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61. Trading Security: A Case Study on Maritime Security Decision Points in the Context of Global Trade

Author:
Caroline Troein and Anne Moulakis
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
The term maritime security often evokes destroyers and aircraft carriers, disputes over territorial waters or islands, or piracy and terrorist attacks such as the USS Cole bombing in 2000. High profile crises can lead us to forget that maritime security is an everyday event; it is about enabling safe transit. Each step within the maritime transport of goods has security challenges and considerations. At the same time, the continued stability and effectiveness of maritime trade is itself a broader security matter of importance to consumers, businesses, and governments. With the “weaponization of finance” maritime trade will play a central role in economic actions being taken out of geopolitical concerns.
Topic:
Security, Maritime Commerce, Territorial Disputes, Geopolitics, Maritime, and Trade
Political Geography:
Global Focus and Oceans

62. Moving East and South: U.S. Navy and German Navy Strategy in the Eurasian Theater 1991- 2014, A View from Germany

Author:
Sebastian Bruns
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
The Cold War ended rather suddenly in 1991. With it went the model on which the United States’ maritime strategy of the 1980s had rested. Driven by individuals like John Lehman, President Ronald Reagan’s long-time Secretary of the Navy, that series of strategic documents promulgated a forward, offensive, counter-force approach and the famous ‘600-ship Navy’ force structure. With the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991, the sole challenger to U.S. naval power vanished practically overnight. Red Fleet warships were rusting away in port or dismantled altogether. In the United States, the military lost significant human capital through a number of force reduction rounds, which reflected how the U.S. Navy could and would take on the post-Cold War world intellectually. In the wake of this strategic recalibration, allied militaries and their navies—such as the Federal German Navy, soon to be renamed German Navy—also underwent substantial transformations. These were often guided by the shifting geopolitical landscape as well as the popular desire to reduce the inflated defense budgets of Cold War days in order to obtain a peace dividend. This analysis will focus on the Eurasian theater—very broadly speaking, the waters that surround the European and Southwest Asian landmasses[1]—in U.S. and German naval strategy between 1991 and 2014. The maritime sphere has become increasingly important as a domain of emerging security since the end of the Cold War, yet comparatively little time and resources are being devoted to research on naval strategy and relationships between allies at sea. As a result, the use of naval force for political and diplomatic ends and the dynamics of maritime geopolitics have suffered. This essay seeks to underline the challenges that have confronted the U.S. Navy in the past generation and analyze their long-term effects. While the U.S. Navy’s geographic focus and operational interests have increasingly shifted from Europe to the Middle East and Asia, and from control of the “blue water” high seas to the littorals, these key interests should not be overlooked. In the view of the author, the fall of the Soviet Union and the implication that allies like Germany would do more to patrol their own maritime neighborhood provided the U.S. Navy with a convenient reason to de-emphasize their previously highly valued naval hub in the Mediterranean Sea. In rebalancing from the Sixth Fleet area of responsibility (AOR) to other regions of the world, the U.S. Navy accepted the consequences for fleet design and ship numbers, perhaps willingly using it as a bargaining chip for force reduction rounds in Washington, D.C. Implicitly, European allies and the U.S. Air Force[2] were expected to fill the gap left behind in terms of naval presence and crisis response, in particular after the successful campaigns in the Adriatic Sea in responding to unrest and war in the Balkans. European allies, however, were largely uninterested in stepping up to the plate; they considered their near abroad safe enough. Most importantly, they were somewhat wary of delivering a combined ‘pocket Sixth Fleet’ of their own. Finally, they were preoccupied with managing German unification, enlargement of the European Union, and establishing a common market and currency, among other things. Accordingly, this paper sheds a light on some key German strategic documents for a time when the reunited country sought its new place in the security environment of the post-Cold War world. By taking a unique view from Germany, one of the U.S. Navy’s premier NATO allies, this analysis also considers the transformation of the Bundesmarine from an escort navy to an expeditionary navy.[3] It seeks to conceptually explain how Germany’s security policy addressed the maritime challenges of the new era. The German Navy was principally drawn south- and eastward geographically after 1991, usually in close cooperation with other allied and friendly navies (and mandated by NATO, the EU, or the UN).[4] It was increasingly asked to address maritime security challenges to which the U.S. Navy no longer, or only in a supporting role, responded. The German Navy went into the breach with what were essentially Cold War assets and a mindset fundamentally dominated by the inability to think strategically. This paper is split into two sections. The first section discusses the 1991-2001 timeframe and the second section covers the period from 2001-2014. 2001 marked the inauguration of President George W. Bush in January and the terrorist attacks on September 11 eight months later. Each section looks at the strategic developments of the U.S. Navy and the German Navy, their major naval operations, and some areas of cooperation between the two navies in Eurasia...
Topic:
Security, Cold War, History, Military Strategy, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

