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11. The Shadow Sector: North Korea’s Information Technology Networks

Author:
Andrea Berger, Cameron Trainer, Shea Cotton, and Catherine Dill
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
North Korea’s commercial information technology (IT) industry has operated overseas, largely unnoticed, for decades. It sells a range of products and services including website and app development, administrative and business management software, IT security software, and biometric identification software for law enforcement applications. Its global network includes a myriad of front companies, intermediaries, and foreign partnerships. Yet despite the attention currently paid to North Korea’s overseas revenue streams and its offensive activities in cyberspace, the spotlight has yet to illuminate the money-spinning North Korean IT firms whose offerings seem to have found their way into corporate supply chains and potentially even Western-allied law enforcement agencies. Drawing upon extensive open-source investigations by the authors, this paper examines several nodes in North Korea-linked IT networks and considers the implications for current and future policy efforts to stem North Korean revenue and mitigate the cyber-security threats the country poses.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Information Age, Disinformation, and Information Technology
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

12. Countering Russian Information Operations in the Age of Social Media

Author:
Keir Giles
Publication Date:
11-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
As investigations into attempts to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election continue, more aspects of Russia’s approach to information warfare are coming to light. A steady stream of new disclosures is revealing a complex blend of hacking, public disclosures of private emails, and use of bots, trolls, and targeted advertising on social media designed to interfere in political processes and heighten societal tensions. Moscow’s hostile actions are driven by the belief that Russia is already in a state of conflict with the West, led by the United States, and that the internet is a domain for waging this conflict. From the earliest stages of the internet’s development, Russia has held a starkly different view from the West of its benefits and its potential. Russia’s national security establishment immediately saw connectivity as a threat and a potential weapon—and eventually as one that could help achieve regime change and deprive a country of its sovereignty—rather than as an enabler of economic development. The organization of Russia’s information-warfare capabilities, which include cyber operators, media outlets, and false flag entities, is shrouded in secrecy. In the West, generally only the intelligence community has a clear picture of how Russian capabilities are directed. Barring the sudden appearance of a Russian counterpart to Edward Snowden, the only view into Russia’s information toolbox is provided by cybersecurity companies and criminal prosecutions. The picture is further muddied because the Russian government keeps many of its cyberwarfare actors at arm’s length by employing contractors and former criminals through middlemen, giving Moscow a degree of deniability if caught. Nevertheless, both Western governments and private industry can take steps to mitigate Russian influence operations. Western governments should swiftly and decisively denounce Russian information activities as soon as they are identified, and their counterintelligence agencies should identify quantitative means to measure the effectiveness of Russia’s methods. Social media companies should more aggressively police their platforms for malicious state-sponsored content, and they should work with news organizations to promote verified and fact-checked content on their platforms.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Political stability, Disinformation, and Election Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and North America

13. The Authoritarian Resurgence: Forward to the Past in Russia

Author:
Lilia Shevtsova
Publication Date:
04-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Democracy
Institution:
National Endowment for Democracy
Abstract:
The Russian system of personalized power has demonstrated the ability to reproduce itself by both imitating and containing the West. In its quest for survival, the system has used foreign policy to a) compensate for the Kremlin’s diminishing resources, and b) contain the West’s impact inside and outside of Russia. The Kremlin’s continued experiments with new “technology” to prolong the system’s life include not only repression but also information warfare, as is seen in the development of a pro-Kremlin lobbyist network in the West to support the left-right “International.”
Topic:
Science and Technology, Authoritarianism, Conflict, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and North America