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211. South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition

Publication Date:
06-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
South Ossetia is no closer to genuine independence now than in August 2008, when Russia went to war with Georgia and extended recognition. The small, rural territory lacks even true political, economic or military autonomy. Moscow staffs over half the government, donates 99 per cent of the budget and provides security. South Ossetians themselves often urge integration into the Russian Federation, and their entity's situation closely mirrors that of Russia's North Caucasus republics. Regardless of the slow pace of post-conflict reconstruction, extensive high-level corruption and dire socio-economic indicators, there is little interest in closer ties with Georgia. Moscow has not kept important ceasefire commitments, and some 20,000 ethnic Georgians from the region remain forcibly displaced. At a minimum, Russians, Ossetians and Georgians need to begin addressing the local population's basic needs by focusing on creating freedom of movement and economic and humanitarian links without status preconditions.
Topic:
Political Violence, Humanitarian Aid, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia

212. Norway's political test in Faryab, Afghanistan: how to lead?

Author:
Ståle Ulriksen
Publication Date:
07-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution
Abstract:
Norway's five-year experience as the lead nation of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Meymaneh in Faryab province, north-west Afghanistan, has been marked by an increased level of violence. This violence is often attributed to the greater strength of the Taliban insurgency. But a close analysis suggests that it has other causes. They include traditional local feuds, struggles between different power structures, and competition over drug trafficking. The nature of politics in this part of Afghanistan – where institutions are weak, parallel power systems coexist, warlords exercise personalised control, ethnicised divisions are growing, and older men dominate – underpins these conflicts. The district of Ghormach in nearby Badghis province, for which Norway took responsibility in January 2009, illustrates the problem: here, a series of military operations in an area of extreme poverty and intense ethnic rivalry seems to have caused more problems than it has solved.
Topic:
Political Violence, War, Insurgency, and Narcotics Trafficking
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Europe

213. Somalia's Endless Transition: Breaking the Deadlock

Author:
Andre Le Sage
Publication Date:
06-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was given a second lease on life in January 2009, after successful peace negotiations in Djibouti produced new TFG leadership and yielded substantial international backing. However, the TFG remains weak and has yet to develop new political alliances or military capabilities that provide traction against Islamist insurgent groups. The insurgents themselves—including al Shabab and Hizbul Islamia—are also weak and internally divided.
Topic:
Government, Islam, Insurgency, and Fragile/Failed State
Political Geography:
Africa and Somalia

214. Prioritizing Strategic Interests in South Asia

Author:
Robert B. Oakley and T.X. Hammes
Publication Date:
06-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
The focus on the war in Afghanistan has prevented the United States from developing a South Asia strategy rooted in the relative strategic importance of the nations in the region. India, a stable democracy enjoying rapid growth, clearly has the most potential as a strategic partner. Pakistan, as the home of al Qaeda leadership and over 60 nuclear weapons, is the greatest threat to regional stability and growth. Yet Afghanistan absorbs the vast majority of U.S. effort in the region. The United States needs to develop a genuine regional strategy. This paper argues that making the economic growth and social reform essential to the stability of Pakistan a higher priority than the conflict in Afghanistan is a core requirement of such a strategy.
Topic:
Political Violence, Economics, Terrorism, War, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, South Asia, and India

215. Tentative Jihad: Syria's Fundamentalist Opposition

Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Prematurely and exaggeratedly highlighted by the regime, belatedly and reluctantly acknowledged by the opposition, the presence of a powerful Salafi strand among Syria's rebels has become irrefutable. That is worrisome, but forms only part of a complex picture. To begin, not all Salafis are alike; the concept covers a gamut ranging from mainstream to extreme. Secondly, present-day Syria offers Salafis hospitable terrain – violence and sectarianism; disenchantment with the West, secular leaders and pragmatic Islamic figures; as well as access to Gulf Arab funding and jihadi military knowhow – but also adverse conditions, including a moderate Islamic tradition, pluralistic confessional make-up, and widespread fear of the kind of sectarian civil war that engulfed two neighbours. Thirdly, failure of the armed push this past summer caused a backlash against Salafi groups that grabbed headlines during the fighting.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Islam, Armed Struggle, Insurgency, and Sectarian violence
Political Geography:
Middle East, Arabia, and Syria

