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11. The 2016 U.S. Election: Can Democracy Survive the Internet?

Author:
Nathaniel Persily
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Democracy
Institution:
National Endowment for Democracy
Abstract:
The 2016 presidential election represents the latest chapter in the disintegration of the legacy institutions that had set bounds for U.S. politics in the postwar era. It is tempting (and in many ways correct) to view the Donald Trump campaign as unprecedented in its breaking of established norms of politics. Yet this type of campaign could only be successful because established institutions—especially the mainstream media and political-party organizations—had already lost most of their power, both in the United States and around the world. The void that these eroding institutions left was filled by an unmediated populist nationalism tailor-made for the Internet age.
Topic:
Elections, Democracy, Internet, and Election Interference
Political Geography:
United States and North America

12. Turnout and Voter Insecurity in the French Elections

Author:
Adrien Abecassis
Publication Date:
10-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
One of the key questions in the current debate on the causes of the rise of populism is whether the economic harshness and distrust in traditional political parties increase or decrease election turnout. This question was debated in a recent roundtable discussion, organized by the Weatherhead Research Cluster on Global Populism, on the economic and cultural causes of populism’s prevalence. Would voters struck by economic shocks—those whose futures seemed to be vulnerable, and who have lost their sense of security about their own lives and that of their children’s—tend to vote to prevent this from happening? Or would their suffering cause them to retreat and withdraw from political elections? And indeed, the answer is not obvious: Luigi Guiso et al. found that economic security shocks significantly increased the likelihood of abstention, while David Autor et al. showed that economic shocks due to foreign trade competition raised—not lowered—voter turnout.
Topic:
Elections, Populism, Political Parties, and Election Interference
Political Geography:
Global Focus

13. New Report on Abuse of State Resources in Georgia

Author:
Erica Shein, Chad Vickery, Heather Szilagyi, and Julia Brothers
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Foundation for Electoral Systems
Abstract:
his report details findings from an IFES Abuse of State Resources Assessment conducted in Georgia following October 2016 elections. This assessment served as the pilot test of the Abuse of State Resources Research and Assessment Framework assessment methodology, which was researched, developed, and peer-reviewed under the Global Elections and Political Transitions mechanism supported by the United States Agency for International Development. Using this methodology, the report draws on detailed desk research as well as a field research mission to Georgia in May 2017. Findings are focused on abuse of state resources (ASR) legal provisions, oversight institutions and enforcement mechanisms. ASR violations are a consistent feature of national and municipal elections in Georgia, and assessment interlocutors see the participation of civil servants in campaign activities as one of the most significant challenges. Also of concern is the perceived over-staffing of public service departments and legal entities of public law, especially at the local level. This report aims to provide actionable recommendations for improving the ASR environment in Georgia. The report focuses on three principles for detecting, deterring and remedying ASR abuses in a manner commensurate with international standards. Principle 1 evaluates the legal framework for addressing three potential avenues for ASR: state personnel, state funds and physical resources, and official government communications. Principle 2 focuses on oversight of the ASR legal framework by independent institutions. Principle 3 analyzes the effective enforcement of sanctions and penalties. The methodology applied for this assessment also acknowledges the need to account for contextual factors may impact the ASR in elections. As such, the report provides a narrative overview of challenges related to the public service framework, campaign finance framework, civil society oversight and advocacy, media environment and public information, and public procurement in Georgia. Based on in-depth analysis of each of the areas described above, the report offers detailed recommendations to strengthen the legal framework with an emphasis on clarifying the rights and responsibilities of civil servants, ensuring that ASR sanctions and penalties achieve a deterrent effect, and clarifying mandates of oversight and enforcement bodies.
Topic:
Corruption, Elections, Voting, Election Interference, and Rigged Elections
Political Geography:
Europe, Eurasia, Eastern Europe, and Georgia

14. Countering Russian Information Operations in the Age of Social Media

Author:
Keir Giles
Publication Date:
11-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
As investigations into attempts to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election continue, more aspects of Russia’s approach to information warfare are coming to light. A steady stream of new disclosures is revealing a complex blend of hacking, public disclosures of private emails, and use of bots, trolls, and targeted advertising on social media designed to interfere in political processes and heighten societal tensions. Moscow’s hostile actions are driven by the belief that Russia is already in a state of conflict with the West, led by the United States, and that the internet is a domain for waging this conflict. From the earliest stages of the internet’s development, Russia has held a starkly different view from the West of its benefits and its potential. Russia’s national security establishment immediately saw connectivity as a threat and a potential weapon—and eventually as one that could help achieve regime change and deprive a country of its sovereignty—rather than as an enabler of economic development. The organization of Russia’s information-warfare capabilities, which include cyber operators, media outlets, and false flag entities, is shrouded in secrecy. In the West, generally only the intelligence community has a clear picture of how Russian capabilities are directed. Barring the sudden appearance of a Russian counterpart to Edward Snowden, the only view into Russia’s information toolbox is provided by cybersecurity companies and criminal prosecutions. The picture is further muddied because the Russian government keeps many of its cyberwarfare actors at arm’s length by employing contractors and former criminals through middlemen, giving Moscow a degree of deniability if caught. Nevertheless, both Western governments and private industry can take steps to mitigate Russian influence operations. Western governments should swiftly and decisively denounce Russian information activities as soon as they are identified, and their counterintelligence agencies should identify quantitative means to measure the effectiveness of Russia’s methods. Social media companies should more aggressively police their platforms for malicious state-sponsored content, and they should work with news organizations to promote verified and fact-checked content on their platforms.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Political stability, Disinformation, and Election Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and North America

15. Honing Cyber Attribution

Author:
Justin Key Canfil
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of International Affairs
Institution:
School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University
Abstract:
Concerns about state-directed cyber intrusions have grown increasingly prevalent in recent years. The idea that state principals can obfuscate their involvement in such attacks by delegating operational tasks to non-state agents poses a particularly significant challenge to international enforcement and remedies. Gaps in international law, coupled with obstacles to detection in such cases, may make it more difficult to bring sponsoring states to justice. This paper offers a roadmap for assessing the propensity of states to delegate to non-state actors and correct for false positives in standard (typically more technical) cyber attack attribution methods. I conclude that the conditions under which attacks are likely to have been backed by sponsoring states occupy a much narrower window than conventional wisdom suggests, and that the universe of transgressors can be identified when standard indicators overlap with specific conditions.
Topic:
Security, Elections, Cybersecurity, and Election Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and North Am