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301. We Need to Distinguish Between Local and Globalist Foreign Fighters

Author:
Maja Touzari Greenwood
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
The broad definition of the term ‘foreign fighter’ causes operational problems for risk assessments. It is therefore important for security officials to identify significant variations by classifying actors into major categories. RECOMMENDATIONS ■When assessing the risk of continued security threats from foreign fighters, it is crucial to distinguish strategically between foreign fighters who join local rebel groups and those who join globalist groups. ■Ways should be provided for foreign fighters who have joined local rebel groups to ‘opt out’ and return home after the end of fighting in order to discourage them from becoming globalist foreign fighters and to stem potential flows of foreign fighters to new theatres of conflict.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Terrorism, and Fragile States
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

302. Inside the Russian Digital Domain: Plug in, plug out

Author:
Flemming Splidsboel Hansen
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
The digital domain is an arena of opportunity for Russia in which to attempt to achieve its various objectives. However, it is also a source of threat, as it contains the possibility of attacks on Russia’s digital infrastructure, including the ability to send a relatively uninterrupted flow of information to the public. The continued development of artificial intelligence has the potential to upset the system, and Russia, which will trail the leading states within this field, is still in the early phases of formulating a response to this challenge. Recommendations ■ Remember that the digital domain in Russia is seen not only as an arena of opportunity, but also as a source of threat to the state (or rather to the regime). ■ Be prepared for Russia to think creatively to minimize the gap separating it from the world’s leaders in the development of AI. ■ Be prepared for Russia to work for an international regime restricting the use of AI for military purposes.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Power Politics, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

303. Disinformation Goes South: Political technologies threaten developing countries

Author:
Adam Moe Fejerskov and Flemming Splidsboel Hansen
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
Political technologies executed from within the digital domain are increasingly deployed in the Global South. Here, social media monopolies and an upsurge in the number of new digital media users allow information operations to reach millions and affect important political developments. The consequences can be fatal, as seen in Myanmar. Recommendations Be prepared for a rapid transfer of the political technology of contemporary information operations to political actors in the Global South ■ Anticipate information operations, including the use of disinformation, that exploit the combination of social media monopolies and an upsurge in the number of new digital media users ■ Invest in digital media literacy and social media accountability mechanisms in states that have recently been affected by media disruption
Topic:
Security, Development, Science and Technology, and Fragile States
Political Geography:
Southeast Asia and Myanmar

304. Achieving a Sustainable Peace in Yemen Lies with Locally Driven Initiatives

Author:
Maria-Louise Clausen
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
The conflict in Yemen will not be solved by a peace agreement between the Houthis and the internationally recognized government due to the increased fragmentation of internal political and economic structures. RECOMMENDATIONS ■Denmark is well positioned to take on a bigger role in pushing for a sustainable peace agreement and a realistic transitional framework. ■Denmark should prioritize building close links with local actors. ■Denmark should support and empower local authorities and communities in parallel with an effort to build the capacity of the Yemeni state.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Non State Actors, and Fragile States
Political Geography:
Yemen and Gulf Nations

305. Can China Buy Peace? Money and Security in the South China Sea

Author:
Yang Jiang
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
Despite China’s strong economic influence over Southeast Asian countries, tensions in the South China Sea have been flaring up again this year, as domestic oppositions and external interventions create dilemma for Southeast Asian governments. RECOMMENDATIONS ■ When considering joining the freedom of navigation operations in the SCS Denmark should consider that foreign interference will likely escalate Chinese military activities. ■ Denmark’s delicate relationship with the US and China must be carefully evaluated and managed. ■As a major maritime nation it is important for Denmark to secure a free sea through diplomacy and UN institutions. ■European countries have much room to enhance their contribution to regional development in Southeast Asia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, International Organization, History, Power Politics, Economy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China and Asia

306. Denmark's China Challenge

Author:
Luke Patey
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
A common refrain in Denmark is that China is too far away to be a threat to Danish economic, foreign and security policy interests. This is no longer the case. Danish policy-makers acknowledge that China’s rise as a global superpower presents Denmark with new challenges. However, transforming this strategic thinking into practice is no simple task. Recommendations Intensify cooperation between the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs to ensure Denmark’s initiatives in foreign policy, security and economic relations with China are more closely integrated. Beware of the bilateral. Beijing’s new assertive foreign policy and US-China strategic competition require that Denmark leverage its interests increasingly through the EU, NATO and other multilateral bodies. Assess the economic vulnerabilities of Danish industries in China and diversify trade and investment across Asia’s emerging markets and developed economies in the G7/EU.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Power Politics, Bilateral Relations, Cybersecurity, and Global Political Economy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Denmark

307. The Impact of Remote Surveillance in Iraq: A tool of coercion or public security

Author:
Maria-Louise Clausen
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
The state of Iraq is struggling to exert control over its territory. As a result, remote surveillance is being used to enhance the effectiveness of policing. However, constant surveillance may have a negative impact on emerging state–society relations. RECOMMENDATIONS ■ Invest in research focusing on the impact of surveillance on state–society relations in the Global South. ■ Work to introduce transparency in the use of surveillance in the Global South. ■ Encourage a discussion of issues of privacy and the regulation of airspace in the Global South.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Fragile States, Surveillance, Violence, and Justice
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Global South

308. Renewed Escalation: Why Does Al-Shabab Attack Kenya?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The Somali-based al-Shabab al-Mujahideen movement has stepped up its terrorist attacks on neighboring countries, chiefly Kenya. Such attacks have receded over the past three years, amid the movement’s focus on targeting police and military forces in Somalia. However, the recent terrorist operation launched by the movement’s affiliates in the capital, Nairobi, on January 15, 2018, which hit the Dusit-D2 complex, housing a hotel and offices, killing around 15 people and injuring a similar number, raises numerous questions about the motives behind targeting Kenya again. This comes at the time when numerous analysts suggest that the movement will more likely intensify internal assaults on the Somali security and military institutions with the aim of consolidating its influence and curtailing the activity of rival groups.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, and Al Shabaab
Political Geography:
Kenya, Somalia, and Africa

309. Shared Destiny: How Do Security Arrangements Tie the Rukban Camp to al-Tanf Base?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The Rukban camp on the Jordan-Syrian borders constitutes a double crisis of a humanitarian and political nature. While there are signs that the humanitarian crisis is on its way to be resolved through an understanding to alleviate the suffering of tens of thousands of the displaced persons in the camp, the political crisis remains very complex. This is primarily because of obstacles to dialogue between the concerned parties. The camp falls under the scope of the American al-Tanf base. While Russia and the Syrian regime are pushing for dismantling the largest human enclave on the road to al-Tanf, the US does not share the same desire on the grounds that there is still a need for guarantees for the return of displaced persons to their homes, which are currently under the control of the regime. This shows how far the crisis is linked to the fate of the US military presence in Syria as well as the Russian and Syrian positions.
Topic:
Security, Refugees, Syrian War, and Rukban
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, North America, Jordan, and United States of America

310. Possible Rivalry: What is the Impact of al-Baghdadi Video Message on Boko Haram?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Mutual escalation has come to define the constant confrontations between the Nigerian movement Boko Haram and the Multinational Joint Task Force, formed by some West African countries, to confront its activity and weaken its ability to expand beyond the national borders, namely to Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. This escalation may continue over the coming period, as the movement becomes one of the main branches of ISIS, on which the latter relies to stage counter-strikes in response to the losses sustained in Syria and Iraq.
Topic:
Security, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, and Boko Haram
Political Geography:
Africa, Iraq, Middle East, West Africa, Syria, Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger