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1001. Re-energising Europe’s global green reach

Author:
Giovanni Sgaravatti, Simone Tagliapietra, and Cecilia Trasi
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The goals of decarbonisation, competitiveness and strategic autonomy will underpin the implementation of the European Green Deal during the 2024-2029 European Union institutional cycle. To strike the right balance between these sometimes conflicting objectives, EU policymakers should focus on both domestic and international aspects of the Green Deal. Domestically, they must ensure implementation of the agreed climate plan, avoiding inaction or delay. Internationally, they must establish a new green-diplomacy and partnerships strategy, which will support global decarbonisation while addressing competitiveness and strategic autonomy concerns. The current EU approach to green diplomacy is uncoordinated, lacking a clear strategy and appropriate resources. Given the EU’s limited share of annual global emissions, supporting decarbonisation abroad is fundamental to meet the global net-zero emissions goal. The EU’s green diplomacy and partnerships need to be strengthened and expanded in a pragmatic and coherent manner. The main priorities include focusing on the implementation of international emissions reduction pledges, a new diplomatic push for carbon pricing and international green taxation, the creation of streamlined partnerships for green industrialisation with major partner countries and the promotion of new global trade and climate agreements. To succeed in these, a revision of the current governance of EU global green action will be required.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Partnerships, Carbon Emissions, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Europe

1002. The implications of the European Union’s new fiscal rules

Author:
Zsolt Darvas, Lennard Welslau, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
European Union countries are required by the EU Treaty to keep their budget deficits within 3 percent of GDP, and their public debt within 60 percent of GDP. A new framework to enforce these rules is based on country-specific debt sustainability analyses (DSA) and uses a single indicator, a measure of public expenditure, as the annual fiscal policy target. These changes are welcome. To assess the sustainability of public finances, it is much better to focus on the likely evolution of the debt path than to rely on simple numerical rules. Public expenditures net of changes to tax policy are a far better target for fiscal policy than the deficit, since they are under the control of the government and cannot give rise to pro-cyclical fiscal policy (excess spending in good times, fiscal cuts in bad times). These features could increase the framework’s efficiency and improve compliance. However, the new framework also contains numerical safeguards to ensure a minimum pace of debt and deficit reduction. These might overwrite the DSA-based requirements and could undermine the rationale for the new rules and the incentives for compliance. The safeguards could also introduce some pro-cyclicality and, more importantly, could hold back increases in public investment. Our calculations show that the new framework will require ambitious fiscal adjustments from high-debt countries, though less than would have been required by the previous framework. Numerical safeguards will not be a significant constraint in the first application of the framework in 2024, except in the case of Finland. In the next application, in 2028, they imply for France and Italy greater fiscal adjustment than required by the DSA and the 3 percent benchmark. There is ambiguity about the consistency of the new fiscal rules and the largely-unchanged excessive deficit procedure (EDP), and whether proposed reforms and investment will influence the DSA. This could interfere with the successful application of the framework. We recommend that the EDP should require the same adjustment as the DSA, a method- ology should be developed to estimate the quantitative impact of proposed investments and reforms, and the DSA methodology should be revised. In case EU countries’ investment plans on aggregate do not fill the green public-investment gap, we recommend a new EU facility to foster such investments.
Topic:
Budget, European Union, Investment, and Fiscal Policy
Political Geography:
Europe

1003. How much does Europe pay for clean air?

Author:
Miquel Oliu-Barton and Juan Mejino Lopez
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Despite significant progress, air pollution still causes €600 billion in losses each year in the European Union – equal to 4 percent of its annual GDP. These costs stem from productivity losses such as increased absenteeism, the reduction of in-job productivity and harm to ecosystems. Air pollution costs are disproportionately high in eastern Europe and Italy, where losses are projected to remain above 6 percent of GDP until 2030. The EU’s 10 percent most-polluted regions suffer 25 percent of the burden of mortality attributable to air pollution. Measures against air pollution should be prioritised, not delayed, in these regions. Promoting clean air boosts economic growth by €50 billion to €60 billion every year. The EU’s increasing commitment to cleaner air is reflected by a threefold increase in the funds allocated to promoting clean-air policies, from €7 billion annually for the period 2014-2020 to €25 billion annually for 2021-2027, notably supported by the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). EU financial support must continue beyond 2026 when the RRF terminates. The EU Ambient Air Quality Directive sends a strong signal but leaves loopholes: exceptions and postponements may jeopardise overall progress on cleaner air. Fossil-fuel consumption is one of the main obstacles to achieving clean-air targets. Yet fossil fuels subsidies were fourteen times higher than EU clean-air funds between 2014 and 2020, and are projected to remain five times higher for the years ahead. Ammonia, an important precursor of fine particulate matter mainly stemming from agriculture, is insufficiently regulated. Effectiveness of clean-air policies is context-dependent. Identifying concrete actions for each region and quantifying the potential gains are required to accelerate the transition to cleaner air. Phasing out coal use in residential heating is most profitable in eastern Europe, while reducing industrial and agricultural emissions would reap more benefits in the north of Italy.
Topic:
European Union, Economic Growth, Productivity, and Air Pollution
Political Geography:
Europe

1004. The economic case for climate finance at scale

Author:
Patrick Bolton, Alissa M. Kleinnijenhuis, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
It will be impossible to contain the global temperature rise to 1.5 to 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels unless emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) decarbonise much more rapidly. This policy brief examines the economic case for advanced-country financial support for replacement of coal with renewable energy sources in EMDEs. Such conditional financial support is necessary in the sense that an exit from coal consistent with keeping the global temperature rise to between 1.5°C and 2°C will not happen without it, desirable from the perspective of the financier countries, and financially feasible. Although the global economic benefits of phasing out coal are very large, the costs of exiting coal generally exceed the benefits to EMDEs. However, the collective economic benefits to advanced countries greatly exceed those costs. These net benefits are positive even for small coalitions of advanced countries (G7 or G7 plus EU). The fiscal costs of financing the coal exit in EMDEs (without China) are modest as a share of G7+EU GDP at about 0.3 percent of GDP per year, assuming public-sector participation in renewable energy investment costs through blended finance of around 25 percent. Although providing climate finance to EMDEs is economically desirable and feasible from the G7 perspective, it is not happening at the necessary scale, partly because of incentives and political-economy challenges. Advanced countries are more likely to be willing to commit financing to climate action outside their borders if they have more control over how this money is spent. Developing countries are reluctant to phase out coal unless sufficiently large financial support is forthcoming for renewable investments that are consistent with their development goals. These problems could be overcome by tying renewable finance to a coal phase-out. Already-existing Just Energy Transition Partnerships with South Africa, Indonesia and Vietnam are prototypes of this approach. They should be scaled up, with sufficient grants to pay for coal closures and the social transition in coal communities, by explicitly conditioning funding on a coal phase-out and through a stronger governance structure to implement these deals.
Topic:
Climate Change, Emerging Markets, Climate Finance, Renewable Energy, Coal, Carbon Emissions, and Emerging Economies
Political Geography:
Global Focus

1005. A conceptual framework for the identification and governance of European public goods

Author:
Gregory Claeys and Armin Steinbach
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The challenging current policy environment has raised the question of which policy decisions should be taken at national level and which at European Union level. As a general rule, the EU should be responsible only for the provision of European public goods (EPGs), while countries are better placed to provide national public goods. However, in practice, the situation is rarely that simple. We offer a framework for identification of EPGs with three main insights. First, a decision to provide a public good at national level, EU level or a combination of both depends on the degree of heterogeneity of preferences across countries and the efficiency case for EU-level provision. When preferences vary and the efficiency case is weak, goods should be provided at national level. When preferences are similar and the efficiency case is strong, goods should be provided at the EU level. When preferences differ but there is a strong efficiency case, a trade-off arises. Second, institutional and legal instruments exist already to manage this trade-off. These include: competence transfers, decision-making modalities, variable participation of countries, centralisation of delivery and funding, and compensating negatively affected countries to achieve greater alignment of preferences. Third, both the efficiency case for EPGs and the distribution of preferences over their provision may change over time. This could be because the world around the EU changes (for example, giving greater weight to an efficiency case, eg in areas related to defence) or because preferences change, for example, as result of a pandemic, or because a particular institutional or compensation practice convinces dissenters that they can be better off inside than outside a multi-country arrangement governing the provision of a public good. An implication is that the question ‘should public goods be provided at the national or European level?’ may be the wrong question to ask. The right question is how to find institutional arrangements for public-good provision, to maximise the benefits of public goods for EU members.
Topic:
Governance, European Union, Institutions, and Public Goods
Political Geography:
Europe

