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321. Unleashing AI´s Transformative Power: Reshaping Productivity, Labor Markets and Policy in the Global Economy

Author:
Antonio Serrano
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
This article explores how artificial intelligence (AI) is reshaping global productivity, labour markets and regulatory landscapes. It examines AI's potential to drive innovation, optimise processes and improve decision-making, while acknowledging associated risks such as job displacement, inequality and ethical concerns. The study highlights policy approaches such as the EU AI Act, emphasising a balanced, human-centred framework. It highlights the need for interdisciplinary collaboration to balance the transformative potential of AI with equitable and sustainable growth, and advocates for adaptive governance that fosters innovation while protecting fundamental rights.
Topic:
Economy, Economic Growth, Artificial Intelligence, and Digital Transformation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

322. Prioritizing Patani? Indonesian Human Security Diplomacy Towards the Issue of Thailand’s Deep South Provinces

Author:
Sidik Jatmika, Zain Maulana, and Ajeng Puspa Marlinda
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
This study examines the reasons for Indonesian President Jokowi's foreign policy not to prioritise human security diplomacy towards the Patani issue, specifically the acceleration of peace talks between the Thai government and representatives of the combatants from Thailand's Deep South provinces. A qualitative methodology was employed, involving 22 in-depth interviews with elite and grassroots participants from Thailand and Indonesia. These included 7 interviews with State actors and 15 with non-State actors, 4 of whom were combatants. The findings are discussed in relation to the existing literature on the diffusion and implementation of Indonesian human security diplomacy in relation to peace issues in Patani. The article argues for a more proactive and effective diplomacy including the strengthening the role of Islamic non-governmental organisations to help resolve security issues and conflicts there.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Human Security
Political Geography:
Indonesia, Thailand, and Southeast Asia

323. The Global Terrorist Threat Forecast in 2025

Author:
Liu Chunlin and Rohan Gunaratna
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
The global terrorist threat remains persistent and pervasive as the world moves into 2025. Armed conflicts from Ukraine to Gaza and destabilisation by both State and non-State actors are redefining international stability. The influence of groups such as Islamic State, al-Qaeda and Iranian-backed militias underscores the enduring risks. Key challenges include geopolitical rivalries, radicalisation and increasingly sophisticated cyber and physical attacks. With the Middle East at the epicentre of escalating tensions and Africa emerging as a new hotspot, coordinated international efforts are essential to prevent and counter threats. States must strengthen cooperation in intelligence, security and strategic foresight to deal with a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous global landscape.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Radicalization, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, Collaboration, Threat Assessment, 2023 Gaza War, Transnational Threats, and Salafi-Jihadism
Political Geography:
Middle East and Global Focus

324. Europe’s next watershed – how liberal Europe should react to Trump 2.0

Author:
Fabian Zuleeg
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
The return of Donald Trump to the White House and his “America first” doctrine inevitably poses a fundamental challenge for the EU. Trump’s second presidency represents a new watershed moment: the policies of the next US administration are not just likely to put Europe at a global disadvantage, they will threaten its core objectives of prosperity, sustainability, security, and democracy. This is why European countries will have to act decisively to safeguard the bloc’s unity and strengthen its autonomy in a changed world. Assuming that a second Trump administration will resemble the first would be a serious error. Trump has become more extreme in his policy positions, while facing fewer constraints and operating in a more favourable international environment. As a result, preparing for a worst-case scenario may be a wise approach. Trump’s adversarial, zero-sum approach to international trade is likely to undermine the structures and processes of multilateral economic governance. Measures such as tariffs also threaten the EU’s growth and competitiveness and risk deepening divisions within the bloc. Global progress towards greater sustainability is certain to suffer. A disengagement on behalf of the US from its leadership role in environmental and climate governance will be a significant setback in these efforts. Should the US turn away from its climate goals, this would send a strong signal to other countries that these objectives are no longer a priority. On security, any potential benefit that a Trump presidency might produce in terms of strengthening EU unity is strongly undermined by his stance on Ukraine, which is set to increase the threat facing Europe from Russia. A US-imposed ceasefire would be no guarantee of lasting peace or security for Ukraine or for Europe. In response, the EU and its members will have to take a much bolder and more proactive role, sharply increasing Europe’s own military capabilities and spending. Policies that signal a tolerance for the use of open and covert force, in violation of international law, will also have profound consequences for global security. Far-right and anti-democratic forces within Europe are likely to be emboldened by an incoming Trump government. His actions to exploit Europe’s political divides are set to put significant pressure on European integration – a project Trump will have no qualms in undermining. The entrenchment and normalisation of Trump’s style of populistic, divisive politics and ‘us against them’ rhetoric risks eroding democratic debate more broadly. His amplification of falsehoods and disinformation will undermine public trust in the US and beyond, and could also boost political figures adopting similar strategies in Europe. There is strong potential for Trump’s anti-establishment narrative to gain further ground in Europe, and Europe’s illiberal, regressive and new-nativist forces will no doubt seek to harness this to increase their power. Should they be successful, there is a very real risk of the EU becoming hollowed-out and ineffectual. In this context, achieving consensus and acting with unity will be a greater challenge than ever for the EU27. Those within the EU who are prepared to take the necessary steps to rise to the challenge posed by Trump may have to explore unconventional forms of cooperation to act effectively. Moving forward in this way poses its own legal and political risks. But with European democracy at stake, it may be the only path to achieving the necessary level of ambition and unity to mount a strong response to Trump 2.0.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Donald Trump, Sustainability, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:
Europe