216. An Interview with Raymond T. Odierno

Publication Date:
03-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
How would you characterize the threat to Iraq today? Does the potential for renewed violence or political divisions pose the greatest threat to Iraq succeeding as a viable state? With our Iraqi and coalition partners, we have made good progress in stabilizing Iraq's security situation, specifically over the last 3 years. Today, security incidents are down to levels last seen in 2003—and we continue to see slow progress toward normalcy across Iraq. From a purely security perspective, there are three primary threats from groups still seeking to destabilize Iraq, the most dangerous being al Qaeda in Iraq [AQI]. While AQI started as a broad-based insurgency capable of sustaining significant operations across Iraq, our consistent pressure has degraded AQI, and they have had to morph into a covert terrorist organization capable of conducting isolated high-profile attacks. The Iraqi people have rejected al Qaeda, and the organization is no longer able to control territory. However, AQI remains focused on delegitimizing the government of Iraq, disrupting the national election process and subsequent government formation, and ultimately causing the Iraqi state to collapse. AQI remains a strategic threat. In addition to AQI, there remain Sunni Ba'athist insurgents whose ultimate goal is regime change and a reinstitution of a Ba'athist regime. Shia extremists and Iranian surrogates also continue their lethal and nonlethal efforts to influence the development of the Iraqi state.
Topic:
Insurgency
Political Geography:
Iraq

217. Afghanistan at the Breaking Point

Author:
Gilles Dorronsoro
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The current strategy of defeating the Taliban militarily is unrealistic. The coalition is on the defensive across much of Afghanistan and, with current troop levels, can at most only contain the insurgency. On present course, the coalition is swiftly heading toward an impasse.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Taliban

218. Radical Islam in the North Caucasus

Author:
Sergey Markedonov
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
As Kyrgyzstan plunges into crisis and the threat of a second Afghanistan in Central Asia looms large, the situation in the "Big Caucasus" seems less pressing and thus overshadowed. The worst scenarios predicted by analysts and politicians for the period of the 2008 August war have not been realized. The Russian attempt to "replace the regime" of Mikhail Saakashvili or apply the Georgian pattern in Ukraine, expected by many in the West, has not taken place. Neither have the attempts from the West (the United States, NATO, and others) to "nudge Georgia into a rematch," which were expected in Moscow. Nonetheless, the Caucasus region remains one of the most vulnerable spaces in Eurasia. In the Caucasus, the first precedent of a revision of borders between the former Soviet republics was established. For the first time in Eurasia, and particularly in the Caucasus, partially recognized states have emerged. While their independence is denied by the United Nations, it is recognized by the Russian Federation, a permanent member of the UN Security Council. After the "hot August" of 2008, Moscow demonstrated its willingness to play the role of a revisionist state for the first time since 1991. Russia defines the "Big Caucasus" as the sphere of its vital interests and priorities and consequently pretends to be a key stakeholder for the whole region.
Topic:
NATO, Islam, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, United States, Central Asia, Eurasia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Moscow, and United Nations

219. Nowhere to Turn: The failure to protect civilians in Afghanistan

Author:
Ashley Jackson
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
Despite an increase in the size of international military forces (IMF) from 90,0 00 to 14 0,00 0 over the past year , AOG have continued to expand their presence into the north, center and west a n d now have control of or significant influence in over half of the country. Attacks initiated by AOG have increased by 59% between July and September compared with the same period last year. In 200 9, they increased 43 % on 20 08. Government officials can barely access one-third of the country and there are districts outside government control in almost all of Afghanistan's 3 4 provinces.
Topic:
Political Violence, NATO, War, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan

220. Pakistan: dealing with peace in the tribal areas?

Author:
Laila Bokhari
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution
Abstract:
The six Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along Pakistan's western border have long been seen as a hub for militants, some with sympathies to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The region has increasingly come to the world's attention as a recruitment and training base for groups responsible for attacks on Pakistani soil and as a launch pad for attacks on US troops and their allies in Afghanistan. Even though the various groups comprising the Pakistani Taliban have been around for a number of years, it was only in December 2007 that they formally established themselves as a united force.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Islam, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, and Taliban