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1. Fracking or No Fracking? How a Green Transition Can Work for Workers

Author:
Robert Pollin and Jeannette Wicks-Lim
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
Throughout the 2024 U.S. Presidential campaign, the only climate-related issue to achieve prominence was the question of whether to ban fracking operations in the United States. Donald Trump is a long-time climate denier, and therefore had no qualms in supporting fracking and all other techniques for extracting fossil fuels from the ground. By contrast, Kamala Harris had supported a nationwide ban on fracking during her 2019 presidential campaign. This was due to the severe negative environmental and public health impacts of this natural gas extraction technique and because burning natural gas to produce energy generates CO2 emissions that cause climate change. But Harris opposed a fracking ban in 2024 on the assumption that the ban would impose major costs to the economy of Pennsylvania, which has the second-largest fracking operations among U.S. states, after Texas only. Such negative economic outcomes in Pennsylvania would indeed result if fracking were banned in the U.S. and no large-scale alternative economic activities were introduced into Pennsylvania’s economy. But banning fracking must be understood as one component of a much larger program to advance a viable climate stabilization program, in Pennsylvania, and everywhere else. We find that building a clean energy-dominant infrastructure in Pennsylvania—focused on investments in energy efficiency and renewable energy sources—will generate approximately 160,000 jobs in the state. Meanwhile, phasing down fracking and all other fossil fuel activities by 50 percent between 2026 – 35 will entail job losses in the range of 1,700 per year within the state. We argue that these 1,700 displaced fossil fuel workers should receive just transition policies that include pension, employment and income guarantees, in addition to, as needed, retraining and relocation support. We estimate that such a just transition program for these workers will cost in the range of $240 million per year. This amounts to about 0.02 percent of Pennsylvania’s current GDP. Thus, we show how, between 2026 – 2035, Pennsylvania could phase out 50 percent of all its fossil fuel production activities—including fracking operations—while also providing generous support for workers to transition out of their fossil fuel industry jobs and into activities that both raise public health and environmental standards in the state and contribute toward a viable global climate stabilization project.
Topic:
Climate Change, Elections, Green Transition, and Fracking
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

2. Investing in a Green Future: Finance, Industrial Policy and the Green transition

Author:
Ramaa Vasudevan
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
We present a framework to assess green climate finance and the pathways to building a climate aligned financial system. This would involve the strategic reorientation of central bank interventions, national development banks and multilateral and regional banks and coherent purposive collaborations between these institutions and interventions to decisively reshape the contemporary global financial system that is out of tune with the long-term imperatives of climate action. Aligning finance to climate goals at the necessary scale, pace and direction requires the calibration of financial flows across three axes: ‘public-private’; ‘real-financial’ and ‘national-international’. Along the first axis the naturedepleting, climate imperiling logic of short-term private profitability needs to be contained in order to pursue the public priorities of climate action. Along the second axis, policy efforts have to be geared to ensuring that financial flows are financing investments in climate mitigation and adaptation and not simply providing more fodder for the global portfolio glut and financial accumulation. Finally, along the third axis warding global funding and support on appropriate terms has to be provided to the most vulnerable countries while buttressing national ownership of the green mission.
Topic:
Climate Change, Industrial Policy, Banking, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. Building coalitions for climate transition and nature restoration

