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71. Digital authoritarianism in China and Russia: Common goals and diverging standpoints in the era of great-power rivalry

Author:
Elina Sinkkonen and Jussi Lassila
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
China and Russia are jointly advancing their shared interests in the international arena and are building up cooperation in the tech sector. Despite far-reaching plans, the asymmetry of cooperation in favour of China is increasingly at odds with Russia’s national goals in digital technology. Differences in resources and standpoints are also reflected in the implementation of digital surveillance. China’s surveillance system is sophisticated and extensive whereas Russia’s is largely inconsistent and emerging, as evidenced by the fact that there was virtually no control of the internet in Russia until 2012. While advanced surveillance in authoritarian countries is worrying, technology in strategic sectors is also a key field of increasingly disconcerting great-power competition. As a result of strategic competition, the world is faced with the risk of technological decoupling, which would contribute to further fragmentation of the international community and deepening of existing rivalries.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Authoritarianism, Digital Economy, and Surveillance
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

72. Cyber-incident Management: Identifying and Dealing with the Risk of Escalation

Author:
Fei Su, Dr Vincent Boulanin, and Johan Turell
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The ever-increasing dependence on information and communication technologies (ICTs) in all aspects of society raises many challenges for national crisis management agencies. These agencies need to prepare not only for new cyberthreats and cyber vulnerabilities, but also for the fact that the aftermath of a cyber incident affecting critical infrastructure has its own challenges. On the one hand, the practical disruptions caused by an isolated incident can be hard to predict and control and, on the other hand, the consequences and perceptions of an incident whose cause is not yet determined can be equally hard to manage. Uncertainty around the cause of the incident and remedial actions being taken often lead to public speculation and political pressure to respond in ways that could create political tensions, and possibly conflict, between countries. This policy paper is the result of a nine-month research project that was jointly conducted by SIPRI and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) on cyber-incident management. It explores what national crisis management authorities can do to improve their cyber-incident prevention, detection and response strategies and also how they can do better to deal with the larger societal and potentially political aftermath. It investigates why and how cyber incidents may lead to escalatory scenarios and how these scenarios can be avoided and contained using various de-escalatory approaches. It comprises an introduction providing background and the inspiration of this report (section I); four sections that explore the dynamics of escalation and de-escalation from conceptual (section II), analytical (sections III–IV) and empirical (section V) standpoints; and two sections that present the main findings and recommendations (sections VI–VII).
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Sweden and Global Focus

73. Responsible Artificial Intelligence Research and Innovation for International Peace and Security

Author:
Dr Vincent Boulanin, Kolja Brockmann, and Luke Richards
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
In 2018 the United Nations Secretary-General identified responsible research and innovation (RRI) in science and technology as an approach for academia, the private sector and governments to work on the mitigation of risks that are posed by new technologies. This report explores how RRI could help to address the humanitarian and strategic risks that may result from the development, diffusion and military use of artificial intelligence (AI) and thereby achieve arms control objectives on the military use of AI. The report makes recommendations on how the arms control community could build on existing responsible AI initiatives and export control and compliance systems to engage with academia and the private sector in the governance of risks to international peace and security posed by the military use of AI.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Peace, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Global Focus

74. Productivity and Adaptability: Why COVID-19 Has Not Overrun American Hospitals

Author:
Hanns Kuttner
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Early in the COVID-19 epidemic, many gloomy images emerged of what might be ahead. In one, hospitals would be overrun by more COVID-19 patients than they could treat. Models developed at the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) provided numbers that supported the image. For the most part, overrun hospitals did not happen. Things turned out better because America’s hospitals did better than the IHME model thought they could. Hospital productivity has proved to be greater than anticipated in the IHME model. Productivity determines how many patients hospitals can serve. Productivity reflects how many beds a hospital has and how many days each patient stays in a bed. The most common pattern in hospitals, patients who are discharged alive and do not require time in an intensive care unit (ICU), provide an example. Length of stay for that group has been a third shorter than assumed in the IHME model. The data required to tell the adaptability story in detail is not yet available. Only a qualitative assessment is possible at this point. Hospitals adapted in ways not anticipated in the IHME model. For example, they delayed elective surgical procedures, freeing up beds. The story will become more detailed as data about hospital admissions and the clinical course of COVID-19 patients becomes available.
Topic:
Health, Science and Technology, Health Care Policy, COVID-19, and Pharmaceuticals
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

