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18271. Why the Jewish State Now?

Author:
Raef Zreik
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Palestine Studies
Institution:
Institute for Palestine Studies
Abstract:
Israel's raison d'être was as a Jewish state, yet for almost four decades after the 1948 declaration of its establishment its Jewishness was not inscribed in any law. This essay, a structural-historical discourse analysis, seeks to explore what led up to today's insistent assertion of the state's Jewish identity. To this end, the author traces Israel's gradual evolution from its purely ethnic roots (the Zionist revolution) to a more civic concept of statehood involving greater inclusiveness (accompanied in recent decades by a rise in Jewish religious discourse). The author finds that while the state's Jewishness was for decades an assumption so basic as to be self-evident to the Jewish majority, the need to declare it became more urgent as the possibility of becoming “normalized” (i.e., a state for all its citizens) became an option, however distant. The essay ends with an analysis of Israel's demand for recognition as a Jewish state, arguing why the Palestinian negotiators would benefit from deconstructing it rather than simply disregarding it.
Political Geography:
Israel and Palestine

18272. Toward a New Palestinian Negotiation Paradigm

Author:
Camille Mansour
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Palestine Studies
Institution:
Institute for Palestine Studies
Abstract:
Against a background of prolonged stalemate, this essay provides a detailed examination of two decades of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations with a view to identifying deficiencies in the Palestinian negotiating approach and drawing lessons of use to future Palestinian negotiators in the context of power imbalance. After outlining possible conditions for resuming and conducting negotiations (making the decision and timing tactical rather than strategic), the author advocates a shift in the Palestinian negotiating paradigm that considers negotiations as one diplomatic tool among others in the long Palestinian struggle to achieve their national program, and places the negotiations in the context of priorities for the coming period.
Political Geography:
Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and United Nations

18273. Hamas "Foreign Minister" Usama Hamdan Talks About National Reconciliation, Arafat, Reform, and Hamas's Presence in Lebanon

Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Palestine Studies
Institution:
Institute for Palestine Studies
Abstract:
Usama Hamdan, since mid-2010 in charge of Hamas's international relations (in effect, its foreign minister), was born in al-Bureij refugee camp in the Gaza Strip in 1965. After earning his bachelor's degree in chemistry in 1986 from Jordan's Yarmouk University, where he was active in the Islamic Student Movement, he worked in private industry in Kuwait until the first Gulf war. Appointed Hamas representative to Iran in 1992, he held that post until 1998, when he was named Hamas representative to Lebanon. Since taking charge of the movement's foreign affairs portfolio, Hamdan commutes between Beirut and Damascus. Hamdan agreed to meet a small group from the Institute for Palestine Studies at his Beirut office, and when directions for reaching it became complicated, he offered to send a driver. How necessary this was became obvious as the car threaded its way through the narrow labyrinthine streets of Dahiya, the poor Shi'i suburb south of Beirut, festooned with banners and laundry and posters of Hizballah leader Shaykh Hasan Nasrallah. The building where Hamas had its offices was modest and nondescript, not unlike the other apartment buildings on the unpaved but clean street, quiet but for a group of children kicking a ball. The reception room where Hamdan met us was spare: a laminated coffee table, a couch, chairs lining the walls, a few small tables. Large black-and-white portraits of Shaykh Ahmad Yasin and Abdel Aziz Rantisi, both killed in targeted Israeli airstrikes in Gaza in 2004, adorned one wall. There were also large photographs of Jerusalem's Dome of the Rock and Haram al-Sharif, and a colored poster, almost like a chart, of Hamas leaders assassinated by Israel over the years. Hamdan, casually dressed and relaxed, served the coffee and tea himself, spooning the sugar while chatting in fluid English before the tape recorder was turned on. The interview, conducted jointly by the Journal of Palestine Studies (JPS) and the Majallat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniya (MDF), JPS's sister publication, took place on 13 December 2010. The following are excerpts of the two-hour interview. JPS: These days, reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah seems increasingly urgent. Do you think that the fact that almost everyone recognizes the failure of the negotiating process could increase the chances that it can be achieved? UH: For a limited time, yes. But it's important to emphasize that the division between Hamas and Fatah began long before their overt split in 2007, and in fact political divisions within the Palestinian movement began even before the establishment of Hamas and basically go back to the PLO's political program of 1974.1 The outbreak of the first intifada in 1988 offered an excellent opportunity to get rid of that division by creating a new kind of political process internally—one that could reform the PLO and its political program. Unfortunately, Abu Ammar [Yasir Arafat] did not act to eliminate the division. In fact, he thought he could use the intifada to implement the 1974 program, and that was the gist of the talks held in Tunisia starting in 1989 between Robert Pelletreau, who was the U.S. ambassador at the time, and the PLO. When the Palestinian Authority came into the occupied territories in 1994 under the Oslo agreement, our decision in Hamas was not to fight the PA—despite the suggestions from some Palestinian factions that we impose our position by force. Our decision was to deal with the PA as our own people. Some of our members even formed a political party to facilitate dealings with the PA. But it did not work as we hoped. Abu Ammar promised the Americans and the Israelis that he had full control over the Palestinians and tried to prevent us by force from continuing the resistance against the occupation. And in fact Arafat did control the situation up to 2000, but never even tried to have a political dialogue among Palestinians concerning a future course. He did not even consider the idea of such a discussion. Arafat, whether or not you agreed with him, was one of the most important Palestinian leaders. But he was not a strategic leader. Always his tactics pushed him from his goals, and in order to correct the resulting situation, instead of correcting his actions he changed the goals. This was his vital mistake. When he came back from Camp David in 2000 after the breakdown of the talks, he knew that it was over. He saw there was no possibility of a peace with the Israelis that the Palestinians could accept. But for a while he thought that if he could create some kind of resistance—a controlled resistance— it might change the political environment so he could achieve some of his political goals, like a Palestinian state, not on all the occupied lands, but maybe on part of them, and some solution for Jerusalem. But it didn't work. He couldn't manage or control the intifada as he hoped—I think he didn't realize that after seven years of the Palestinian Authority, a new generation had been created that was more tied to their benefits as part of the PA than to the Palestinian cause and their own people. But there was also the generation that had lived the first intifada and still had those ideals—people like Marwan Barghouti, one of the strongest supporters of the peace process but who also believed that we might be able to improve our situation in that process by our resistance. And I believe these people were really ready to resist the Israelis—because the resistance was not only Hamas but also part of Fatah. Of course Arafat had not counted on the Likud victory and Ariel Sharon's becoming prime minister a couple of months after the second intifada began. He was faced with an entirely new political situation: the Labor party had used the PA to do the dirty work of the occupation, but Sharon decided to keep everything in his own hands even if it meant destroying the PA. He invaded and reoccupied the West Bank in 2002 and put Arafat under siege for two years, and everyone knows now what he meant by the reference he reportedly made to George W. Bush with regard to the need for “regime change” in Palestine— something to the effect that there were ways that the angel of death could be assisted in the matter. Of course it also seems that some of those around Arafat had a hand and betrayed him. I can't say directly, but I believe that some worked against him who understood that the time of change was coming. And they learned this from the Americans, not from their own people.
Political Geography:
Palestine

