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21. New technologies are challenging EU in outer space

Author:
Trine Rosengren Pejstrup
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The increasing commercialisation and militarisation of outer space has intensified geopolitical competition and is re-shaping international relations. Public and private actors are increasingly looking to emerging technologies to gain a technological edge. This brief explores the topic of experimentation with emerging technologies in outer space and why EU decision-makers should address the main risks and implications of this development.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, European Union, Space, Emerging Technology, Militarization, and Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

22. The Next Game Changers: A Priority Innovation Agenda for Global Health

Author:
Cordelia Kenney and Rachel Silverman
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development (CGD)
Abstract:
Over the last century, scientific and technological innovation has led to unprecedented improvements in health outcomes—yet research and development (R&D) investments and progress to address health threats has been uneven. Commercial R&D has focused where investors can expect substantial financial returns: rich countries, the diseases that affect them, and high-tech solutions designed for the richest and most sophisticated systems. Despite supplemental funding from philanthropic and government grants, R&D to address many leading causes of death and disability—especially those that primarily affect low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) or insure against future risk—has been consistently underfunded relative to potential health gain. This implies that many untapped opportunities remain to dramatically improve global health and welfare via biomedical innovation. In this paper, we report the results of a horizon-scanning exercise to source opportunities for global health R&D investment—that is, high-value potential biomedical innovations which are currently underfunded but which could be transformative for health, quality of life, and health security in LMICs and around the world. Drawing from a literature review and expert interviews with researchers, economists, funders, advocates, and implementers, we lay out an expansive and high-promise (though non-comprehensive) biomedical innovation agenda for global health spanning the unfinished MDG agenda; non-communicable diseases; and global health security. We conclude with a discussion of implications for research, funding, and practice.
Topic:
Development, Health, Science and Technology, Innovation, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
Global Focus

23. Securing AI-based Security Systems

Author:
Sandra Scott-Hayward
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Fundamental weaknesses of AI include brittleness, embedded bias, catastrophic forgetting and lack of explainability. Although research is under way to address some of these issues, the adoption of AI techniques and models in security systems exposes potentially critical security systems to weaknesses/vulnerabilities such as these. Adversarial training is one strongly recommended approach to increase the robustness (i.e. reduce the brittleness) of the AI model. In this approach, the training dataset is extended to include adversarial examples representative of potential attacks on the system. However, the implementation of adversarial training is currently ad hoc. Given the evidence of AI weaknesses, the omission of adversarial training and similar hardening techniques for AI-based security systems is unacceptable. Standardised testing and evaluation of AI-based security systems is recommended. From a governance perspective, evidence of adversarial robustness evaluation should be a minimum requirement for the acceptance of an AI-based security system. The production of strong adversarial samples does not account for “black swan” events, i.e. random and unexpected events that have an extreme impact. Given that security systems tend to be designed to detect “old” or “known” types of attack, ways need to be found to manage the occurrence of “new” attacks.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Artificial Intelligence, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
Global Focus

24. Women in AI: Is There a Singapore Model?

Author:
Tamara Nair
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
The 4ᵗʰ Industrial Revolution introduced Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence (AI) to the forefront and very soon, if not already, AI will be embedded in almost all spheres of our lives. While AI technologies like Alexa and Siri have female names and voices, there are very few women involved in developing AI products and services. Is there a model Singapore can offer?
Topic:
Industrial Policy, Artificial Intelligence, Industrialization, Emerging Technology, and Gender
Political Geography:
Asia and Singapore

