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101. Leashing the Surveillance State: How to Reform Patriot Act Surveillance Authorities

Author:
Julian Sanchez
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Congress recently approved a temporary extension of three controversial surveillance provisions of the USA Patriot Act and successor legislation, which had previously been set to expire at the end of February. In the coming weeks, lawmakers have an opportunity to review the sweeping expansion of domestic counter-terror powers since 9/11 and, with the benefit of a decade's perspective, strengthen crucial civil-liberties safeguards without unduly burdening legitimate intelligence gathering. Two of the provisions slated for sunsetroving wiretap authority and the so-called “Section 215” orders for the production of records—should be narrowed to mitigate the risk of overcollection of sensitive information about innocent Americans. A third—authority to employ the broad investigative powers of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act against “lone wolf” suspects who lack ties to any foreign terror group—does not appear to be necessary at all.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Intelligence, National Security, Counterinsurgency, Governance, and Law
Political Geography:
United States

102. Indonesia: Debate Over a New Intelligence Bill

Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
A controversial bill defining the role and functions of Indonesian intelligence agencies has top priority in the Indonesian parliament. It was originally scheduled for enactment in July 2011 but will now be delayed until September or October. It would be better to put the bill on hold even longer until there is a more comprehensive assessment of security needs and how to address them.
Topic:
Security, Democratization, Development, and Intelligence
Political Geography:
Indonesia and Southeast Asia

103. Improving United Nations Intelligence: Lessons from the Field

Author:
Melanie Ramjoué
Publication Date:
08-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The past twenty years have seen an exponential growth of UN peacekeeping in terms of breadth of mandates, scale and duration of operations. Where peacekeepers in the 1960s, 70s and 80s were deployed primarily to monitor ceasefires, they now investigate human rights violations, provide electoral support, and occasionally even support active combat operations. This surge has required a five-fold rise in the UN peacekeeping budget over the past ten years, from USD 1.5 billion in 1999 to almost USD 8 billion in 2011; it has similarly led to a four-fold increase in UN personnel deployed to support peacekeeping activities, from 27,000 military, civilian and police peacekeepers in 1999 to over 120,000 in 2011.
Topic:
Intelligence, International Organization, United Nations, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
Geneva, Finland, Germany, Estonia, and Denmark

104. Who Controls Pakistan's Security Forces?

Author:
Shuja Nawaz
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Internal militancy and insurgency are the immediate threats to Pakistan's security. Pakistan's polity is fractured and dysfunctional, allowing the military to assert greater control over Pakistan's response to this growing internal threat. Civilian authorities have missed numerous opportunities to assert control over security matters. Miscalculation by the current civilian government in its attempt in 2008 to exert control over the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate soured civil-military relations at a time when the new army chief favored keeping the army out of politics. The military's interests are expanding to newer sectors, including economic policymaking, since a shrinking economy could hurt military interests and lifestyles. An opportunity to improve security sector governance exists in the proposed National Counter Terrorism Authority, which the government has unduly delayed.
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, Islam, Terrorism, and War
Political Geography:
Pakistan

105. Introduction

Author:
Catherine Lotrionte
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
Espionage and intelligence-gathering activities have evolved significantly since the end of the Cold War. State governments are no longer the only actors to make use of these practices, and information collection methods range from covert surveillance activities to monitoring financial transactions. Espionage plays an ever-greater role in the operations of states, non-state actors, and corporations, and has, as a result, created a host of new challenges to U.S. interests. The Forum of this issue addresses the changing threat of espionage after the Cold War, some of the new consumers of intelligence, and the unique and effective ways that actors have begun to use these practices.
Topic:
Cold War, Government, and Intelligence
Political Geography:
United States

