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102. Myths and Misconceptions in the Afghan Transition
- Author:
- Noah Coburn and Shahmahmood Miakhel
- Publication Date:
- 04-2012
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- United States Institute of Peace
- Abstract:
- The coming period of transition to Afghan control of national security will require greater cooperation and understanding between all parties. Cooperation between the international community, the Afghan government and local communities is currently being undermined by a series of myths and assumptions which stem from the unstable conditions, a perceived lack of shared interests and a handful of highly publicized incidents. The international community often underestimates local capacity for governance in Afghanistan and ignores the success that Afghanistan did have with self-rule for much of the 20th century. Local Afghan communities are skeptical of the aims of both counterinsurgency and state-building measures, as projects, such as internationally sponsored elections, have failed to yield anticipated results despite the continued presence of international troops. There is an urgent need to rethink some of the assumptions on both sides of the table which threaten to undermine the long-term prospects for peace in Afghanistan.
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, Counterinsurgency, Fragile/Failed State, and Governance
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan
103. Homeland Security and Intelligence: Next Steps in Evolving the Mission
- Publication Date:
- 01-2012
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Aspen Institute
- Abstract:
- American expectations of how their government secures the United States have evolved substantially, especially during the post-9/11 decade. From the post-World War II, 20th-century evolution of the national security architecture in the United States, focused on countering overseas nation-states with conventional forces, we now face requirements to protect at home. And not only to protect, but to prevent: the new, domestic security architecture is targeted more at securing borders, infrastructure, and cyberspace with defensive measures as it is at pursuing any single adversary with offensive measures.
- Topic:
- Intelligence, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
- Political Geography:
- United States and America
104. India in Afghanistan: A Rising Power or a Hesitant Power?
- Author:
- Harsh Pant
- Publication Date:
- 04-2012
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Centre for International Peace and Security Studies
- Abstract:
- Indian diplomacy faced a major setback at the Afghanistan Conference in London in January 2010, where Indian concerns were summarily ignored. In one stroke, Pakistan rendered New Delhi irrelevant in the evolving security dynamic in Afghanistan. When Indian External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna underscored the folly of making a distinction “between good Taliban and bad Taliban,” he was completely out of sync with the larger mood at the conference. Days before this much-hyped conference, senior U.S. military commanders were suggesting that peace talks with the Taliban may be imminent and that Taliban members might even be invited to join the government in Kabul. The West had made up its mind that it was not a question of if, but when and how to exit from Afghanistan, which seemed to be becoming a quagmire for the leaders in Washington and London.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Foreign Policy, Terrorism, War, Power Politics, and Counterinsurgency
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, Washington, India, Taliban, London, and New Delhi
105. Beware of Imitators: al-Qa' ida through the lens of its Confidential Secretary
- Author:
- Nelly Lahoud
- Publication Date:
- 06-2012
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
- Abstract:
- “I should write a history of the jihadis in my time as I witnessed it and not as it is perceived by the West or those who disagree with us,” explains Fadil Harun regarding his motivation to publish his two-volume manuscript al-Harb `ala al-Islam: Qissat Fadil Harun (The War against Islam: the Story of Fadil Harun). Posted on the jihadi website Shabakat Ansar al-Mujahidin on 26 February 2009, the manuscript constitutes Harun's autobiography, in which he presents an intimate account of his life in the context of his career with al-Qa`ida. Harun (also known as Fazul `Abdallah Muhammad) was an al- Qa`ida operative who was killed in June 2011 by Somali government forces. Among the operations in which he played a key role are the 1998 East Africa bombings that targeted U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, following which he claims to have been appointed al-Qa`ida's “Confidential Secretary” (amin sirr al-qa`ida).
- Topic:
- Islam, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
- Political Geography:
- United States, Somalia, Nairobi, and East Africa
106. What Is Boko Haram?
- Author:
- Andrew Walker
- Publication Date:
- 05-2012
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- United States Institute of Peace
- Abstract:
- Boko Haram is an Islamic sect that believes politics in northern Nigeria has been seized by a group of corrupt, false Muslims. It wants to wage a war against them, and the Federal Republic of Nigeria generally, to create a “pure” Islamic state ruled by sharia law. Since August 2011 Boko Haram has planted bombs almost weekly in public or in churches in Nigeria's northeast. The group has also broadened its targets to include setting fire to schools. In March 2012, some twelve public schools in Maiduguri were burned down during the night, and as many as 10,000 pupils were forced out of education. Boko Haram is not in the same global jihadist bracket as Algeria's al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or Somalia's al Shabab. Despite its successful attack on the UN compound in Abuja in August 2011, Boko Haram is not bent on attacking Western interests. There have been no further attacks on international interests since that time. Following the failed rescue of hostages Chris McManus and Franco Lamolinara in north¬eastern Nigeria in March 2012, President Goodluck Jonathan played up the connections between the group and international terrorism. However, links between Boko Haram and the kidnappers are questionable. It is difficult to see how there can be meaningful dialogue between the government and the group. The group's cell-like structure is open for factions and splits, and there would be no guarantee that someone speaking for the group is speaking for all of the members. Tactics employed by government security agencies against Boko Haram have been consis-tently brutal and counterproductive. Their reliance on extrajudicial execution as a tactic in “dealing” with any problem in Nigeria not only created Boko Haram as it is known today, but also sustains it and gives it fuel to expand. The group will continue to attack softer targets in the northeast rather than international targets inside or outside Nigeria. It is also likely to become increasingly involved in the Jos crisis, where it will attack Christian indigenes of the north and try to push them out. Such a move would further threaten to destabilize the country's stability and unity.Now that the group has expanded beyond a small number of mosques, radical reforms in policing strategy are necessary if there is to be any progress in countering the group. Wide¬spread radical reform of the police is also long overdue throughout Nigeria. As a first step, jailing a number of police officers responsible for ordering human rights abuses might go some way to removing a key objection of the group.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Security, Islam, Religion, United Nations, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Algeria, Nigeria, and Somalia
107. Leadership Decapitation and the End of Terrorist Groups
- Author:
- Bryan C. Price
- Publication Date:
- 05-2012
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- Leadership decapitation has largely failed to produce desired policy results against organizations other than terrorist groups, such as state regimes and drug cartels. For example, killing or capturing kingpins has had little effect on the flow of drugs into the United States, and worse, it has often led to more drugs, more cartels, and more violence. Terrorist groups are different. Because they are violent, clandestine, and values-based organizations, terrorist groups are especially susceptible to leadership decapitation.
- Topic:
- Political Violence, Crime, Terrorism, Counterinsurgency, Narcotics Trafficking, and Governance
- Political Geography:
- United States
108. The Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation in Combating Insurgencies
- Author:
- Patrick B. Johnston
- Publication Date:
- 06-2012
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- Targeting militant leaders is central to many states' national security strategies, but does it work? What should policymakers expect when government armed forces kill or capture militant leaders? Is leadership decapitation more likely to succeed or fail under certain conditions? These questions have never been more pressing than since the May 2011 killing of al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Political Violence, Islam, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
109. The War on Terror from Bush to Obama: On Power and Path Dependency
- Author:
- Hilde Eliassen Restad
- Publication Date:
- 04-2012
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- James Madison famously stated in 1793: “War is in fact the true nurse of executive aggrandizement.” By this, Madison meant that, when confronted with a grave threat to national security, the instinct of a state is to concentrate power at the very top. This can lead – and has led – to abuse of power. For instance, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's signing of Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942 resulted in the forcible internment of Japanese Americans (two thirds of whom were U.S. citizens), an episode widely seen as regrettable later, after history had removed Americans from the anxiety of war. But by no means do we have to look as far back as to World War II. We can note Cold War incidents such as the Iran-Contra scandal (1985–87), when the Reagan administration took it upon itself to bypass Congress – and specific laws – in order to support the controversial Nicaraguan Contras with money acquired by selling arms to Iran.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Government, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
- Political Geography:
- United States and Iran
110. What It Will Take to Secure Afghanistan
- Author:
- Max Boot
- Publication Date:
- 06-2012
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Abstract:
- Afghanistan is approaching a major inflection point in its long and turbulent history. In 2014 most of the foreign military forces are due to pull out. With them will go the bulk of foreign financing that has accounted for almost all of the state's budget. Twenty fourteen is also the year that Afghanistan is due to hold presidential elections. Hamid Karzai, the only president the country has known since the fall of the Taliban, has said he will not seek another term in office. Thus Afghanistan is likely to have a new president to lead it into a new era. This era will be shaped by many factors, principally decisions made by Afghans themselves, but the United States has the ability to affect the outcome if it makes a sustained commitment to maintain security, improve the political process, and reduce Pakistani interference so as to build on the tenuous gains achieved by the U.S. troop surge since 2010.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Democratization, Islam, Terrorism, War, and Counterinsurgency
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, and Taliban