325. Building Economic Security into Europe’s Clean Energy Agenda: Eight Recommendations for Europe’s Net-Zero Course Correction

Author:
Pawel Swieboda, Georg Riekeles, and Simon Dekeyrel
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
A European consensus may still exist on the end goal of climate neutrality, yet there is no such consensus on the political, economic and social choices required to reach it. Each possible pathway carries a distinct set of costs and trade-offs across the energy trilemma of sustainability, affordability and security. An excessively benign reading of the international environment, political and economic negligence and a lack of sufficient action on key parameters of the trilemma have put Europe on a decarbonisation trajectory of high prices and low security. This has become increasingly untenable. The long-term reliance on Russian natural gas was a fateful symptom of this predicament but is not a stand-alone example. Europe’s situation is currently aggravated by a series of equations that do not compute, with targets being set not matched by the required efforts and investments across core areas of Europe’s ambitions, such as wind, hydrogen, nuclear, net-zero manufacturing and energy efficiency. Europe is, consequently, on paths towards endpoints that are inconsistent with the EU’s Fit for 55 and 2040 climate scenarios. All too often, the EU’s energy choices have been an outcome of inner-EU compromises, rather than a reflection of the long-term strategic approach. All this is happening in a stormy international environment, with President Trump abandoning international cooperation and climate ambitions while China’s overcapacities are taking global economic relations to the brink. Consequences are bound to be dire. Unless yearly energy system investments can be significantly ramped up, suggestions that Europe can no longer pursue its 2050 net-zero objective at the expense of cost competitiveness and economic security will only get stronger. Europe should not abandon its net-zero ambitions, but a significant course correction is required. Building on the former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi’s call for a joint approach to decarbonisation and competitiveness and adding an economic security perspective, this paper proposes eight recommendations for Europe’s net-zero course correction. We argue that the best course of action for Europe is to gain ‘escape velocity’ on the green transition: prioritising cost-effective investments in clean industry and energy infrastructure, which are essential to enable a transition to clean energy. While the competitiveness debate tends to focus on the more immediate ways of activating growth, economic security encompasses a broader, forward looking framework that emphasises resilience. This includes managing risks, reducing dependencies, and preparing for potential disruptions. Staying on track toward achieving net-zero emissions by 2050 must remain Europe’s overarching objective, coupled with a parallel goal of optimising economic value-creation and reducing the cost, uncertainty and risks of the energy transition. EIGHT RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EUROPE’S NET-ZERO COURSE CORRECTION Prioritise and coordinate large-scale investments to achieve ‘escape velocity’ in the energy transition. Set realistic targets and priorities using foresight and analysis recognising the interdependencies between policy levers at EU and national levels. Double down on electrification through proactive technology-neutral supply policies, grid investment, strategic industrial policy and enabling frameworks. Elaborate and implement a dedicated ‘masterplan for energy system flexibility, grid investment and energy storage’. Anchor the Clean Industrial Deal on an ‘economic security yardstick’ involving strategic funding for European ecosystems, enabling infrastructure and necessary shielding. Factor in nuclear power investments as an essential component in Europe’s net-zero scenario. Strengthen single market coordination, price differentiation and investment incentives while expanding long-term contractual solutions. Develop a comprehensive energy system risk management approach.
Topic:
Renewable Energy, Carbon Emissions, Economic Security, and Net Zero
Political Geography:
Europe