106. Paradox of Power: Sino American Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability

Author:
David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Book
Abstract:
The United States and China each have or will soon have the ability to inflict grave harm upon the other by nuclear attack, attacks on satellites, or attacks on computer networks. Paradoxically, despite each country's power, its strategic vulnerability is growing. Particularly since September 11, 2001, Americans have sensed this vulnerability. The extent to which the Chinese sense it is unclear. Vulnerability to nuclear attack is familiar to both countries. But the United States and China are also becoming exposed to damage in space and cyberspace because of their growing reliance on those domains for their prosperity and security, as well as each side's increasing antisatellite (ASAT) and cyber war capabilities. For China, economic integration, production, and commerce-and thus, sustained growth and perhaps political stability-depend vitally on data sharing, making networks and satellites as strategic as they are for the United States. All three strategic domains are "offense dominant"-technologically, economically, and operationally. Defenses against nuclear, ASAT, and cyber weapons are difficult and yield diminishing results against the offensive capabilities of large, advanced, and determined states such as the United States and China. Nuclear weapons are patently offense dominant because a single explosion can destroy a city. Moreover, it is easier and cheaper for China to improve the survivability of its strategic missile launchers, to multiply deliverable weapons, and to penetrate U.S. missile defenses than it is for the United States to maintain a nuclear first-strike capability. Though it has yet to admit it, the United States cannot deny the Chinese the second-strike nuclear deterrent they are determined to have. Satellites are inherently vulnerable: conspicuous, easy to track, and fragile. Destroying them or degrading their performance is easier than protecting them. ASAT interceptors are much cheaper than satellites. Likewise, defending computer networks becomes harder and more expensive as the scale and sophistication of the attacker increase. The woes of the cyber defender are compounded by integrated global markets and supply chains for digital components and equipment-in which U.S. and state-affiliated Chinese corporations are leading competitors-increasing the potential for strategic degradation of network infrastructure and disruption of services. In general, strategic offense dominance gives each country an incentive to invest in offense, which in turn spurs the other to keep pace. Apart from offense dominance, the advance of technology has slashed the costs in lives and treasure of strategic attack, as capabilities have graduated from mass invasion to heavy bombing to nuclear weapons to ASAT and cyber war. If one ignores possible deaths resulting from disruption of public services, ASAT and cyber war might even be considered "nonviolent." As the number of expected casualties from strategic attack options drops, so could international opprobrium and the inhibitions of decisionmakers. Absent deterrence, thresholds for war in space and cyberspace could become perilously low as offenses improve.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Foreign Policy, Communism, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia

107. How Reliable is Intelligence on Iran's Nuclear Program?

Author:
Barbara Slavin
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
For a country that has been accumulating nuclear know-how since the Eisenhower administration, Iran has hardly been sprinting toward a bomb. Indeed, repeated prognostications that Tehran was on the verge of becoming a nuclear power have a Chicken Little quality: The sky did not fall over the past decade, and it seems unlikely to do so for the next year or two or three. Still, Iran has made steady progress accumulating the elements and expertise required to make nuclear weapons, and it would be naive and irresponsible to discount what appears to be a cottage industry of piecemeal proliferation.
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

108. Chronology of US-Korea Relations:October – December 2010

Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Oct. 2, 2010: US Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Leon Panetta makes a surprise visit to Seoul to discuss North Korean succession with President Lee Myung-bak. Oct. 6, 2010: US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell visits Tokyo to discuss strategies to deal with North Korea. Oct. 7, 2010: Secretary Campbell visits Seoul for talks on a wide range of issues. Oct. 8, 2010: South Korean Defense Minister Kim Tae-young meets Defense Secretary Robert Gates in Washington for an annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM). Oct. 10, 2010: North Korean defector Hwang Jang-yop dies at his home in Seoul of an apparent heart attack at the age of 87.
Topic:
Intelligence
Political Geography:
East Asia and North Korea

109. From the Editor

Author:
Rashid I. Khalidi
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Palestine Studies
Institution:
Institute for Palestine Studies
Abstract:
Can Palestine achieve liberation unilaterally by state-building and economic growth, despite the ongoing constraints of a suffocating occupation? Is a two-state solution of any sort still possible, and is it even desirable? What more can we learn about key turning points in Palestine's history like 1917 and 1948? The articles and essays in this issue of the Journal address these and other concerns about Palestine.
Topic:
Intelligence and World Bank
Political Geography:
Israel and Palestine

110. Secret Weapon: High-value Target Teams as an Organizational Innovation

Author:
Christopher J. Lamb and Evan Munsing
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
This study argues that interagency teams were a major catalyst in turning around the Iraq War, and that they will disappear from America's arsenal unless the knowledge base supporting the innovation can be secured. Most explanations credit the dramatic reduction in violence in Iraq between 2007 and 2008 to new U.S. leadership, the surge in U.S. forces, and/or U.S. financial support to Sunni tribal leaders. In contrast, we argue that the United States employed an underappreciated organizational innovation—interagency teams—to put insurgent clandestine organizations on the defensive and give population security measures a chance to take effect.
Topic:
Intelligence, Terrorism, Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and Population
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and America