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31. Securing Energy Supply and Maritime Interests: Seeking Convergence

Author:
Frank Umbach
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS)
Abstract:
As ASEAN’s energy demand is likely to increase by almost two-thirds in the period up to 2040, the regional oil and gas resources in the offshore zones of the ASEAN member states will become even more important for enhancing the energy supply security of both the individual member states as well as for ASEAN as a whole. Accordingly, access to and political as well as physical control and security of these offshore energy resources will receive even more governmental attention. In context of China’s Belt and Road Initiative as well as South China Sea policies and its energy dimensions, they can fuel already existing maritime competition and conflicts in the South China Sea, the Bay of Bengal, the Indian Ocean and the interconnecting sea lanes and regional choke points. This paper analyses the question to what extent are energy security concepts and challenges are interlinked with maritime policies, particularly in regard to the unresolved overlapping claims in the South China Sea and the perceived intensifying naval competition in the Indian Ocean. It also highlights the strategic implications of ASEAN's rising energy demand and growing exploitation of its offshore maritime energy resources for future regional cooperation, enhanced competition and potential strategic rivalries as well as conflicts.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Oil, Gas, Maritime, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea

32. Contested Seas Maritime Domain Awareness in Northern Europe

Author:
Kathleen H. Hicks
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Northern Europe, and specifically the Baltic and Norwegian Seas, has been the site of increasingly provocative and destabilizing Russian actions. The country’s use of a range of military, diplomatic, and economic tools to undermine the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its allies highlights the need to monitor and understand Russian activity. The region is characterized by complex factors like unique geographic features, considerable civilian maritime traffic, the presence of advanced Russian and Western military capabilities, and strategic proximity to Russia and the Kola peninsula, home to the Russian Northern Fleet. While the Norwegian and Baltic Seas do differ in key ways, they are linked by the emerging risk posed by Russia’s long-range strike capabilities. Responding to Russian challenges across the competitive space requires a deep understanding of the Northern European maritime environment. Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), defined by the United States as the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of a nation or region, is an exceptionally broad concept. At its core, MDA has three functions: the collection of raw data, the analysis of that data, and the action of disseminating information to and coordinating among the different components of the framework. In order to provide security in Northern Europe, NATO and its allies must use MDA frameworks to understand and respond to the challenges above, on, and underneath the sea, as well as the surrounding land environment. While some constructive work has been done to address the evolving Russian threat, NATO and its partners must make changes to their current MDA capabilities to evolve alongside with it. Russia presents three challenges of particular concern to the MDA efforts in Northern Europe: maritime hybrid warfare, electronic and cyber warfare capabilities, and long-range strike systems. Maritime Hybrid Warfare—The Russian military is experienced and effective in its use of hybrid warfare, seen in Syria, Crimea, and Northern Europe. The ambiguity possible in the maritime domain lends itself well to this strategy. Russia uses three specific approaches in this realm: deception through different types of vessels including civilian ships, deniable forces like the amphibious and light infantry that easily navigate the complex Baltic and Norwegian Seas, and the country’s well-developed and diverse force for seabed warfare. Cyber and Electronic Warfare—Russia’s advanced EW capabilities have the potential to hinder information gathering and dissemination methods, which are both vital functions of MDA. These capabilities are challenging for military personnel but potentially devastating in civilian contexts, especially as civilian networks and technology (like GPS) are far less secure. Long-Range Strike Capabilities—New challenges for NATO and Northern European partners have emerged with Russia’s development of a long-range precision strike complex. The weapons, now being mounted on new and existing Russian naval vessels, give these vessels the option to stay in the Barents or White Seas and strike targets across Northern Europe. This, combined with air force capabilities based on the Kola Peninsula and in Kaliningrad, presents threats unlike any seen by NATO before. These capabilities require NATO and its partners to use MDA frameworks to monitor launch platforms across the domain. The modern history of MDA begins in the United States, with Homeland Security Presidential Directive – 13 (HSPD-13) / National Security Presidential Directive – 41 (NSPD-41) issued in 2004 by President George W. Bush. The document lays out core interests for the United States to enhance security in the maritime domain and creates a cooperative framework to support MDA operations across different spheres. At the same time, the European concept of maritime security awareness was built upon the U.S. definition of the challenge, placed within the context of rising illicit traffic in the Mediterranean. A weakness of the original MDA and Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) concepts is that many of the associated capabilities and frameworks are focused on civil maritime issues. Given the global proliferation of advanced military capabilities, like antiship cruise missiles, NATO and its partners require a holistic understanding of the maritime environment that focuses on everything from civil maritime actions to high-end military operations and even issues associated with the maritime environment. A key implication of the heightened maritime threat environment is the need to improve the integration of and attention to undersea aspects of MDA. Antisubmarine warfare (ASW), a traditional strength of Western naval intelligence and operations, has atrophied since the end of the Cold War. Today, Russian submarines with conventional long-range missiles pose a threat to NATO. ASW must be integrated with MDA to address these concerns. Comprehensive understanding of the undersea realm should extend beyond ASW. Russia’s amphibious special forces and combat swimmers threaten more than just military targets, including civilian vessels and undersea cables, which are an integral part of MDA. ASW technology can be useful in countering these and other threats. In the Norwegian Sea, the biggest challenge for NATO is detecting advanced ultra-quiet submarines. This issue is sharpened by dramatically depleted stockpiles of sonobuoys, a constant need for increasingly advanced sonobuoy technology, and an American unwillingness to share highly classified information about the undersea domain. NATO would benefit from an apparatus like the ASW Operations Centers (ASWOC), used most prominently during the Cold War to streamline ASW operations. Integration of platforms is a challenge in the Baltic Sea as well, largely because Sweden and Finland are not NATO states, making data sharing challenging. Frameworks like Sea Surveillance Co-Operation Baltic Sea (SUCBAS) and the Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR) project facilitate the work of regional states to address these issues but more must be done. Additionally, NATO monitoring of the Baltic region is largely domain specific and suffers from not examining the maritime domain holistically. The alliance and its partners should also act to focus on resiliency to continue to operate in the face of jamming and nonkinetic attacks from Russia. The key to enhancing MDA capabilities in Northern Europe is the integration of frameworks across the maritime domain. Cooperation between NATO states and allies is vital to understanding the complex environment. The CSIS study team has identified seven recommendations of particular importance: Create a Baltic Sea MDA analytic center at the Baltic Maritime Component Command (BMCC) at Rostock, Germany; Empower a small analytic team at the BMCC to focus on maritime hybrid issues; Develop a training course for military intelligence officers on best practices for Baltic Sea MDA analysis; Create a classified Baltic Sea data environment that can incorporate both NATO and partner states; Develop a multinational operational framework for the Baltic Sea; Integrate subsurface sensors and antisubmarine warfare into a comprehensive MDA framework; and Acquire significant stockpiles of advanced sonobuoys and associated acoustic processing systems. These priority recommendations are presented in detail in Chapter 4 of the report, along with others. Collectively, their implication would markedly enhance security in Northern Europe by closing identified gaps and ensuring capabilities for collection, analysis, and action in MDA.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, North Atlantic, North America, Western Europe, Baltic Sea, and Norwegian Seas

33. Security Implications of China’s Military Presence in the Indian Ocean

Author:
Zack Cooper
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The issue: China’s increased military presence in the Indian Ocean should not come as a surprise. China is following in the traditional path of other rising powers; it is expanding its military operations to match its interests abroad. The security implications of China’s push into the Indian Ocean region are mixed. In peacetime, these efforts will certainly expand Chinese regional influence. In wartime, however, China’s Indian Ocean presence will likely create more vulnerabilities than opportunities. China’s military forays into the Indian Ocean have triggered a series of warnings. The term “string of pearls” was first used to refer to Chinese basing access in the Indian Ocean by a 2004 report for the U.S. Department of Defense. That report suggested China’s growing regional presence could “deter the potential disruption of its energy supplies from potential threats, including the U.S. Navy, especially in the case of a conflict with Taiwan.” Other scholars have warned that Beijing seeks to “dominate” the Indian Ocean region. Others suggest that the Chinese government is simply following its expanding trading interests and seeking to secure its supply lines against disruption. Although China’s presence in the Indian Ocean may permit it to increase its regional influence, Chinese facilities and forces would be highly vulnerable in a major conflict. Thus, the security implications of China’s push into the Indian Ocean region are mixed. In peacetime, these efforts will certainly expand Chinese regional influence. In wartime, however, China’s Indian Ocean presence will likely create more vulnerabilities than opportunities.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Imperialism, Military Strategy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
United States, China, India, Taiwan, Asia, and Indian Ocean

