This interesting book is an in-depth guide to workings of the mind of one of history's great environmental scientists, Wallace (Wally) Broecker, of Columbia University. It is strongly recommended for anyone interested in climate change policy. However, it is not an easy read. Despite the somewhat turgid text—and myriad, excruciating, and sometimes unexplained concepts and details—there are several important lessons. The most important of these is that what modern man would think of as dramatic climate change is the rule, not the exception, and we only partially understand, within broad limits, why our climate is so inherently unstable.
In these remarks I discuss a proposal to legislate a rule for monetary policy. The proposal modernizes laws first passed in the late 1970s, but largely discarded in 2000.
It is a pleasure to join you at Cato's 28th Annual Monetary Conference. In preparing today's remarks, I noted that this year's topic of how monetary policy should deal with asset prices was also discussed here in 2008. The speakers at that time expressed a wide variety of views and opinions. The fact that this important question continues to resurface here and at other prominent meetings in recent years suggests that a consensus has yet to emerge.
The Federal Reserve's conduct of monetary policy casts a spell over market participants, commentators, and academics. The pages of financial newspapers parse subtle differences among the comments of Fed officials and delve deeply into potentially multiple meanings of official statements. Academic discussions argue that the path of the policy rate may (as in Taylor 2009) or may not (as in Bernanke 2010, and Greenspan 2010) have fueled a home-price bubble in the United States.
In this article, we argue that the present constellation of exchange rate arrangements among the major currencies has led to the creation of excessive global liquidity, which has contributed to asset price bubbles. Although the exchange rates of many of the major currencies—including the U.S. dollar, the euro, the yen, and the pound sterling—float against each other, the currencies of many Asian emerging market economies and oil-exporting economies are pegged to the dollar. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2004a) labeled this system “Bretton Woods II” (BWII). The original Bretton Woods regime (BWI) lasted for about a quarter of a century. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (DFG) argue that the present regime, despite its large global imbalances, will also be sustainable.
President George W. Bush famously remarked in July 2008 that during the housing boom “Wall Street got drunk . . . and now it has a hangover.” It was the Federal Reserve that spiked the punchbowl. The Fed sowed the seeds for the bust of 2007–08 by overexpanding credit, keeping interest rates too low for too long. The Fed made these mistakes despite our having been assured that it had learned from past errors and that the art of central banking had been all but perfected. A commodity standard with free banking, and no central bank to distort the financial system, would have avoided such a boom-and-bust credit cycle.
In Matthew 25: 14–30, Jesus recounts the Parable of the Talents, the story of how the master goes away and leaves each of three servants with sums of money to look after in his absence. He then returns and holds them to account. The first two have invested wisely and give the master a good return, and he rewards them. The third, however, is a wicked servant who couldn't be bothered even to put the money in the bank where it could earn interest. Instead, he simply buried the money and gave his master a zero return. He is punished and thrown into the darkness where there is weeping and wailing and gnashing of teeth.
The financial crisis that surfaced in 2007 has stressed the need to identify the ultimate sources of the incentives that were behind the preceding credit and housing bubbles. To lower the likelihood of future financial collapses, prudent economic policies as well as an adequate regulatory and supervisory framework for financial institutions are required. Monetary policy, in turn, should be directed toward price stability, which is a central bank's best contribution not only to long-term economic growth, but also to financial stability.
The most important lesson we can learn from the financial crisis is what caused it. Even though the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) has been signed into law, this is still an important question. If we do not attribute the crisis to the right cause, we could well stumble into another crisis in the future; and if the DFA was directed at the wrong cause, we should consider its repeal. There are several competing narratives. One of them will eventually be accepted, and will determine how the great financial crisis of 2008 is interpreted, and thus how it affects public policy in the future.
To the extent that monetary policy influences asset prices, it does so via the demand for assets, by changing the borrowing costs to purchase assets, or via supply, where movements in interest rates can make investment in assets look more or less attractive. Fiscal policy interventions can also contribute to bubbles by changing the cost of acquiring specific assets. Most discussions of asset bubbles, particularly those involving the role of monetary policy, focus on demandside factors. This article examines the role of supply-side factors in the recent booms in the U.S. housing market and dot-com stocks. The importance of supply constraints in each market is discussed. Policy implications are then presented.