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1. The value added of central bank digital currencies: a view from the euro area

Author:
Maria Demertzis and Catarina Martins
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Different jurisdictions have set out different reasons for creating central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). Some countries, particularly those with already-operational CBDCs for retail purposes, aim to to promote financial inclusion. But in countries where most citizens have access to financial services, central banks are interested in CBDCs as an aspect of the increasing digitalisation of finance. Central banks could also choose to use CBDCs to guarantee in full citizen’s holdings (currently, deposits in commercial bank are only partially guaranteed), but this would trigger major changes in the financial system in terms of the role of commercial banks in intermediation and the role of fiat money. So far, central banks have not opted to go this way. In the euro area, consumers have multiple payment options and a very efficient retail payments system. The currency enjoys high levels of trust and is not challenged by the emergence of private currencies, such as Bitcoin, or by the risk that cash, a monetary system’s anchor, will disappear. Therefore, creating a CBDC for retail purposes in the euro area offers little obvious value added, at least for the foreseeable future. However, there is a strong case for building a CBDC that banks could use for cross-border wholesale purposes (ie with other currencies). Wholesale CBDCs could revolutionise the way that cross-border, cross-currency payments are made for two reasons. Cross-border payments are currently slow and inefficient. Pilot projects have shown that wholesale payments with CBDCs can generate substantial time and cost savings. Any two central banks that have operational wholesale CBDCs could settle transactions between themselves. This would be very different from the current system, as most settlements today are done via the dollar (and then the euro) infrastructure and use correspondent banks. The euro area and the United States would have to consider carefully from a geopolitical perspective how wholesale CBDCs might affect their global economic standing. By developing a CBDC for wholesale purposes, the European Union would be able to contribute to developing the global standard.
Topic:
Monetary Policy, Governance, Regulation, Central Bank, Digital Currency, and Euro
Political Geography:
Europe

2. Signaling Virtue or Vulnerability? The Changing Impact of Exchange Rate Regimes on Government Bond Yields

Author:
Z. Barta, Lucio Baccaro, and A. Johnston
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
Do exchange rate regimes affect the conditions under which developed countries borrow? This paper argues that they do, but their impact on yields depends on the prevailing macroeconomic context. When investors regard inflation as the most relevant risk to bond holdings, monetary union has a distinct advantage over floating and fixed exchange rates because of its credible in-built mechanism to control inflation. However, once default is seen as the most relevant risk, exchange rate rigidity becomes a liability due to its constraining effect on governments’ ability to respond to adverse shocks. We test our argument with a moving window panel analysis for twenty-three OECD countries from 1980 to 2017. We find that before the late 2000s, inflation was penalized under floating and (to a lesser extent) fixed exchange rate regimes, but not in countries in monetary union. Since the 2010s, inflation carries no penalty under any exchange rate regime. Variables linked to default risk (debt and entitlement spending) did not affect yields under any exchange rate arrangements until the mid-2000s. Afterwards, countries in monetary union (and to a lesser extent in fixed exchange rate regimes) were significantly penalized for public debt and entitlement spending, whereas countries with floating regimes were not. Our results speak to the literatures on governments’ institutional commitments and “room to move.”
Topic:
Financial Markets, Bonds, Exchange Rates, and Euro
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. The Cyclical Behaviour of Fiscal Policy During the Covid-19 Crisis

Author:
Philipp Heimberger
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
This paper analyses the cyclicality of fiscal policy (discretionary versus automatic) for 28 advanced economies over 1995-2021 by paying special attention to the Covid-19 crisis. We find evidence that discretionary fiscal policy during the Covid-19 crisis (2020-2021) was significantly more countercyclical than before – in particular in the Eurozone. We do not find comparable evidence for more counter-cyclicality during the financial crisis or Euro crisis, which lends support to the argument that discretionary fiscal policy responded especially forceful to stabilise the economy during the Covid-19 crisis. Furthermore, automatic fiscal stabilisers contributed significantly to counter-cyclical stabilisation, although their performance over 2020-2021 was more in line with the past than for discretionary fiscal policy. Overall, fiscal policy in non-Eurozone advanced countries is more countercyclical than in the Eurozone. However, the cyclicality varies markedly across countries. Our findings shed light on how the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy varies across countries and time.
Topic:
Financial Crisis, Crisis Management, Fiscal Policy, COVID-19, and Euro
Political Geography:
Europe

4. The international role of the euro and the dollar: Forever in the lead?

Author:
Martin Mühleisen
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The international monetary system has been surprisingly resilient over the past two years, considering the size of pandemic and geopolitical shocks that hit markets during this period. Liquidity injections by the major central banks helped stabilize economic activity and avoid disruptions to capital flows or foreign exchange markets. Major exchange rates remained range-bound throughout most of the crisis, even if the dollar has appreciated sharply in recent months. Volatility is likely to pick up as monetary policy responds to high inflation, but there should be no doubt that the dollar-based monetary order has withstood a major test during the past two years. This feat has been even more remarkable as the global security landscape has deteriorated in dramatic fashion, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has brought international tensions to a level not seen since the 1961 Cuban missile crisis. Moreover, while the dollar’s safe haven status remains firmly established, the center of global economic activity has been shifting east. Asia has become an economic powerhouse, and China is on course to become the world’s largest economy over the next few years. It is a natural question whether China will challenge the United States and Europe for global economic leadership, and whether the renminbi will appear as a leading, if not dominant, currency. This paper argues that this is unlikely for the foreseeable future, in part because a larger global role for the renminbi would be inconsistent with the Chinese leadership’s current policy priorities. However, there is no room for complacency. With the post-World War II international order in gradual decline, the world could again reach a moment where unforeseen geopolitical events might lead to changes in long-held political and economic paradigms. The United States and Europe can reduce this risk by making their growth models more robust and sustainable. Moreover, keeping their global alliances intact could prevent a loss of influence that has heralded changes in the international monetary system in the past.
Topic:
Economic Growth, Currency, Financial Institutions, Digital Policy, Digital Currency, Dollar, and Euro
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

5. Measuring macroeconomic uncertainty during the euro’s lifetime

Author:
Monika Grzegorczyk and Francesco Papadia
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
It is a cliché in official economic institutions’ publications and their leaders’ speeches to lament exceptional uncertainty. The complaint does, however, ring true currently. A solid empirical basis should be given to this view by properly measuring macroeconomic uncertainty. To measure macroeconomic uncertainty, we start from observable forecasts of macroeconomic variables, which are transformations of underlying economic conditions. By observing how forecasts change over time, we measure the flow of macroeconomic surprises. The more intense the flow of surprises, the greater uncertainty can be said to be. Greater differences among forecasts are also evidence of uncertainty. We draw out four indicators of macroeconomic uncertainty, measured over the lifetime of the euro: How the macroeconomic forecasts of a given institution for the same time period change over time; How the macroeconomic forecasts of a given institution deviate from realised outcomes; How the macroeconomic forecasts of different institutions deviate from one other; How dispersed the forecasts of different professionals are. We also measure whether the ‘stag-‘ or the ‘-flationary’ component is stronger in the overall stagflationary shock caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Topic:
Economy, Institutions, Macroeconomics, Uncertainty, and Euro
Political Geography:
Europe and Global Focus

6. Signaling Virtue or Vulnerability? The Changing Impact of Exchange Rate Regimes on Government Bond Yields

Author:
Zsófia Barta, Lucio Baccaro, and Alison Johnston
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
Do exchange rate regimes affect the conditions under which developed countries borrow? This paper argues that they do, but their impact on yields depends on the prevailing macroeconomic context. When investors regard inflation as the most relevant risk to bond holdings, monetary union has a distinct advantage over floating and fixed exchange rates because of its credible in-built mechanism to control inflation. However, once default is seen as the most relevant risk, exchange rate rigidity becomes a liability due to its constraining effect on governments’ ability to respond to adverse shocks. We test our argument with a moving window panel analysis for twenty-three OECD countries from 1980 to 2017. We find that before the late 2000s, inflation was penalized under floating and (to a lesser extent) fixed exchange rate regimes, but not in countries in monetary union. Since the 2010s, inflation carries no penalty under any exchange rate regime. Variables linked to default risk (debt and entitlement spending) did not affect yields under any exchange rate arrangements until the mid-2000s. Afterwards, countries in monetary union (and to a lesser extent in fixed exchange rate regimes) were significantly penalized for public debt and entitlement spending, whereas countries with floating regimes were not. Our results speak to the literatures on governments’ institutional commitments and “room to move.”
Topic:
International Political Economy, Financial Markets, Bonds, Exchange Rates, and Euro
Political Geography:
Global Focus

7. Is the Euro up for Grabs? Evidence from a Survey Experiment

Author:
Lucio Baccaro, Bjorn Bremer, and Erik Neimanns
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic may lead to a resurgence of the euro crisis. In this context, Italy seems particularly vulnerable: support for the euro is lower than in most other eurozone countries, and a possible exit could have serious consequences for the common currency. Based on a novel survey experiment, this paper shows that the pro-euro coalition is fragile in Italy and preferences are malleable. They are heavily dependent on the perceived costs of continued membership, as a majority of Italians would opt for Italexit rather than accepting a bailout plan requiring the implementation of austerity policies. Individuals who feel they have not benefited from the euro are most likely to support exit when faced with the prospect of austerity. This suggests that, differently from Greece, where voters were determined to remain in the euro at all costs, the pro-euro coalition may crumble if Italy is exposed to harsh conditionality.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Crisis Management, Voting, Survey, COVID-19, and Euro
Political Geography:
Europe and Italy

8. Has the “External Constraint” Contributed to Italy’s Stagnation? A Critical Event Analysis

Author:
Lucio Baccaro and Massimo D'Antoni
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
Has the strategy of the “external constraint” (voluntarily limiting the country’s policy-making discretion by tying it to the European mast) contributed to Italy’s stagnation over the past twenty-five years? The existing literature is divided on this question. The dominant interpretation is that Italy’s stagnation is due to insufficient liberalization, and that the external constraint has had no negative and even a positive influence. An alternative interpretation emphasizes the demand compression and supply-side effects of the external constraint. Based on three case studies of public debt management, privatization, and labor market policy, this paper reconstructs the process by which the external constraint has affected outcomes. It argues that it has had a negative impact, but more as a necessary condition than as a sufficient one. In other words, it would probably have been possible to manage the external constraint differently to produce better outcomes, but without the external constraint, the stagnation would likely have been less deep.
Topic:
Economics, Political Economy, and Euro
Political Geography:
Italy and North America

9. Will the U.S. Dollar Remain the Global Reserve Currency?

Author:
Marek Dabrowski
Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Social and Economic Research - CASE
Abstract:
The U.S. economy’s rapidly growing trade and current account deficits (2003-2007) and systematic weakening of the dollar against the Euro and other currencies raised several concerns about its future as the global reserve currency. The global financial crisis of 2007-2009, while reinforcing the U.S. dollar’s role as the most liquid and in demand currency (especially during periods of increased risk aversion) triggered a political debate on how the future global reserve currency system should be shaped.
Topic:
Finance, Economy, Currency, Dollar, and Euro
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America