75. Ambition and Overreach: Countering One Belt One Road and Beijing’s Plans to Dominate Global Innovation

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The first monograph in this series, China’s Economic Slowdown: Root Causes, Beijing’s Response and Strategic Implications for the US and Allies, examined the structural problems in the Chinese economy that have led to a recent permanent slowdown after three decades of double-digit growth rates. The monograph focused on the political and economic costs of the slowdown and efforts to stabilize an economy that has poured far too much national wealth into commercially unproductive areas. Yet the Communist Party is not passively awaiting an unhappy economic fate in connection with its mounting imbalances and domestic economic dysfunction. In many respects, its leaders have been highly creative in seeking solutions that do not entail a weakening of the party’s hold on economic power. On the contrary, the party has been busily shaping and pursuing grand strategic policies such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Made in China 2025 (MIC 2025) to solve or alleviate many of its domestic political-economic problems. This monograph, part two in the series, examines how the US and its allies can confront and counter these Chinese strategies and initiatives. It will do so by taking seriously the challenge they present and suggesting responses that take into account Chinese vulnerabilities and the points of leverage available to the US and its allies. This linking of China’s vulnerabilities and weaknesses, on the one hand, and its ambition and purpose with respect to its outward-focused policies, is essential for effective policy responses. If the domestic is not linked with the external, US policies are much more likely to become complacent, counterproductive, or susceptible to overreaching. In linking analyses of Beijing’s domestic political economy with its external policies, the monograph will challenge some enduring but incorrect grand narratives that play into the hands of the CCP.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Science and Technology, and Trade
Political Geography:
China and Asia

76. The Sputnik Moment: Historic Lessons for Our Hypersonic Age

Author:
Jerry Hendrix
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This paper seeks to both explore and understand the first “Sputnik Moment” in all of its facets. It will investigate its origins; how it came as such a surprise to so many outside of the White House and the intelligence community; and how various groups—to include leaders in the Soviet Union, the separate American military services, the scientific and engineering communities and, finally, opposing political forces within the United States—moved to leverage the “moment” to their own advantage. Because of this phenomenon, great investments were made in the U.S. military, the National Air and Space Administration was created, and the U.S. public educational system was overhauled to place greater emphasis on science and engineering within its curriculums. This study will also seek to distill lessons learned from the first “Sputnik Moment” and to examine the question of whether such an event could happen again and, if so, what would be the modern reactions?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, and Space
Political Geography:
Russia and United States of America

77. The Executive’s Guide to Quantum Cryptography: Security in a Post-Quantum World

Author:
Arthur Herman
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This guidebook answers key questions about how quantum technology itself, in the form of quantum random-number generators (QRNG) and quantum-key distribution (QKD), can provide secure solutions for addressing the quantum computer threat. After explaining how QRNG and QKD work, the guidebook recommends that executives combine these quantum cryptographic solutions with other software-based, quantum-resistant applications that can deter future quantum computer attacks. Finally, the guide shows how quantum science will determine the future of communication technology by making it safe, secure, and ready for the twenty-first century.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Business, and Quantum Computers
Political Geography:
Global Focus

