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51. US Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Implications for Pakistan

Author:
Mushtaq Ahmed Abbasi and Nazir Hussain
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Political Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
The US Exit Strategy 2014 from Afghanistan has now entered one of their final phase, which happens to be the Withdrawal from Afghanistan. The US has already lessened its troops, though there were certain changes after Trump came to power. But still there is a looming confusion which exists regarding the aftermath of the event. That is how this Withdrawal will come to play and what would the Afghanistan’s post-US withdrawal would look like. Moreover, Pakistan will also be affected in more than one ways. The US is going to be leaving quite a vacuum upon which many regional and foreign powers have set their eyes on. India, Iran, China and Russia are all going to be a part of the post-US Afghanistan but this might only produce more instability. Moreover, it will have drastic security, political and strategic implications for Pakistan. The picture which comes to the mind is going to be of an everlasting loop of security complexes and strategic undertones after the withdrawal.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Al Qaeda, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, North America, and United States of America

52. Are U.S. Drone Strikes Legal?

Author:
Kate Martin
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
There has been much controversy and criticism about drone strikes conducted by the United States, especially those that have targeted Al Qaeda operatives outside Afghanistan in Yemen, Somalia, and the border regions of Pakistan. Many questions have surfaced about the effectiveness of using drone strikes. There is also a widespread perception that strikes have killed many civilians and that they are illegal. The Obama administration recently promised to release information about the number of civilians killed, as well as its policy guidance governing drone strikes outside Afghanistan. However, this new information is unlikely to directly address the question of what legal framework governs such drone strikes. In fact, the Obama administration has never been completely clear about its views on the legal basis for the drone program. But an understanding of the legal framework is necessary to evaluate the new information and the legality of the drone program.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, Drones, and Legal Theory
Political Geography:
United States and North America

53. Pulling Apart at the Seams: How the Smuggling and Narcotics Trade Are Helping to Reshape Governance in the Sahel

Author:
Andrew Lebovich
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
The jihadist takeover of northern Mali in mid-2012 caught many regional observers by surprise. For years, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and later the AQIM splinter group, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO in French), were seen largely as smugglers, criminals, and “narco-traffickers.” This perception led to a curious process by which some analysts dismissed the risk posed by these groups, while others (chiefly, Western governments) developed a near obsession with the prospect that money from smuggling operations, particularly drugs, would finance jihadist activity in the Sahara and Sahel.[1] While regional experts have since aggressively critiqued the notion of extensive ties between Sahelian militant groups and smuggling, particularly in the narcotics trade,[2] it is nonetheless important to assess the extent of these connections and how they fit into a larger regional context. ​ The purported link between cocaine trade and militant groups gained traction among outside observers due to the appearance of both in northern Mali at approximately the same time. Cocaine first began circulating through and in northern Mali in the early 2000s, while the group that would become AQIM, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), achieved notorious renown in 2003 with the kidnapping of 32 Europeans in southern Algeria. [3] Analysts also focused extensively on cocaine, despite the large circulation through and within the region of cannabis products, amphetamines, and other drugs.[4] However, the rise of smuggling networks and economies in the region long preceded the arrival of jihadist militancy. As anthropologist Judith Scheele and others have noted, smuggling in northern Mali began in the 1960s and 1970s with the trade in foodstuffs, especially powdered milk and pasta produced in Algeria, which was then re-sold in Mali and northern Niger.[5] In the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, illicit or semi-licit (grey market) trades emerged, including the smuggling of subsidized petrol from Libya and Algeria into the Sahara, as well as the two-way movement of weapons, counterfeit or contraband cigarettes, and people.[6] This smuggling was itself part of an older process in a region that has always depended on the circulation of people and goods for survival...
Topic:
Crime, Al Qaeda, Borders, Drugs, and Smuggling
Political Geography:
Africa, Libya, Algeria, Mali, Sahel, Niger, and Sahara

54. The Rise Of The IS (Islamic State) In Syria And Iraq After The Arab Spring

Author:
Alper Y. Dede
Publication Date:
04-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Alternative Politics
Institution:
Department of International Relations, Abant Izzet Baysal University, Turkey
Abstract:
The Arab Spring is a social movement triggered by a complex set of social, political and economic factors. Despite the initial success of the Arab Spring in ousting some of the bureaucraticauthoritarian status-quo oriented regimes, mass mobilization of people could not oust all dictatorships and introduce meaningful reforms toward more democratization in the region. Worse, the mass protests that started as part of the Arab Spring later deteriorated into utter chaos and even civil war in some parts of the region. With the disappearance of state authority in those places, sub-state actors gained ground, challenging the stability and order that were once provided by authoritarian regimes through coercion. The IS’s sudden expansion has mainly resulted from large scale instability in Iraq and Syria and the disappearance of nation-state borders between the two states. The IS, which emerged as a sub-state actor, is currently in the process of becoming a proto state. Thus, this paper has two simultaneous research goals. The first is to establish the link between lack of institutionalization of the Arab Spring and its failure to bring about positive and meaningful political change in the region with the power vacuum created in the region and subsequent emergence of sub-state actors and groups like the Al- Qaeda in Iraq and the IS (Islamic State) in Iraq and Syria. The second is to study and evaluate the emergence and growth of the IS in conjunction with the deteriorating security situation in Iraq and Syria, and how the international involvement with the IS might have shaped the tactics and the course of action that the IS has taken since the IS captured the city of Mosul in June 2014, shocking the whole world. Assessment of the IS’s AP AP the rise of the IS (islamic state) in syria and iraq 169 military, economic and political prospects will also be provided in the concluding section. Keywords: The Arab Spring, the IS (Islamic State), Abu Mus’ab Al-Zarqawi, Abu Bakr Al
Topic:
Social Movement, Al Qaeda, ISIS, Arab Spring, and Institutionalism
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Syria

55. A New Threat Landscape in 2015

Author:
Rohan Gunaratna
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
The al Qaeda-centric terrorist landscape is eclipsed by an Islamic State (IS)-centric threat landscape. Today, an al Qaeda-IS hybrid influences and shapes the global threat landscape of political violence. With three dozen threat groups in Asia, Africa and the Middle East expressing support to the Caliphate and pledging allegiance to self-styled Caliph Abu Bakr al Baghdadi in 2014, IS will expand its international footprint in 2015. IS is transforming from a group in the Iraq and Syrian Theatre to a global network.
Topic:
Terrorism, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, and Non-Traditional Threats
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Syria

56. Does Al Qaeda Central Still Matter?

Author:
Kangil Lee
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
This article examines whether Al Qaeda Central are still relevant or not. By investigating Al Qaeda Central’s activities, which are aimed at provoking violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as its continuous plots of direct attacks against the US, this article shows that Al Qaeda’s operational capability is stronger than anticipated by the US and other scholars. In addition, Al Qaeda affiliates maintain a close relationship with the group which in turn facilitates Al Qaeda Central’s resiliency. Moreover, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’s aggressive support and contribution to the Al Qaeda network indicates that Al Qaeda Central’s longevity depends on its relationship with affiliates. The article concludes that under these conditions, Al Qaeda Central still has a place in global security discussions.
Topic:
Terrorism, Taliban, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, and Haqqani Network
Political Geography:
Pakistan and South Asia

57. New York City's Preparedness for Terrorism (and Catastrophic Natural Disasters)

Author:
Clark Kent Ervin
Publication Date:
10-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Aspen Institute
Abstract:
Sooner or later, somewhere or other, another natural disaster will strike America, be it a hurricane, a tornado, an earthquake, or a flood. Sooner or later, somewhere or other, terrorists will attempt to strike America again. Indeed, many experts believe that the threat of another attack is rising. 1 Al Qaeda is resurgent, having reconstituted itself along the Afghan-Pakistan border. 2 And, recent history shows that terrorists are especially prone to strike during the transition from one administration to another or early in the term of a new government. Adding to our vulnerability, the nation is now bogged down in two wars and groaning under mounting debt, while our economy is sinking from the greatest financial crisis since the Great Depression.
Topic:
Security, Natural Disasters, Financial Crisis, and Al Qaeda
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and United States of America

58. Why Do Islamist Groups Become Transnational and Violent?

Author:
Quinn Mecham
Publication Date:
08-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Since al-Qaeda’s rise to prominence as the most commonly rec- ognized Islamist group worldwide, Islamist movements are increasingly viewed as violent, transnational organizations. Most Islamist groups, however, are actually non-violent and focused on the domestic audience of their home countries. They can become both violent and transnational as their domestic contexts and incentives change, however. The reasons that Islamist movements move from non-violence to violence, and from national to transna- tional strategies, have far-reaching implications for the way we deal with Islamist groups and are critical for policymakers to under- stand.
Topic:
Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Al Qaeda, transnationalism, and Militant Islam
Political Geography:
Global Focus

59. The Bush Administration is Weak on Terror

Author:
Stephen W. Van Evera
Publication Date:
10-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
The U.S. public widely credits President Bush with toughness on terror. An August 2006 poll found 55 percent of Americans approving his handling of the campaign on terror and only 38 percent disapproving. Republican candidates are running successfully on the terror issue in this fall’s election campaign. In fact, the Bush administration is weak on terror. The administration wages a one-front war against al-Qaeda, the main terror threat, when effort on every relevant front is needed. Specifically, it has focused on an offensive military and intelligence campaign abroad while neglecting five other critical fronts: bolstering homeland security, securing weapons and materials of mass destruction from possible theft or purchase by terrorists, winning the war of ideas across the world, end- ing conflicts that fuel support for al-Qaeda, and saving the failed states where al-Qaeda and like groups can find haven. The administration has also bungled parts of the mili- tary offensive by diverting itself into a counterproductive sideshow in Iraq and by alien- ating potential allies. As a result, al-Qaeda and related jihadi groups remain a potent threat more than five years after the 9/11 attacks.3 Assessments by U.S. intelligence and other analysts actually indicate that the terror threat has increased since 9/11.4 The Bush administration’s toughness on terror is an illusion. Its counterterror cam- paign has been inept and ineffective.5 President Bush talks the talk of strong action but doesn’t walk the walk. And his weakness on terror is a putting the United States in great danger.
Topic:
Intelligence, Terrorism, Al Qaeda, and War on Terror
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, and North America