63. A Useful Pause in Arctic Drilling

Author:
Bruce M. Everett
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Until last year, drilling for oil in the Arctic was the subject of considerable discussion focused not only on the potential impacts of Arctic resources on the oil market, but also on the environmental and geopolitical implications of opening this area to development. Prospects for Arctic drilling dimmed considerably in 2015 when Shell decided to abandon its ambitious drilling efforts in the Burger Field in the Chukchi Sea, writing off several billion dollars in the process. The recent collapse in oil prices has probably put a stop to Arctic drilling for the time being, and this pause may prove useful in resolving some of the outstanding issues.
Topic:
Environment, Oil, Natural Resources, Geopolitics, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Russia, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Greenland, Arctic, United States of America, and Oceans

64. Troubled Waters? Seeking a New Maritime Order in East Asia

Author:
Min Gyo Koo
Publication Date:
08-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Without a doubt, the most heated and persistent maritime disputes in the world are in the East Asia region. The vast bodies of water included in this region are the Northwest Pacific, the East Sea, the West Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea. The diplomatic spat in the fall of 2010 between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea was a strong indication that any mishandling of maritime issues can disrupt the subtle balance of power and interests in the region. Equally problematic are the disputes in the South China Sea, where China’s growing assertiveness has provoked concern among not only its Southeast Asian neighbors but also with the United States. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been the main provider of maritime security in the East Asia region but now faces the challenge of a rising China. In May 2011, a Chinese patrol boat cut the cable of a Vietnamese petroleum and gas probe vessel in the South China Sea. From this incident, tensions escalated to the brink of armed conflict. As countries in the region participate in tit-for-tat military exercises, the atmosphere has become worse. Under such conditions, many considered that the South China Sea issue, tangled with conflicts between China and ASEAN and the United States could flare up significantly. However at the 18th ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) held from July 22-23 2011 a new perspective developed as China stated that “the importance of the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is clear and all countries should be beneficiaries of such freedom.” Furthermore, during the China-ASEAN ministerial of the 2011 ARF Beijing stepped back by adopting the guidelines for the implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which was agreed upon in 2002. Washington welcomed this move as it suggested an effort to decrease tensions with respect to the South China Sea. This is in stark contrast to the 2010 ARF meeting where confrontations arose between the United States and China with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stating “a peaceful resolution of the South China Sea conflict directly relates to U.S. national interest.” From such developments, one can assess that the ARF has made important progress with respect to the South China Sea issue. However, the 2002 Declaration of Conduct that establishes the principle for peaceful resolution of maritime disputes in line with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) lacks binding capacities and the newly adopted guidelines are mostly declaratory and lack specific details. Thus it would be too soon to consider the 2011 ARF meeting as a success with respect to the South China Sea dispute. Considering that China tends to use such multilateral channels as a ground for making peace but then is more forceful in its bilateral relations, the outcome of the recent ARF meeting could come to have less significance than expected.
Topic:
Security, International Law, Maritime Commerce, and Maritime
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South China Sea, and ASEAN