Search

Begin New Search Topic Economic Competition

11. Net International Investment Position Surplus: A Key to Reconciling Financial Stability and Internationalization

Author:
Young Sik Jeong and Yena Song
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
This study examines the influence of net international investment position (IIP) on financial stability and financial internationalization. We find a strong correlation between creditor status (IIP surplus) and resilience to financial crises. Net creditor countries appear to act as buffers, with foreign assets returning to the home country during potential crises, thus preventing deterioration in external sector soundness. Furthermore, our analysis reveals that external financial assets positively affect the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) of financial service. Specifically, the positive relationship between external financial assets and financial service RCA is more pronounced during periods of net IIP surplus compared to net IIP deficit periods. Our findings suggest that a net IIP surplus is beneficial for both financial stability and international competitiveness.
Topic:
Economics, Investment, Financial Stability, Internationalization, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
Global Focus

12. The three pillars of effective European Union competition policy

Author:
Fiona M. Scott Morton
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Competitiveness is a region’s ability to achieve high productivity, attracting businesses, creating jobs and fostering innovation. It stems from efficiently using resources, is driven by competitive markets and is supported by three pillars: competition policy, procompetitive industrial policy and regulation. Competition enforcement keeps markets competitive by preventing harmful practices such as cartels, dominance abuse and anticompetitive mergers. While there is a push to relax European Union merger laws to promote European ‘champions’, this risks inefficiency and monopolisation. Instead, expanding the EU’s market size while maintaining competition is essential, especially in digital sectors. Procompetitive industrial policy addresses market failures and fosters well-functioning markets by targeting externalities such as worker training, R&D and infrastructure. Unlike outdated policies favouring national champions, this approach should focus on EU-level initiatives that promote competition and deepen the single market. This allows firms to achieve scale and drive innovation. Monopolised markets, whether state-created or naturally formed, need regulation to ensure competitive outcomes. The EU Digital Markets Act (DMA) aims to enhance competition and innovation on digital platforms by mandating data sharing, non-discriminatory access and interoperability. However, resistance to compliance on the part of tech giants poses enforcement challenges. Without effective and timely enforcement, trust in the law will erode, stalling innovation and reducing Europe’s global regulatory influence. When competition enforcement, procompetitive industrial policy and monopoly regulation work together, markets benefit consumers, firms and workers. Effective EU policy will refine competition enforcement, regulate monopolies where necessary and redesign state aid strategically to create welfare-enhancing markets. This comprehensive approach ensures an economy that serves its people and remains competitive.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, European Union, Microeconomics, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

13. Trade and Competitiveness: Putting the Firm at the Centre of the Analysis

Author:
Lucian Cernat and Oscar Guinea
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The European Commission published its communication for the long-term competitiveness of the EU. Trade and Open Strategic Autonomy were among the selected policy areas that will drive EU competitiveness in the future and trade with the rest of the world as a share of EU Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was the selected indicator to measure progress. This Policy Brief proposes a new set of indicators that complement this and similar indicators that focus on the value of trade. Using the Trade by Enterprise Characteristics (TEC) database, this paper produces indicators that measure the number of exporters, non-EU suppliers, non-EU customers, and foreign companies. By putting the firm at the centre of the analysis, these indicators offer insights that complement policy-makers’ views on trade and competitiveness.
Topic:
European Union, GDP, Trade, Strategic Autonomy, European Commission, Economic Competition, and Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

14. Trade Shocks and Social Mobility: The Intergenerational Effect of Import Competition in Brazil

Author:
Andrés César, Matias Ciaschi, Guillermo Falcone, and Guido Neidhöfer
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Distributive, Labor and Social Studies (CEDLAS)
Abstract:
This paper investigates whether the impact of trade shocks on employment and wages persists across generations. Using an instrumental variable strategy on survey data with retrospective information on parental employment, we study the consequences of increased Chinese import competition in Brazilian industries on individuals with differently exposed fathers. Results show that several years after the shock, children of more exposed fathers have lower education and earnings, lower chances of formal jobs, and are more likely to rely on social assistance. These effects are substantial for children from disadvantaged background, indicating that the shock had a negative impact on intergenerational mobility.
Topic:
Trade, Imports, Economic Competition, and Social Mobility
Political Geography:
Brazil and South America