18274. Letter from the UN: After the U.S. Veto on Settlements

Author:
Graham Usher
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Palestine Studies
Institution:
Institute for Palestine Studies
Abstract:
Obama's first veto in defense of Israel at the UN was of a Security Council draft resolution that condemned Israeli settlements in language reflecting the administration's own stated policy. The draft, supported by all other UNSC members, forced the U.S. to choose between undermining its credibility internationally and alienating constituencies at home. For the Palestinians, insistence on tabling the draft in defiance of Washington was seen by some as a first step in an “alternative peace strategy” involving a turn away from the Oslo framework in favor of the UN. After reviewing the context of the resolution, the author analyzes the stakes for the various players, the repercussions of the veto, and the diplomatic prospects in its wake. On 18 February 2011, the Obama administration vetoed a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution that would have condemned as illegal Israeli settlement in the occupied territories. Palestinian insistence on submitting the resolution incurred America's wrath. But the Council's fourteen other member states (including permanent members Britain, France, China, and Russia and nonpermanent powers Germany, Brazil, India, and South Africa) all voted for the resolution. And a colossal 123 countries cosponsored it, including every Arab and African state except Libya (which rejects a twostate solution to the conflict). Israel “deeply appreciated” the American veto—understandably so. Rarely had it been left so alone internationally, with even close allies like Germany ignoring appeals to abstain. For the Americans, Obama's first veto in defense of Israel at the United Nations came at a time when he wanted to appear at least rhetorically on the side of young Arab protestors who from Morocco to Yemen had been demanding change, rather than with the ancien régimes defending inertia. U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice's contortions were palpable as she tried to explain a veto that violated elemental justice, international law, and until recently her administration's own stated policy on settlements—all in the name of a peace process that no longer exists. The veto “cost the Americans blood,” admitted Israel's Maariv newspaper, paraphrasing a “sharp” exchange between Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the aftermath. It also cost Obama in the occupied territories. In Ramallah, some 3,000 mainly Fatah members staged a “day of rage” against the veto, with the West Bank Palestinian Authority's (PA) usually pro-American Prime Minister Salam Fayyad incandescent: “The Americans have chosen to be alone in disrupting the internationally backed Palestinian efforts,” he said. Smaller Fatah anti-America demonstrations occurred in Qalqilya, Hebron, Jenin, and East Jerusalem. The Palestinian and Arab decision to take the resolution to the UN was born of the beaching of the U.S.-steered “peace process” after the Israeli government's refusal last September to renew a partial moratorium on West Bank settlement starts. It was the first run of what has been called the PA's new “alternative” diplomatic strategy. Combined with the promise of new elections in the West Bank and Gaza, moves toward reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, and the approaching climax of Fayyad's state-building agenda in September, the alternative strategy involves freeing the Palestinian case from the grip of American tutelage in order to anchor it again on UNSC resolutions and international law. How serious is the alternative?
Political Geography:
Russia, China, America, India, South Africa, Brazil, Palestine, and Germany

18275. The Palestine Papers: Chronicling the U.S. Abandonment of the Road Map

Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Palestine Studies
Institution:
Institute for Palestine Studies
Abstract:
A. Meeting Minutes, PLO Negotiation Affairs Department Office, Jericho, 16 September 2009 (excerpts) B. Meeting Minutes, PLO Negotiation Affairs Department Office, Jericho, 17 September 2009 (excerpts) C. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, New York, 24 September 2009 (excerpts) D. Meeting Summary, U.S. State Department, Washington, 1 October 2009 (excerpts) E. U.S. Draft Terms of Reference Document for Restarting Negotiations, 2 October 2009 F. PLO Negotiation Support Unit, Preliminary Comments on U.S. Proposal as Presented on 2 October 2009 G. Meeting Minutes, U.S. State Department, Washington, 2 October 2009 (excerpts) H. Meeting Minutes, U.S. State Department, Washington, 21 October 2009 (excerpts).
Political Geography:
United States and Palestine

18276. A Jerusalem Story

Author:
Michelle Hartman
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Palestine Studies
Institution:
Institute for Palestine Studies
Abstract:
Reviewed work(s): Once Upon a Time in Jerusalem, by Sahar Hamouda. Reading: Garnet, 2010. vii + 122 pages. Sources to p. 123. Glossary to p. 125. Al Fitani Genealogy to p. 127. Al Fitani Family Tree to p. 130. $39.95 cloth.
Political Geography:
Jerusalem

18277. Selective Legal History

Author:
Michael Lynk
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Palestine Studies
Institution:
Institute for Palestine Studies
Abstract:
Is it a coincidence that, as disillusionment spreads about the viability and justice of a two-state settlement as the solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we are witnessing a spate of books that is shifting the political-historical focus from 1967 to the 1917–1948 period as the fulcrum point by which to assess this malignant struggle? Recent histories such as The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict by Jonathan Schneer (Random House, 2010) and Victor Kattan's From Coexistence to Conquest: International Law and the Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1891–1949 (Pluto Press, 2009) have lucidly and critically explored the colonialist foundations of the British Mandate, the British-Zionist alliance, and the deeply flawed premises of the United Nations partition plan.
Political Geography:
Israel and Palestine

18278. The Flotilla Effect

Author:
Edda Manga
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Palestine Studies
Institution:
Institute for Palestine Studies
Abstract:
Reviewed work(s): Midnight on the Mavi Marmara: The Attack on the Gaza Freedom Flotilla and How It Changed the Course of the Israel/Palestine Conflict, edited by Moustafa Bayoumi. New York: OR Books, 2010. ix + 293 pages. Contributors to p. 299. Credits to p. 301. $16.00 paper.
Political Geography:
New York, Israel, and Palestine

18279. Everday Dreams

Author:
Barbara Harlow
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Palestine Studies
Institution:
Institute for Palestine Studies
Abstract:
Reviewed work(s): Touch, by Adania Shibli. Translated by Paula Haydar, Northampton, MA: Clockroot Books, 2010. 72 pages. $13.00 paper.

18280. Refugee Life

Author:
Aseel Sawalha
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Palestine Studies
Institution:
Institute for Palestine Studies
Abstract:
Voices from the Camps: A People's History of Palestinian Refugees in Jordan, 2006, by Nabil Marshood. Lanham: University Press of America, 2010. ix + 112. Epilogue to p. 116. Index to p. 122. About the Author to p. 123. $25.00 paper. Reviewed by Aseel Sawalha Nabil Marshood, professor of sociology at Hudson County Community College, New Jersey, has written an accessible work about a complex aspect of the Palestinian experience. Voices from the Camps: A People's History of Palestinian Refugees in Jordan, 2006—as the title suggests—allows curious readers, with or without much knowledge of the lives of Palestinian refugees, to hear the voices of the residents of refugee camps in Jordan. The interviewees (women and men both old and young) narrate their stories of leaving their home villages in Palestine, their arrival to the camps, and the daily challenges they encounter.
Political Geography:
Palestine