, none of them would have anywhere to go, and this makes them more committed to him than any ideologue could be. Steadily, since 2008, the Malikiyoun have enabled the Prime Minister to neutralize, one by one, the checks and balances the Iraqi constitution was meant to enshrine to prevent just such a consolidation of power.1 Over the past three years, Iraq's independent commissions, armed forces, intelligence services, and judiciary have come under the formal or de facto control of the Prime Minister's office. The Malikiyoun have placed heavy emphasis on the coercive arms of the state and can now be found in the highest levels of the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and intelligence apparatus. They can also be found atop the Iraqi Special Operations Forces and police commandos that now answer directly to the Prime Minister's office and have coalesced into a new set of coup-proofing forces akin to Saddam's Special Republican Guard. As they have gained control of these arms of the government, the Malikiyoun have gradually purged political opponents or independents from many key government positions. In addition, practically all major military, security, and intelligence appointments are now made directly by the Prime Minister's Office, without confirmation by the Iraqi parliament. This, then, is the Iraqi regime that happened to be in power during the historic events of 2011.
Political Geography:
Arab Countries

17388. Turkey's Moment of Truth

Author:
Joshua W. Walker and Nora Fisher Onar
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of International Security Affairs
Institution:
Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
Abstract:
Half a year after sweeping national elections for the third consecutive time, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is unrivaled on Turkey's domestic political scene and making ever more of an impression on the international front. In Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the party has a forceful “man of the people”; in Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, it has a grand strategist who has offered a Turkey long plagued by an identity crisis a framework through which to make sense of the country's multi-dimensional profile. However, Turkey's newfound confidence, in tandem with the attempt to reframe and reposition, also has upset a familiar pattern of regional interactions. This has perturbed many observers accustomed to assessing Turkey's behavior through the prism of its convergence with—or divergence from—U.S. and EU policies and preferences. What can we expect from a more assertive Turkey in the wake of the Arab revolutions as the status quo in the region at large is being reconfigured? The answer is critical. At best, Ankara stands poised to play a leadership role in the region. At the very least, Turkey can be a game-changing “swing” state in the rapidly unfolding geopolitical changes in the region. Turkey's changing profile in a transforming Middle East is not necessarily detrimental to the West. Rather, Turkey's new approach could represent an important asset to its European and American partners. Yet promise does not translate into practice automatically. As U.S. Secretary of State Clinton reminded her Turkish audience on a trip to Turkey in July, “Turkish democracy is a model because of where you came from and where you are. That doesn't mean you don't have work to do.” In the emerging realities of the new Middle East, Turkey's ability to deliver on that promise hinges on its consistent pursuit of democratization at home and a principled foreign policy that puts authoritarian rivals in the region to shame.
Political Geography:
Turkey

17389. How Saudi Arabia Has Survived—So Far

Author:
Jonathan Schanzer and Steven Miller
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of International Security Affairs
Institution:
Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
Abstract:
On December 17, 2010, the self-immolation of Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi, who was protesting the confiscation of his wares and harassment by the country's authorities, touched off mass protests that brought about the shocking exodus of dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali on January 14th. Across the Middle East, the masses celebrated the drama in Tunisia as a step toward democracy. Indeed, it was the first time that mass protests forced an Arab leader from office. By January 25th, hundreds of thousands of protesters gathered in Egypt's Tahrir Square, also calling for the end of Hosni Mubarak's regime. At the same time, protest movements sprouted in Jordan, Libya, Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen. Media commentators called it the “Arab Spring.” For the Saudi royal family, looking to preserve their autocratic state, this was the dead of winter. They watched events unfold and waited in fear. Would Saudi Arabia's population take to the streets? In short, the answer was no. Saudi Arabia remained remarkably quiescent during the first year of the Arab protests. Quite by accident, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies was monitoring Saudi social media during this time for another study (analyzing the ideas and influence of Saudi clerics online). What follows is an account, informed by both social media and more traditional sources, of how the Saudis dodged the proverbial bullet during the 2011 Arab uprisings, but may yet face challenges in their wake.
Political Geography:
Saudi Arabia

17390. Learning from the "Arab Spring"

Author:
Lawrence J. Haas
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of International Security Affairs
Institution:
Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
Abstract:
The growing turmoil of the “Arab Spring”—the populist awakening that spread like a brushfire across the Middle East and North Africa after a desperate fruit peddler in Tunisia set himself afire in December of 2010—can shake the optimism of even the most enthusiastic human rights promoter. As of this writing, populist uprisings have toppled dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. But Egypt's government remains in a leadership tug-of-war between its military and Islamist parties, while in Libya rebel militias control the streets and the government's interim leaders still must establish their legitimacy, write a new constitution, and hold elections. Autocrats in Syria and Bahrain continue the brutal crackdowns on their respective populations, with the slaughter in Syria in particular reaching unspeakable levels. That experts wonder whether the “Arab Spring” is more accurately an “Arab Winter” or “Islamist Spring” reflects the uncertainty surrounding the region's future. For the United States, the Greater Middle East has long presented a host of tricky challenges. It is home to most of the world's oil, on which the U.S. and global economies are so dependent; a dangerous theocracy in Iran that seeks nuclear weapons, is expanding the range of its ballistic missiles, and has killed U.S. troops directly and indirectly in Afghanistan and Iraq; the world's most active state sponsors of terrorism in Iran and Syria; and a vital U.S. ally in Israel that is surrounded by states and terrorist groups seeking its destruction and is facing cooler relations with post-Mubarak Egypt and increasingly Islamist Turkey. In the short term, the United States must protect its vital interests by navigating the economic, military, and diplomatic landmines that these challenges present. Longer term, the challenge is quite different: to promote freedom and democracy across the region (just as the United States has promoted freedom and democracy in every other region in recent decades). That's because a freer, more democratic Greater Middle East would benefit America in myriad ways. Liberal democracies do not tend to sponsor terrorism, so a freer, more democratic region would lessen the threats to the United States and its allies. Meanwhile, new free-market economies would provide new trade and investment opportunities for U.S. businesses, generating more prosperity back home. For Washington, the question is how to get from here to there—how to support democratic forces over the long term without compromising U.S. interests in the short term. That is no easy task. The answer, however, lies not in reducing our efforts to promote freedom and democracy as a result of regional turmoil and retreating to the relative safety of “stability.” Instead, it hinges on understanding that change is coming to this volatile region whether we like it or not—and that a deft combination of savvy diplomacy, targeted economic and technical assistance, and (when necessary) military power can nudge it in the right direction.
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, North Africa, and Tunisia