1006. Navigating the treacherous political economy of structural reform

Author:
Davide Furceri, Jonathan Ostry, and Chris Papageorgiou
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
We examine the economic and electoral effects of liberalisation measures using newly-constructed databases on structural economic reforms and the outcome of democratic elections since the 1970s. The data shows a remarkable slowdown in the pace of liberalisation in both advanced and emerging market and developing countries since the 1990s. A debate has emerged about the causes of this slowdown, including the possibility that reforms do not deliver the economic benefits that advocates, including the multilateral financial institutions, trumpeted. Some have pointed to the fact that the current and previous United States administrations have abandoned neoliberal policies in favour of more government intervention in the economy, and the effect has been globally contagious. Our empirical analysis suggests that the growth dividend from liberalisation is economically and statistically significant, but it emerges only slowly over time. Because of this delay, liberalising reforms are costly to democratic incumbents when they are implemented close to elections. Reforms may generate immediate concentrated losses, which elicit an electoral backlash, especially when the aggregate gains are only visible several years after the reform’s implementation. The electoral penalty is also sensitive to overall business-cycle conditions, being much larger when an economy is in recession. Electoral effects also differ depending on the type of reform. Notably, financial reforms generate more perceptible growth-equity trade-offs than real-economy reforms, especially when implemented during weak economic conditions. The political economy of reform is treacherous. To avoid adverse electoral effects, timing reform early in the electoral term and when business-cycle conditions are favourable is critical. So too is avoiding reforms that generate large distributional costs in the face of small aggregate gains (an adverse growth-equity trade-off). Focusing on these considerations is critical to reinvigorate support for structural reform.
Topic:
Economics, Political Economy, Reform, Elections, and Liberalization
Political Geography:
Global Focus

1007. Instruments of economic security

Author:
Conor McCaffrey and Niclas Poitiers
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Geopolitical and economic developments, including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and trade disruptions during the COVID-19 pandemic, have raised concerns about the European Union’s exposure to hostile countries. The challenge of improving European economic security (which we narrowly treat here as exposure to foreign trade or production shocks) has grown in importance, with various relevant policy measures introduced at EU level. Focusing in particular on the threat posed by economic coercion, this paper begins by assessing the nature of this threat, before outlining two lessons that can be drawn from two recent instances of this coercion in action: China’s actions against Lithuania and Australia respectively. First, while much of the policy debate has focused on imports, the threat to EU exporters should not be ignored. Second, while coercion may not cause any macroeconomically significant harm, this may mask severe impacts on the targeted industries, which should be considered in any policy responses. The EU has significantly added to its policy tools in this area, though some of the instruments introduced under the umbrella of economic security go beyond the definition we consider. An effective response should be built around: building a deeper understanding of the risks facing the EU; improving diversification of both exports and imports; using targeted industrial policy in the limited sectors where the risks warrant intervention; and managing and limiting the fallout of any shocks using ex-post instruments.
Topic:
European Union, Economic Policy, Economic Security, and Coercion
Political Geography:
Europe