Author:
Jean Pisani-Ferry, Beatrice di Mauro, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Global climate and biodiversity outcomes will largely be determined in emerging and developing economies (EMDEs). We propose a four-pillar strategy to support climate and nature preservation in line with the economic interests of both developing and advanced countries. This would move beyond voluntary pledges to embed climate and nature objectives into the structures of trade, finance and industrial policy, creating a self-reinforcing system of cooperation and reducing the net costs of the green transition. Under Pillar 1, a coalition of advanced and developing countries would link tiered carbon pricing with a common carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM). Pillar 2 would create a climate-finance coalition to decarbonise the power sectors of developing countries. Pillar 3 would involve partnerships to develop clean energy-intensive industrial production stages in developing economies with rich renewables endowments; these would feed into the supply chains of the European Union and other energy-importing advanced economies. Pillar 4 would redesign markets to create scalable and credible mechanisms to fund carbon removals. Technology-based removals can be incentivised through the introduction of clean-up certificates into the EU emissions trading system, while nature-based removals would require improved market design centred on a new asset class: nature shares. The four pillars reinforce each other. A multi-country CBAM and carbon pricing coalition (Pillar 1) would reduce the cost of financing power sector decarbonisation (Pillar 2). Linking EMDE membership of the CBAM and carbon-pricing coalition to financial support for the decarbonisation of power sectors would also make it more attractive for EMDEs to adopt carbon prices. Decarbonisation of power sectors (Pillar 2) would be a precondition for developing clean, highly energy-intensive industry in renewables-rich EMDEs (Pillar 3). The Pillar 1 coalition should include the EU, China and as many other countries as possible. Advanced countries and China could underpin the Pillar 2 financier coalition. Pillar 3 would involve the EU and potentially other energy-poor advanced countries, along with EMDEs that are richly endowed with renewables. Pillar 4 would include the main custodians of the planet’s natural capital. Enabling these coalitions will require EU leadership.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economics, Industrial Policy, Trade, Sustainability, Decarbonization, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Europe

4. European Election: Red Alert!

Author:
Pascale Joannin
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Europeans are being called to the polls between 6 and 9 June 2024 — depending on the country — to renew the members of the European Parliament. These will be the tenth elections by direct universal suffrage since 1979.
Topic:
Elections, Geopolitics, Economic Growth, Crisis Management, COVID-19, Regional Politics, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Europe

5. The German 'Schuldenbremse' crisis: a symptom to be taken seriously in Europe

Author:
Clara Bösche
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The priority to be given to the ecological transition and its practical implementation are dividing Germany and Europe. The European Union is being accused of making the conditions of production for farmers even more difficult: the number of demonstrations across the European Union has been rising after the Germans began their protests on 15 January 2024, as they denounced the ambitions of the European Green Deal, as well as the human and financial costs. At the start of 2024, the German coalition government (SPD, Greens and FDP Liberals) led by Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD) is struggling, since its draft budget has been cut by around €60 billion. The origins of the budget cuts to which the government has had to resort lie in a decision taken by the Constitutional Court of Karlsruhe dated 15 November 2023. The latter censured the decision to reallocate 60 billion €, initially intended to cushion the economic impact of the pandemic crisis, to a special fund for the transformation of the economy and the climate. For two months now, opposition has been growing in Germany over the resources allocated, the priorities to be defined and the rules governing public debt. The constitutional appeal was lodged by CDU-CSU members of parliament, who denounced the government's "sleight of hand". As Germany enters a recession, the debate is whether or not it is still appropriate to limit public debt to 0.35% of GDP. Current circumstances no longer justify bending the rule: the pandemic crisis is over, and the exceptional funds earmarked should not be used for the economy or the environment. As a result, since the Constitutional Court's ruling against the federal budget, in addition to opposition over the priority to be given to the green transition in economic and agricultural life, further opposition has emerged: regarding whether the constitutional principle of the debt brake (Schuldenbremse) should be reformed or not. This principle is firmly defended by Friedrich Merz, leader of the CDU and of the CDU/CSU in the Bundestag. In his view, the debt brake is the only way to avoid saddling future generations with debt, and he fears that lifting it might have a knock-on effect in terms of the financial stability of other European Union countries. Within the government, the SPD and the Greens (led by the Vice-Chancellor and Minister for the Economy, Robert Habeck), would like to reform the debt brake to facilitate the necessary investments, in line with the European Green Deal. However, within the same government, the FDP Liberals, led by Finance Minister Christian Lindner, have long refused to challenge this constitutional principle, in the same way as the CDU/CSU opposition. Christian Lindner is therefore in a difficult situation, caught between traditional positions, his coalition partners and the opposition. A hard-won agreement on the 2024 budget, on 13 December 2023, provides for cuts that will result, in particular, in the reduction of tax relief on diesel on agricultural machinery - the main focus of demonstrations in Germany – but also in a postponement of the “climate bonus”. Priorities have had to be set because of this cutback, but they are the source of dissatisfaction both on the part of the farmers, as well as the promoters of the European Green Deal. The debate on Germany's levels of debt, in the light of the demonstrations now rocking the country, is further weakening the coalition - the aim in this paper is not to take position on this - but above all, to consider the problem of the priorities to be identified, not only in Germany but also in Europe.
Topic:
Budget, European Union, Tax Systems, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

6. The various causes of the agricultural crisis in Europe

Author:
Bernard Bourget
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The farmers' revolt, which peaked in January and February 2024, has affected most EU Member States. It is motivated by rising production costs, foreign competition, falling incomes, environmental constraints and cumbersome administrative procedures. However, certain causes are more specific to certain countries. This is the case in the Netherlands, where the farmers' revolt began in June 2022, in opposition to the Dutch government's plan to reduce nitrogen emissions by cutting livestock numbers. Dutch farmers had taken advantage of the abolition of milk quotas in 2015 to increase their production, making massive use of cattle feed imported from North and South America, and consolidating the Netherlands' position as Europe's leading exporter of food products. This farmers' revolt led to the creation of a party, the "Farmer-Citizen Movement" (BBB), which made a strong entry into the Senate in the March 2023 elections. In the countries of Central Europe - Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania - it was the fall in cereal prices, due to the influx of products imported from Ukraine following the closure of the Black Sea shipping route and the suspension of customs duties in May 2022, that provoked farmers' anger. It even led to the resignation of the Polish Minister of Agriculture in April 2023. In Germany, as in France, it was the governments' plans to reduce tax rebates on agricultural diesel that triggered farmers' protests and led to motorway blockades in January 2024. Farmers' discontent had already made itself felt quietly in France in the autumn with the turning over of road signs at the entrances to rural communities. Other grievances have been added to the increase in taxes on diesel, notably the growing environmental obligations under the Green Deal of the European Union and hostility to the free-trade agreements under negotiation with Mercosur, Australia and New Zealand. The first measures taken or announced by governments and the European Commission helped to calm farmers' anger, but the farm protests then spread to Italy and Spain. In response to the scale of the farmers' protests across Europe, on 25 January the President of the European Commission launched, a Strategic Dialogue on the future of agriculture in the European Union, led by a German academic, Peter Strohschneider, whose conclusions are due before the end of the summer. The conclusions should inform the next Commission and prepare the programming of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) after 2027. Themes proposed to participants include farmers' incomes, the sustainability of their practices, technological innovation, and competitiveness. Beyond the immediate measures taken to calm farmers' anger and with a view to analysing its causes, this agricultural crisis needs to be considered in the context of the long-term development of the CAP and European integration.
Topic:
Agriculture, Social Movement, Crisis Management, Carbon Emissions, Farmers, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Europe

7. Re-energising Europe’s global green reach

Author:
Giovanni Sgaravatti, Simone Tagliapietra, and Cecilia Trasi
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The goals of decarbonisation, competitiveness and strategic autonomy will underpin the implementation of the European Green Deal during the 2024-2029 European Union institutional cycle. To strike the right balance between these sometimes conflicting objectives, EU policymakers should focus on both domestic and international aspects of the Green Deal. Domestically, they must ensure implementation of the agreed climate plan, avoiding inaction or delay. Internationally, they must establish a new green-diplomacy and partnerships strategy, which will support global decarbonisation while addressing competitiveness and strategic autonomy concerns. The current EU approach to green diplomacy is uncoordinated, lacking a clear strategy and appropriate resources. Given the EU’s limited share of annual global emissions, supporting decarbonisation abroad is fundamental to meet the global net-zero emissions goal. The EU’s green diplomacy and partnerships need to be strengthened and expanded in a pragmatic and coherent manner. The main priorities include focusing on the implementation of international emissions reduction pledges, a new diplomatic push for carbon pricing and international green taxation, the creation of streamlined partnerships for green industrialisation with major partner countries and the promotion of new global trade and climate agreements. To succeed in these, a revision of the current governance of EU global green action will be required.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Partnerships, Carbon Emissions, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Europe