25. Strengthening a Transnational Semiconductor Industry

Author:
James Lewis
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
If data is the new oil, it could be said that chips are the new steel—a fundamental component of national power similar to the foundational role steel production played in the industrial age. As such, semiconductor chips are a natural focus for government intervention and support to accelerate growth and build secure supply chains. The specific goals for U.S. semiconductor policy are to increase reliability and trust in supply, reinforce all elements of chip-making capacity, and reduce China’s role in the supply chain. Chip production is based on complex, globally distributed, specialized supply chains involving many stages in production, including specialized materials, production equipment, design and related software, fabrication, testing, and packaging. In some stages of production, labor costs are important; in others, it is capital costs because a cutting-edge fabrication plant, or fab, can cost more than $12 billion. Taiwan, South Korea, the United States, Japan, Singapore, and China are the leading chip-producing nations. There are also important facilities (often subsidiaries of a leading producer) in Europe, Southeast Asia, South America, and Israel. This global distribution has led some to push for greater production in the United States, but trying to “reshore” a global supply chain spread across many countries would be counterproductive if the goal is a reliable and more productive supply chain. The problem is China, not global production. The politics of the chip industry are generally favorable to the United States. One leading producer, South Korea, is a treaty ally and faces less risk of disruption from China than does Taiwan. Another leading producer, Japan, is one of the most important U.S. security partners and, with the United States, dominates the production of semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME). ASML, another leading producer of SME, based in the Netherlands, is also an important ally. Singapore, while it would prefer not to be caught in a battle between giants, is also a dependable partner. These countries share democratic values and in many instances are treaty allies. The global distribution of chip-making in countries friendly to the United States is an advantage.
Topic:
Science and Technology, transnationalism, Emerging Technology, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
Global Focus

26. Choking off China’s Access to the Future of AI

Author:
Gregory Allen
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
On October 7, 2022, the Biden administration announced a new export controls policy on artificial intelligence (AI) and semiconductor technologies to China. These new controls—a genuine landmark in U.S.-China relations—provide the complete picture after a partial disclosure in early September generated confusion. For weeks the Biden administration has been receiving criticism in many quarters for a new round of semiconductor export control restrictions, first disclosed on September 1. The restrictions block leading U.S. AI computer chip designers, such as Nvidia and AMD, from selling their high-end chips for AI and supercomputing to China. The criticism typically goes like this: China’s domestic AI chip design companies could not win customers in China because their chip designs could not compete with Nvidia and AMD on performance. Chinese firms could not catch up to Nvidia and AMD on performance because they did not have enough customers to benefit from economies of scale and network effects. Because of the new export controls, revenues that formerly flowed to U.S. chip companies will now go to Chinese chip companies, offering a viable path to economies of scale and competitive performance. In the short term, this policy will significantly harm Chinese AI data center companies. However, blocking U.S. AI chip designers from selling their world-leading chips is actually good for China in the longer term because it will strengthen China’s domestic chip design ecosystem. While the reasoning in this criticism is sound, it does not imply that the Biden administration’s actions are self-defeating. Rather, it shows how the policy as disclosed in September was incomplete. A policy like this would not make sense if that is the only step the administration planned to take. Clearly something was missing, and industry experts have been waiting for the other shoe to drop ever since. On October 7, the other shoe dropped. The Biden administration announced a massive policy shift on semiconductor exports to China as well as revised rules for how the lists of restricted parties are managed. In recent decades, U.S. semiconductor policy has been primarily market driven and laissez faire. With the new policy, which comes on the heels of the CHIPS Act’s passage, the United States is firmly focused on retaining control over so-called “chokepoint” (or as it is sometimes translated from Chinese “stranglehold”) technologies in the global semiconductor technology supply chain. The most important chokepoints in the context of this discussion are AI chip designs, electronic design automation software, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and equipment components. The Biden administration’s latest actions simultaneously exploit U.S. dominance across all four of these chokepoints. In doing so, these actions demonstrate an unprecedented degree of U.S. government intervention to not only preserve chokepoint control but also begin a new U.S. policy of actively strangling large segments of the Chinese technology industry—strangling with an intent to kill.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Hegemony, Artificial Intelligence, Rivalry, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

27. A Two-Track Approach for Trustworthy AI

Author:
Michel Girard
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
Standards and certification programs are developed to support new trustworthy artificial intelligence (AI) legislation. Recent developments point to the emergence of a two-track approach. One track would focus on the certification of AI applications embedded in tangible products using objective criteria through established conformity assessment bodies. Regarding AI interacting with humans and used in delivering services, there is a need to create a new track. This track is needed to verify and validate compliance against subjective criteria, values and ethics, seen by many as an integral part of what constitutes trustworthy AI. The practice of “assurance as a service” can be adapted to verify and validate conformance to upcoming trustworthy AI standards. This policy brief provides an update on key legislative and policy developments framing trustworthy AI. It sketches possible approaches for the certification, verification and validation of AI embedded in products and in services and looks at recent proposals regarding the creation of a new chartered profession to deliver assurance services to achieve trustworthy AI.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Regulation, Artificial Intelligence, Emerging Technology, and Trust
Political Geography:
Global Focus