34. China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative: Economic Drivers and Challenges

Author:
Matthew Funaiole and Jonathan Hillman
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The issue: China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) seeks to connect Beijing with trading hubs around the world. Beijing insists the MSRI is economically motivated , but some observers argue that China is primarily advancing its strategic objectives. This article examines several economic criteria that should be used when analyzing port projects associated with the MSRI. China’s leaders have mapped out an ambitious plan, the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI), to establish three “blue economic passages” that will connect Beijing with economic hubs around the world.1 It is the maritime dimension of President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which could include $1–4 trillion in new roads, railways, ports, and other infrastructure. Within this broad and ever-expanding construct, Chinese investments have been especially active in the Indo-Pacific region, raising questions about whether it is China’s economic or strategic interests that are driving major port investments.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Imperialism, Maritime, and Trade
Political Geography:
China and Asia

35. Enhancing the U.S.-Indonesia Strategic Partnership

Author:
Brian Harding and Andreyka Natalegawa
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The United States and Indonesia are natural partners. Despite our geographic distance, we have striking similarities. We are large, diverse, and democratic societies. We both seek an international order in the Indo-Pacific region based on rules that enable all countries to have a voice. Our shores each span two oceans, imbuing our countries with a deep maritime heritage and culture that shapes how we approach the world. When each plays its natural role as a leader in regional affairs, both parties benefit. In recognition of the great mutual benefit that a close U.S.-Indonesia partnership could bring, Presidents Barack Obama and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono launched a comprehensive partnership in 2010 to build closer government-government, economic, and people-people ties between our two countries. Critically, the agreement created a framework for collaboration across a multitude of government departments and ministries under a joint commission co-chaired by the U.S. secretary of state and the Indonesian minister of foreign affairs. In 2016, under President Joko Widodo (Jokowi), the comprehensive partnership was elevated into a strategic partnership, further signaling the relationship’s importance to both countries. Yet despite having many common interests and recent high-level efforts to push the relationship forward, U.S.-Indonesia relations are not meeting their potential. Bilateral economic interaction is limited compared to the size of our economies. Official interaction is often bureaucratic and rarely strategic. And people-people relations, including of education exchanges, are minuscule considering that Indonesia and the United States are the third- and fourth-most-populated countries in the world. President Donald Trump’s political ascent has also created additional headwinds for U.S.-Indonesia relations. Candidate-Trump’s statements regarding the Muslim world caused unease in Indonesia and his policies as president toward Israel and Palestine have damaged Indonesian views of the United States. In Asia, the Trump administration’s framing of great-power competition with China and the administration’s nontraditional economic statecraft have created uncertainty in Jakarta. From Washington’s perspective, the Jokowi administration’s relative disinterest in playing a leading role in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and in the broader Indo-Pacific region has dampened enthusiasm in some quarters for investing in the relationship. Recognizing the importance of both the U.S.-Indonesia relationship and its continued underperformance, on May 3, 2018, the CSIS Southeast Asia Program convened a first annual bilateral, track 1.5 strategic dialogue in Washington, D.C., to inject new momentum into the relationship and to begin building deeper connectivity between policy experts in the two countries. This report outlines conclusions and recommendations that surfaced during the dialogue. However, the report reflects the opinions of the authors, and does not necessarily reflect those of the dialogue participants.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Culture, Maritime, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
United States, Indonesia, North America, and Indo-Pacific

36. Documents on Canadian Arctic Maritime Sovereignty

Author:
Adam Lajeunesse
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In September 1985, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark announced to the House of Commons the establishment of straight baselines around the Arctic Archipelago, defining those straits and passages within as historic internal waters of Canada and under full national sovereignty.1 “The policy of this government is to maintain the natural unity of the Canadian Arctic archipelago” Clark declared, “and to preserve Canada’s sovereignty over land, sea, and ice undiminished and undivided.” (Document 68). This was the first time Canada had delineated its Arctic maritime space, clearly defining in legislation those waters over which it had sovereignty. It was an important clarification, as Canada had claimed and exercised sovereignty for decades without ever stating with precision where that sovereignty began and ended. In the assertion of sovereignty, precision is important. As the American geographer Isaiah Bowman once said, a boundary line “has to be here, not hereabouts.” While this definition was an important clarification it did not fundamentally change the Canadian approach to its Arctic waters. In making this announcement Clark was not staking a claim, rather he was making official what Canada had long assumed and practiced. In so doing, he marked the culmination of decades of political and legal discussions, negotiations, and debate. It was the logical conclusion to a lengthy political and legal evolution, by which Canadian sovereignty came to be defined and asserted in the way that it ultimately was in 1986. This volume is a documentary history, charting the evolution of Canada’s Arctic maritime sovereignty through government memoranda, notes, communiqués, and other primary source material. In so doing, it offers as unfiltered a look as possible at the political thinking, legal analysis, and international discussions that defined Canadian Arctic policy during its formative period. The material included is necessarily limited and selective – drawn from tens of thousands of pages of archival documents on the subject. These documents were included for several reasons: some are important government studies which shaped policy making, some are records of discussions or communications which illuminate important decisions, while others were selected for the context they provide at key moments in Canadian policy making. The period covered in this compendium stretches from 1950 to 1988 and is, in some respects, artificial. Canadian policy makers certainly considered the question of Arctic maritime sovereignty in the years before 1950, but it was never a pressing consideration, nor was any real policy formed. To reproduce material from this period would also be redundant, duplicating as it inevitably would the thorough collection compiled by Janice Cavell in her 2016 Documents on Canadian External Relations volume on Arctic sovereignty and P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Peter Kikkert’s excellent volume in the DCASS series. This volume has also avoided reproducing material in Whitney lackenbauer and Peter Kikkert’s 2010 book The Canadian Forces a& Arctic Sovereignty, which examines armed forces documents on this subject. This volume ends in 1988, not because the Mulroney government’s declaration of straight baselines – and the Canada-US negotiations which followed – ended discussion on the matter but because, by that point, the internal Canadian debate over the precise nature and extent of Canada’s claim had been settled. Documents 69-74 extend this volume to 1988 to provide some insight into how Canada’s new policy was received both internally and internationally. From a logistical perspective, documentary material on this subject also becomes nearly impossible to secure after this date – even through the Access to Information Act, the vehicle by which the lion’s share of this collection was secured.5 The focus of this volume is on Canadian government material; however, certain key documents from the United States National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, MD) and the Foreign Relations of the United States6 series have also been included. This American material provides context to Canada’s decision making and offers researchers a glimpse at how crucial Canadian policy initiatives were received by the country’s most important partner – and sometimes opponent – in this field. Ultimately, the purpose of the Documents on Canadian Sovereignty and Security is to facilitate new research and new interpretations which can add to, improve, and challenge the existing literature. This collection should provide academics, students, and policy makers with the research foundation to launch new inquiries into the field. Undergraduate students can use this collection as a substitute for extensive primary research, while graduate students and scholars can employ it as a ready jumping off point to undertake more thorough archival work.
Topic:
Nationalism, Sovereignty, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Canada, North America, Atlantic Ocean, and Pacific Ocean

