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1441. Containing the Containment: Using Art. 16 ASR to Overcome Accountability Gaps in Delegated Migration Control

Author:
Almut Möller
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Goettingen Journal of International Law
Institution:
The Goettingen Journal of International Law
Abstract:
When the European Court of Human Rights found Italy responsible for push-backs on the high seas in Hirsi Jamaa based on Italy’s effective control over the individuals, it simultaneously solidified the concept of jurisdiction as a prerequisite of human rights obligations and provided States with deeper knowledge on how to avoid responsibility. Since then, instead of pushing the migrants back themselves, destination States increasingly delegate the task of migration control to third States. Under the guise of “capacity building”, they fund, train, and equip third States to exercise containment measures and carry out pull-backs. By way of bilateral agreements, destination States remain in control of the migration flow while avoiding any direct contact with the migrants that would trigger their human rights obligations. One example for this is the Italian-Libyan cooperation under the 2017 Memorandum of Understanding, which was renewed in 2020. Migrants intercepted by Libya are systematically detained in prisons under horrific conditions, which is in clear violation of their human rights. The present article explores ways to allocate responsibility on destination States for their involvement in those human rights violations notwithstanding the lack of jurisdiction. In particular, the article deals with the question whether the general international law of State responsibility is applicable alongside international human rights law. Responsibility for complicity, as lined out in Art. 16 of the Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts, is compared to the concept of due diligence obligations in international human rights law, dismissing the claim that the latter poses lex specialis. Subsequently, Art. 16 ASR’s substantive requirements are applied to the case study in order to test the provision’s capability to overcome the accountability gap.
Topic:
Human Rights, International Law, Migration, Accountability, and European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
Political Geography:
Europe, Libya, and Italy

1442. Nigerien Law 2015-36: How a New Narrative in the Fight Against Smugglers Affects the Right to Leave a Country

Author:
Sarah Isabel Pfeiffer
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Goettingen Journal of International Law
Institution:
The Goettingen Journal of International Law
Abstract:
In 2015, the Republic of the Niger adopted an anti-migrant smuggling law (Law 2015-36) with direct involvement of the European Union (EU). Since then, concerns have been raised that this law constitutes a de facto travel ban for anyone moving northwards from Niger. Rather than addressing the involvement of the EU, this article will focus on the direct obligations of Niger, including those set by regional human rights agreements, as the country where the so-called cooperative migration control takes place. People on the move towards Libya will be a special focus as the most affected by the Nigerien law. First, the Nigerien law and its provisions will be described, in order to then assess whether the law and its application infringe the human right to leave any country including one’s own. Drawing from the findings of non-governmental organizations and the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, this article argues that Law 2015- 36 renders it impossible for non-Nigerien nationals to leave the country without risking their life and safety. Thus, Law 2015-36 infringes the right to leave. The third part explores possible justifications for the law with a focus on the interests of people on the move, the interests of bordering States, and national interests. It finds that Law 2015-36 is disproportionate and, in fact, impairs the essence of the right to leave, resulting in an unjustified interference. The concluding fourth part contains recommendations for possible amendments to the law.
Topic:
Human Rights, International Law, Migration, European Union, Smuggling, and Irregular Migration
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, and Nigeria

1443. Environmental Peacemaking in Somalia: Integrated Climate and Conflict Analysis of the Newly Liberated Areas of Hirshabelle and Galmudug

Author:
Arthur Brochen, Mohamud Mohamed Khadar, Abdirashid Artan, Delphine Virnot, and Albert Martinez
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
European Institute of Peace (EIP)
Abstract:
This analysis assesses both the short and long-term impacts of environment- and climate-related security risks in the Newly Liberated Areas (NLA) of Somalia in Hirshabelle and Galmudug. The analysis had the objectives of (1) understanding the pathways in which environmental and climate risks can affect conflict better and (2) developing actionable recommendations for environmental peacemaking and peacebuilding in these states of Somalia. This integrated climate and conflict analysis employed a methodology based on the conflict analysis guidance from the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the climate security guidance developed by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Environment, Conflict, and Peacemaking
Political Geography:
Africa and Somalia

1444. EU-NATO relations in a new threat environment: Significant complementarity but a lack of strategic cooperation

Author:
Tuomas Iso-Markku
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The relationship between the EU and NATO has traditionally been characterised by a degree of ambiguity and competition but also by attempts at coordination and cooperation. In the context of Russia’s war on Ukraine, the EU and NATO have played crucial and mutually complementary roles, taking advantage of their respective strengths. However, there are also many areas in which their efforts overlap and closer cooperation would be necessary. Thus far, only small steps in this direction have been taken. Ideally, the EU and NATO would work together to develop a more strategic outlook on issues such as developing Europe’s military capabilities, strengthening the security and defence of membership aspirants as well as managing crises beyond EU and NATO territory. Formal relations between the EU and NATO remain complicated. However, there are ways to work around the existing obstacles to EU-NATO cooperation, not least in the capitals of EU and NATO member states.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Europe

1445. Nuclear arms control policies and safety in artificial intelligence: Transferable lessons or false equivalence?

Author:
Eoin Micheál McNamara
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Multiple nuclear arms control treaties have collapsed in recent years, but analogies associated with them have returned as possible inspiration to manage risks stemming from artificial intelligence (AI) advancement. Some welcome nuclear arms control analogies as an important aid to understanding strategic competition in AI, while others see them as an irrelevant distraction, weakening the focus on new frameworks to manage AI’s unique and unprecedented aspects. The focus of this debate is sometimes too narrow or overly selective when a wider examination of arms control geopolitics can identify both irrelevant and valuable parallels to assist global security governance for AI. Great power leaders frequently equate AI advancement with arms racing, reasoning that powers lagging behind will soon see their great power status weakened. This logic serves to intensify competition, risking a spiral into more unsafe AI practices. The global norm institutionalization that established nuclear taboos can also stigmatize unethical AI practices. Emphasizing reciprocal risk reduction offers pragmatic starting points for great power management of AI safety. This research is part of the Reignite Multilateralism via Technology (REMIT) project, funded by the European Union’s Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under Grant Agreement No. 101094228.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Cybersecurity, Economic Policy, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America

1446. NATO as a nuclear alliance : NATO’s nuclear capability and its evolution in the international nuclear order

Author:
Tapio Juntunen, Jyri Lavikainen, Matti Pesu, and Iro Särkkä
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Finland’s entry into NATO marked admission to a nuclear alliance. The aim of this report is to provide an overview of the structure and trends of the international nuclear order, the basics of NATO’s nuclear deterrence and its implementation, and decision-making related to the alliance’s nuclear weapons policy. The study will also assess how Finland can participate in NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy if it so wishes and what effects NATO membership will have on Finland’s arms control policy. Nuclear deterrence constitutes one part of NATO’s deterrence mix, and the alliance views nuclear weapons as the supreme guarantee of its security. U.S. nuclear weapons form the backbone of NATO’s nuclear deterrence, and a small proportion of its nuclear weapons are stationed in allied countries. According to NATO’s statements, the purpose of its nuclear deterrence is to preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter military aggression. NATO has not made any major changes in its nuclear weapons policy in recent years. The key outlines of NATO’s nuclear weapons policy are decided at NATO summits. The alliance has its own senior body for discussion on nuclear weapons: the Nuclear Planning Group. Non-nuclear allies such as Finland have several opportunities to influence and participate in the alliance’s nuclear weapons policy. Importantly, as a member of NATO, Finland can continue its active arms control efforts.
Topic:
NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Alliance, Deterrence, and International Order
Political Geography:
Europe and Finland

