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231. Unlocking the Potential of Civic Technology

Author:
Kris Hartley
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
According to IDC Research, aggregate worldwide investment in technology programs for cities reached $80 billion in 2018 and will reach $135 billion by 2021. The rise of information and communications technologies (ICT) has generated unprecedented opportunities for public engagement in urban policy and service delivery. Through a set of applications collectively known as civic technology (hereafter “civic tech”), increased public participation has the potential to deepen the democratization of urban governance and improve its responsiveness and accountability. As the digital revolution enables initiatives like smart cities and e-governance, safeguarding methods of democratic influence is a core strategic mandate for city governments wishing to politically legitimize technology. Pursuant to this issue, civic tech is distinguishable from smart cities and other urban technology programs in its focus on citizen empowerment. For this reason, it has the potential to go beyond the typical promises of efficiency gains – as peddled by standard technologies – and transform how citizens engage with policymakers.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, Urban, and Cities
Political Geography:
Global Focus

232. The Use of Predictive Analysis Programs in Police Intelligence: A European Comparison / El uso de programas de análisis predictivo en la inteligencia policial: una comparativa europea

Author:
Virginia Cinelli and Alberto Manrique Gan
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
Nowadays, two main limitations persist in intelligence analysis: the intrinsic existence of a certain degree of uncertainty and the large volume of information available. In order to face these problems, since the end of the 90s, technology and statistics have been used in the field of security to tackle the analytical limitations of human beings, improving their performances. As a result, professionals in the crime prevention areas started using technology in investigation to calculate the probability that a (criminal) event might occur in the future. Such a phenomenon is also called predictive analysis. Today, Europe stands out both for the number and the type of predictive programs implemented in different national contexts. The main objective of this article is to analyze the phenomenon of predictive policing in the European context through a comparative analysis of 6 cases study in 5 different countries (Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) to, firstly, assess the implications in the improvement of the security context of the European Union, and secondly, to detect the innovative cases within this framework.
Topic:
Crime, Intelligence, Science and Technology, and European Union
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, France, Germany, Italy, and Netherlands

233. Cyber agenda for India’s digital payments

Author:
Sameer Patil and Sagnik Chakraborty
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:
India has rapidly transitioned from a cash-based economy to one reliant on digital payment systems. This has resulted in financial inclusion and greater transparency, but also expanded the system’s vulnerability to cybercrimes. This paper analyses India’s digital payments industry, maps the potential threat vectors and recommends measures to strengthen the cybersecurity of digital payment systems.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Finance, Currency, and Digitization
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

234. The Digital Counter-Revolution: Why the Kremlin Pursues a Sovereign Internet?

Author:
Antonin Plattner
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s attempts to control and regulate the flow of online information and communication within its territory reached a new stage on 1 November 2019 after its so-called “internet sovereignty” law came into force. Designed to increase state control over what Russia’s citizens can access and do online, the law has already sparked numerous protests across Russia. Although it remains to be seen how effective the law is likely to be, it is already clear that it fits perfectly well with the regime’s survival considerations and, more importantly, with the broader geopolitical strategy of the Kremlin towards the West. This paper analyses the reasons behind the failure of Moscow’s successive strategies to enforce the central state’s absolute sovereignty online. These reasons may include: The amount of data online, the web’s decentralised routing technology and the prospective satellite-based internet which together undermine Moscow’s strategies of control through physical infrastructures. The relative reluctance of international platforms to execute the authorities’ requests for censorship which limits the global success of Moscow’s strategy of control through ownership. The determination and inventiveness of the domestic digital resistance which prevents the total success of Moscow’s legal and social coercion strategies. Secondly, this paper proposes an original insight concerning Russia’s cyberstrategy. It argues that the Kremlin’s aspiration for neo-Westphalian “internet sovereignty” ultimately depends on a radical change of the internet governance format. Moscow’s call to replace the current multi-stakeholder model with a multilateral system should be understood as an absolute prerequisite for its control over domestic communications and information. From that perspective, this paper identifies Russia-based campaigns of cyber disruption as Moscow’s attempt to actively demonstrate the merit of “internet sovereignty”, by sowing international distrust in the principle of a free and international internet, as defended by the current multi-stakeholder model of governance.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Authoritarianism, Geopolitics, Internet, Protests, Counterrevolution, and digital culture
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

235. Seeing Is No Longer Believing: Deepfakes, Cheapfakes and the Limits of Deception

Author:
Emilia Anna Porubcin
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Disguise and deception are permanent fixtures in history. Claiming another person’s identity is a practice that stretches all the way from ancient Rome to imperial Russia. Today’s technology, however, has introduced a bevy of tools that enhance and complicate duplicity online. One such tool has garnered significant interest from academia, industry, and the public, in recent years but especially in recent months: deepfakes. A portmanteau of “deep learning” and “fakes,” deepfakes are videos altered with the help of artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms, often to portray one individual performing words or behavior of the deepfake creator’s choice. This paper explores the social and political ramifications of deepfakes. It documents their recent uses, surveys regulatory responses from both the private and public sectors, and explores the landscape of recommendations that have been made for their further regulation. In straying from a purely technical understanding of deepfakes and their effectiveness, this paper seeks to emphasize the value of non-regulatory responses to potentially malicious technologies. Deepfakes sit at the confluence of several consequential issues, including privacy, free speech, online identity, and who is in charge of defending these values. Their intersection produces an invaluable, and perhaps unprecedented, space for constructing and understanding information online. Finding a solution that can mitigate deepfakes’ negative use cases without hampering their positive assets will grant digital citizens a degree of freedom online that might be difficult to secure so effectively in any other environment.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Governance, Resilience, and Information Technology
Political Geography:
Global Focus

236. Geostrategically motivated co-option of social media: The case of Chinese LinkedIn spy recruitment

Author:
Mika Aaltola
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Social media platforms enable a strategically motivated and harmful set of practices that leverage both their scalability and targeting potentials. The wider vulnerabilities of digitalized democracies have been much discussed in connection with election meddling and disinformation campaigning. However, the emphasis here is on the more direct vulnerability of mass spy recruitment. The ongoing LinkedIn-based mass recruitment provides a case in point, representing a dangerous vulnerability that can lead to the theft of intellectual property and confidential materials, as well as to the setting up of influence networks. An important case in point is the Chinese co-option of LinkedIn for gaining operatives in and confidential information from Western states and enterprises. Exposing the emerging adversary techniques used by resourceful state actors is the first counter-step. Moreover, preparedness needs to be highlighted, counter-measures modernized, and laws updated to address the new vulnerabilities.
Topic:
Intelligence, Science and Technology, Social Media, Covert, and Spy
Political Geography:
China and Asia

237. US foreign policy tools in the era of disinformation: Deficiencies prevent effective response to malign information operations

Author:
Deborah A. McCarthy
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russia, China, Iran and ISIS use information operations to undermine the national security objectives of the United States and its allies. However, the US’s international response has been weak. Internal constraints have limited more effective counter-measures. In particular, the lack of a coordinated White House-level strategy, dispersed authorities and little cooperation with private social media companies can be identified as causal factors. Additional steps by the Trump Administration to counter foreign disinformation will aim to protect the 2020 presidential elections rather than to push back on efforts to undermine US leadership abroad.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, ISIS, Social Media, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Asia, and North America

238. Security Aspects of Connectivity

Author:
Tomas Ries
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Published in October 2018, the European Commission’s joint communication Connecting Europe and Asia – Building Blocks for an EU Strategy offers a good outline of the principles underlying the European Union’s (EU) connectivity interests. However, the document does not address the security implications of connectivity: it merely notes that “’flow security’ matters”. This Policy Brief attempts to cover that gap and expand on the notion of flow security. Security challenges should not be seen as an intrinsic obstacle to connectivity itself, or to its development. What we call “connectivity” today is part of a deeper trend whereby societies and economies are increasingly tied to each other, and most developed economies now bid on a further deepening of this trend, as is apparent in discussions over the “internet of things” (IoT) or “Industry 4.0”. Still, connectivity entails specific and dynamic challenges that require dedicated attention
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Science and Technology, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe and Asia

239. The Expanding China-Russia Defense Partnership

Author:
Richard Weitz
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Russia and China’s relationship is increasingly strengthened by arms sales, joint military exercises, and mutual diplomatic support. With growing frequency, the two countries hare expressing joint concern towards “threatening” U.S. military capabilities and security policies. China’s growing ability to deny foreign navies access to waters and airspace is connected to the sophisticated defense platforms provided by Russia. Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping are seeking a closer defense partnership, which could take the form of integrated military operations, collaboration on battlefield technology, or a joint missile defense system. Through joint military exercises, China is learning from Russia’s military experience in Crimea, gaining operational knowledge on expeditionary logistics and how to protect military bases in foreign countries. In 2021, the Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship expires. Its renewal could introduce new dynamics to the China-Russian relationship, and the possible inclusion of collective defense provisions like those between the U.S. and Japan.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, National Security, Science and Technology, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and United States of America

240. Modernizing the Land-Based Leg of the Nuclear Triad: Myths and Facts

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs and Brandi Jackson
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Across Democratic and Republican administrations over the past sixty years, U.S. strategists have determined that for the United States, a nuclear triad is the most strategically sound means to credibly deter adversaries. In an increasingly complex threat environment—facing nuclear adversaries and nuclear aspirants with different national objectives, military capabilities, and strategies—a nuclear triad provides the President of the United States with necessary flexibility while accounting for possible changes in adversaries’ capabilities and the geopolitical environment. To remain effective, the U.S. must modernize its Cold War legacy nuclear forces. This booklet is intended to dispel myths surrounding the land-based leg of the nuclear triad and explore the advantages of adopting the ground-based strategic deterrent missile system (GBSD) rather than continuing to recapitalize the aging Minuteman III system.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Military Spending, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America