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41. Tracking COVID-19 in the Age of AI and Tech Wars

Author:
June Park
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
June Park, political economist at the National Research Foundation of Korea, explains that “even the like-minded countries of GPAI have revealed their differences and institutional variance in deploying digital technology to fight COVID-19 at a time of grave national emergency and public health crisis.”
Topic:
Science and Technology, Crisis Management, Trade, Artificial Intelligence, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:
Asia and Global Focus

42. Americans Positive on South Korea Despite Trump’s Views on Alliance

Author:
Karl Friedhoff
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
The Trump presidency has strained relations with several Asian allies, including South Korea. But the 2020 Chicago Council Survey results show that President Donald Trump’s repeated threats and bullying tactics on defense and trade issues with Seoul have done little to soften support among the American public for the alliance with South Korea. In fact, favorable views of South Korea are now at an all-time high.
Topic:
International Relations, Defense Policy, and Trade
Political Geography:
South Korea, North America, Korea, and United States of America

43. Algeria-Morocco Business Dialogue: The Agricultural and Food Manufacturing Sector

Author:
Charles Elkins
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EastWest Institute
Abstract:
On January 20-21, 2020, the EastWest Institute (EWI) held its first meeting in Berlin as part of its new Algeria-Morocco Business Dialogue, an initiative aiming to address the impediments to greater cross-border trade. By convening sector-specific meetings between local business people from both countries, the project aims to produce a concrete set of feasible recommendations to encourage greater bilateral trade. The inaugural January meeting brought together small to medium-sized business leaders from the agricultural sector to consider boosting greater trade on a micro level, as well as discuss the shortcomings and challenges of each countries’ agricultural and trade policy.
Topic:
Agriculture, International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, and Trade
Political Geography:
Africa, Algeria, and Morocco

44. Challenges in the Transatlantic Partnership: Are We Drifting Apart?

Author:
Martin Michelot
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
During November 2019, EUROPEUM co-organized the second Transatlantic Policy Forum along with CEPA, a leading US think-tank. The private roundtable provided a unique opportunity for candid and open discussion about the issues that are at the heart of transatlantic cooperation. Our research fellow Martin Michelot concluded a debrief and analysis of these debates. 2019 will certainly go down as a year when the political unity of the Alliance was tested - and when NATO held together strong. The year ended with a NATO Leaders Summit that centered around the comments made by French President Emmanuel Macron a month prior, where he declared NATO to be in a state of “brain death” and cast a shadow on whether the collective security guarantee would still hold strong in the near future. That was not the only moment of transatlantic tension: tensions flared over European 5G markets, which may be built by Chinese companies, and trade has become an inflamed issue between Europe, the U.S. and China. The debrief includes analysis of NATO, U.S.-EU Trading Relations and a to-do list for transatlantic cooperation.
Topic:
International Relations, NATO, Trade, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, United States of America, and North America

45. Cooperation in Trade in Services

Author:
Akshay Mathur and Purvaja Modak
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:
The shift in the global trend from trade in goods to trade in services, especially digital services has focused attention on the necessity of a modern and robust regulatory framework for it. The bilateral steps by India and Canada outlined in this paper can feed into current efforts by multilateral institutions to develop a universal framework for capturing services trade data.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Regulation, Institutions, Services, and Trade
Political Geography:
South Asia, Canada, India, and North America

46. Fostering Growth in Digital Trade

Author:
Don Stephenson
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:
The shifting trends in trade, especially given the growth in communications capacity and reduced cost of computing have altered traditional economic development. India and Canada have a shared commercial interest in E-trade. Both countries need to align their resources to frame trade rules of the new digital economy, to mutual benefit.
Topic:
Communications, Economic growth, Trade, and Economic Development
Political Geography:
South Asia, Canada, India, and North America

47. Ambition and Overreach: Countering One Belt One Road and Beijing’s Plans to Dominate Global Innovation

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The first monograph in this series, China’s Economic Slowdown: Root Causes, Beijing’s Response and Strategic Implications for the US and Allies, examined the structural problems in the Chinese economy that have led to a recent permanent slowdown after three decades of double-digit growth rates. The monograph focused on the political and economic costs of the slowdown and efforts to stabilize an economy that has poured far too much national wealth into commercially unproductive areas. Yet the Communist Party is not passively awaiting an unhappy economic fate in connection with its mounting imbalances and domestic economic dysfunction. In many respects, its leaders have been highly creative in seeking solutions that do not entail a weakening of the party’s hold on economic power. On the contrary, the party has been busily shaping and pursuing grand strategic policies such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Made in China 2025 (MIC 2025) to solve or alleviate many of its domestic political-economic problems. This monograph, part two in the series, examines how the US and its allies can confront and counter these Chinese strategies and initiatives. It will do so by taking seriously the challenge they present and suggesting responses that take into account Chinese vulnerabilities and the points of leverage available to the US and its allies. This linking of China’s vulnerabilities and weaknesses, on the one hand, and its ambition and purpose with respect to its outward-focused policies, is essential for effective policy responses. If the domestic is not linked with the external, US policies are much more likely to become complacent, counterproductive, or susceptible to overreaching. In linking analyses of Beijing’s domestic political economy with its external policies, the monograph will challenge some enduring but incorrect grand narratives that play into the hands of the CCP.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Science and Technology, and Trade
Political Geography:
China and Asia

