MADRID-Spain was attacked by Islamists on March 11, 2004, but the new government that emerged from the polls three days later never learned the right lessons from that massacre. Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and his Socialist government argued that Spain had been attacked because of its presence in Iraq and because of the conservative government's cooperation with the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush. Based on this notion, they concluded that by pulling out of Iraq and distancing itself from America, Spain could insulate itself from Islamic terrorism.
Over the past several years, Americans have become more aware and more vocal regarding the number of illegal aliens who have taken up residence in the United States. While this issue—and a resolution of this issue—is still being debated, many have questioned why current enforcement efforts are so lax. The focus of this paper is on the government agency responsible for the enforcement of our immigration laws, and in particular how the actions of this agency are influenced by political interests. This paper fills a gap in the literature-to-date by examining the enforcement of immigration laws within the interior of the nation. While other studies put border enforcement efforts in a political framework, this analysis is the first, to the authors' knowledge, to place interior enforcement within the interest-group theory of government framework. Our findings indicate that pressure groups shape the pattern of enforcement that emerges. Despite polls that indicate a majority of Americans favoring stricter enforcement, government enforcement agencies charged with this responsibility apparently succumb to the wishes of those that matter most politically.
Topic:
Government, Political Economy, Politics, Immigration, and Law Enforcement
In this paper we compare insurance regulatory frameworks in the United States (US) and European Union (EU), focusing primarily on solvency, but also considering product and price regulation, as well as other elements of consumer protection. This comparison highlights the use of more fluid and principles-based approaches in the EU as it is developing under Solvency II, while the US continues to focus essentially on static, rules-based regulation. The discussion further notes evidence suggesting that the EU approach is more successful in promoting a financially solid insurance sector.
For many years successive governments in Turkey have ignored an even denied the existence of Kurds in Turkey. What would have been possible in the past by recognizing cultural rights has now been a problem whereby an operation seems to be needed. Two common and important mistakes of governments: one is to say Kurds are primary citizens of this country as if there are secondary citizens! The second is “end the terror and we will recognize some rights”. Basic rights cannot be negotiated. This second mistake has led Öcalan to announce his own road map paralel to the Governments. Negotiating with hostile entities is very difficult and needs public consensus. Turkey, unlike Britain and Spain does not have public consensus. The best way was and is to follow EU's democratisation road map.
This special issue of Strategic Insights will continue our exploration of extended deterrence that began in our Fall 2009 issue. Its articles reflect the latest research as presented at the workshop on Extended Deterrence, Security Guarantees, and Nuclear Proliferation: Strategic Stability in the Gulf Region held at the Gulf Research Center, held in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, on October 4-5, 2009.
Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies
Abstract:
A large literature in political science takes for granted that democratic leaders would pay substantial domestic political costs for failing to carry out the public threats they make in international crises, and consequently that making threats substantially enhances their leverage in crisis bargaining. And yet proponents of this audience costs theory have presented very little evidence that this causal mechanism actually operates in real—as opposed to simulated—crises. We look for such evidence in post-1945 crises and find hardly any. Audience cost mechanisms are rare because (1) leaders see unambiguous committing threats as imprudent, (2) domestic audiences care more about policy substance than about consistency between the leader's words and deeds, (3) domestic audiences care about their country's reputation for resolve and national honor independently of whether the leader has issued an explicit threat, and (4) authoritarian targets of democratic threats do not perceive audience costs dynamics in the same way that audience costs theorists do. We found domestic audience costs only as secondary mechanisms in a few cases where the public already had hawkish preferences before any threats were made.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Government, Politics, Political Theory, and Public Opinion
One of the greatest dilemmas of the early 21st century is how to satisfy the demands of densely populated states in the context of a global environmental crisis. As the world's biggest polluter and prominent emerging world power, China is at the centre of the global debate. Worsening pollution trends, increasing resource scarcity, and widespread ecological degradation have serious implications for China's ongoing modernisation drive. The spillover effects across borders also pose a challenge to its relations with the outside world. Although China's per capita CO2 emissions are low relative to the United States and Australia, they already exceed the world average. In 2007, China overtook the United States to become the world's largest aggregate emitter.
Topic:
Environment, Government, International Trade and Finance, and Reform