326. How to Spend It: European defence for the age of mass precision

Author:
Chris Kremidas-Courtney
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
Europe urgently needs to redefine its defence strategy in response to the United States’ growing disengagement from its transatlantic allies. The suspension of US military assistance to Ukraine and calls for increased European self-reliance have forced policymakers to rapidly reassess how to sustain collective security. The European Union’s ReArm EU plan seeks to mobilise €800 billion in national defence spending to meet these challenges, but investments must be made wisely to prepare for future warfare. Modern warfare has entered into an era of mass precision, where forces can achieve the effects of massed firepower through distributed, AI-enabled, and highly accurate weapons systems. Ukraine’s innovative use of drone swarms and precision strikes against Russian forces has demonstrated this shift. China and the US are also leveraging mass precision to reshape the battlefield, making traditional mass-based warfare increasingly obsolete. However, while armoured vehicles, fighter jets, and ships require new protections, they remain essential when integrated into networked, distributed operations. To prepare for this new strategic reality, Europe must: Invest in mass precision and distributed operations – Prioritise drone warfare, deep-strike capabilities, and networked operations. Accelerate investment in the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA) programme to develop long-range cruise missiles. Build a European command-and-control (C2) system – Reduce reliance on NATO’s US-centric C2 infrastructure. Strengthen Europe’s intelligence capabilities and decision support – Expand European satellite and cyber capabilities and expand analytical capacities. Strengthen air and missile defence – Accelerate the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) and deploy cost effective countermeasures such as more cost effective laser-based systems. Build a European military logistics system – Ensure the ability to sustain forces and ensure rapid troop and equipment mobility within Europe. Train and exercise European forces at scale – Conduct large-scale joint exercises to build readiness. Buy Ukrainian – Integrate Ukrainian defence firms into EU supply chains. Buy European – Reduce dependence on US arms while leveraging UK, Norwegian, Canadian and Turkish defence industries. Build a European nuclear umbrella – France and the UK should explore extended deterrence options to protect all European allies in case of further US withdrawal. Build a European blue-water navy – Strengthen and expand European naval capabilities to protect vital sea lanes in addition to supporting territorial defence. Winning the next war, not the last one Europe can no longer afford slow, bureaucratic and fragmented defence spending—it must accelerate, integrate and innovate in order to defend itself in the event that the United States is unable or unwilling to do so. We don’t just need bigger budgets—we need a better strategy. The future of warfare is mass precision and distributed operations, enabled by AI, and supported by capabilities that enable decision, cyber and information dominance. If Europe invests wisely, it can be a technologically advanced, resilient and autonomous military power while remaining a robust pillar of NATO’s collective security. The hour of Europe is now.
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Weapons, Disengagement, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

327. The e-commerce challenge: Is importing low-value consignments going to become more cumbersome in the EU and the US?

Author:
Anna Jerzewska
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
In the last few months, terms such as e-commerce and de minimis (threshold below which imported goods are not subject to tariffs) have made headlines both in the EU and in the US. The rapid growth of e-commerce exacerbated problems with this exemption both in the US and in the EU. The first problem is lack of control. Only a percentage of commercial goods are subject to physical border checks, and for e-commerce goods this number is even smaller. Then there is the issue of endangering the level-playing field. De minimis benefits consumers and businesses that rely on it, but harms domestic manufacturers and retail outlets that import in bulk (and thus are subject to full customs and product standards and safety requirements). But can the challenges around the rapid growth of e-commerce be solved by the removal of de minimis? And what would be the consequences of removing the exemption? The paper summarises recent attempts and proposals of removing de minimis in the EU and the US and the challenges faced by both administrations. In both cases, e-commerce is still under discussion and it’s not clear what the final solution will look like. However, there are already noticeable differences in approach.
Topic:
European Union, Trade, Imports, and E-Commerce
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

