Search

Begin New Search Topic Radicalization

91. The Rise of Nontraditional Islam in the Urals

Author:
Alexey Malashenko and Alexey Starosin
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
There have been significant changes in the composition and distribution of Russia’s Muslim community during the era of President Vladimir Putin. In particular, as Islam expands in the Ural Federal District, religious and political life there is evolving. Much of this expansion is due to the arrival of Muslim migrants from Central Asia and the Caucasus, and some migrants bring with them religious radicalism—a challenge that requires a more effective official response.
Topic:
Islam, Migration, Politics, and Radicalization
Political Geography:
Russia

92. The Cyber Extremism Orbital Pathways Model

Author:
Omer Ali Saifudeen
Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
The starting premise of this study is that internet-based communications possess unique characteristics that warrant the need to have a discrete pathway model to explain online radicalisation. This online radicalisation pathway model would especially apply to the growing communities of young netizens whose socio-psychological makeup is shaping a ―new normal‖ in the way we exchange information and interact. The proposed Cyber Extremism Orbital Pathways Model (CEOP) describes how online cognitive radicalisation can move towards real-world violent extremism. The model also elucidates the multitude of competing forces in cyberspace that promote or impede such radicalisation and what this means for online counter-radicalisation strategies. The CEOP model is based on inferences made from content and discourse analysis of extremist narratives on the internet and current studies about internet-based communications. The research took into account distinctive factors that made internet-based messaging more persuasive and this includes the effects of crowdsourcing. Finally, the CEOP model suggests how the same persuasive communication strategies used on the internet by extremists can be conversely used to counter online radicalisation.
Topic:
Violent Extremism, Radicalization, and Internet
Political Geography:
Global Focus

93. Mitigating Radicalism in Northern Nigeria

Author:
Michael Olufemi Sodipo
Publication Date:
08-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Ongoing attacks by Boko Haram and other violent Islamist groups coupled with an at times arbitrary response by Nigeria’s security forces have contributed to a deteriorating security situation in the north. Increasingly frequent attacks and bombings also mask longer-running radicalization dynamics. A sustained approach targeting every stage of the radicalization spectrum, from addressing socioeconomic grievances, to cross-cultural peacebuilding initiatives, to rehabilitating radicalized members of violent Islamist groups, as well as a more measured use of force are needed to reverse this broader trend.
Topic:
Radicalization and Political and institutional effectiveness
Political Geography:
Nigeria

94. Edges of Radicalization: Ideas, Individuals and Networks in Violent Extremism

Author:
Scott Helfstein
Publication Date:
02-2012
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
The Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point is pleased to announce the release of a new report entitled “Edges of Radicalization: Ideas, Individuals and Networks in Violent Extremism,” by Scott Helfstein. This paper examines radicalization as a social phenomenon through the behavior of individuals and networks. Violent extremists, individuals pursuing political change through violence, remain committed to striking the U.S. homeland and its interests abroad. It is important to understand how radical ideas spread to counter or contain this immediate and persistent threat. This study argues that the spread of violent extremism cannot be fully understood as an ideological or social phenomenon, but must be viewed as a process that integrates the two forces in a coevolutionary manner. The same forces that make an ideology appealing to some aggrieved group of people are not necessarily the same factors that promote its transfer through social networks of self-interested human beings. This means that there is value in differentiating why radical ideologies resonate among individuals, and how individuals come to adopt and advocate those ideas. This report helps contextualize the current terrorist threat, the role of technology in radicalization, and next steps in decoding radicalization.
Topic:
Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Radicalization, and Networks
Political Geography:
Global Focus

95. Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare

Author:
Christopher Boucek
Publication Date:
09-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In the aftermath of a wave of deadly terrorist attacks that began in 2003, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia launched a wide-ranging counterterrorism campaign. Central to Saudi counterterrorism efforts has been the use of unconventional “soft” measures designed to combat the intellectual and ideological justifications for violent extremism. The primary objective of this strategy is to engage and combat an ideology that the Saudi government asserts is based on corrupted and deviant interpretations of Islam. The impetus for this soft approach came in large part from the recognition that violent extremism cannot be combated through tradition security measures alone. This Saudi strategy is composed of three interconnected programs aimed at prevention, rehabilitation, and postrelease care (PRAC). Although only in operation for the past four years, the Saudi strategy—especially the rehabilitation and counter-radicalization programs—has generated very positive and very intriguing results. To date, recidivist and rearrest rates are extremely low, at approximately 1 to 2 percent. Similar programs designed to demobilize violent extremists and their supporters are increasing in popularity, with a number of countries adopting comparable counter-radicalization programs. Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia have all established rehabilitation and engagement programs, as has the U.S. military through Task Force 134 in Iraq. As such, the importance of understanding the Saudi strategy, and counter-radicalization broadly, is increasing in relevance in the fight against violent radical Islamist extremism
Topic:
Security, Islam, Counter-terrorism, and Radicalization
Political Geography:
Saudi Arabia

96. Bombers, Bank Accounts and Bleedout

Author:
Brian Fishman, Jacob N. Shapiro, Joseph Felter, Peter Bergen, and Vahid Brown
Publication Date:
07-2008
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
This report is the second to assess the demographics, procedures, finances, and leadership of al-Qa`ida’s foreign fighters, especially those currently fighting in Iraq. It analyzes al-Qa`ida in Iraq’s (AQI) operations from spring 2006 to summer 2007 and includes almost 600 AQI personnel records for foreign fighters crossing into Iraq, AQI contracts for suicide bombers, AQI contracts for fighters leaving Iraq, narratives written by al-Qa`ida’s Syrian smugglers, and AQI financial records.
Topic:
Radicalization, Islamic State, Recruitment, and Foreign Fighters
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Syria

97. Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records

Author:
Brian Fishman and Joseph Felter
Publication Date:
01-2007
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
On December 4, 2007 Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, the reputed Emir of al-Qa’ida’s Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), claimed that his organization was almost purely Iraqi, containing only 200 foreign fighters. Twelve days later, on December 16, 2007, Ayman al-Zawahiri urged Sunnis in Iraq to unite behind the ISI. Both statements are part of al-Qa’ida’s ongoing struggle to appeal to Iraqis, many of whom resent the ISI’s foreign leadership and its desire to impose strict Islamic law. In November 2007, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point received nearly 700 records of foreign nationals that entered Iraq between August 2006 and August 2007. The data compiled and analyzed in this report is drawn from these personnel records, which was collected by al-Qa’ida’s Iraqi affiliates, first the Mujahidin Shura Council (MSC) and then the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). The records contain varying levels of information on each fighter, but often include the fighter’s country of origin, hometown, age, occupation, the name of the fighter’s recruiter, and even the route the fighter took to Iraq. The records were captured by coalition forces in October 2007 in a raid near Sinjar, along Iraq’s Syrian border. The data reveals several critical findings: Saudis made up the largest contingent of foreign fighters entering Iraq. Libyans were second and Syrians third. Recent political developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the prevalence of Libyan fighters in Iraq, and evidence of a well-established smuggling route for Libyans through Egypt, suggests that Libyan factions are increasingly important in al-Qa’ida. The Sinjar Records reinforce anecdotal accounts suggesting that al-Qa’ida’s Iraqi affiliates rely on smugglers and criminals—rather than their own personnel—to funnel recruits into Iraq. Many of the foreign fighters entering Iraq arrived with a group from their hometown, suggesting that al-Qa’ida’s recruiters try to attract groups of friends simultaneously. The majority of fighters that listed their occupation before traveling to Iraq were students. Universities have become a critical recruiting field for al-Qa’ida. The Sinjar Records reveal several weaknesses that the United States and other governments can exploit: Al-Qa’ida’s reliance on criminal and smuggling networks exposes it to the greed of mercenaries. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group’s unification with al-Qa’ida and its apparent decision to prioritize providing logistical support to the Islamic State of Iraq is likely controversial within the organization. The Islamic State of Iraq has failed politically because it has been unable to balance the practical demands of its local Iraqi constituency and the religious demands of its foreign supporters. The Syrian and Libyan governments share the United States’ concerns about violent salafi-jihadi ideology and the violence perpetrated by its adherents. The authors assert that the United States may be able to increase cooperation from governments to stem the flow of fighters into Iraq by addressing their concerns about domestic jihadi violence.
Topic:
Radicalization, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Recruitment, and Foreign Fighters
Political Geography:
Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia