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1. Strategic Ambivalence: Japan’s Conflicted Response

Author:
Matthew Goodman
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The Abe administration has adopted a strategy that combines three main lines of effort: enhanced diplomatic and economic engagement with Beijing; hedging and balancing, including deepening integration with other countries of the Indo-Pacific region and attempting to keep the United States engaged in the Indo-Pacific region; and leadership on regional and global economic rule-making. The main strands of this approach are likely to continue after Abe leaves office, though uncertainty surrounds them all.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

2. Japanese Views of South Korea: Enough is Enough

Author:
Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
While the sources of contention are deep and enduring, relations between Japan and South Korea have been especially troubled in the last few years. The two countries are grappling with deeply entrenched, emotional legacies that have been inflamed by recent controversies, rendering history both immediate and real. This chapter explores Japan’s perception of and reaction to those events. While it aims to provide an objective assessment of Japanese thinking, it does not purport to be even-handed or balanced. It is an analysis of the Japanese view of the relationship with South Korea. To be brief and blunt, Japanese are frustrated with and angered by South Koreans. Frustrated because they have been unable to build a future with them that rests on a foundation of shared concerns and values; domestic politics continues to override strategic interests. Angry because Korean complaints deny the many changes that have occurred in Japan since the end of World War II. Japanese do not deny that atrocities took place, but they are offended when they are laid at the feet of current generations. A growing number of Japanese believe that Koreans prefer to occupy the moral high ground over building a mutually beneficial long-term partnership. This belief increasingly colors the way that Korean actions and statements are interpreted.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

3. Chinese Views of South Korea: Aligning Elite and Popular Debates

Author:
See-Won Byun
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
China and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have experienced periods of conflict and cooperation since officially forging “partnership” relations in 1998. From a historical perspective, Korea was among the most willing participants of the Sinocentric tribute system and its underlying cultural hierarchy. Yet the 2003-2004 dispute over the ancient Koguryo kingdom’s identity marked the first major downturn in the China-ROK relationship since normalization. The rapid expansion of trade, at an average annual rate of 18 percent since 1992, has not prevented the two sides from fighting over political grievances. Most notably under the current Xi Jinping leadership, Beijing’s assertions of unprecedented friendship quickly turned into accusations of betrayal requiring economic punishment. Why and how did China’s policy toward South Korea shift so drastically after two decades of diplomatic normalization? To answer, we must focus on the expectations raised by China’s national identity for ties with South Korea. This study examines the evolution of Chinese views of South Korea with a focus on elite and popular narratives since 2013. Despite increased interdependence, these narratives point to China’s increasingly fragile political ties with Asian partners. Most importantly, China’s growing weight facilitates its strategic combination of economic and discursive tools of diplomacy framed by national identity. Recent tensions over the U.S.-ROK military alliance displayed Beijing’s denial of direct economic retaliation under the cover of public hostility, conveniently blurring the lines between state-led and voluntary actions. By hardening the identity dimensions of conflict, such strategies may only have long-term counterproductive effects of constraining Beijing’s political influence at home and abroad. The four sections below proceed as follows. First, I review two decades of China-ROK relations since the establishment of partnership ties in 1998. I identify two related trends: the intensification of political disputes despite trade, and China’s growing economic leverage in managing those disputes, keeping an eye on the role of national identity. Second, I assess the pessimistic turn in China’s domestic discourse on South Korea in the Xi Jinping period, using official, academic, and media sources. Third, I trace the interaction of elite and popular narratives, focusing on the 2016-2017 dispute over a U.S. missile defense system, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). I briefly extend the discussion to public clashes over Hong Kong in 2019 to underscore the enduring impact of China’s major power and domestic political identities on China-ROK relations. To conclude, I consider the trajectory of bilateral relations under the leadership of Xi Jinping and Moon Jae-in, including the domestic and foreign policy implications of nationalist discourse.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, Public Opinion, and Elites
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

4. The Case of United States Views of Its Ties with China

Author:
Scott W. Harold
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
U.S. views of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have been hardening for at least two decades, from George W. Bush characterizing China in the 2000 presidential campaign and the first months of his presidency as a “strategic competitor,” to the Obama administration’s pursuit of a “pivot” to the Asia–Pacific in response to China’s growing assertiveness, to the Trump administration describing China’s rise as signaling the “return of an era of great power competition.” Does this trend reflect changes in U.S. self-conception and national identity? Evolving assessments of threat in light of Chinese behavior and what these imply about the regime’s intentions? A reaction to shifts in the overall balance of power between the two countries, perhaps a reflection of a declining superpower facing a rising challenge, “tragically” destined to participate in a “contest for supremacy in Asia” that will ineluctably result in a “Thucydides trap” or war of hegemonic transition? Or is it instead an inevitable clash between a liberal, democratic, rule of law capitalist hegemon and a resilient authoritarian challenger that is a communist dictatorship increasingly reliant on aggressive nationalism since the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre and evolving rapidly towards national socialism or fascism? While each of these perspectives provides some purchase on the recent developments in U.S. – China relations as seen from Washington, this chapter focuses on the role of national identity, arguing that identity is by no means the sole or best explanation, but that it is an important factor that should not be overlooked or underestimated.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

5. Donald Trump’s Geopolitical Framework for Northeast Asia: Something Borrowed, Something New

Author:
Mark Tokola
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Does the forty-fifth president of the United States, Donald J. Trump, have a foreign policy, not least of all inclusive of the vital Northeast Asian region? The question is not flippant. Policy is usually thought of as a set of principles that guide action towards a desired outcome. Trump may, as he professes, act from instinct – reactively and transactionally rather than from an intent to implement an established policy. In the eyes of some of his supporters, this would be a virtue. They elected him expressly for the purpose of breaking with a traditional Washington policy machinery that they did not believe was serving their interests. However, Trump and his administration do assert and describe a distinct foreign policy. They even have a name for it, “principled realism.” Moreover, when Trump was running for the presidency in 2016, he announced his intention to “develop a new foreign policy direction for our country, one that replaces randomness with purpose, ideology with strategy, and chaos with peace.” He stated, “It’s time to shake the rust off America’s foreign policy.”
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

6. Chinese Media: Why Did the Hanoi Summit Fail and What Comes Next?

Author:
Danielle Cohen
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Chinese media sources reflect a widespread propensity in 2019 to reassure the United States while not compromising vital national interests on the Korean Peninsula. They heartily welcomed Kim Jong-un’s turn to diplomacy. They enthusiastically endorsed Donald Trump’s embrace of Kim. They strongly approved of Moon Jae-in’s bold moves to straddle the two sides and find a way to build momentum. After praising the Singapore summit’s accomplishments, the Chinese faced the uncomfortable reality of failure in Hanoi, with calls to redouble efforts to put diplomacy back on track and repeated idealistic assertions about how the differences could be bridged. At the same time, they left mostly implicit the true objectives of a deal that Pyongyang was expected to accept and that China would consider suitable in order to satisfy its geopolitical aspirations. Reassurances consisted of the following claims: China, as asserted in its 2017 white paper, is not trying to squeeze the U.S. out of the region or break the U.S.–ROK alliance, unlike its earlier policy indications; the Sino–DPRK alliance treaty is a relic of a past era without substantive importance; China is firmly committed to denuclearization, but considers it realizable only by means of talks and a long-term, multi-stage process that encourages Pyongyang to abandon its isolation; China does not take sides on whether a “big deal” is needed first to produce “small deals”; and Moon should be encouraged to keep engaging with Kim Jong-un even if Moon is correct in recognizing that he cannot be a mediator since the ROK is a U.S. ally. Yet, Chinese optimism is premised on notions about limits to North Korean demands, on North Korean willingness to denuclearize in return for conditions that are left vague, and on often unstated assumptions about how the peninsula would evolve during the process of denuclearization and how the U.S. military presence would change.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Media, and News Analysis
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

7. Why Did the Hanoi Summit Fail and What Comes Next? The View from Russia

Author:
Artyom Lukin
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This chapter provides an overview of Russian expert commentary found in Russia’s media during the run-up to the Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi and in its aftermath, covering the period of January to April 2019. The chapter also covers Kim’s first meeting with Vladimir Putin that took place in Vladivostok in late April. With regard to the Korean Peninsula’s nuclear problem, Russia’s commentariat traditionally splits into three groups. The first includes specialists who are more or less neutral toward North Korea. The second one is formed by experts who sympathize more with Pyongyang and tend to blame Washington and American allies for anything that goes wrong on the Korean Peninsula. The third group, now almost extinct in Russia, represents liberal and pro-Western pundits who loath the North Korean regime and view it as a major threat to international, and Russia’s, security. Similar to Western media, the Russian press has extensively covered the preparations for the Hanoi summit, the event itself, and its outcomes. The tone of the Russian reporting did not differ much from that of the world’s media. Most of the Russian commentators sounded moderately optimistic prior to the two-day summit, expecting that at least something would come out of it. That the second Kim-Trump rendezvous failed to produce any deliverables came as a somewhat disappointing surprise to most Russian observers. Still, the general mood remained cautiously optimistic even after Hanoi’s apparent failure, with the prevailing majority of Russia’s Korea watchers believing diplomacy between Pyongyang and Washington would continue and might eventually succeed. The Russian commentary on the Vladivostok summit was generally positive, hailing the symbolism of Moscow’s return to the major leagues of Korean Peninsula geopolitics. At the same time, many experts pointed out that, beyond displaying the decorum of the traditional Russia-DPRK friendship, the Kim-Putin summit produced modest outcomes.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Media, and News Analysis
Political Geography:
Russia, Asia, and North Korea

8. Japanese Media: Why Did the Hanoi Summit Fail and What Comes Next?

Author:
Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Japanese coverage of the diplomacy between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un as well as the broader spectrum of international relations over North Korea has been intensive over the first months of 2019. Assessments of what to expect and then what really happened involve interpretations of North Korean intentions, the character of U.S. diplomacy, the role of South Korean diplomacy, the impact of China, and the geopolitical situation in Northeast Asia. Each development over this period has been scrutinized closely, often with an addendum: What does it mean for Japan? The fate of North Korea looms very large for a nation fearful of a missile attack from it, cognizant of the absence of any settlement after 1945 of its claims against Japan’s occupational conduct, and nervous about the regional balance of power and U.S. trustworthiness as an ally and nuclear umbrella, when the United States itself is quickly coming under threat from the North’s nuclear weapons. Below, the views on the political right range from Sankei Shimbun to the establishmentoriented Yomiuri Shimbun, and on the political left from Asahi Shimbun to Tokyo Shimbun. While editorials figure heavily into the analysis, much of the regular news coverage also serves to differentiate Japanese sources. What negative outcomes does Japan fear from the success or failure of ongoing diplomacy over North Korea? In recent coverage we can identify at least eight worrisome outcomes: 1) failure of the talks resulting in a war scare beyond what occurred in 2017; 2) suspension of U.S.-DPRK talks and China as well as Russia breaking with the UN sanctions regime, fueling prospects of three-way coordination with China taking the lead; 3) discord about how to proceed with damaging U.S.-ROK relations, weakening the U.S. military presence in South Korea at a cost to Japan’s defense; 4) South Korea splitting with the U.S. on the North and raising the specter of inter-Korean nationalism deemed hostile to Japan; 5) success of the talks based on “America First,” agreeing to a deal on denuclearization (as a process) that leaves Japan’s concerns about missiles and abductees aside, isolating Japan; 6) success of the talks leading toward reunification, also strengthening national identity versus Japan; 7) a new geopolitical framework replacing the talks, as the U.S. retreats from the region; and 8) a period of instability, where Trump only delays making decisions and Japan is left frustrated. Four general responses to the Hanoi Summit and its early aftermath could be discerned in Japanese publications: 1) Trump outfoxed Kim, has a strategy reassuring to Japan, and the outcome in sight is positive; 2) Trump erred in his diplomacy but has been brought to his senses and now will follow a course welcome in Japan, however uncertain the outcome; 3) the situation is growing more dangerous, Trump does not know what to do, and Japan has to keep its eyes on the other players; and 4) Trump will renew diplomacy, keeping Japan off balance in coordinating with the U.S. as Japan struggles with its isolation in this diplomacy. When anticipating what should come next, sources understandably suggest what their own government should do. Many in Japan emphasize the abductions issue and willingness to offer economic assistance when that along with denuclearization and missiles is addressed. One can discern how Abe Shinzo should proceed in diplomacy with each of the leaders active in the region. Of course, most attention centers on how he should deal with Trump or the alliance.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Media, and News Analysis
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and North Korea

9. South Korean Print Media on Why the Hanoi Summit Failed and What Comes Next

Author:
Kimberly Kim
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Since the first historic summit meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un last June in Singapore yielded a two-page joint agreement without a clear definition of or a timeline for denuclearization, expectations and misgivings further escalated for the second U.S.-DPRK summit, which was officially announced during Trump’s State of the Union address to be held on February 27 and 28 in Vietnam. As the dates approached, a hailstorm of news reports from Seoul hinted at the possibility of a “small deal” to be signed in Hanoi; North Korea would make progress on denuclearization, which would likely involve dismantling its Yongbyon nuclear facility and/or intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and, in return, the U.S. would offer economic aid by easing sanctions, probably along with officially ending the Korean War and building liaison offices. This forecast partially stemmed from the political plight Trump faced in Washington due to the impending Mueller report with a Democrat-controlled House and the 2020 election nearing, meaning that he would have to show some progress in nuclear negotiations with Kim so as to break through the ongoing domestic challenge. Against this backdrop, Stephen Biegun, the U.S. Special Representative for North Korea, said at Stanford University1 in late January, “President Trump is ready to end this war [the Korean War]. It is over. It is done.” This was followed by remarks from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo during an interview2 with CBS in mid-February, “It’s our full intention of getting a good outcome in exchange for relieving those sanctions [economic sanctions.]” Such comments hailed the possibility of a deal quite favorable to Kim. News delivered just prior to the summit, that South Korean president Moon Jae-in and Trump shared a positive outlook for the meeting over the phone, hyped the likelihood of a promising result in Hanoi between Washington and Pyongyang. Moon, during the phone conversation3 with Trump, suggested his vision of inter-Korean economic cooperation as one of the “corresponding measures” that could be awarded to Kim, lessening the burden on Washington’s shoulders, if North Korea gives up its nuclear program and, according to the Blue House, Trump gave a positive response. Moon reportedly said that South Korea is “ready to take over the role of undertaking anything from reconnecting railways and roads between Seoul and Pyongyang to other inter-Korean economic projects.”4 Such an approach was brought up earlier during an interview which the special adviser to the South Korean president, Moon Chung-in, had with Joongang in January,5 right after Kim Jong-un’s New Year’s address came out; he proposed incremental economic exchanges, limited to only between Seoul and Pyongyang, to bring about the North’s denuclearization, and said, “economic exchanges between the two Koreas can exceptionally be exempted from the target of UN sanctions as the two Koreas of the same ethnic group have a special relationship with each other.”
Topic:
Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Media, and News Analysis
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

10. Why Did the Hanoi Summit Fail and What Comes Next? Coverage in Four Countries

Author:
Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The summit on February 27-28 in Hanoi between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un ended on a sour note, casting doubt on the one-year old diplomatic process that had produced an upbeat summit between the two in Singapore the previous June. Much speculation followed on what had gone wrong, who was to blame, and how diplomacy could be put back on track. Given the importance of the four countries caught between the U.S. and North Korea in setting the course for addressing the North Korean challenge, their media and journal coverage of the state of diplomacy after the Hanoi summit merits close attention, which is provided below. The following chapters examine how the South Korean, Chinese, Japanese, and Russian media and journal articles have covered the Hanoi summit and its immediate aftermath. They tell us about the hopes and concerns of four countries and point to differences in thinking about the nature of the diplomacy between the U.S. and North Korea and the expectations for what will follow. Coverage ranges from anticipation of the summit in the first two months of 2019 to immediate reporting on what transpired on February 27-28 to interpretations over the next month or longer of the impact of the summit for U.S. and North Korean policy and for the geopolitics of Northeast Asia and, specifically, the foreign policies of each of the four countries. Each chapter pays special heed to the apprehensions related to the talks or how they could leave one’s country in dire straits, and to the range of responses to what is transpiring. Close attention is given to what one’s own country should do either if progress is made in diplomacy or if a breakdown occurs. Also of interest is whether coordination with other states is sought.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Media, and News Analysis
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea