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51. Strength and Consistency: A Key to North Korean Nuclear Sanctions

Author:
Kim Taewoo
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
Pyongyang's fourth nuclear test on January 6, 2016, the February 2 test launch of the Kwangmyongsong-4 satellite (which in fact was a longrange missile), and other provocative activities amply reminded the international community of the reasons for strong and consistent sanctions. Such activities again proved the Kim Family Regime (KFR) will not accept voluntary changes or engage in denuclearization dialogue. Instead, the regime declared de facto "Nuclear-First Politics," thus ruling out the possibility of denuclearization. If the KFR is allowed to continue unhampered nuclear weapons development, it will become a nuclear power with over 50 nuclear weapons within a decade. Its weapons will include atomic bombs, boosted fission bombs, and hydrogen bombs. The KFR will also possess increasingly formidable delivery vehicles, such as Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. This situation must be a nightmare particularly to South Korea. However, the current international sanctions headed by the UNSCR 2270, along with unilateral sanctions, are unlikely to bear fruit in the foreseeable future due to China’s conflicting policies. Beijing’s attitude towards North Korean nuclear program has alternated between ‘pressure and connivance;’ its military relationship with the United States determining China’s position on sanctions. China’s alternating position prevents effective sanctions against North Korea. While the international community should endeavor to make sanctions concerted, strong and consistent, South Korea and the U.S. should think about a Plan B that includes presenting China the threat of nuclear proliferation in East Asia.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Nonproliferation, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

52. Emerging Satellites for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Verification

Author:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Publication Date:
06-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
he project’s final report is now available for free release. The final report discusses these particular development trends in the commercial EO domain. This is followed by an examination of how such capabilities might apply to observing nuclear fuel cycle or weapon development facilities, using facilities in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as a case study. Treaty verification requirements are primarily examined in the contexts of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). New EO capabilities are also examined in the context of the United Nations Security Council nuclear-related sanctions implementation, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and nuclear arms control and disarmament efforts. The report identifies opportunities, obstacles and future considerations for the application of emerging types of commercial EO satellite data in various treaty verification domains.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, United Nations, Nonproliferation, and Chemical Weapons
Political Geography:
Global Focus

53. A Non-Ideological Reframing of the US-Russian Arms-Control Agenda

Author:
Nikolai Sokov
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
US-Russian nuclear arms control has remained deadlocked since the conclusion of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in 2010. The absence of progress hasn’t, however, been a major concern in either country. Although the United States could benefit from additional reductions as it considers the wholesale replacement of its strategic delivery vehicles, that interest appears rather marginal. Russia, already in the midst of its own delivery-vehicle replacement program, seems even less interested.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

54. Outlawing State-Sponsored Nuclear Procurement Programs & Recovery of Misappropriated Nuclear Goods

Author:
Leonard Spector
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
State-sponsored illicit nuclear-procurement activities have played a crucial role in advancing the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea and will undoubtedly be used by the next country that seeks to pursue a nuclear-weapon capability. Such repeated state-sponsored abuse of other states’ export-control systems undermines a key objective of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, which requires all states to adopt such controls. However, as this study details, this dangerous conduct has never been condemned as a distinct offense against international norms and rules sufficient to trigger sanctions or other punitive action against the offending state. This study proposes to outlaw state-sponsored illicit nuclear-procurement programs through the accretion of declarations by international and multilateral bodies condemning this conduct and expressing the intention to consider punitive measures in future cases where this conduct is observed. Even if consensus on such a declaration cannot be reached in every relevant forum, repeated, well-publicized demands for such action by a group of diplomatically influential aggrieved states can have a significant deterrent effect. Importantly, with illicit procurement activities often serving as an early indication of a clandestine nuclear-weapon program, establishing this activity as an offense against international norms would set the stage for early, concerted action against the next offending state, well before its nuclear program might approach its goal.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Illegal Trade, and Procurement
Political Geography:
Global Focus

55. Keeping the Bombs in the Basement: U.S. Nonproliferation Policy toward Israel, South Africa, and Pakistan

Author:
Or Rabinowitz and Nicholas L. Miller
Publication Date:
06-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Many accounts suggest that the United States did little to prevent Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa from developing nuclear weapons. These accounts are flawed, however. The United States did attempt to stop all three countries from acquiring the bomb and, when those efforts failed, to halt additional proliferation measures such as further testing and weaponization.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, Israel, and South Africa