37. Fluid Foundations: Ocean Transparency, Submarine Opacity, and Strategic Nuclear Stability

Author:
Elizabeth Ann Mendenhall
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The primary value of submarines as a nuclear platform is their ability to hide undetected beneath the sea. The persistence of a ‘secure’ second strike, and therefore nuclear strategic stability, rests on fluid foundations: ocean transparency is a continuous and dynamic variable. Technological advancement in marine sensing – increasingly driven by non-military imperatives like climate change – currently risks the achievement of an unprecedented degree of transparency. After tracing the Cold War competition between hiding and seeking, this paper evaluates progress in ocean sensing, to identify where and how incremental improvements and radical innovations may make SSBNs more detectable and targetable than ever before. Emerging ocean transparency has implications for nuclear policy, force structure, and strategy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Global Focus

38. Protection for Those Who Need It Most: Sustainable Property Insurance in High-risk Areas

Author:
Jason Thistlethwaite and Daniel Henstra
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
Private property insurance is an efficient, resilient and legitimate approach to disaster recovery, but flood insurance premiums in high-risk areas are too expensive for many property owners to afford. Comparing flood insurance regimes in other states demonstrates the difficult balance between ensuring coverage is available and keeping it affordable for policyholders. Sustaining property insurance in high-risk areas in Canada requires a partnership whereby governments invest strategically in risk reduction and inform Canadians about the location of high-risk areas, while insurers provide coverage and adjust premiums to reward community-level actions that reduce risk.
Topic:
Natural Disasters, Maritime, and Insurance
Political Geography:
Canada

39. Energizing Regional Collaboration and Governance: CIGI Summit of North American Arctic Leaders

Author:
John Higginbotham and Jennifer Spence
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
The North American Arctic (NAA) is a distinct subregion of the Arctic, with vast territories, extreme environmental conditions, small and remote communities, complex governance and significant resource constraints. There is an urgent need for stronger east-to-west cooperation among regional and national governments, Indigenous organizations, business, academia and other stakeholders to build the region’s prosperity. In February 2018, working closely with the Labrador North and Baffin Regional Chambers of Commerce, the Centre for International Governance Innovation hosted the “CIGI Summit of North American Arctic Leaders” — two special panel discussions exploring ways to foster this cooperation and strengthen dialogue among stakeholders. These panels occurred during the Northern Lights 2018 Business and Cultural Showcase, a four-day event in Ottawa bringing together more than 1,200 participants from across the country and around the world. The first panel featured the political leadership of the NAA; the second brought together experts in marine development and infrastructure. This conference report describes the summit’s key themes, priorities and takeaways.
Topic:
Environment, Natural Resources, Governance, Maritime, and Indigenous
Political Geography:
Arctic

40. From Fisheries Subsidies to Energy Reform under International Trade Law

Author:
Markus Gehring
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
Economic, environmental and other international regimes are jointly facing a wicked climate problem. Climate change impacts on human activity and ecosystems have the potential to jeopardize attaining shared goals of these different regimes, and yet can only be addressed by overcoming the division and occasional conflict between their different stakeholders and areas of focus. Discussions have begun in the hallways on how trade law could best be leveraged to bring the international community together to prevent climate-related harms. This paper argues that World Trade Organization (WTO) fisheries subsidies negotiations should be a priority area for those practitioners and researchers building links between trade and climate law. It is submitted that successful fisheries subsidies reform will directly contribute to the implementation of the Paris Agreement and to the delivery of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 13 (“Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts”), given the important synergies that exist between the transformation of fisheries subsidies and climate mitigation and adaptation. Furthermore, fisheries subsidies negotiations are of crucial importance for international climate law because they can provide a case study to learn from and increase chances of success with fossil fuel subsidy reform. This paper provides a brief historical overview of trade law negotiations aiming to reduce and reform fisheries subsidies, and shows the important synergies that exist between reforming fisheries subsidies and implementing the Paris Agreement as well as the SDGs. The paper then extracts five drivers for success that can be observed from the current process of fisheries subsidies reform: leadership of key countries and of the WTO Secretariat itself; meticulous academic, scientific and policy background analysis; commitment by civil society and the private sector; the development of alternatives to those subsidies that encourage overfishing; and inter-regime learning. Lastly, the paper discusses the transferability of these drivers for success to prevent climate harms and to address more general challenges encountered in both the climate and trade regimes.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, World Trade Organization, Maritime, and Fishing
Political Geography:
Global Focus