15. United States–China semiconductor standoff: A supply chain under stress

Author:
Jeremy Mark and Dexter Tiff Roberts
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
In August 2022, the US Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act, a law that approves subsidies and tax breaks to help jump-start the renewed production on American soil of advanced semiconductors.1 Just two months later, the Joe Biden administration issued wide-ranging restrictions on the export to China of chips and chip-making technology to undercut that country’s ability to manufacture the same class of integrated circuits.2 Taken together with a steady stream of Biden administration prohibitions on technology sales to key Chinese companies, the US initiatives represent a profound turn toward competition with China in the high-tech realm.3 They also highlight an effort to restructure the complex, multinational supply chains centered on East Asia that manufacture hundreds of billions of dollars of semiconductors a year. As such, the Biden administration has set in motion a process that could alter the business strategies—and fortunes—of homegrown and foreign-invested semiconductor companies based in China, world-leading chipmakers in Taiwan and South Korea, and suppliers around the world that provide the industry with the machinery and myriad inputs that fuel chip production. The Biden administration insists that its restrictions on sales to China are intended only to limit China’s ability to produce the cutting-edge chips that can feed into the development of weapons and other strategically important technologies—and not to cripple its semiconductor industry. But the current state of play of sanctions and support for US-based semiconductor production, including by Taiwanese and Korean chipmakers, is not the endpoint in this process. Rather, the momentum to constrain Beijing’s semiconductor program is likely to continue in the coming months, at the very least with additional restrictions on Chinese companies and government-linked entities, and unprecedented bureaucratic scrutiny of American venture-capital and equity-financing flows to China. That amounts to more bad news for corporate leaders in Asia, North America, and Europe who have spent the past generation building a globe-spanning semiconductor industry that has faced few barriers to expansion. As US restrictions mount, and sales of certain technologies to China flag, the once-unimaginable process of reorienting semiconductor supply chains will become an ever-present reality. The CHIPS and Science Act already is becoming an important factor in corporate strategy, providing incentives for Taiwanese, Korean, and American companies to make big bets on new factories in places like New York, Ohio, Texas, and Arizona—witness Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s (TSMC’s) recent decision to build a second factory in Phoenix.4 This paper explores the potential implications of US semiconductor policy for the global semiconductor supply chains and the competition for primacy in an industry that is constantly changing the face of the global economy and one that has implications for global security in all its dimensions. It begins by examining the policies put in place by the Biden administration, and then discusses the changes taking place across the industry, with a focus on Asia.
Topic:
Economy, Business, Supply Chains, Semiconductors, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

16. Plurilateral Controls and a New Export Control Regime are Needed to Make Export Controls More Effective and Less Counterproductive

Author:
Kevin Wolf
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
If the first rule of export control regulation is to define clearly the problem to be solved, the second, with some exceptions, is to ensure that the rule is both effective and not counterproductive. By “effective,” I mean that the rule actually stops or hinders the end users of concern from getting the items at issue from any source. My reference to “not counterproductive” means ensuring that foreign competitors of U.S. companies do not gain outsized advantages in markets to which U.S. firms no longer have access thanks to export controls. The income gained in these instances could allow the foreign competitors to out-innovate, out-compete, or even displace entirely the U.S. company. The exceptions pertain to situations where the U.S. should impose a unilateral control to express objection to and not otherwise support human rights violations or move quickly when the issue to be addressed is urgent, particularly if there is a threat to the warfighter. In both cases, the point remains that the eventual adoption of multilateral or plurilateral controls will make them more effective.
Topic:
Regulation, Exports, Unilateralism, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

17. The geopolitics of European wheat

Author:
Sébastien Abis
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
With its twenty-seven Member States, the European Union is a major agricultural and cereal-producing power. And with 450 million inhabitants, it is the world's second largest consumer of wheat after China[1]. More than just a single market, the EU has also become the world's largest wheat producer, although the Middle Kingdom regularly challenges this position[2] , especially when the harvests on the Old Continent are not as good. The European Union is also now the world's second largest wheat exporter, behind Russia but ahead of the United States[3] . These geo-economic advantages are based on a political project: union. The figures on European wheat, disaggregated and observed by member state, would not be so comforting. But is the European Union aware of its agricultural strengths and does it want to maintain them in the 21st century? Why does wheat embody both power as well as a dose of experimentation?[4]
Topic:
Agriculture, Markets, European Union, Food Security, Geopolitics, Economic Competition, and Wheat
Political Geography:
Europe

