The fissures appearing in the U.S.-Japan alliance's foundation are deeply rooted, not the function of one political leader or party. Factors like relations with China, nuclear policy, and the future of the Japanese constitution have made Japanese political factions, and alliance dynamics, more complicated.
Recent reporting by the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) and the Department of Defense provides added insight into how the course of the fighting tracks with the development of Afghan security forces. The metrics in this analysis are not a substitute for reading the detailed Department of Defense reporting on Afghan force development available in the publications section of DoD's web site at defenselink.gov, or the new NTM-A report, "Year in Review, November 2009 to November 2010." They do show, however, that there is now a far more credible prospect that Afghan forces will be ready for transition in 2014, and capable of largely assuming responsibility for security operations. The one critical caveat is that these efforts must continue to be properly funded, and that NATO has not yet obtained anything like the quantity and quality of trainers and partners it needs to win. These metrics make it clear that this is a the highest single priority for added military contributions from NATO countries, and that current assets meet less that 40% of the requirement needed by mid-2011.
The absence of consensus, and therefore of policy, on how to balance privacy with the need for government cybersecurity measures, has led many to contemplate intelligence oversight practices as a possible model for oversight in the cybersecurity realm. Reliance on intelligence privacy oversight practices for cybersecurity might allow us to duck the hard work of developing appropriate cybersecurity policy, but it would not in the end further cybersecurity for the nation. A better approach would be to adopt the purely structural aspects of Executive Order 12333, developing a parallel executive order tailored to the distinct goals and operational drivers of cybersecurity. Such a document would establish basic guidelines for policy governing cyber mission, frame cybersecurity oversight processes, and mandate the development and approval of procedures to implement them.
As we approach the tenth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks next September, the United States, its Western allies, and nearly all states in the Islamic world are facing a weakened jihadi enemy, but one still capable of inflicting, or threatening to inflict, spectacular acts of terrorist violence. The recent attempts to send package bombs on cargo planes is only the latest in a series of plots suggesting that although al-Qaida and its cohorts have suffered a number of setbacks, the group and its affiliates and associates continue to pose a serious challenge to the security of the United States and its allies.
With the exception of a handful of capitals friendly to Tehran, and of course the Iranian regime itself, few now dispute the notion that the Islamic Republic of Iran is involved in a nuclear weapons program—and one that will, unfortunately, come to fruition in the next few years. News of Iran's seemingly-unstoppable drive for nuclear status is no real surprise, of course; despite four UN Security Council Resolutions condemning Iran and imposing punitive economic sanctions, Tehran continues to enrich uranium for those weapons virtually unhindered.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Political Violence, Islam, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and International Security
Wan-Jung Chou, Alistair Hunt, Anil Markandya, Andrea Bigano, Roberta Pierfederici, and Stephane La Branche
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies
Abstract:
There is a decided movement in EU energy markets towards a deregulated framework. This framework, however, might lack the necessary incentive structure for generators to maintain high service reliability, thus increasing the risk of generation and transmission outages. Faced with such a challenge, it is crucial for policy-makers to envisage consumer valuation of service reliability in the future so that an acceptable combination of regulatory and economic tools can be applied to maintain adequate security of energy supply that is socially optimal and economically efficient.
Efficient development of electricity transmission infrastructure is crucial to achieving EU targets for a secure, competitive and sustainable electricity supply. However, many uncertainties, such as future load demand, generation supply, electricity prices and increasing time requirements for the realisation of transmission infrastructures in member states, increase the risk that these targets will not be reached. Given the forecasted increase of distributed generation and the introduction of demand response techniques to control load, new decentralised network architectures must be defined to guarantee the system's efficient use and stability. Each link in the chain of electricity security of supply is crucial, from generation to transmission to distribution to demand.
Christian von Hirschhausen, Clemens Haftendorn, Johannes Herold, Franziska Holz, Anne Neumann, and Sophia Rüster
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies
Abstract:
Europe faces a paradox with respect to coal supply security. On the one hand, coal is a reliable fossil fuel, with ample reserves available from a large number of producers. Globally, coal use has risen at a rate of 4.9% annually in recent years (WCI, 2010). Yet on the other hand, Europe's climate policy objectives will not allow continued use unless this 'dirtiest' of all fossil fuels can be transformed into a 'clean' one, e.g. via new carbon capture, transport and storage (CCTS) technology. CCTS, however, this requires substantial technological advances for application in the medium and long term (MIT, 2007). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2005) concludes that CCTS can contribute 15-55% of the cumulative emissions reduction effort through 2100, and assumes a major role in a portfolio of the low carbon technologies needed to mitigate climate change. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2008), CCTS is "the most important single new technology for CO2 savings" in both power generation and industry. However, the IEA's 2009 'Blue Map' scenario also states that 100 carbon capture plants, a minimum of 10,000 km of pipelines and storage of 1.2 GtCO2 are required for CCTS to become a serious abatement technology by 2020. We are nowhere close to these and might never get there.
Clearly the natural gas market is experiencing considerable change: a second Ukraine-Russia gas crisis, a collapse in the price of natural gas, a new European natural gas security of supply regulation and the mass production of natural gas from unconventional sources in the US as a result of technological advancements, which could yet have an impact on the EU. This Policy Brief is a summation of the European Union's vulnerability to natural gas supply security risks.
Considers the Republicans' alternatives following their victories in the 2010 midterm elections, and identifies a moral conflict, which, if unresolved, will preclude them from saving the land of liberty