78. Next Steps for US Trade, Manufacturing, and Supply Chains After COVID-19

Author:
Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The imperative to return supply chains to the United States for products important to national defense, medical security, and competitiveness in key industrial and technology sectors is not new. The explosive growth of the Chinese manufacturing sector, its mercantilist challenge to the world trading system, and its impact on jobs and industrial leadership in the United States is well known and well documented. This challenge has prompted new research and policies to help reverse the erosion of US supply chains. US technology leadership has been undermined by China’s forced technology transfer, theft of intellectual property, and subsidization of traditional and new higher technology sectors. In turn, the loss of global markets and US manufacturing jobs have resulted in social problems of increasing devastation to communities in industrial areas. China’s economic growth depends, in a historically unprecedented way, on its export model and the suppression of domestic consumption. This results in a cycle of overproduction, expansion of external spheres of economic influence, and dumping of products abroad. In recent years, the United States has begun to challenge the Chinese model. However, much work remains to be done to accomplish the goal of ending mercantilist practices, establishing a level playing field for US producers, and reinvigorating domestic production. Critical supply chains for US national defense and high technology leadership have become overly dependent on China and other foreign sources. The vulnerability of supply chains has been demonstrated by interruptions in supply of key materials by both natural disasters and political decisions such as Beijing’s cutoff of rare earth metals a decade ago. More recently, in July 2020, the production of critical personal protective equipment was interrupted by massive flooding in the interior of China. Beyond Beijing’s unfair practices, China is a continental economy with the ambition to displace the United States as the leader in the global economy of the 21st century and has the economies of scale to represent a serious, long term threat to US leadership and markets. The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated these preexisting trends and underscores the importance of bringing industrial supply chains, including medical products, back to the United States. First, the cut-off of medical supplies, not just from China but from Europe and other allies, brought the vulnerabilities of relying on outside sourcing into clearer and more immediate focus. Ninety countries blocked the exports of medical products during the early months of the pandemic. Second, border closures around the world, even within the European Union (EU), added to the worries about supply chain interruptions, including for workers and logistics. Seventy percent of the world’s points of entry restricted foreign travelers at some point as the pandemic grew. Third, border closures and supply chain interruptions increased tensions between nations, especially between the United States and China, which was criticized for its suppression of information at the start of the pandemic. Beijing’s brazen imposition of a new security law in Hong Kong while the world was preoccupied by the pandemic further eroded its global standing, especially in Europe. Fourth, the economic collapse due to the pandemic response again focused attention on the need to create more domestic jobs, including those in the hard-hit industrial sector. Finally, all these developments led allies such as the United Kingdom, Japan, and the EU to advance new policies meant to bring production back to home territories. These trends support initiatives to increase the resiliency of domestic production, even beyond the parameters of defense and medical security.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, Manufacturing, Trade, COVID-19, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

79. Sustaining the Undersea Advantage: Transforming Anti-Submarine Warfare Using Autonomous Systems

Author:
Bryan Clark, Seth Cropsey, and Timothy A. Walton
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Submarines have posed a challenge to naval forces for more than a century, enabling weaker maritime powers to launch surprise attacks ashore or cut an opponent off from the sea. But submarine threats, and the difficulty of countering them, increased substantially for the United States and its allies during the past decade. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is modernizing its fleet with conventional air-independent propulsion submarines (SSPs) that support its broader sensor and weapon networks. It is also fielding nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) capable of longer or more distant deployments. New generations of Russian Federation Navy (RFN) SSNs are difficult to track and could be employed for conventional or nuclear strikes during a conflict. Both countries are augmenting their submarine fleets with large autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) incorporating submarine like capabilities. Modern submarine technology has also proliferated, with the North Korean and Iranian navies using submarines and AUVs to level the playing field with their larger regional competitors and the United States. Unfortunately, the current US and allied approach to antisubmarine warfare (ASW) is unlikely to cope with the probable scale of undersea threats in a crisis or conflict. US Navy ASW concepts rely on fixed seabed sensors such as the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) or Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS) ships to detect and initially track submarines. Multiple maritime patrol aircraft and guided missile destroyers (DDGs) then track each adversary submarine before potentially passing it to an SSN for longerterm surveillance. This approach works when opposing submarines deploy infrequently but is likely to break down during a large-scale submarine deployment or as submarines become quieter and harder to track. When manned platforms and expendables such as sonobuoys or torpedoes run out or are needed elsewhere, ASW operations will necessarily collapse to a defensive strategy protecting high-value targets, instead of suppressing enemy submarine operations closer to the adversary’s waters. This may result in unlocated adversary submarines operating in the open ocean, where they could threaten US and allied shipping and maritime operations.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Maritime, Automation, and Submarines
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

80. Weaponizing the 5G Value Chain

Author:
Bryan Clark and Dan Patt
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
US national security experts worry the United States is falling behind China in the competition for 5G mobile communication dominance. While US companies led establishment of today’s 4G networks, they are not the frontrunners in setting 5G standards, building 5G equipment, or deploying 5G infrastructure. The lead in 5G implementation belongs instead to China’s Huawei, which exploited a combination of regulatory protection, government subsidies, and capable technology to rapidly gain one-third of the global 5G market.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Internet, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America