56. Planning Ahead: A Blueprint to a Middle East WMD Free Zone

Author:
Chen Kane
Publication Date:
04-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Freeing the Middle East from all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and establishing a weapon-of-mass-destruction-free zone (WMDFZ) is a concept that originated many decades ago. Although this idea has existed for more than forty years, surprisingly little thought has been given to how it can be realistically implemented. Currently, there remain significant gaps regarding core concepts of the WMDFZ (the “Zone”) negotiations and implementation within the Middle East and internationally. The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies offers a new report in an effort to address these gaps with regard to the planned WMDFZ Middle East Conference, negotiation process, and the subsequent establishment of such a Zone by identifying the legal, technical, and organizational elements required to support the Zone negotiations and implementation. Creating a WMDFZ is a very tall order; not only has one never been created before, but also all existing nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) formalized an already existing situation—the absence of nuclear weapons in their region. The WMDFZ, by contrast, is aimed at reversing the status quo by dismantling existing WMD capabilities and programs in a region that is suspected of hosting all three categories of WMD. Moreover, the region suffers from deep-rooted conflicts and mistrust, and many areas are undergoing considerable social and political change. The increasing influence of non-state actors on states’ affairs in the region is another complicating factor. Additionally, while there are regional and international regimes and organizations charged with verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear energy programs and chemical industries (all of which could inform the WMDFZ negotiators), there are no comparable mechanisms to cover nuclear and biological weapons dismantlement, verify sensitive activities for biological programs, nor sufficiently regulate WMD delivery systems—all of which are mandated under the Middle East WMDFZ.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Middle East

57. The Case for Highly Enriched Uranium Free Zones

Author:
Andrew Bieniawski, Miles A. Pomper, and Elena Sokova
Publication Date:
06-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Highly enriched uranium (HEU)—one of the key ingredients for nuclear weapons—is one of the most dangerous materials on the planet. Significant progress has been made over the past several years to eliminate all HEU from 26 countries and Taiwan. The creation of regional HEU-Free Zones would help cement a global norm against civilian HEU use in much the same way that Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones have strengthened global non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. In many cases, only one or two countries in each proposed regional HEU-Free Zone have small amounts of remaining HEU, presenting an opportunity for countries to take action prior to the Nuclear Security Summit in 2016. This concept paper was developed by a working group on “The Elimination of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Applications,” a project of the Fissile Materials Working Group, a coalition of eighty civil society organizations committed to improving fissile materials security. Initial work on the concept was also funded by the Nuclear Threat Initiative.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Nonproliferation, and Uranium
Political Geography:
Global Focus

58. Replacing High-Risk Radiological Materials

Author:
Miles A. Pomper and George M. Moore
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Permanent Risk Reduction of Radioactive Sources Illustration by Evelyn Helminen, MIIS There has been a marked increase in international and domestic attention to the need to replace high-risk radioactive sources with less risky and non-isotopic alternatives in order to forestall an act of radiological terrorism. In response to this need, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute for International Studies at Monterey, with the support of the US and UK governments, hosted three, closed-door workshops with governmental and nongovernmental experts in Washington, London, and Vienna to propose appropriate policies. Through these workshops and additional research, CNS has developed the new occasional paper, “Permanent Risk Reduction: A Roadmap for Replacing High-Risk Radioactive Sources and Materials,” which offers a series of actions that governments could take to help expedite and encourage the substitution of high-risk sources with non-isotopic alternatives as an important contribution to the nuclear security framework.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Radiological Weapons
Political Geography:
Global Focus

59. The Future Impact of North Korea’s Emerging Nuclear Deterrent

Author:
Leonard Spector
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The emergence of North Korea’s nuclear deterrent has been a grievous blow to international nonproliferation efforts and poses serious national security challenges for the United States and its Northeast Asian allies. It is by no means clear, however, that the precedent North Korea has set will significantly erode the nonproliferation regime or stimulate proliferation elsewhere. In a new paper (published by the US-Korea Institute at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, on its website, 38north) CNS’s Leonard S. Spector examines the arenas in which North Korea’s new nuclear weapon status has significant negative consequences and assesses the damage that will likely be done. He concludes that the ripple effects of North Korea’s crossing the nuclear threshold may be more limited than they first appear.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

60. Nuclear Deterrence: The Wohlstetter-Blackett Debate Re-visited

Author:
Rajesh Basrur
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS)
Abstract:
The Cold War debate between Albert Wohlstetter and Patrick Blackett over the requirements of effective deterrence is of profound relevance half a century later. The two thinkers offered systematic arguments for their maximalist (Wohlstetter) and minimalist (Blackett) positions. How we conceive of these requirements shapes the kinds of nuclear weapons doctrines, forces and postures we adopt. Whereas the Wohlstetter-Blackett debate was based largely on deductive logic, the opposing arguments can today be assessed on the basis of evidence drawing from nearly seven decades of strategic behaviour between nuclear rivals. An analysis of major confrontations in five nuclear dyads – United States-Soviet Union, United States-China, Soviet Union-China, India-Pakistan, and United States-North Korea – clearly offers much stronger support for Blackett‟s minimalist case than for Wohlstetter‟s maximalist one. Effective deterrence does not require second-strike capability as defined by Wohlstetter and the nuclear balance has no effect on a state‟s capacity to deter. Consequently, the central tenets of orthodox nuclear deterrence theory and doctrine are shown to be without foundation. For policymakers, the optimal forces and postures required for effective deterrence are therefore less demanding and the hurdles in the path of arms control and at least partial disarmament less difficult to cross.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, China, India, and Asia