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3141. Health Challenges for the 21st Century

Author:
Joshua Lederberg, Margaret Hamburg, Stephen Morse, Philip R. Reilly, and Timothy Wirth
Publication Date:
02-1997
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
New York Academy of Sciences
Abstract:
A crisis usually eliminates the time required to focus on the long-term: The urgent tends to drive out the important. Over the past several years, public policy perspectives on health care have often suffered from such myopia. In the United States, and in many other countries around the world, spiraling costs and shrinking budgets have focused health policy attention on perceived near-term crises over the allocation of (often public) resources. Because public resource allocation involves tax dollars, and because voters feel personally affected by changes in health services, the controversy enters the political arena. Moreover, politics itself is a very near-term business, with the ballot box and polling data providing its primary compass. In turn, this has added to the tendency to think of health care challenges in terms of immediate needs and to focus on the moment rather than on the consequences of today's changes in tomorrow's complex patterns.
Topic:
Economics, Government, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
United States and America

3142. Privatization and Regulation: Lessons from Argentina and Chile

Author:
Luigi Manzetti
Publication Date:
04-1997
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The North-South Center, University of Miami
Abstract:
Some economists have argued that before governments privatize state-owned monopolies in public utilities, they should first try to promote competition. If this is not done, privatization does not produce gains in economic efficiency; instead, it fosters rent-seeking behavior by the new private ownership. Few empirical analyses of rent-seeking behavior for Latin America in post-privatization environments have been done — those that exist concentrate on economic issues and neglect important political motivations. The purpose of this paper is to fill that gap and address key issues of public policy by examining the cases of Chile and Argentina and providing a political explanation for why the Chilean and Argentine governments allowed rent-seeking behavior in important public utility markets. Based upon an analysis of these experiences, the paper then discusses the types of institutions most likely to avoid such negative consequences.
Topic:
Economics, Government, and Political Economy

3143. Public and Private Roles in the Protection of Critical Information-Dependent Infrastructure

Author:
Stephen J. Lukasik
Publication Date:
05-1997
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
The discussion begins with a conceptual framework for addressing the protection of infrastructure systems subject to attacks on their information subsystems. This includes treating the types of infrastructure systems, possible strategies for their protection, and the nature and scale of the attack. Three components of a protection strategy are identified: preventing attacks, limiting the damage in an attack, and ensuring rapid reconstitution of the target system following an attack. The paper concludes with a discussion of public and private responsibilities for infrastructure protection and the identification of a number of areas where public initiatives might be effective. These are ordered roughly in terms of the cost and difficulty of implementation. In addressing the subject, the analysis is from the perspective of minimizing government intervention in privately owned infrastructure systems.
Topic:
Government and Industrial Policy
Political Geography:
United States

3144. Westphalia in Europe as West Failure Abroad? A Comparative Study of the Fate of the Nation-State in Non-Europe

Author:
Imtiaz Hussain
Publication Date:
01-1997
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas
Abstract:
Conventionally viewing the state as a black box and focusing almost exclusively on its outward orientation, the Westphalia paradigm, I argue, has outlived its purpose, and may even be misleading when applied to the more porous and democratic state today. Rather than measure state viability in terms of power balances abroad, three constituent elements extracted from the Westphalia literature are used to evaluate internal state viability instead: the relationship between the nation and the state, the capacities of the state itself, and the state within a collectivity. Whereas the first is operationalized in terms of Buzan's four-fold typology, the second focuses on how two forms of internal divisions have been resolved—between city and country interests over policy-making, and between various classes in society through governmental income redistribution programs—while the third evaluates the propensity of the state to delegate loyalties to any supranational entity in the 1990s. Over 160 sovereign countries are pooled into 5 geographical regions for the analysis. The results strengthen the above argument, and generally portray the exceptionalism of West Europe: It is the global hub of established national states, even though there are more state nations worldwide whose historical emergence accented internal development over external security considerations; viable states, measured in terms of established democracies, urban preponderance over policy making, and welfare redistribution; and transferring loyalties beyond the state.
Topic:
International Relations, Democratization, Development, and Government
Political Geography:
Europe, Maryland, and Westphalia

3145. Electricity: Liberal Futures

Author:
Walt Patterson
Publication Date:
11-1997
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Chatham House
Abstract:
Like the international dimension of electricity discussed in Working Paper 1, the liberal dimension of electricity has emerged only recently, at least as a recognized concept. However, whereas the international dimension is genuinely new, the dimension now characterized as 'liberal' needs closer examination. The language of policy discourse is not always consistent. Until the 1990s, policy analysts habitually referred to the electricity industry as 'conservative', in the sense that it was resistant to change and deeply wary of risk. However, those who first acted to 'liberalize' electricity were themselves 'conservative', in conventional political terms, notably the governments of Chile and the UK in the 1980s. That apparent irony in itself suggests that 'liberalizing' electricity is a more subtle and complex process than the term itself might indicate.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Environment, Government, Industrial Policy, International Trade and Finance, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Chile

3146. Domestic Structures and Democratic Foreign Policy: Peacemaking After World War II

Author:
Norrin Ripsman
Publication Date:
07-1997
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics, University of Pennsylvania
Abstract:
Unlike the comparative political economy literature, the literature on foreign security policy treats democracies as a coherent category of states, focusing on their commonalities rather than their differences. Both classical and contemporary theorists of foreign security policy have emphasized that all democratic states--states that are characterized by popular sovereignty, where the ultimate source of authority resides within the people as a whole -- share certain constitutional, procedural and normative features which affect the nature and content of their foreign security policies in similar ways. Using this logic, traditional Realists have argued that public involvement in the policy process makes democracies slow to react to international threats, reluctant to spend on defense, incapable of secrecy and war-averse; consequently, they conclude that democracies are at a disadvantage in international politics, where balance-of-power policies are necessary. Liberals, on the other hand, argue that democracies enjoy certain advantages at international bargaining, devote more aggregate resources to implementing their foreign and security policies, and are less likely than non-democratic states to have their policies subverted to serve the particular interests of their leaders, private interest groups or foreign countries. Moreover, as democratic peace theorists have recently argued, shared political norms and common political procedures prevent democracies from waging war against other democracies.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Government, and Peace Studies
Political Geography:
United States, United Kingdom, Europe, and France

3147. Mixed Signals

Author:
Peter A. Hall and Robert J. Franzese Jr.
Publication Date:
09-1997
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute of European Studies
Abstract:
Plans for European Monetary Union are based on the conventional postulate that increasing the independence of the central bank can reduce inflation without any real economic effects. However, the theoretical and empirical bases for this claim rest on models of the economy that make unrealistic information assumptions and omit institutional variables other than the central bank. When the signaling problems between the central bank or other actors in the political economy are considered, we find that the character of wage bargaining conditions the impact of central bank independence by rendering the signals between the bank and the bargainers more or less effective. Greater independence can reduce inflation without major employment effects where bargaining is coordinated, but it brings higher levels of unemployment where bargaining is uncoordinated. Thus, currency unions like the EMU may require higher levels of unemployment to control inflation than their proponents envisage; they will have costs as well as benefits, costs which will be distributed unevenly among and within the member nations based on the changes induced in the status of the bank and of wage coordination.
Topic:
Economics, Government, International Trade and Finance, and Political Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

3148. Balancing Positive and Negative Integration: The Regulatory Options for Europe

Author:
Fritz W. Scharpf
Publication Date:
11-1997
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
During the golden years from the 1950s to the mid-1970s, the industrial nations of Western Europe had the chance to develop specifically national versions of the capitalist welfare state - and their choices were in fact remarkably different (Esping-Andersen 1990). In spite of the considerable differences between the "Social-Democratic", "Corporatist" or "Liberal" versions, however, all were remarkably successful in maintaining full employment and promoting economic growth, while also controlling, in different ways and to different degrees, the destructive tendencies of unfettered capitalism in the interest of specific social, cultural, and/or ecological values (Scharpf 1991a; Merkel 1993). It was not fully realized at the time, however, how much the success of market-correcting policies did in fact depend on the capacity of the territorial state to control its economic boundaries. Once this capacity is lost, countries are forced into a competition for locational advantage which has all the characteristics of a Prisoner's Dilemma game (Sinn 1994). It reduces the freedom of national governments and unions to raise the regulatory and wage costs of national firms above the level prevailing in competing locations. Moreover, and if nothing else changes, the "competition of regulatory systems" that is generally welcomed by neoliberal economists (Streit/Mussler 1995) and politicians may well turn into a downward spiral of competitive deregulation and tax cuts in which all competing countries will find themselves reduced to a level of protection that is in fact lower than that preferred by any of them.
Topic:
Economics, Government, International Organization, and International Political Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

3149. Regulatory Competition and International Cooperation

Author:
Philipp Genschel and Thomas Plumper
Publication Date:
04-1997
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
Recent research has shown that regulatory competition does not necessarily lead to downward pressures on regulation, but may at times also push the level of regulation upwards. Extending David Vogel's "California effect" argument, this paper shows that such upward pressure may not only result directly from the dynamics of the competitive process but also from international cooperation. Evidence from two case studies on international capital market regulation is used to identify the conditions under which cooperation in the shadow of regulatory competition is likely to succeed or fail. The successful multilateral standardisation of banking capital requirements in the BIS is compared to failed attempts to harmonise interest taxation across EC member states.
Topic:
Government, International Cooperation, and International Political Economy
Political Geography:
California

3150. Nigeria: Country Profile

Publication Date:
11-1996
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Africa Policy Information Center
Abstract:
Nigeria, Africa's most populous nation, was a pioneer in the movement for African independence. In past centuries, its territory was home to a series of powerful and technically-advanced societies, renowned for their artistic, commercial, and political achievements.
Topic:
Democratization, Economics, Ethnic Conflict, Government, Nationalism, and Politics
Political Geography:
Africa and Nigeria