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41. Genomic surveillance: Inside China's DNA dragnet

Author:
Emile Dirks and James Leibold
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Abstract:
What’s the problem? The Chinese Government is building the world’s largest police-run DNA database in close cooperation with key industry partners across the globe. Yet, unlike the managers of other forensic databases, Chinese authorities are deliberately enrolling tens of millions of people who have no history of serious criminal activity. Those individuals (including preschool-age children) have no control over how their samples are collected, stored and used. Nor do they have a clear understanding of the potential implications of DNA collection for them and their extended families. Earlier Chinese Government DNA collection campaigns focused on Tibet and Xinjiang, but, beginning in late 2017, the Ministry of Public Security expanded the dragnet across China, targeting millions of men and boys with the aim to ‘comprehensively improve public security organs’ ability to solve cases, and manage and control society’.1 This program of mass DNA data collection violates Chinese domestic law and global human rights norms. And, when combined with other surveillance tools, it will increase the power of the Chinese state and further enable domestic repression in the name of stability maintenance and social control. Numerous biotechnology companies are assisting the Chinese police in building this database and may find themselves complicit in these violations. They include multinational companies such as US-based Thermo Fisher Scientific and major Chinese companies like AGCU Scientific and Microread Genetics. All these companies have an ethical responsibility to ensure that their products and processes don’t violate the fundamental human rights and civil liberties of Chinese citizens. What’s the solution? The forensic use of DNA has the potential to solve crimes and save lives; yet it can also be misused and reinforce discriminatory law enforcement and authoritarian political control. The Chinese Government and police must end the compulsory collection of biological samples from individuals without records of serious criminal wrongdoing, destroy all samples already collected, and remove all DNA profiles not related to casework from police databases. China must enact stringent restrictions on the collection, storage, use and transfer of human genomic data. The Chinese Government must also ensure that it adheres to the spirit of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data (2003), the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (1997) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), as well as China’s own Criminal Law (2018). National and international legal experts have condemned previous efforts to enrol innocent civilians and children in forensic DNA databases, and the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy should investigate the Chinese Government’s current collection program for any violations of international law and norms.2 Foreign governments must strengthen export controls on biotechnology and related intellectual property and research data that’s sold to or shared with the Chinese Government and its domestic public and private partners. Chinese and multinational companies should conduct due diligence and independent audits to ensure that their forensic DNA products and processes are not being used in ways that violate the human and civil rights of Chinese citizens.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Minorities, Surveillance, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and DNA
Political Geography:
China, Australia, and Asia-Pacific

42. After Covid-19: Australia and the world rebuild (Volume 1)

Author:
John Coyne and Peter Jennings
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Abstract:
This Strategy report offers policy-focused analysis of the world we will face once the pandemic has passed. At a time when all our assumptions about the shape of Australian society and the broader global order are being challenged, we need to take stock of likely future directions. The report analyses 26 key topics, countries and themes, ranging from Australia’s domestic situation through to the global balance of power, climate and technology issues. In each case we asked the authors to consider four questions. What impact did Covid-19 have on their research topic? What will recovery mean? Will there be differences in future? What policy prescriptions would you recommend for the Australian government?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Climate Change, Disaster Relief, National Security, Science and Technology, Coronavirus, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Australia and Global Focus

43. Weaponised deep fakes

Author:
Hannah Smith and Katherine Mansted
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Abstract:
Fakes are all around us. Academic analysis suggests that they’re difficult to spot without new sensors, software or other specialised equipment, with 1 in 5 photos you see being fraudulent. The exposure of deep fakes and the services they facilitate can potentially lead to suppression of information and a general breakdown in confidence in public authorities and trust. We need to react not just to false or compromised claims but to those who would try to exploit them for nefarious purposes. We should not assume the existence of fake news unless we have compelling evidence to the contrary, but when we do, we should not allow the propaganda. I’ve never been more sure of this point than today. —GPT-2 deep learning algorithm The foreword to this report was written by a machine. The machine used a ‘deep fake’ algorithm — a form of artificial intelligence (AI) — to generate text and a headshot. Deep fakes are increasingly realistic and easy to create. The foreword took us approximately five minutes to generate, using free, open-source software.1
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Internet, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

44. Uyghurs for sale: 'Re-education', forced labour and surveillance beyond Xinjiang

Author:
Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, Danielle Cave, James Leibold, Kelsey Munro, and Nathan Ruser
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Abstract:
The Chinese government has facilitated the mass transfer of Uyghur and other ethnic minority1 citizens from the far west region of Xinjiang to factories across the country. Under conditions that strongly suggest forced labour, Uyghurs are working in factories that are in the supply chains of at least 82 well-known global brands in the technology, clothing and automotive sectors, including Apple, BMW, Gap, Huawei, Nike, Samsung, Sony and Volkswagen. This report estimates that more than 80,000 Uyghurs were transferred out of Xinjiang to work in factories across China between 2017 and 2019, and some of them were sent directly from detention camps.2 The estimated figure is conservative and the actual figure is likely to be far higher. In factories far away from home, they typically live in segregated dormitories,3 undergo organised Mandarin and ideological training outside working hours,4 are subject to constant surveillance, and are forbidden from participating in religious observances.5 Numerous sources, including government documents, show that transferred workers are assigned minders and have limited freedom of movement.6 China has attracted international condemnation for its network of extrajudicial ‘re-education camps’ in Xinjiang.7 This report exposes a new phase in China’s social re-engineering campaign targeting minority citizens, revealing new evidence that some factories across China are using forced Uyghur labour under a state-sponsored labour transfer scheme that is tainting the global supply chain.
Topic:
Human Rights, Science and Technology, Labor Issues, Minorities, Business, and Uyghurs
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Australia

45. Australia's next cybersecurity strategy: Views from The Strategist

Author:
Fergus Hanson, Gai Brodtmann, Rachael Falk, Nigel Phair, Lesley Seebeck, and Peter A. Dutton
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Abstract:
Back in 2016, Australia launched a new national cybersecurity strategy. The strategy covers a four-year period to 2020, and given the changes in the security environment, an update is now clearly warranted. To that end, the government has just released a discussion paper to kick off the public consultation. The closing date for submissions on the discussion paper is 1 November. To complement the public submission process, ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre is initiating a public debate on what should be included in the next cybersecurity strategy. Contributions will be compiled into a report that we will deliver to the Department of Home Affairs to inform the strategy’s development. This Strategic Insight includes views from The Strategist published in late 2019.
Topic:
Development, Government, Science and Technology, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

46. ICT for development in the Pacific islands

Author:
Bart Hogeveen
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Abstract:
Information and communication technologies (ICTs) as an invisible driver of socio-economic change have long captured the imagination of politicians, policymakers and aid professionals alike. Since the first fibre-optic submarine cable connected Fiji 20 years ago, many reports and studies have been written about the potential that the introduction of ICTs in the South Pacific would bring for reaching targets of poverty reduction and economic growth. The internet, mobile devices and e-commerce have already penetrated the Pacific, configured to the political, economic and sociocultural context of the various island nations. This report takes a step back and zooms in on one aspect of that digital revolution: e-government. E-Government is defined as a set of capabilities and activities that involves the use of ICTs by government to improve intragovernmental processes and to connect with citizens, businesses and industry. Fiji was the first island to get linked up to the global network of submarine communications cables in 2000. In 2020, all major islands in the region are connected through one or more domestic and international fibre-optic cables. The region is connected. This report finds that the potential of ICTs to enable stronger governance, effective public service delivery and better government services is there. In all countries that are part of this study, critical foundational infrastructure is in place: Government broadband networks that connect departments, schools and hospitals have been established. Central government data centres have been built, public registries are being digitised, and the introduction of national (digital) identities is currently being considered. All Pacific island states have introduced relevant strategy and policy documents and have reviewed, or are currently reviewing, legislation related to data-sharing, cybersecurity and universal access. All islands have an online presence that is steadily professionalising. Government (information) services are increasingly provided online, along with tourism information, fisheries data, geological data and meteorological forecasts. But there’s still a lot to be unlocked. Increased internet connectivity, the availability of mobile devices and online services and access to information are creating a greater demand from users to their governments. International donors similarly focus on the delivery of ‘digital aid’, using ICTs to provide international assistance more efficiently and effectively. This report asks the following questions: What capabilities have been established and are in place? What are the current policy issues? What can the international (donor) community do to enhance its support for the digitisation process of the Pacific island governments? The report reaches five main conclusions for the implementation of e-government and digital government initiatives, and it concludes with four recommendations for future programming of international support in the area of ICTs and e-government.
Topic:
Development, Science and Technology, Communications, and Internet
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

