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1112. Between the Chinese Dragon and American Eagle: 5G Development in the Baltic States
- Author:
- Maya Guzdar and Tomas Jermalavicius
- Publication Date:
- 08-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- In the course of 2018-20, development of Fifth Generation (5G) communication networks has been increasingly influenced by the considerations of national security and geopolitics. The largest provider of 5G equipment, the Chinese mobile telecom giant Huawei, has come under fire from the U.S., Czechia, Poland, and other nations in recent years for attempted espionage, theft of intellectual property and other nefarious activities; in the past month, UK decided to ban Huawei technology from its networks. All this comes into sharp focus as the geopolitical confrontation between Washington and Beijing reaches new heights. However, China is one of the EU’s largest trading partners and has worked to establish its economic, political, and cultural influence in various Member States. The EU and NATO have both released standards for member states must use when gauging the security of potential 5G networks. Yet, the EU in particular has not enacted a blanket ban or sweeping restrictions on the Chinese 5G equipment providers, leaving the tradeoffs between national security, technological progress and cost-efficiency to individual states. Although the Baltic states are well-versed in dealing with cybersecurity challenges, their road to 5G development is going to be complex. Whole-of-society awareness, political diligence, technical competence, regional cooperation, and resilience to Beijing’s influence operations are needed in forging a clear path to 5G that is aligned with their key geopolitical interest—maintaining their close strategic alliance with the United States. This brief aims to explore the geopolitical factors at play in determining the Baltic states’ 5G policy and regulations, with a particular focus on the EU, U.S., and China’s influence. It also provides a short of overview of the state of current 5G networks and regulations in the Baltic states while identifying challenges that the region will face in the coming years.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, Science and Technology, European Union, Cybersecurity, Resilience, and 5G
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Baltic States
1113. The Bronze Soldier Crisis of 2007: Revisiting an Early Case of Hybrid Conflict
- Author:
- Ivo Juurvee and Anna-Mariita Mattiisen
- Publication Date:
- 08-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- This report revisits the spring 2007 crisis in Estonia, centred on the World War II memorial known as the Bronze Soldier statue. The crisis is well-known both in Estonia and abroad. It was one of the first wake-up calls to the cooling of relations between Russia and the West. It also involved the first use of wide-ranging cyber-attacks against a state.
- Topic:
- Security, History, Cybersecurity, Resilience, Hybrid Warfare, and Hybrid Threats
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, and Estonia
1114. China’s Influence Activities in Estonia
- Author:
- Frank Jüris
- Publication Date:
- 09-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- China’s influence activities aim to create a positive image of China and to counter any kind of criticism. Influence activities in countries with big Chinese communities can mobilise the Chinese diaspora for the party’s benefit—there are plenty of examples from Finland and Sweden. But where this is not possible, propaganda work may fall to the CPC Central Committee’s International Liaison Department, which is responsible for exchanges with foreign parties. The International Liaison Department has been active in its interactions with Estonian politicians. Today, three former government ministers work for Powerhouse, which offers lobbying services for the Chinese company, Huawei. To a large extent, China’s influence activities in Estonia have so far gone unnoticed. This article aims to fill this gap.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, and 5G
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, Estonia, and Baltic States
1115. Democracy, ‘Alternative Reality’ and Estonia’s Resilience
- Author:
- Dmitri Teperik
- Publication Date:
- 10-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- The brief explores reasons why the concerns, grievances and perceptions of all vulnerable societal groups should receive adequate attention if further harm inflicted by fact-free and/or fact-twisting ‘alternative realities’ is to be averted. As some intergroup differences fall notably along the lines related to age, levels of educational attainment, overall welfare and life satisfaction, perceptions of inclusion, and geography, the pervasiveness of misconceptions and social myths as well as their impact on the attitudes, perceptions, and behaviour of citizens can be considered as reliable indicators of societal resilience in Estonia.
- Topic:
- Politics, Governance, Democracy, Resilience, and Information Technology
- Political Geography:
- Estonia and Baltic States
1116. Strengthening NATO’s Cohesion Through Consultation
- Author:
- Wojciech Lorenz
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- In the first of a new series of policy briefs intended to shed light on some of the issues related to the Alliance’s further adaptation and their possible impacts in the Baltic region, Wojciech Lorenz of the Polish Institute of International Affairs examines how NATO’s mechanisms for consultation among Allies have evolved in response to shifts in the security environment, and offers suggestions as to how these mechanisms might be strengthened as a means of mitigating tensions in NATO today.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Social Cohesion
- Political Geography:
- Baltic States
1117. China in Europe and Transatlantic Security
- Author:
- Andrew A. Michta
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Andrew A. Michta argues that the governments of Central and Eastern European countries will need to weigh the benefit to them of continued economic engagement with China, especially in the area of 5G.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, Economy, Transatlantic Relations, and 5G
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America
1118. Capability and Resolve: Deterrence, Security and Stability in the Baltic Region
- Author:
- Heinrich Brauss, Kalev Stoicescu, and Tony Lawrence
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- In response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014, NATO has revitalised its core business of deterrence and defence and adapted it to today’s political and geostrategic circumstances. In the Baltic region, the most visible expression of this effort has been the deployment of the enhanced Forward Presence battlegroups in Poland and the three Baltic states. These are, in turn, backed up by a readiness and reinforcement strategy, which NATO has also strengthened through the adoption of a number of measures agreed by the Allies. But deterrence is a complex matter that involves political, diplomatic, military, economic, cyber, information-related, and other aspects. In the Baltic region, the constraints of geography coupled with the proximity of the region to Russia pose particular challenges to NATO’s approach. The region remains a focus of tensions between Russia and the West and the three Baltic states are still NATO’s most vulnerable members. Moscow, meanwhile, pretends that it is particularly threatened in the Baltic region, where it regards the territory of the Baltic states as a potential bridgehead of American power projection and presents NATO’s deterrence measures as a deliberate, unprovoked and unjustified build-up of forces around its periphery. Two interdependent developments in the period since 2014 have pointed to a particular need to re-examine the credibility of NATO’s posture as it pertains to the Baltic region: first, Russia’s continued programme to achieve conventional military superiority in its western direction; and second, its recent deployment of new mobile, land-based, intermediate-range, nuclear-capable missiles. The former has given Russia has a substantial numerical advantage in ground forces in the Baltic region which give Moscow the option of executing a rapid land-grab attack before NATO could react. The latter could be used to try to decouple Europe from the extended nuclear deterrence provided by the US, paralysing NATO decision making and undermining the Allies’ resolve. Full and expeditious implementation of all decisions taken at Warsaw and Brussels to strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defence posture is therefore imperative. In this policy paper, we recommend some steps that NATO should take in order to strengthen the deterrent effect of NATO forces and to ensure that timely reinforcement of its peripheries is feasible. In the light of a US Congressional request for a detailed assessment from the Pentagon on whether to expand US military presence in the Baltic states, we pay particular attention to the role of US forces in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, Political stability, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Baltic States
1119. Preparing for Crises in Estonia: Improvement Options for Civilian Food and Emergency Goods Supplies
- Author:
- Ivo Juurvee and Ramon Loik
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- The Estonian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications and the Estonian Ministry of Rural Affairs commissioned the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) to compile a list of civilian food and emergency goods supplies, estimated average amounts of supplies at home and in stores, and calculations for the price of national emergency goods supplies and logistics. In addition to the quantities of food and industrial goods, the contracting authorities were interested in the legal issues of stockpiling and the possibilities of storage and distribution. Water, fuel, and drug supplies were not covered by the studies. In the course of the research, the experts also reviewed the solutions of Finland, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Lithuania and other countries and took into account the recommendations of international organisations. The experience of other countries suggests that involving businesses and maintaining the operation of trading networks in the event of a crisis are of key importance. It is reasonable to organise logistics centrally, as crisis transport cannot be ordered separately by ministries and local authorities. Recommendations for the division of tasks between the state and local governments: State-level tasks: Ensure that the goods required in a crisis situation exist through purchases or pre-contracts. Ensure the timely delivery of required food products and emergency goods to distribution points in municipalities (e.g. through pre-contracts with logistics companies). Support local authorities in planning the distribution of goods and test their preparedness by organising special exercises. Local government-level tasks (preparations for distribution of goods): Have an overview of the population and where people are. Coordinate with the state-level to identify the locations of existing and potential additional distribution points that should be situated in the vicinity of shopping centres or other locations people are familiar with visiting. Plan the local distribution of supplies and find relevant partners.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Food, Crisis Management, and Resilience
- Political Geography:
- Estonia and Baltic States
1120. Until Something Moves: Reinforcing the Baltic Region in Crisis and War
- Author:
- Ben Hodges, Tony Lawrence, and Ray Wojcik
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- NATO’s ability to efficiently move large and heavy armed forces into and across Europe is a key aspect of its deterrence and defence posture. In establishing the enhanced Forward Presence in Poland and the three Baltic states, NATO leaders acknowledged that credible deterrence would also require these small multinational forces to be underpinned by a robust reinforcement strategy. In this report, we examine this key aspect of NATO’s defence and deterrence posture as it relates to the Baltic region. In a crisis, military movement in Europe is likely to be confronted by legal and procedural obstacles, by the limited capacity of infrastructure, and by issues related to coordination, command and control. The severity of these problems would vary according to the type of crisis. For an operation to restore Alliance territory following an armed attack, the sheer scale and breadth of NATO’s requirements for military movement would present a major challenge to Europe’s transport infrastructure, and to prioritisation and coordination efforts. NATO has had little practice in reinforcing Allies at scale since the end of the Cold War. A preventative deployment to respond to a potential crisis, meanwhile, would put a premium on speed of movement. In this case, legal and procedural obstacles may be more problematic as timescales for dealing with the bureaucracy would be similar to the timescales for the movement itself. NATO and the EU have cooperated widely to mitigate the legal and procedural challenges of moving armed forces across the European continent, but the processes in place remain numerous and complex. NATO and the EU have also collaborated on the harder task of ensuring that transport infrastructure is suited to military needs. Movement would be challenged by both physical constraints, such as weight limits on roads and bridges and traffic volume restrictions for rail transport, and procedural ones, such as the limitations of the contractual arrangements necessary to enable the use of civilian railway wagons and heavy equipment transporters for military purposes. Such constraints, while manageable in peacetime, may make it difficult to meet the armed forces’ requirements for large-scale movement during crisis. Furthermore, the Baltic region also lacks supporting logistics infrastructure, for example for receiving and staging (and sustaining for extended periods) forces that have arrived in the region. A third set of challenges arises from the need for coordination among the multiple agencies involved in the movement of armed forces. Even amongst movement specialists there is no clear picture of how these agencies would work together during crises or of how movements would be prioritised to serve the operational needs of the Joint Force Commander.
- Topic:
- NATO, War, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Political Crisis
- Political Geography:
- Poland and Baltic States