1447. Japan’s multi-layered security strategy: Deterrence, coalition-building and economic security

Author:
Bart Gaens
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
At the end of 2022, Japan announced substantial changes to its defence posture with the publication of a new National Security Strategy, a National Defence Strategy, and a Defence Buildup Programme. These included a boosted defence budget and the addition of deterrence through counterstrike capabilities. The policy shift is partly driven by the war in Ukraine, even if it can also be seen in the light of a much longer process of incremental changes. Furthermore, the new defence policy should be viewed in a broader context as part of Japan’s evolving multi-layered security strategy. In addition to deterrence, other central pillars of this multi-layered strategy include coalition-building through alignment, Official Security Assistance for developing countries, a normatively pragmatic engagement with the Global South, and economic security. Japan’s enhanced capabilities and increasingly proactive stance on coalition-building and alignment policy offer opportunities for cooperation, including with the EU and NATO. However, a more robust defence posture is offset by domestic challenges, including institutionalized self-imposed restrictions, political opposition, public opinion, economic and fiscal factors, and a greying population.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Aging, Deterrence, Economic Security, and Coalition
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

1448. China as the second nuclear peer of the United States: Implications for deterrence in Europe

Author:
Jyri Lavikainen
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
China’s nuclear build-up will make it a nuclear peer adversary of the United States in the 2030s. The US will have to deter both Russia and China, as well as other regional adversaries, with forces geared to engage in one major war at a time. If two major wars occur either simultaneously or sequentially, US military capability will be put under great stress. In the event of a second war, the US may find itself in a situation of conventional military inferiority, which it might have to compensate for with greater reliance on nuclear weapons. Since the US remains the ultimate guarantor of European security, its deterrence challenges elsewhere affect European security as well. Thus, even the possibility of war in the Indo-Pacific is a European security issue. European NATO allies can help mitigate the two-peer problem by permanently taking on a greater share of the burden of Europe’s conventional defence. At the same time, the effectiveness of NATO’s nuclear capability must be enhanced. A strategic defeat for Russia in the war in Ukraine would postpone Russia’s ability to pose a military threat to Europe. Ukraine’s NATO membership would further serve to reduce the threat of another major war in Europe.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

1449. The EU and military AI governance: Forging value-based coalitions in an age of strategic competition

Author:
Katja Creutz, Ville Sinkkonen, Mahmoud Javadi, and Michal Onderco
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has increased dramatically, driving discussion on the best way to govern it. While much of the discussion has focused on AI in the civilian domain, its usage in military applications raises distinct ethical and legal questions that actors increasingly seek to address. Governance initiatives are becoming more common, even though strategic competition between major powers remains a challenge. The EU navigates this governance landscape more hesitantly than in the civilian domain with its Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA). More information is needed regarding what kind of regulation, and especially with whom the Union could pursue such avenues. This paper seeks to address these questions by presenting and analyzing results from an expert survey conducted in autumn 2023 by researchers at Erasmus University Rotterdam. It argues that the EU needs to pursue a broad range of cooperation formats to advance its values and interests in the context of military AI. Strategic multilateralism is needed, especially with like-minded states that share values with the Union.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, European Union, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

1450. Foreign investments, de-risking and the EU’s green transition: Mining critical minerals in Finland

Author:
Elina Sinkkonen and Marco Siddi
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The EU is highly dependent on imports of critical and strategic raw materials, both at the extraction and the processing stages. Many of the key supply chains for these materials are dominated by China. In addition, the EU is also dependent on China for many green technologies, such as battery production. The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act (2023) sets concrete targets for reducing dependencies in the green transition by 2030. Considering both the level of existing dependencies in critical and strategic raw materials and the fact that the Act does not provide any new funding instruments, the feasibility of reaching the set targets is questionable. The Finnish mining sector presents an interesting case that illustrates the scarcity of domestic financing. Most metal ore mines in Finland are owned by foreign companies, and similar trends apply to the refining and recycling of materials. If the EU wishes to mitigate the risks of becoming dependent on authoritarian countries, foreign investments in sectors relevant to the green transition should be subject to investment screening. For example, the Finnish Act on the Screening of Foreign Corporate Acquisitions does not cover greenfield investments such as investments in building battery factories.
Topic:
European Union, Mining, Supply Chains, Green Transition, Raw Materials, Critical Raw Materials (CRM), and De-Risking
Political Geography:
Europe and Finland