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1351. Inside the ICBM Lobby: Special Interests or the Public Interest?

Author:
William D. Hartung
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The nuclear weapons lobby is one of the most powerful forces in the military industrial complex. 1 The lobby’s current priority is advocating for the $315 billion Sentinel program to build a new Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). The program has faced controversy over both its utility and its cost, including a cost increase of a whopping 81 percent since 2020. The key champions of the Sentinel program are the Senators from Montana, North Dakota, Utah and Wyoming — states that are home to major ICBM bases or host major work on the Sentinel program. The group — known as the Senate ICBM Coalition — stresses the Sentinel’s purported role in strengthening nuclear deterrence as well as its creation of jobs in the states they represent. However, other members of Congress and ex–defense officials have raised urgent concerns about the Sentinel program, questioning the deterrence rationale that undergirds it and raising the alarm over the risk of accidental nuclear usage. Despite claims about Sentinel’s economic benefits, it remains unclear how many jobs the program will actually create. Weapons contractors — led by the Sentinel’s prime contractor, Northrop Grumman — play a central role in the ICBM lobby. Since 2018, members of the strategic forces subcommittees of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees have received $3.8 million from the 11 major Sentinel contractors. In total, ICBM contractors have donated $87 million to members of Congress in the last four election cycles alone. Contractors’ influence efforts are aided by the fact that senior government officials and members of Congress often secure jobs in the arms industry when they leave government; this provides them the opportunity to lobby former colleagues. In all, the 11 ICBM contractors have spent $226 million on lobbying in the past four election cycles. They currently employ 275 lobbyists, the vast majority of whom have passed through the revolving door from influential positions in government. The Sentinel program should be scrutinized as part of a larger reassessment of U.S. nuclear policy. The 2023 report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States endorses the program and calls for a comprehensive nuclear weapons build-up, including the possible placement of multiple nuclear warheads on ICBMs — a highly aggressive strategic posture that has not been in place since the Cold War. A high number of Commission members have ties to the nuclear weapons industry, including its co–chair Jon Kyl, who was once a lobbyist for Sentinel prime contractor Northrop Grumman. Congress must weigh the dubious benefits of the Commission’s proposals against the significant risks and costs its recommendations would entail if carried out.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Grand Strategy, Military-Industrial Complex, Militarism, and Sentinel Program
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and United States of America

1352. A Saudi Accord: Implications for Israel-Palestine Relations

Author:
Jeremy Pressman
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The Biden administration and Israel’s Netanyahu government have both expressed support for the idea of a trilateral agreement in which Saudi Arabia would normalize diplomatic relations with Israel in exchange for the United States providing significant benefits to Saudi Arabia, such as security guarantees. A major selling point has been the claim that such an agreement could pave the way to settling the bitter Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has again erupted into a central threat to peace in the Middle East. However, given the experience of the Trump administration’s Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between four Arab states and Israel with the hope of moving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a resolution, deep skepticism is warranted. The Abraham Accords did nothing to advance Palestinian-Israeli conflict resolution. Even before October 7, there was no hint of Israeli moderation in response to the accords. Since October 7, we have witnessed the largest Palestinian terrorist attack in Israeli history, followed by Israel’s destruction of Gaza and the killing of thousands of Palestinians in response. This conflict risks destabilizing the entire Middle East. This brief reviews the relevant history and incentives around the claimed relationship between Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution and Israeli-Arab normalization agreements. It concludes that a U.S.-brokered normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia would be counterproductive to Israeli-Palestinian peace. Indeed, recent history suggests that Saudi Arabia and the United States would be wasting potential leverage for influencing Israeli policy and that the regional approach unhelpfully diverts attention away from the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory. Rather than pursue the already failed approach of seeking peace through the normalization of relations between Israel and third-party countries, a better route would include using U.S. leverage to directly drive Israeli-Palestinian peace. To do this, the U.S. should: 1.) Use its leverage through military aid to secure a permanent ceasefire in Gaza as a matter of urgency; 2.) Refocus on the core issues of Israeli-Palestinian peace, such as occupation, and demand genuine, substantive concessions from the Israeli government; and 3.) Fully integrate the use of U.S. leverage, such as arms sales and military assistance, into the pursuit of these goals.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, National Security, Hegemony, Conflict, Donald Trump, Joe Biden, and Administration
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, United States of America, and UAE

1353. Right-Sizing the Russian Threat to Europe

Author:
George Beebe, Mark Episkopos, and Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Western leaders, including U.S. President Joe Biden, have frequently framed the invasion of Ukraine as the first step in a Russian plan of broader European conquest. However, a close examination of Russian intent and military capabilities shows this view is dangerously mistaken. Russia likely has neither the capability nor the intent to launch a war of aggression against NATO members — but the ongoing brinkmanship between Russia and the West still poses serious risks of military escalation that can only be defused by supplementing military deterrence with a diplomatic effort to address tensions. An analysis of Russian security thinking demonstrates that Putin’s stated views align with long-standing Russian fears about Western encroachment, given Russia’s lack of natural barriers to invasion. As Putin has come to view NATO as increasingly hostile to Russia, aggressive Russian action in defense of its claimed “sphere of influence” has become a factor in European security. However, contrary to many Western analyses, this does not mean that Russia views future wars of aggression against NATO member states as in its security interest. This does not imply naivete about the danger of Russian aggression, as reflected most recently in its illegal invasion of Ukraine. But it highlights the fundamental differences between Russia’s perceptions of Ukraine, which it has long regarded as both critical to its national security and integral to its history and culture, and its views of NATO countries, where the cost-benefit balance of aggression for Russia would be very different. Understanding Russian incentives also requires assessing Russia’s actual military capabilities compared to NATO. As frequently reiterated by NATO leadership, such an assessment shows that Russia is at a decisive conventional military disadvantage against the NATO alliance. While Russia would do damage in a conventional war with NATO, it would almost certainly suffer a devastating defeat in such a conflict absent nuclear escalation. NATO has a greater than three-to-one advantage over Russia in active-duty ground forces. NATO also has even greater advantages in the air and at sea. The alliance has a ten-to-one lead in military aircraft and a large qualitative edge as well, raising the probability of total air superiority. At sea, NATO would likely have the capacity to impose a naval blockade on Russian shipping, whose costs would dwarf current economic sanctions. While Russia has clear military superiority over individual NATO states, especially in the Baltics, it is extremely unlikely it could exercise this advantage without triggering a broader war with the entire NATO alliance. However, NATO’s powerful military deterrent alone cannot create stability in Europe. Paradoxically, an excessive reliance on military deterrence is likely to increase instability by inducing Russia to rely increasingly on its nuclear force as its primary basis for deterrence. Unlike conventional forces, Russia and NATO possess roughly the same amount of nuclear weapons. Washington must work to defuse this increasingly unstable dynamic by restoring diplomatic lines of communication between Russia and the West.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, NATO, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

1354. Foreign Lobbying in the U.S.

Author:
Ben Freeman and Nick Cleveland-Stout
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
This brief takes a deep dive into a newly available tranche of data tracking foreign influence in the U.S. political process. The new data was released in early 2024 following reforms to the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), which made access to all foreign registrants’ political activities and campaign contributions publicly available. The brief unearths a complex web of foreign influence in the United States — with countries like Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Azerbaijan reaping the benefits of massive political influence campaigns. Influence operations today often follow a standard playbook: outside countries use firms based in Washington to lobby active members of Congress in pursuit of various aims — such as receiving U.S. weapons, currying American favor in regional conflicts, and more general reputation laundering. In 2022 and 2023, FARA registrants reported $14.3 million in political contributions and nearly 130,000 political activities. This relationship between lobbyists representing foreign countries and U.S. policymakers in itself is concerning, raising questions of whether politicians are really prioritizing the interests of their constituents, and of all Americans. To make matters worse, authoritarian regimes represent a majority of the most active countries — including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which placed first and fourth, respectively, among the countries most engaged in political activities under FARA from 2022–23. Greater FARA transparency is certainly a welcome development, but still more can be done to help Americans understand the who, what, and how of the foreign lobbying industry. For one, FARA registrants should be required to report a unique identifier for each office contacted, making it easier to determine lobbyists’ contacts. Greater language specificity in the descriptions of political activities is also needed. In addition, Congress could pass legislation that would introduce civil fines on the underreporting of political activities, although such a step should be accompanied by protections against the abuse of the FARA process.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Democratization, Conflict, and Military-Industrial Complex
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and United Arab Emirates

1355. Implications of a Security Pact with Saudi Arabia

Author:
Paul R. Pillar
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The Biden administration is seeking a deal in which Saudi Arabia would extend full diplomatic recognition to Israel in exchange for the United States providing Saudi Arabia a security guarantee, assistance in developing a nuclear program, and more unrestricted arms sales. Such an arrangement would further enmesh the United States in Middle Eastern disputes and intensify regional divisions. It would work against a favorable pattern of regional states working out their differences when the United States leaves them on their own — illustrated by the Chinese-brokered détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Besides being an authoritarian state lacking shared values with the United States, Saudi Arabia under Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) has aggressively pursued regional dominance, most notably with its highly destructive war in Yemen. A U.S. security guarantee could motivate MBS to engage in even riskier behavior and draw the United States into conflicts in which it has no stake, such as the sectarian dispute that had led Saudi Arabia to break relations with Iran. An expanded Saudi nuclear program would have a military as well as an energy dimension, with MBS having openly expressed interest in nuclear weapons. Granting the Saudi demand for help in enriching uranium would be a blow to the global nonproliferation regime as well as a reversal of longstanding U.S. policy. A race in nuclear capabilities between Iran and Saudi Arabia may result. Meeting MBS’ demands would not curb Saudi relations with China, which are rooted in strong economic and other interests. The United States could compete more effectively with China in the region not by taking on additional security commitments but instead by emulating the Chinese in engaging all regional states in the interest of reducing tensions. Normalization of diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia would not be a peace agreement, given the already extensive security cooperation between them. Even the gift of normalization with Riyadh would be unlikely to soften Israel’s hard-line positions regarding the war in Gaza and the larger Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and instead would only reduce further Israeli motivation to resolve that conflict.
Topic:
Diplomacy, National Security, Conflict, Normalization, Joe Biden, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

1356. Private Finance and the Quest to Remake Modern Warfare

Author:
Michael Brenes and William D. Hartung
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Official Washington is all in on promoting a new type of warfare based on military applications of AI and other emerging technologies. This determination was on full display last year when the Biden administration unveiled the “Replicator” initiative, an attempt to develop swarms of high-tech weapons systems at relatively low cost, and in numbers capable of overwhelming any potential adversary. But the history of so-called miracle weapons offers ample reasons to doubt Replicator’s supposedly transformative potential. Previous innovations, from the “electronic battlefield” in Vietnam to drone warfare in the Global War on Terrorism, did not, in fact, revolutionize war as we know it. Cutting-edge technology is no substitute for sound strategy or a realistic assessment of what military force can achieve. Unfortunately, so far, at least, these lessons from history have been no match for the boosterism of venture capital (VC) firms that pride themselves on disrupting industries and overturning conventional wisdom. While estimates of total VC funding of emerging military technology vary widely, it is clear that private investments in emerging weapons technologies are large and growing, driven by a handful of major Silicon Valley players, including Peter Thiel’s Founders Fund and Andreessen-Horowitz. Companies backed by these firms, including Palantir, Anduril, and SpaceX, have already landed major contracts for weapons systems that incorporate next-generation technology. These firms and their allies in the Pentagon and Congress are determined to move full speed ahead on the development and deployment of weapons based on AI and other technological innovations, despite many unanswered questions about the costs and risks involved. While the bulk of Pentagon funding still goes to the “big five” contractors — Lockheed Martin, RTX (formerly Raytheon), Boeing, General Dynamics, and Northrop Grumman — VC-backed startups aspire to become the future of military contracting, and they hope that AI and other emerging technologies will be their ticket. These startups may prove to be more nimble and innovative than the bloated, top-heavy firms that currently dominate the arms industry, but they should not be allowed to operate with impunity. Congress must establish ground rules that prevent military startups from exploiting the procurement process in ways that pad their bottom lines while providing flawed systems — outcomes that we have seen all too often from their traditional rivals. What is most important, the rush to profit from emerging military tech cannot be allowed to short-circuit the careful scrutiny and wide-ranging public debate that must precede any move toward a brave new world of autonomous warfare in which human intervention in the kill chain is significantly reduced, if not eliminated. This brief offers policymakers a framework for ensuring that unsupported promises to “reinvent” warfare don’t exacerbate the cycle of corruption and waste that has all too often plagued the Pentagon’s procurement process, to the detriment of our safety and security.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Finance, Grand Strategy, and Warfare
Political Geography:
North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

1357. Rethinking the U.S.–Belarus Relationship

Author:
Mark Episkopos
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Belarus is commonly seen as a Russian outpost on NATO’s eastern flank, with its president, Aleksandr Lukashenko, cast as a categorical opponent of Western interests. This narrative became ascendant in the West after Russia’s full–scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. However, a fuller examination of Belarusian foreign policy under President Lukashenko reveals a more nuanced picture of a country that, despite its historic ties to Russia, has consistently demonstrated a willingness to engage with the West. Lukashenko has sought to pursue what he calls a “multi–vector foreign policy,” straddling the great powers to best safeguard Belarus’s national sovereignty and its interests. This multi–pronged approach has shifted decidedly in recent years, however, with Lukashenko drifting into the Russian camp, as evidenced by Minsk providing logistical support and safe passage to Russian troops in its war on Ukraine, and allowing Russian tactical nuclear weapons on Belarussian soil. But these policies did not occur in a vacuum. They were, rather, a direct result of American efforts to isolate Belarus through a maximum pressure campaign which began in the aftermath of the 2020 re–election of Lukashenko. Western policies aimed at isolating Minsk have had the counterproductive effect of pushing Lukashenko closer to Moscow and Beijing, in an effort to counteract what he sees as a Western program of driving regime change in Belarus. Western governments, particularly Washington, should recognize that maximum pressure will backfire by pushing Belarus closer to Moscow. An alternative strategy based on resetting relations with Belarus and enabling the return of Lukashenko’s multi–vector foreign policy holds the promise of preventing the further integration of Belarus and Russia and possibly even reversing some of Putin’s moves to pull Belarus into the Russian orbit. To execute this strategy, the United States should: Explicitly disavow regime change and the training of anti–Lukashenko dissidents as U.S. policy goals in direct talks with Belarussian officials, conditioned on Belarussian assurance that it will not use its territory as a staging ground for attacks on NATO Establish a piecemeal approach for sanctions relief with Belarus as progress is made toward resetting relations Pursue bilateral cooperation with Belarus, including the resumption of energy trade, American investment, and other cultural arrangements. Pursuing the soft reset prescribed in this paper will not be easy, but the alternatives would leave the United States in a weaker strategic position by needlessly heightening Minsk’s dependence on its Russian neighbor. Steps toward reaching a new understanding with Belarus can instead bolster eastern European stability and enhance NATO’s eastern deterrent posture.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, National Security, Bilateral Relations, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eastern Europe, Belarus, and United States of America

1358. Subsidizing the Military-Industrial Complex: A Review of the Secretary of Defense Executive Fellows (SDEF) Program

Author:
Brett Heinz and Ben Freeman
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
For nearly 30 years, an obscure Department of Defense (DoD) program has given Pentagon contractors a taxpayer-subsidized opportunity to influence U.S. military policy, creating massive conflicts of interest — yet little scrutiny. This research brief offers a first of its kind look at the DoD’s Secretary of Defense Executive Fellows (SDEF) program, which sends U.S. military officers to work at major corporations for a year, and then return and provide recommendations to the DoD for how it might improve. Military contractors benefit disproportionately from the SDEF program. Twenty-nine percent of all SDEF fellows have gone to the nation’s top 50 government contractors, with 15 percent going to the “big five” military contractors alone. None of the 317 fellows in the program’s history has ever served at a public sector institution. Decades of SDEF recommendations have consistently focused on reforms that would both benefit corporations and bolster their influence over the DoD, including calls for a greater share of the agency’s budget to be given to military contractors, reduced oversight, greater private outsourcing of agency responsibilites, and the loosening of international arms trade regulations. SDEF also keeps the revolving door between public service and private profit spinning. Forty-three percent of SDEF fellows went on to work for a government contractor at some point in their post-military career. In consistently failing to distinguish between what’s best for corporate executives and what’s best for the American people, the SDEF program represents a dangerous embrace of the military-industrial complex. Whereas Dwight D. Eisenhower warned against the “conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry” whose “total influence” can be seen in “every office of the Federal Government,” the SDEF program explicitly advocates for it. SDEF has become a reliable method for corporations to disguise self–interested policy aspirations as helpful recommendations for DoD. If this program is to continue, DoD must act forcefully to address and minimize the unsettling conflicts of interest embedded within SDEF by: Enforcing a “one defense contractor per year” rule; Barring fellows from working in “government relations” roles; Exploring post–employment restrictions for former fellows; Re–balancing orientations away from undue corporate influence and political bias; Rationalizing program size.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military-Industrial Complex, and Militarism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1359. The U.S.–Japan–South Korea Trilateral Partnership: Pursuing Regional Stability and Avoiding Military Escalation

Author:
James Park and Mike M. Mochizuki
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
A trilateral partnership is emerging in northeast Asia. Building off last August’s Camp David summit between the countries’ leaders, the United States, Japan, and South Korea are now engaging militarily in an unprecedented fashion, shaping an alignment aimed to counter North Korea and China. Efforts to discourage North Korean and Chinese aggression are necessary, particularly considering Japan and South Korea’s physical proximity to the two countries. But the emerging trilateral arrangement between the United States, Japan, and South Korea could backfire and increase the risk of conflict if it focuses exclusively on military deterrence. The United States, Japan, and South Korea should instead pursue a more balanced arrangement — one that promotes stability on the Korean peninsula, credibly reaffirms long standing policy over the Taiwan issue, and disincentivizes China from pursuing its own trilateral military partnership with North Korea and Russia. To deter North Korea, the United States, South Korea, and Japan are relying on strike capabilities and military coordination to retaliate against North Korean aggression. This approach, however, will likely induce North Korea to increase its nuclear weapons and upgrade its missile capabilities. With this in mind, the three countries should roll back policy rhetoric and joint military exercises that might further provoke rather than deter North Korea, especially anything geared towards regime destruction. At the same time, the United States, Japan, and South Korea have in recent years become more reluctant to endorse the original understandings they each reached with China about Taiwan. For the sake of reassurance, the three countries together should clearly confirm in official statements their One China policies and declare that they oppose unilateral changes to the status quo by any side, do not support Taiwan independence, and will accept any resolution of the Taiwan issue (including unification) achieved by peaceful and non–coercive means. Each country’s respective relationship with Taiwan should also remain strictly unofficial. Another concerning aspect associated with this trilateral is the possibility of a corresponding alliance formation of Russia, China, and North Korea. To disincentivize this development, the United States, Japan, and South Korea should leverage their blossoming relationship to assuage Chinese fears of strategic containment, particularly through economic and diplomatic engagement that rejects the creation of a broadly exclusionary bloc in the region.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, Escalation, Regional Security, Great Powers, and Regional Stability
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

1360. Stabilizing the Growing Taiwan Crisis: New Messaging and Understandings are Urgently Needed

Author:
Michael D. Swaine
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The U.S.–China relationship appears to have stabilized since the November 2023 meeting between U.S. president Joe Biden and China’s president Xi Jinping in San Francisco. The reality, however, is that the features and trends pushing both countries toward a confrontation over Taiwan persist, fueling a dangerous, interactive dynamic that could quickly overcome any diplomatic thaw between the world’s foremost powers. These underlying forces — increased levels of domestic threat inflation in both the United States and China, the worst–casing of the other side’s motives and intentions, and the resulting erosion in the confidence of the original understanding over Taiwan reached in the 1970s — threaten to push Beijing and Washington into a crisis over Taiwan that both sides say they want to avoid. To defuse this worrying dynamic, both the United States and China must reaffirm long standing policy on Taiwan, while also undertaking a set of specific actions to further stabilize the relationship between the two countries. The Biden administration should explicitly reject extreme rhetoric towards China and deviations from longstanding policy on Taiwan, such as the framing of Sino–American competition as a titanic struggle between democracy and authoritarianism, and the contention that an independent Taiwan is strategically crucial to overall Asian security. The administration can further inject stability into U.S.–China interactions over Taiwan by re–affirming and clarifying the One China policy through a series of statements, including: The United States opposes any Chinese effort to coerce Taiwan or compel unification through force. However, the United States would accept any resolution of the cross–Strait issue that is reached without coercion and that is endorsed by the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The United States recognizes that the defense of Taiwan is primarily the responsibility of the people of Taiwan. Relatedly, and in accordance with the U.S.–China normalization agreement, Washington is committed to maintaining only unofficial relations with Taiwan and has no desire to alter this commitment. The United States Government reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China’s internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan. These statements should be made in combination with actions that bolster cooperative engagement with China, such as the initiation of a combined civilian and military Track 1.5 dialogue with Beijing. We believe that this type of reassurance would lead to corresponding commitments from China that would improve stability in the Taiwan Strait, such as reductions in provocative military exercises and potentially high level Chinese declarations that reject coercive measures towards Taiwan and a specific timeline for reunification. The recent improvements to the Sino–American relationship shouldn’t go to waste. The United States and China should go beyond the mere appearance of stabilization and revitalize the original understanding over Taiwan. Otherwise, they risk a continuous spiral towards full–scale conflict.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Realism, Regional Stability, and Restraint
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America