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19891. Development of Operational Thinking in the German Army in the World War Era

Author:
Gerhard Gross
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Historians and military figures, especially British and American individuals, again and again raise the question of why the German army was - at least for a time - so successful in battle in the world war era despite its inferiority in materiel and personnel. In addition to tactical capabilities, the explanations given often include the operational capabilities of the German land forces. While Geoffrey P. Megargee and Shimon Nahev are critical in their assessment of the Wehrmacht's operational achievements because of specific German command and control problems and Naveh points out that there is no coherent theory behind Germany's operational thinking, others emphasize the outstanding operational capabilities of the German army. Edward N. Luttwak describes the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as follows: “In fact it was an operation very much in the German style: elegant, full of risks, and most profitable.” Robert M. Citino goes even further. He draws a direct line from the Schlieffen Plan to Desert Storm, the most successful American military operation since World War II. The key to success lay in the decision to wage a war of maneuver, which was well-planned and thought-out, as well as the establishment of clear points of main effort - a fact any German officer is aware of. Both writers suggest that the Germans had a timeless art of command and control, the main factors of which – the establishment of points of main effort, risk awareness, speed and maneuver – were broadly adopted by American and Soviet officers. In this paper, I will present a short outline of the development of operational thinking in the German army in the world war era.
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Germany

19892. "Military Doomsday Machine"? The Decisions for War 1914

Author:
Holger Herwig
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
On 28 June 1914 the heir presumptive to the Austro-Hungarian throne was assassinated. The Austrian government alleged official Serbian involvement, issued an ultimatum, and, rejecting negotiation, began hostilities on 29 July with a bombardment of Belgrade. In a linked series of decisions, four other major European powers—Germany, Russia, France, and Britain—joined the struggle. Ultimately, twenty-nine nations, including Japan and the Ottoman Empire, would be involved. In all instances, the decision makers recognized the inherent hazards. They knew their choices could enlarge the conflict and significantly escalate the dimensions of the struggle.
Political Geography:
Britain, Russia, Europe, France, and Germany

19893. Politics by other means: Canadian "Strategy" and the Italian Campaign, 1943

Author:
Christine Leppard
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In 1939 Canada entered World War Two with a tiny military and obsolete kit. Four years later, Canada had raised a five division, two corps army that was defending the shores of Dover, although the immediate threat of German invasion had long since passed. Instead of joining the Allied war in North Africa the Canadian army remained, in the words of Army Commander Andrew McNaughton, the “dagger pointed at the heart of Berlin,” ready and waiting to go ashore in North-West Europe whenever the long-awaited invasion finally came. This posture pleased the Canadian public, who well versed in the laurels won by Arthur Currie and the Canadian Corps in the Great War, anticipated a similar role for the entire Canadian army in the liberation of Europe. Plus, Canada's expected role in the main invasion would bolster its esteem among its more powerful allies, Britain and the United States. Although Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King was speaking about Canadian public opinion when he told one of his cabinet minister's that “he laughed best who laughed last,” it surely also applied to Mackenzie King's view of what Canada's post-war role would be: one with a newly minted role for Canada as an independent ally, neither wholly British nor wholly American, standing independent and tall within the British Commonwealth and the United Nations.
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Canada, Germany, and United Nations

19894. "Let them make SOUP:" The Essential Ingredients of Euro-American Grand Strategy and the Amerindian Conquest

Author:
Tony Mullis
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Grand strategy is a nebulous concept. It is virtually impossible to define the term in a meaningful and unequivocal manner. Some even doubt that it actually exists. Others acknowledge its existence, but avoid authoritative definitions because of the notion's elasticity. Grand strategy is somewhat akin to Carl von Clausewitz's idea of the culminating point. The concept makes sense in hindsight, but it is extremely difficult to identify when one is engaged in battle or in warfare. Grand strategy offers a similar dilemma. Because it consists of both physical and metaphysical components, grand strategy, much like Clausewitz's use of the paradoxical trinity to describe war, defies a simple, straightforward definition. Nonetheless, historians have a distinct advantage when trying to determine the components and forces that contributed to what can be described as grand strategy. This historical perspective is particularly useful when assessing sweeping paradigmatic changes involving multiple actors and dissimilar cultures over hundreds of years of interaction. The Roman and British Empires, for example, offer many opportunities to dissect the essential ingredients of imperial strategy. The persistent conflict between Amerindians and European and later American peoples provides another opportunity to break down the critical parts of a grand strategy. From first contact in the late fifteenth century to the tragedy of Wounded Knee in 1890, it is possible to distinguish the key elements of a grand strategy that guided Europeans and Americans, either consciously or subconsciously, in their conquest of the western hemisphere.
Political Geography:
Europe

19895. The Evolution of Strategic Thinking in World War I: A Case Study of the Second Battle of the Marne

Author:
Michael Neiberg
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In his often-cited but infrequently read classic, On War, Carl von Clausewitz famously observed that war is an extension of politics by other means. Exactly what that now ubiquitous phrase means remains a topic of considerable scholarly debate. Generally speaking, however, a consensus has emerged that Clausewitz was urging policy makers to tie their use of military force to the political ends they wished to achieve. By keeping ends and means in harmony, political leaders can mitigate risk and avoid dangers like the phenomenon we now call mission creep. This consensus also cites nineteenth-century Prussia as a model for how to achieve Clausewitz's vision; Otto von Bismarck, the wily Prussian/German chancellor, kept his war aims limited to the abilities of the Prussian army while taking great care not to involve his state in a long war that he feared it might not win. He therefore had an appropriate understanding of what military force could achieve, and, maybe more importantly, what it could not achieve. As a result, he formed the unified Germany under Prussian dominance that was his strategic goal at an appropriate cost to his state's resources.
Political Geography:
Germany and Prussia

19896. Strategy "in a microcosm": Processes of tactical learning in a WWI German Infantry Division

Author:
Christian Stachelbeck
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Despite the defeat of 1918, the tactical warfare of German forces on the battlefields against a superior enemy coalition was often very effective. The heavy losses suffered by the allies until well into the last months of the war are evidence of this. The tactical level of military action comprises the field of direct battle with forces up to division size. Tactics – according to Clausewitz, the “theory of the use of military forces in combat” – is the art of commanding troops and their organized interaction in combined arms combat in the types of combat which characterized the world war era – attack, defense and delaying engagement.
Topic:
War
Political Geography:
Germany

19897. Grand Strategy, Culture, and Strategic Choice: A Review

Author:
David S. McDonough
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The Canadian debate on security matters has rarely been discussed as a matter of grand strategy. Indeed, John Gellner once bluntly remarked that there is “no tradition of independent Canadian strategic thought,” while Colin Gray would go even further with his memorable term “strategic theoretical parasitism” to describe Canada's penchant for relying on the strategic thinking of its erstwhile allies. Others pessimistically conclude that “recourse to grand strategies” is largely “the prerogatives of the greater states.” Yet these views have also come under increasing challenge. For example, Andrew Richter and Sean Maloney provide a strong defence of Canada's military strategy in the early Cold War, though both authors remain less sanguine on the strategic acumen displayed by later governments.3 Another prominent voice has been former Minister of National Defence David Pratt, who was less shy in describing such behaviour as an example of grand strategy but remained in general agreement that Canada's once vigorous strategy had by the 1960s “appeared to wither on the vine.
Topic:
Cold War
Political Geography:
Canada

19898. States, Citizens and the Privatization of Security.

Author:
Duane Bratt
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The rise of private security firms has become a high profile feature of international relations since the end of the Cold War. This was symbolized by the private military company Executive Outcomes operating in Africa in the 1990s and Blackwater operating in Iraq in the 2000s. However, these companies were not the only ones in existence; they were just the most visible. In fact, there were more American-based private security companies in Iraq than members of the United States Armed Forces. In addition, the privatization of security involves more than just the use of armed guards; it also involves the outsourcing of many military services, such as logistics, base management, and training. This transformation has raised a number of important questions for mature democracies: Has the state monopoly on collective violence been eroded? What is the extent of democratic control over military force? Should armies be made up of volunteers or conscripts?
Topic:
Cold War
Political Geography:
Africa and United States

19899. Mud: A Military History

Author:
Adam Lajeunesse
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The natural first impression when presented with a history of mud lies somewhere between amusement and curiosity. Have historians truly exhausted all other potential subjects and are now resorting to the study of moist dirt? Yet, if given more than brief consideration – and certainly after reading the book itself – the importance of mud to the history of warfare becomes obvious and undeniable. As Clyde Wood shows, the gooey substance has had a significant impact on the course of human conflict over the ages through its tendency to slow marching armies, wear down mechanized divisions and even ground air forces.
Political Geography:
Southeast Asia

19900. The German Army and the Defense of the Reich: Military Doctrine and the Conduct of the Defensive Battle 1918-1939.

Author:
Matt Bucholtz
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
For decades historical research dedicated to the study of the German army, or Reichswehr, before the Second World War has been dominated by a single overriding question: How did the German army create Blitzkrieg? Studies, both popular and academic, have focused on German offensive doctrine and the leading figures responsible for its creation, in an attempt to understand the stunning German victories of the first half of the Second World War. While this has led to a fuller appreciation of the various characteristics of combined arms warfare, it has also generated a skewed vision of the German army that does not accurately portray its operation, activities, strategic outlook, and doctrinal breadth. Matthias Strohn's work, The German Army and the Defense of the Reich provides a much-needed counter-weight to the existing 'Blitzkrieg' centric historiography of the Reichswehr between the First and Second World Wars.
Topic:
War
Political Geography:
Germany