18. Fair Competition for an Evolving Economy

Author:
Keldon Bester
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
Fair competition is essential to economic growth. Without it, corporate concentration takes over. Canada’s permissive merger law has allowed a small number of big corporations to dominate key sectors of the Canadian economy, resulting in limited consumer choice. Although Canada’s competition laws are currently under review, its global peers are taking steps to protect competition in their own economies. This paper recommends that Canada should focus on the role of fair competition in its competition law framework, specifically differentiating beneficial and harmful competition. Canada’s abuse of dominance provision protects against anti-competitive conduct, but it does little to protect new and emerging competitors. This paper suggests that Canada should look to international peers such as the European Union, Germany and the United States for cues to reform its own system.
Topic:
European Union, Economy, Legislation, Corporations, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
Europe, Canada, Germany, North America, and United States of America

19. Merger Policy, Competition and Innovation Leadership: Implications for the UK’s Investment Attractiveness

Author:
Matthias Bauer, Oscar du Roy, and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The UK’s competition regulator has adopted hard-sitting views in its assessment of transnational mergers and acquisitions. Since 2019, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has blocked a historic 59% of all mergers that were under investigation, which is double compared to the previous five years. With increased competence to set conduct requirements for large technology companies, aggressive enforcement by the CMA risks undermining Britain’s ambitions to become a leader in global trade, technology, and innovation.[1] Acquisitions in the technology sector have increasingly been scrutinised by competition authorities over the past decade, often based on the hypothesis that transactions involving large multinational companies tend to be anti-competitive. Authorities’ concerns are based on theories about post-acquisition market structures and the impacts of “killer acquisitions”. While their theories lack empirical justification, competition authorities have increasingly quoted them to assess cases through an ideological lens. Indeed, investigations into acquisitions show that competition authorities can come to markedly distinct conclusions when assessing the impacts on competition over time, especially in technology-intensive industries. The premise that acquisitions of small rivals by large tech companies inherently result in decreased competition lacks solid empirical evidence. Competition authorities often fail to adequately consider efficiency criteria and the resultant benefits for consumers. The proposed acquisition of Activision Blizzard, a video game maker, by Microsoft is a case in point. The UK CMA had initially found that the acquisition would reduce competition in gaming markets. EU and US competition regulators, by contrast, have cleared the transaction, highlighting the uncertain nature of merger review results for international transactions. Large multinational technology companies are major sources of innovation and productivity growth. The services they provide are increasingly pervasive across developed market economies, promising large productivity gains. Small, medium, and young companies in high-tech sectors are also important sources of innovation and productivity growth and, therefore, major targets for investment. Ideologically charged competition enforcement would have a negative impact on the UK’s investment attractiveness. The prospect of an innovative and commercially successful company being taken over by another company is an important precondition for investors to make early-stage and continued seed capital investments. Acquisitions also play an important role in driving investments in business growth and internationalisation. By contrast, there is no hard evidence to support the presumption that acquisitions by major tech companies result in decreased competition. A continuation of aggressive merger enforcement by the UK CMA would undermine investments in innovation-driven UK businesses and reduce access to funding for British venture capital-backed start-ups.
Topic:
Digital Economy, Leadership, Investment, Innovation, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

20. Achieving Inclusive and Innovative Growth with Competition Policies

Author:
Minsoo Han and Subin Kim
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
In recent years, inequality has grown worse worldwide. Recent studies have pointed out weakening market competition and deepening industrial concentration as one of factors for this phenomenon. Therefore, the role of competition policies in promoting market competition should also be considered as a countermeasure against deepening inequality beyond the traditional view about competition policies. Against this backdrop, we empirically analyze cases of the US, the EU and Korea, and then propose a competition policy direction to achieve inclusive and innovative growth pursued by the Korean government.
Topic:
Inequality, Economic Growth, Innovation, Inclusion, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
South Korea, United States of America, and European Union