48. Next Steps for US Trade, Manufacturing, and Supply Chains After COVID-19

Author:
Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The imperative to return supply chains to the United States for products important to national defense, medical security, and competitiveness in key industrial and technology sectors is not new. The explosive growth of the Chinese manufacturing sector, its mercantilist challenge to the world trading system, and its impact on jobs and industrial leadership in the United States is well known and well documented. This challenge has prompted new research and policies to help reverse the erosion of US supply chains. US technology leadership has been undermined by China’s forced technology transfer, theft of intellectual property, and subsidization of traditional and new higher technology sectors. In turn, the loss of global markets and US manufacturing jobs have resulted in social problems of increasing devastation to communities in industrial areas. China’s economic growth depends, in a historically unprecedented way, on its export model and the suppression of domestic consumption. This results in a cycle of overproduction, expansion of external spheres of economic influence, and dumping of products abroad. In recent years, the United States has begun to challenge the Chinese model. However, much work remains to be done to accomplish the goal of ending mercantilist practices, establishing a level playing field for US producers, and reinvigorating domestic production. Critical supply chains for US national defense and high technology leadership have become overly dependent on China and other foreign sources. The vulnerability of supply chains has been demonstrated by interruptions in supply of key materials by both natural disasters and political decisions such as Beijing’s cutoff of rare earth metals a decade ago. More recently, in July 2020, the production of critical personal protective equipment was interrupted by massive flooding in the interior of China. Beyond Beijing’s unfair practices, China is a continental economy with the ambition to displace the United States as the leader in the global economy of the 21st century and has the economies of scale to represent a serious, long term threat to US leadership and markets. The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated these preexisting trends and underscores the importance of bringing industrial supply chains, including medical products, back to the United States. First, the cut-off of medical supplies, not just from China but from Europe and other allies, brought the vulnerabilities of relying on outside sourcing into clearer and more immediate focus. Ninety countries blocked the exports of medical products during the early months of the pandemic. Second, border closures around the world, even within the European Union (EU), added to the worries about supply chain interruptions, including for workers and logistics. Seventy percent of the world’s points of entry restricted foreign travelers at some point as the pandemic grew. Third, border closures and supply chain interruptions increased tensions between nations, especially between the United States and China, which was criticized for its suppression of information at the start of the pandemic. Beijing’s brazen imposition of a new security law in Hong Kong while the world was preoccupied by the pandemic further eroded its global standing, especially in Europe. Fourth, the economic collapse due to the pandemic response again focused attention on the need to create more domestic jobs, including those in the hard-hit industrial sector. Finally, all these developments led allies such as the United Kingdom, Japan, and the EU to advance new policies meant to bring production back to home territories. These trends support initiatives to increase the resiliency of domestic production, even beyond the parameters of defense and medical security.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, Manufacturing, Trade, COVID-19, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

49. Double-Edged Aid: China’s Strategy to Gain Influence through Regional Assistance

Author:
Liselotte Odgaard
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This report addresses China’s approach to development in Central Asia, Southeast Asia, East Africa, and the Arctic. China has worked through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to meet Russian demands for continued regional primacy in Central Asia, helping Beijing foster economic and social dominance, access strategic energy resources, and treat the Uyghur minorities as a problem of terrorism rather than a development issue. In Southeast Asia, China has worked through the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to meet regional demands for soft and hard infrastructure to legitimize China’s growing strategic presence. China is therefore able to undermine the regional economic and security foothold of the US alliance system and challenge the interpretations of the Law of the Sea that legitimizes the military presence and activities of extra regional powers. In East Africa, China has cooperated with the African Union (AU) and the East African Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to address regional demands for hard and soft infrastructure without political conditions, to link antipiracy problems to problems of poverty, and to mediate local civil wars. This has helped China establish an economic and strategic foothold at the intersection of the Indian Ocean and Middle East, projecting power far from its shores. In the Arctic, China has established research stations that function as both environmental research laboratories and military surveillance stations.
Topic:
International Relations, Economics, Health, Foreign Aid, Regulation, and Trade
Political Geography:
China and Asia

50. Brexit: An Assessment of Zambia- UK Trade & Investment Relations

Author:
Shimukunki Manchishi and Mwanda Phiri
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (ZIPAR)
Abstract:
Following the Brexit referendum held in the UK in 2016 that resulted in a majority vote to leave the EU, there has been speculation and uncertainty surrounding the likely impact of Brexit on trade relations between the UK and developing countries such as Zambia. With Brexit, comes the exit of the UK from the EU, its customs union as well as the single market. Consequently, this implies that Zambia’s trade with the UK will no longer be under the ambit of the EU Everything But Arms (EBA) trade agreement which grants Zambian products other than arms, duty-free and quota-free market access to the UK. Naturally, this brings about questions of the likely impact of Brexit on trade relations between Zambia and the UK which thus far, has been determined collectively under the framework of the EU since the UK’s accession to the EU customs union. In this policy paper, we provide a contextual analysis of the same. From this, we deduce that a ‘deal’ or ‘no deal’ Brexit is not likely to adversely impact the UK’s trade with Zambia. This is on condition that the UK’s own unilateral preference scheme comes into place and in time, to replicate the EU-EBA scheme with no disruption to traders. On the Investment front, although the UK has been Zambia’s fourth-largest source country for FDI inflows over the period 2010-2017, investments have been waning. Brexit has the potential to turn things around as the UK seeks to increase investments in other jurisdictions outside of the EU. With the UK now envisioning to become the largest G7 investor in Africa by 2022, there is a high probability that Brexit could lead to a positive investment crowding in effect, provided Zambia becomes a more attractive investment destination.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Brexit, Investment, and Trade
Political Geography:
Africa, United Kingdom, Europe, and Zambia