47. The Use of Cyberspace in the Context of Hybrid Warfare. Means, Challenges and Trends

Author:
Cholpon Abdyraeva
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
This paper aims to introduce the state of art on hybrid warfare and seeks to address the conceptual confusion regarding an ever-expanding concept of hybrid warfare. By doing so, this paper simultaneously attempts to assess the growing significance of cyber and information domains within the hybrid warfare, which can be clearly illustrated by the example of the Russian hybrid warfare strategy. The Russian approach to hybrid warfare has considerably broadened the scope of hybrid warfare and changed the focus of debates from military to non-military components of hybrid warfare. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is: 1) to produce a deeper insight into hybrid warfare, including related trends, and 2) to assess the role and impact of cyber and information warfare with a particular focus on Russia. This paper can serve as an introduction that guides policy makers with expert opinions, and as such, intends to motivate further investigation in this field.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Internet, Conflict, and Hybrid Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia and Global Focus

48. Normalization by Other Means—Technological Infrastructure and Political Commitment in the North Korean Nuclear Crisis

Author:
Christopher Lawrence
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
The 1994 Agreed Framework called for North Korea to dismantle its plutonium-production complex in exchange for civilian light water reactors (LWRs) and the promise of political normalization with the United States. Today, scholars look back at the Agreed Framework as a U.S. offer of “carrots” to bribe the regime, but this framing overlooks the credibility challenges of normalization and the distinctive technical challenges of building LWRs in North Korea. Political and technical analysis reveals how the LWR project helped build credibility for the political changes promised in the Agreed Framework.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Politics, Science and Technology, History, Infrastructure, Crisis Management, and Normalization
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, Korea, and United States of America

49. Asia Beyond China: Developing a European Indo-Pacific Strategy for a Changing Global Order

Author:
Luke Patey
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
Much of Europe’s attention to Asia is currently being captured by China. However, if the European Union and its member states are serious about maintaining a rules-based global order and advancing multilateralism and connectivity, it should increase its work in building partnerships across Asia, particularly in the Indo-Pacific super-region. To save multilateralism, go to the Indo-Pacific. RECOMMENDATIONS: ■ Multilateralism first. Unpack and differentiate where the United States and China support the rules-based order and where not, but also look to new trade deals and security pacts with India and Southeast Asia partners. ■ Targeted connectivity. The EU should continue to offer support to existing regional infrastructure and connectivity initiatives. ■ Work in small groups. EU unanimity on China and Indo-Pacific policy is ideal, but not always necessary to get things done. ■ Asia specialists wanted. Invest in and develop career paths for Asia specialists in foreign and defence ministries and intelligence services.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Emerging Markets, International Organization, Science and Technology, Power Politics, and European Union
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

50. Danish Civil-Society Organizations Need to Sharpen their Innovation Focus: Maturing 'techvelopment'

Author:
Adam Moe Fejerskov and Dane Fetterer
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
Danish civil-society organisations have initiated a multitude of tech and innovation projects in recent years. Now is the time to focus efforts on clear strategic objectives in order to generate tangible impacts. RECOMMENDATIONS ■ Strategically align innovation work around the core priorities of the organisation, rather than pursuing a shotgun approach that chases disparate innovations across a field of interests. ■ Expand the scope of innovation beyond radical technology to include operational approaches, methodologies and theories of change as well. ■ Localize innovation by involving local partners and beneficiaries not just in needs assessments but in innovating solutions.
Topic:
Civil Society, Development, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
Europe and Denmark