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21. Achieving a Safer U.S. Nuclear Posture

Author:
Joseph Cirincione
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
• U.S. nuclear posture is on a dangerous path that imperils national security and expends far too many resources. It is not a rational response to external threats but is driven primarily by domestic factors including a hubristic strategy of nuclear supremacy, partisan politics, and entrenched arms lobbies with formidable influence in the Pentagon and Congress. • A safer nuclear policy entails, among other steps, reducing the number of deployed strategic warheads by one-third, to about 1,000, taking nuclear-armed missiles off hair-trigger alert, embracing no first use or sole purpose doctrines, and requiring an additional senior official to authorize launch. Pacts such as AUKUS that encourage the spread of nuclear weapons technology must also be rethought. • If implemented, these policies will greatly reduce risk while maintaining deterrence; they will also lead to significant savings in the national security budget. A majority of independent experts believe that U.S. national security objectives can be met at far lower levels and with a safer nuclear posture, saving hundreds of billions of dollars over the next few decades. • Many of these recommendations can be implemented even if the Biden administration’s upcoming Nuclear Posture Review proves disappointing. The president retains substantial policy and budgetary options for reducing the risk of nuclear war and the cost of nuclear deterrence.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Budget, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

22. Pathways to Pentagon Spending Reductions: Removing the Obstacles

Author:
William D. Hartung
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
• Despite the changing security landscape, in which nonmilitary challenges ranging from pandemics to climate change are the gravest threats to the American people, United States security spending continues to focus on the Pentagon at the expense of other agencies and other policy tools. • In December 2021 Congress authorized $768 billion in spending on the Pentagon and related work on nuclear warheads at the Department of Energy — $25 billion more than the Pentagon asked for, and higher in real terms than peak budgets during the Korean and Vietnam wars and the Reagan buildup of the 1980s. An additional $10 billion in mandatory spending drove the final figure to $778 billion. There are press reports — yet to be officially confirmed by the administration — that the comparable proposal for spending on national defense in the fiscal year 2023 budget could exceed $800 billion.1 • The three main drivers of excessive spending on the Department of Defense are strategic overreach, pork-barrel politics, and corporate lobbying. • An overly ambitious, “cover-the-globe” strategy that favors military primacy and endless war must be replaced with a strategy of restraint that would provide a more-than-sufficient defense while increasing investments in diplomacy, foreign economic development, and other nonmilitary tools of statecraft. • Measures to weaken the influence of the military-industrial complex in the budget process should include prohibiting the armed services from submitting “wish lists” for items that are not in the Pentagon’s official budget request; slowing the “revolving door” between government departments and the weapons industry, and reducing the economic dependence of key communities on Pentagon spending, along with alternative government investments in areas such as infrastructure, green technology, and scientific and public health research.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Defense Spending, and Military-Industrial Complex
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

23. OTAN, España y el FrenteSur. Análisis geopolítico tras cuarenta años de experiencia compartida

Author:
Emily E. Arnold-Fernández
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
Cuatro décadas es tiempo suficiente para realizar un balance de la relación de España con la OTAN, como miembro de pleno derecho.Balance de particular interés en este periodo en el que hemos asistido a tantos cambios en el contexto internacional; cambios que han afectado a nuestra percepción de amenazas y a los modos de hacerles frente.Este trabajo analizará desde dos enfoques la experiencia española como miembro de la Alianza y los distintos estados de la relación, tanto con la Organización, como con su principal socio. El primero tomará en consideración los condicionantes domésticos de cada una de las partes. El segundo, atenderá a los condicionantessistémicos que tanto han variado desde la época de la guerra fría. Particular atención merecerá el siempre mejorable enfoque del denominado “flanco Sur”, con la vista puesta en la elaboración del nuevo concepto estratégico de la OTAN. Al respecto, se atenderá a las distintas sensibilidades dentro de la Alianza y la reivindicación de un trato análogo al recibido por el tradicional “flanco Este”. El contenido del documento de reflexión para la elaboración del nuevo concepto estratégico OTAN respecto a la proyección sur, puede implicar un cambio en la naturaleza de la relación con esta zona de operaciones. La metodología de investigación de basará en una serie de entrevistas sobre la base de una encuesta previa a oficiales españoles con experiencia práctica en la OTAN, tanto en operaciones como en diversos puestos directivos. Se incluirán también elementos de la consideración norteamericana respecto a la participación española. Combinados los resultados con el apoyo científico de académicos, foros de defensa y contribuciones de think tanks, se extraerán las conclusiones y recomendaciones para una mayor y mejor comprensión en los próximos cuarenta años.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Budget, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
Europe and Spain

24. ¿Un buen aliado? Análisis de la visión estadounidense sobre el rol español en la OTAN

Author:
Juan Tovar
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
Estados Unidos es el actor más relevante dentro de la OTANy ha condicionado la participación española en la organizacióndesde su ingreso. El artículo analiza desde la perspectiva estadounidense la participación española en la OTAN. Para ello se centra en diferentes factores como serían las declaraciones públicas de los dirigentes estadounidenses en las reuniones bilaterales,la posición de la opinión pública estadounidensey el análisis de diversos objetos de debate como el gasto en defensa, los activos estratégicos españoles, su participación en las diferentes misiones implementadas por la organizacióny la posición española en asuntos y regiones de interéspara Estados Unidos. A pesar de lasdeclaraciones de los líderes estadounidenses sobre el rol españoly la imagen positiva de Españaen la opinión pública estadounidense, se constata un importante margen para su mejora.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Public Opinion, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
Europe, Spain, North America, and United States of America

25. US Arms Sales Reveal Discord in Taiwan's Defense Strategy

Author:
Ethan Kessler
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
Washington has started selling arms that serve a "porcupine" defense strategy to Taiwan. Whether Taipei fully embraces this new approach remains to be seen. Taiwan, claimed by China as a rogue province and armed by the United States, is at a crossroads. Should it continue buying big-ticket US arms, such as advanced fighter jets and tanks, to counter Chinese forces in case of a blockade or invasion? Taipei’s longstanding conventional strategy, which calls for these kinds of arms, views the ambiguous US defense commitment as concerning. Since Washington may not intervene against a Chinese attack, conventionalists want to hold on to Taiwan’s traditional, long-range weapons. Conventionalists also claim that buying big-ticket arms strengthens Washington’s political commitment to Taiwan. However, officials and experts increasingly see another strategy as prudent. Recent Chinese economic growth and military modernization have greatly enhanced Beijing’s capabilities, to the point that many believe Taiwan could not hold out alone against a Chinese invasion. Reformers thus argue that Taiwan needs to start building its forces around small, easily distributed weapons such as mobile anti-ship missiles and patrol boats and make greater investments in reserve forces and territorial defense. This “porcupine” defense strategy can theoretically buy more time for US forces to arrive in a war. The fate of Taiwan’s military strategy, which also depends greatly on political relations between Beijing, Taipei, and Washington, will help determine the strength of deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. A breakdown in this deterrence could lead to US-China war. The United States not only influences Taiwan’s strategy, but has a great stake in its future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Budget, Defense Spending, and Arms Sales
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

26. Assessing the cost of friction between NATO allies

Author:
Odysseus Katsaitis and George Andrew Zombanakis
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
This paper proposes a method for assessing the cost of friction between North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies and highlights internal threats. This is applied to the Greek–Turkish conflict within the NATO context and concerns the functioning of defence expenditure in Greece, modified in such a way as to focus on the causes of friction between these allies. The analysis concentrates mainly on the issue of internal threats to the long-run equilibrium of NATO. The ARDL methodology used modifies the typical error correction model by introducing a mechanism that accelerates the process that leads back to the long-run equilibrium. Along with assessing the cost to an ally in relation to an internal threat, the method proposed allows the time required for the long-run equilibrium of NATO to be restored. The paper concludes that dynamic incidents of friction between allies expressed as an internal threat disturb NATO’s static equilibrium, destabilise an individual ally’s defence policy and contribute to cost being incurred.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, and Greece

27. The Case for Withdrawing from the Middle East

Author:
Justin Logan
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The Middle East is a small, poor, weak region beset by an array of problems that mostly do not affect Americans—and that U.S. forces cannot fix. The best thing the U.S. can do is leave. The immense cost and evident fruitlessness of U.S. wars in the Middle East are widely lamented in American politics, but not enough to extricate U.S. troops. And even beyond the wars, U.S. policy in the region is an expensive and unnecessary disaster. The cost of maintaining forces to protect the Middle East from itself is extraordinary, even in peacetime. Conservatively, attempting to control the Middle East costs Americans on the order of $65–70 billion each year, apart from the trillions spent on wars there. The number should be closer to zero. Nothing about the Middle East warrants the U.S. investment there over the past 30 years. The few important interests there—preventing major terrorist attacks, stopping the emergence of a market-making oil hegemon, curbing nuclear proliferation, and ensuring no regional actor destroys Israel—do not require American troops. The roughly 60,000 U.S. troops in the region should leave. American efforts to manage the Middle East make nothing about oil, Israel, or terrorism better. The U.S. would be better off withdrawing all forward-deployed troops from the region, while maintaining access agreements for naval ports with the consent of host countries. Withdrawing ground forces from the Middle East will make it harder for the U.S. to start or join any wars there. Shrinking the U.S. armed forces to reflect the lack of threat from the Middle East will free up resources for any number of higher priorities at home or abroad.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
Middle East, North America, and United States of America

28. Concerns on the issue of defence expenditure in the post-crisis Greece

Author:
Odysseus Katsaitis, Konstantine Kondylis, and George Andrew Zombanakis
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
The paper aims to tackle a controversial issue, namely the anticipated developments regarding defence expenditure once the Greek economy returns to growth. Such a comeback is expected to occur following a prolonged recessionary period during which defence spending cuts were a top priority, as recommended by the IMF, the ECB and the EC, members of the so-called “Troika”. The paper uses both conventional econometrics as well as neural networks to consider and evaluate the hierarchy’s ordering of the determinants used in such a demand for defence expenditure based on their explanatory power. While the role of property resources is certainly pronounced, as expected, human resources variables also seem to be able to explain defence spending developments, especially in the recent past. A forecasting investigation based on this background points to a number of interesting conclusions on the anticipated developments concerning defence spending in the future as well as on the determinants of such developments which might represent a threat to NATO cohesion.
Topic:
Security, Crisis Management, Economic Security, Arms Race, Defense Spending, and Military
Political Geography:
Europe and Greece

29. The Unaffordable Arsenal: Reducing the Costs of the Bloated U.S. Nuclear Stockpile

Author:
Tom Z. Collina
Publication Date:
10-2014
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The United States currently plans to spend some $355 billion to maintain and rebuild its Cold War-era nuclear arsenal over the next decade, even as the overall U.S. defense budget is declining and U.S. military planners and the president have determined that the United States can deter nuclear threats against the United States and its allies with far fewer nuclear weapons. This report argues that the increasingly high cost of nuclear weapons, combined with shrinking budgets and stockpiles, should compel the executive branch, Congress, and the American public to rethink current plans to rebuild U.S. nuclear forces in the years ahead. The Unaffordable Arsenal outlines common sense ways to save roughly $70 billion over the next decade across all three legs of the triad by scaling-back, delaying, and/or deferring expensive new delivery systems and by taking a more disciplined, straightforward approach to nuclear warhead life-extensions and refurbishments.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

30. Budget 2011 – Restraining Growth in Defence Spending?

Author:
Brian MacDonald
Publication Date:
08-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
The Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) was tabled on June 19, 2008. Among its promises was “A Military with Stable, Predictable Funding,” which was to be delivered through a twenty year “new long term funding framework for the Defence Department,” which had not been the practice of previous White Papers and Policy Statements. The framework included the promise of an increase in the annual inflation adjustment from 1.5% to 2%, plus a “Real Growth” adjustment of 0.6% annually for a total of 2.6%. The CFDS also forecast an increase in the total defence budget “from approximately $18 billion in 2008-09, to over $30 billion in 2027-28. In total, the Government planned to invest close to $490 billion in defence over this period.” In addition, the Government committed to fund separately the incremental costs of any expeditionary deployments such as that in Afghanistan. The CFDS also promised “A Military with the Right Equipment and Training.” The first new equipment tranche would include the already purchased four C-17 strategic airlifters, plus maritime helicopters, plus “17 new CH47F Chinook helicopters, three replenishment ships, 2,300 trucks, up to 100 Leopard 2 tanks and 6-8 Arctic/Offshore patrol ships.” Further down the road the second tranche would add “15 ships to replace existing destroyers and frigates, 10 to 12 maritime patrol aircraft, 17 fixed wing search and rescue aircraft, 65 next generation fighter aircraft, and a fleet of land combat vehicles and systems.” The CFDS also proposed to increase the Regular Force strength to 70,000 and the Reserves to 30,000. The CFDS planned to allocate the total budget to the following categories: Personnel – 51%, Equipment – 12%, Infrastructure – 8%, and Readiness – 29%. Over the 20 year period personnel expenses would amount to $250 billion; the first tranche of equipment purchases would account for $15 billion of capital; the second tranche of major fleet acquisitions would account for $20 billion; Infrastructure would account for $40 billion and Readiness would account for $140 billion.
Topic:
Budget, Defense Spending, and Military
Political Geography:
Canada and North America