1008. Three risks that must be addressed for new European Union fiscal rules to succeed

Author:
Lucio Pench
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The debate on the reform of the European Union’s fiscal rules, the Stability and Growth Pact, has largely focused on their design. This nearly exclusive focus has distracted attention from the equally, if not more, important aspects of implementation. The reform, completed in April 2024, left implementation unaddressed, or at least open to very different potential outcomes. In particular, the reform failed to clarify the interplay between EU countries’ medium-term fiscal structural plans (MTFSPs), which embody the new focus on debt sustainability, and the excessive deficit procedure (EDP), which remains the main enforcement tool under the rules. The need for clarification is urgent as several countries are set to enter EDPs for breaching the SGP’s 3 percent of GDP deficit threshold at the same time as their first MTFSPs are endorsed in autumn 2024. There is a risk that the adjustment paths prescribed by EDPs may be at least temporarily less demanding than the debt-sustainability requirements of the MTFSPs would normally imply. Even if consistency between EDPs and MTFSPs is ensured from the start, inconsistencies may arise over time and be resolved in a way that further postpones the necessary adjustment. The main risk is that the 3 percent of GDP deficit might be perceived as the only target that matters for countries that enter EDPs in 2024, as repeated revisions of the MTFSPs undermine the cogency of the debt sustainability requirements. This scenario is likely to materialise if the countries are allowed to exit their EDPs upon bringing their deficits to or below 3 percent of GDP, while being still far from the necessary correction of the debt trajectory. It is important to shape countries’ expectations on the implementation of the upcoming EDPs in a way that is conducive to the immediate internalisation of the debt sustainability constraint implied by the new rules, rather than allowing it to be viewed as a distant objective. This change in expectations could be achieved by clarifying that, even if a country has been placed in an EDP only for breach of the deficit criterion, it should also satisfy the debt criterion for the procedure to be abrogated.
Topic:
Debt, Reform, European Union, Fiscal Policy, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
Europe

1009. Unpacking China’s industrial policy and its implications for Europe

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Robin Schindowski
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
China is often credited with a successful application of industrial policy. One important particularity of China’s industrial policy is that it aims at levelling the playing field between the state economy and the private economy in access to finance, yet within a framework of strategic goals. This aim is not relevant for market economies, such as those of the European Union, but only for those where state enterprises are clearly privileged. Notwithstanding the difficulties in making valid comparisons, our analysis of how China conducts industrial policy in a variety of sectors points to success in some sectors but not all. More importantly, productivity growth in China has already been declining for two decades. Given the very large resources that China has put into industrial policy, with subsidies being only one part, it is surprising that success is not more evident. This relates partly to factors including cronyism and regional protectionism. While the former might be less relevant for the EU given the different institutional background, the latter certainly is relevant since the EU faces the potential consequences of member country-level industrial policy for its single market. A lesson from China seems to come from the sectoral focus, with a long-term and economic-security mindset. The EU is far from this, but it is in the process of linking economic security to industrial policy. Finally, responding to China’s industrial policy involves diverse investigations and challenges in measuring subsidies accurately. Understanding China’s very diverse and complex approach to helping companies achieve the government’s industrial policy goals is crucial for anticipating the consequences of China’s actions. These could be positive, such as cheaper imports of green technology, or negative, such as Chinese overcapacity spilling over to the EU single market.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, Markets, European Union, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

1010. How to de-risk: European economic security in a world of interdependence

Author:
Jean Pisani-Ferry, Beatrice Weder di Mauro, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Pandemic-related supply disruptions, the energy crisis provoked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and economic coercion by China have put economic security high on the European Union policy agenda. The question is how exactly the EU should ‘de-risk’ its external economic relationships without foregoing the benefits of trade. The standard answer is that it should identify product-level trade dependencies, mainly on the import side, and reduce them, mainly through diversification of suppliers, while otherwise maintaining maximum trade integration. This Policy Brief argues that this answer falls short. First, product-level dependencies cannot be identified reliably even with sophisticated analysis and data. As a result, both ‘missed dependencies’ and ‘false positives’ are inevitable. Second, external shocks and coercion could be propagated through exports, productive assets held abroad and financial channels as much as through imports. The analysis has five main implications Import de-risking should focus on a few product categories for which the costs of supply interruptions would be unquestionably large. This reduces false positives. De-risking and/or buffers to deal with exports and financial coercion require more attention. De-risking must be complemented by raising resilience against all shocks, whatever theirorigin. This requires a deeper and broader European single market. De-risking and resilience must be complemented by deterrence. A sufficiently high probability of chronic trade conflict – or one very large conflict – may justify reducing overall integration with a large trading partner, on both the export andimport sides. EU economic security policies have been right to emphasise the reduction of import dependence on chips and critical raw materials, and the creation of a powerful legal instrument to deter coercion (the Anti-Coercion Instrument). In most other respects, there is room for improvement.
Topic:
European Union, Risk, Trade, Imports, Economic Security, and Interdependence
Political Geography:
China and Europe