8. Why has the Global Demand for Uranium Increased Recently?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
As the world transitions to electricity to combat climate change, nuclear energy is poised to become an increasingly vital component of the global energy mix. New nuclear power projects have recently reached unprecedented levels, with more than 20 countries pledging to triple global nuclear capacity by 2050. China alone plans to construct at least 150 new reactors in the next 15 years, investing over USD 440 billion. India has also announced ambitious plans to increase its nuclear capacity from 6,780 megawatts to 22,480 megawatts by 2031. This surge in nuclear energy development persists despite several factors complicating the rise of uranium as a coveted metal. Chief among these are: the significant and steady decline in investment in uranium exploration and mine development over the past decade, particularly following the Fukushima incident in 2011; governments' focus on solar and wind energy; and the recent Western sanctions imposed on Russia, which have complicated the process of importing Russian uranium (especially with a complete ban on imports to the United States). Additionally, high inflation and interest rates have led to increased costs for new and existing uranium mining projects. Furthermore, conflicts in Niger have resulted in the loss of 5% of the world's uranium supply, representing more than 24% of the European Union's uranium imports.
Topic:
Climate Change, Uranium, Nuclear Energy, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Global Focus

9. Resource curse or darling: Rethinking EU energy interests in Kazakhstan

Author:
Giulia Cretti and Louise Van Schaik
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
With its abundant natural resources and potential for renewable energy production, Kazakhstan – one of world’s most important fossil fuel producers – will play an increasingly prominent role in EU energy security. In the Central Asian Republic, geopolitical players like Russia and China have long-standing security and economic interests and compete with the EU for access to resources. To build a sustainable energy partnership with Kazakhstan that moves beyond a fossil fuel-interdependent relationship, the EU needs to further operationalise its green energy diplomacy based on local needs. This policy brief highlights two key areas of mutually beneficial cooperation: green hydrogen and critical raw materials. The EU could support Kazakhstan with developing its own clean industry locally, which would facilitate domestic decarbonisation and socioeconomic development rather than simply the export of raw materials. Moreover, investments in the Kazakh renewable energy sector need to go hand in hand with a gradual phase-out of oil and gas investments from European energy companies. This would reduce the security risks of continued fossil fuel dependency on the stability of the country.
Topic:
Natural Resources, European Union, Partnerships, Energy, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Central Asia and Kazakhstan

10. Assessing the International Interlinkages and Dependencies of the EU27 ‘Energy-renewables’ Ecosystem

Author:
Francesca Guadagno and Robert Stehrer
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
The energy-renewables ecosystem (ERES) plays a particularly important role in the green transition. This paper analyses its relevance in EU member states and the competitiveness for the EU27 as a whole vis-à-vis other global players and identifies structural dependencies and vulnerabilities. It does so by drawing on the Joint Research Centre’s FIGARO dataset and detailed trade data, and by developing a novel approach that adapts input-output indicators to the analysis of industrial ecosystems. A number of key findings emerge from our analysis. First, the ERES is particularly relevant in new member states, Austria and Germany. At the global level, the EU27 is the second most important exporter after China. Second, in 2020 the EU ecosystem was dependent on imports of coal and lignite from Russia, as well as on a variety of other products from China (including medium- and high-tech electronic products). Third, analysis on the basis of detailed trade data indicates that a few products in the ERES supply chain are delivered by only a handful of countries, which could indicate some vulnerability. Most of the partner countries supply some products that may be characterised as ‘risky’, but China is a main source of such products.
Topic:
European Union, Trade, Renewable Energy, Strategic Autonomy, Green Transition, and Dependency
Political Geography:
Europe