28. Commitment to Control Weaponised Artificial Intelligence: A Step Forward for the OSCE and European Security

Author:
Anna Nadibaidze
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Recent technological and political developments in OSCE participating States suggest a strong interest in pursuing, testing and using weaponised AI and weapons systems with increasingly autonomous features controlled by algorithms. In May 2021 Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that Russia had begun producing combat robots “capable of fighting on their own”,1 while the French Army is planning to introduce robotic systems by 2040.2 The United Kingdom (UK) government has stated its objective of achieving “a leading role in critical and emerging technologies”3 and has established a Defence Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy Unit to better understand them.4 In the United States, the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence has urged the government “not [to] be a witness to the AI revolution in military affairs”.5 The global discussion about autonomous weapons systems is often framed in a futuristic way and focuses on lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) – colloquially called “killer robots” – or the “AI arms race”. But weaponised AI is already a reality of European security. Thus far participating States have been reluctant to utilise the OSCE platform to address the risks caused by the increasing autonomy of weapons systems. Building on this issue, this essay intends to address the following questions: (1) how does the lack of regulation of weaponised AI affect security and stability in Europe? and (2) what role can the OSCE play in mitigating the risks related to weaponised AI?
Topic:
Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Artificial Intelligence, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
Global Focus

29. Breaking Down the Arguments for and against U.S. Antitrust Legislation

Author:
Caitlin Chin
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
In many areas of the world, including the European Union, United Kingdom, South Korea, and Australia, governments are considering new legislation to check the market power of a few dominant technology platforms. Yet some of the most sweeping proposals are taking place within the U.S. Congress. In October 2020, the majority staff of the House Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law published a set of recommendations to promote competition in technology markets, the result of a 16-month investigation that directed attention to the actions of Alphabet (the parent company of Google), Amazon, Apple, and Facebook (now Meta). The House Judiciary Committee advanced six bills in June 2021 that paralleled many of these recommendations, focusing on the anticompetitive impacts of self- preferencing, mergers and acquisitions, data accumulation, and network effects related to digital platforms. Meanwhile, the Senate Judiciary Committee voted to advance the American Innovation and Online Choice Act and Open App Markets Act in early 2022. While antitrust reform has seen broad bipartisan support in Congress, members of both parties have also expressed concerns that these bills might have unintended consequences. For example, many of the newly proposed restrictions would only apply to “covered platforms” that meet certain size or categorical criteria—which, under current market conditions, would primarily include Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, and Meta. In turn, some critics have asserted that unequal rules could create arbitrary winners or losers in the marketplace and even benefit foreign competitors or bad actors at the expense of U.S. technological innovation. To put these issues into context, below is an overview of seven major bills under consideration in the U.S. House and Senate as well as the related challenges, commentary, and controversies that surround them.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Legislation, Antitrust Law, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

30. Next-Generation Technology and Electoral Democracy: Understanding the Changing Environment

Author:
Samantha Bradshaw, Kailee Hilt, Eric Jardine, Florian Kerschbaum, Ulrike Klinger, Michael Pal, Aaron Shull, and Wesley Wark
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
Democracies around the world are facing growing threats to their electoral systems in the digital age. Foreign interference in the form of dis- and misinformation has already influenced the results of democratic elections and altered the course of history. This special report, the result of a research project conducted in partnership with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) Canada, examines these cyberthreats from a Canadian and German perspective. Both Canada and Germany share common goals centred around protecting human rights, democracy and the rule of law, and international peace and security. Using case studies from experts in fields such as computer science, law and public policy, the special report offers recommendations to guide policy makers and stakeholders on how to protect elections from next-generation technologies and the threats they pose to democracy.
Topic:
Environment, Science and Technology, Elections, Democracy, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
Europe, Canada, Germany, and North America