328. Biopower: Securing American Leadership in Biotechnology

Author:
Vivek Chilukuri and Hannah Kelley
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The biorevolution is upon us. Converging breakthroughs in biological sequencing, engineering biology, and machine learning are ushering in an almost science fiction–like world in which humans can manipulate and even design the building blocks of life with increasing sophistication—for good or ill. In this world, cutting-edge biotechnologies will create organs, capture carbon emissions, restore polluted environments, tailor medicines to a person’s genes, and replace vulnerable supply chains for food, fuel, fabrics, and firepower with domestic biobased alternatives. According to one estimate, existing biotechnologies could have a direct economic impact of $4 trillion a year for the next 20 years.1 As innovation continues, the ceiling could be far higher. If next-generation biotechnologies hold great promise, they also come with gathering perils from new bioweapons, intrusive biosurveillance, and the race for biotechnology breakthroughs without adequate safeguards for public health, the environment, and democratic values. For policymakers, the question is not whether the biorevolution has transformative power, but which nation will responsibly harness that power to unlock new tools for defense, health, manufacturing, food security, environmental remediation, and the fight against climate change. No country is better positioned to lead the biorevolution than the United States, but it requires that policymakers act now with swift, ambitious, and far-sighted steps to secure America’s place as the global biopower. The United States enters the biorevolution with formidable tailwinds—an unrivaled innovation ecosystem, world-leading research institutes, unmatched private investment, talent, and a global network of democratic partners and allies. Recent federal investments and an emerging policy framework have fortified U.S. leadership. But in this fast-moving field, settling for gradual progress will guarantee falling behind as competitors like China race to eclipse the United States with ambitions to scale up their biotechnology research, innovation, talent, and infrastructure. To secure America’s place as the global biopower, the Trump administration and Congress should accelerate U.S. tailwinds through greater investment in biotechnology research and infrastructure, especially in sectors beyond health and medicine; expand the pipeline of biotalent; and lead globally to drive biotechnology norms, standards-setting, and responsible adoption. At the same time, policymakers must navigate headwinds that could imperil further progress—specifically, an underdeveloped national biomanufacturing infrastructure; insufficient public and private investment that flows overwhelmingly to biotechnology research and development (R&D) in the health and medical sectors; a lack of uniform federal standards, definitions, and codes; a morass of conflicting policies and regulations; inaccessible and insecure biodata; and low public awareness and trust in emerging and ethically fraught biotechnology applications. This report outlines several recommendations to shore up America’s position as the preeminent biopower, including an investment of $20 billion in new federal funding. Policymakers should view this level of investment as the floor of what it will require to secure U.S. biotechnology leadership. Cutting-edge biotechnologies will create organs, capture carbon emissions, restore polluted environments, tailor medicines to a person’s genes, and replace vulnerable supply chains for food, fuel, fabrics, and firepower with domestic biobased alternatives. Regardless of what U.S. policymakers do, countries around the world are moving swiftly to embrace the biorevolution. The United Kingdom (UK) is driving innovation by concentrating and sharing its biodata through the UK Biobank, which houses the fully sequenced genetic codes of 500,000 people.2 France has invested roughly $9.5 billion through Innovation Santé 2030 to drive biomedical research.3 Japan has committed $3 billion to promote its biotechnology ecosystem.4 South Korea is carving out a niche in digital biotechnology and aims to transition 30 percent of its manufacturing industry to biomanufacturing within a decade.5 If any nation can surpass the United States as the global biopower, it will be China. In its most recent five-year plans, Beijing made explicit its ambition to become a biotechnology “superpower.” It is well on its way. China’s biotechnology leadership has surged on the back of significant public investment, long-term policy prioritization, a massive domestic market, decades of largely unrestricted capital flows, and the amassing of biodata through licit and illicit means.6 China’s concerted biotechnology push has already paid dividends: its scholars rank second in the world for authoring biomedical papers, and the country leads high-impact research in biofuels and biomanufacturing. China’s high-impact research in synthetic biology is more than triple that of the United States, posing a high risk of monopolization.7 Today, China is a global biomanufacturing powerhouse that exports roughly 40 percent of the world’s active pharmaceutical ingredients.8 Now, China aspires to move up the biotechnology value chain with a renewed push to support start-ups, integrate its vast biodata with cutting-edge machine learning tools, and dominate emerging markets for biotechnology with “national champions” such as BGI Group and WuXi Biologics, as it did with Huawei and 5G. China’s ambition to close the gap with the United States should inspire action from policymakers to secure and extend America’s lead. To that end, this report outlines a series of immediate and longer-term recommendations in six key areas for leaders in policymaking and industry.
Topic:
Leadership, Innovation, and Biotechnology
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

329. Averting AI Armageddon: U.S.-China-Russia Rivalry at the Nexus of Nuclear Weapons and Artificial Intelligence

Author:
Jacob Stokes, Colin H. Kahl, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
In recent years, the previous bipolar nuclear order led by the United States and Russia has given way to a more volatile tripolar one, as China has quantitatively and qualitatively built up its nuclear arsenal. At the same time, there have been significant breakthroughs in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, including for military applications. As a result of these two trends, understanding the AI-nuclear nexus in the context of U.S.-China-Russia geopolitical competition is increasingly urgent. There are various military use cases for AI, including classification models, analytic and predictive models, generative AI, and autonomy. Given that variety, it is necessary to examine the AI-nuclear nexus across three broad categories: nuclear command, control, and communications; structural elements of the nuclear balance; and entanglement of AI-enabled conventional systems with nuclear risks. While each of these categories has the potential to generate risk, this report argues that the degree of risk posed by a particular case depends on three major factors: the role of humans, the degree to which AI systems become a single point of failure, and the AI offense-defense balance. As Russia and China increasingly aim to modernize their nuclear arsenals and integrate AI into their militaries, it is essential for policymakers to be aware of the risks posed by the AI-nuclear nexus. Dealing with China and Russia on issues at this nexus is likely to be difficult in the current diplomatic and military context, characterized by increasingly strained bilateral relationships between the United States and both China and Russia, along with an uptick in coordination between Beijing and Moscow. Nonetheless, there are still various steps that U.S. policymakers could take to bolster deterrence and stability with respect to these issues. These include: building knowledge and competency around issues at the AI-nuclear nexus; integrating AI into diplomatic initiatives related to nuclear and other strategic risks, and vice versa; establishing and promoting norms for the safe use of AI in relation to nuclear arsenals and other strategic capabilities; developing policy and technical criteria for assessing exactly how and when to keep humans in the loop on all nuclear-related processes; including AI technologies as a factor in oversight and reviews of the U.S. nuclear arsenal; investing in AI-enabled cyber and space capabilities to enhance defense and resilience, reduce incentives to attack those areas, and mitigate entanglement risks; consulting closely with U.S. allies about how AI will shape extended deterrence calculations related to both nuclear and conventional capabilities; and pursuing a comprehensive set of risk reduction and crisis management mechanisms with China and Russia while recognizing the obstacles to progress. Failing to take these steps could leave the country and the world dangerously exposed to risks and ill-prepared to seize any opportunities arising from the increasingly salient AI-nuclear nexus.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

330. Assessing China’s Nuclear Decision-Making: Three Analytical Lenses

Author:
Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
China’s rapid nuclear buildup is raising questions about how the country makes decisions related to nuclear weapons. This policy brief analyzes that trend by presenting three overarching analytical lenses, or categories of factors, that shape Beijing’s nuclear decision-making: leadership, weapons systems and military organizations, and official policies and doctrine. On leadership, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping likely sees nuclear weapons granting prestige and growing in relevance, but his views on nuclear weapons’ efficacy are less clear. On weapons systems and military organizations, the expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal provides the country’s leaders with new options, which could shift those leaders’ intentions over time. Implementation of those options, though, runs through often-corrupt People’s Liberation Army military organizations. On official policies and doctrine, Beijing possibly sees its professed stance as a country that does not engage in U.S.- and Russian-style arms buildups as a source of diplomatic influence, particularly in the developing world or Global South. Separately, the circumstances where China’s nuclear no-first-use policy would face a true test—for example, during a major Taiwan contingency—are precisely the moments when Beijing would have massive incentives to selectively interpret or simply abandon that policy. In the near term, China’s official nuclear weapons policies will likely stay the same, so the gap between rhetoric and action will grow. A bigger arsenal and more nuclear rhetoric and signaling will, over time, also shape future Chinese coercion campaigns. In response, U.S. policymakers should commission an intelligence assessment of Xi’s views of specific nuclear crises, pressure China to issue more explanation of its nuclear policies and capabilities, and expand information sharing about missile tests on a reciprocal basis. U.S. policymakers should also make an authoritative policy statement on what would constitute China reaching nuclear parity with the United States and counter China’s nuclear buildup using both conventional and nuclear capabilities.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Decision-Making
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America