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41. NRGI Impact: Knitting the Fabric of Civil Society Activism in Tunisia (2013-2020)

Author:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
Tunisia is the only country to have accomplished a peaceful transition from authoritarianism after the Arab Spring uprisings, but its democratic gains are not yet entrenched. Tunisians have experienced persistent political instability and voter turnout has been waning—particularly among young people. The governance of extractive industries has influenced, and in turn been impacted, by both the prevailing political context and global dynamics. After the 2013 revolution, there was scant civil society capacity and limited focus on extractives, accompanied by low levels of trust of international partners. Tunisia’s oil and gas reserves are small compared to other resource-rich countries in the region. In addition, political instability and an uncompetitive fiscal regime led to a decline in foreign investment in the sector. As production and prices fell, oil and gas revenues dropped. In terms of mining, the country went from being the world’s fourth largest phosphate producer in 2010 to 20th in 2017. In 2020, amid the coronavirus pandemic, Tunisia resorted to importing phosphate. The production decline is due largely to recurring protests, particularly in the Gafsa phosphate mining basin, which led to regular mining stoppages. Local populations are frustrated because phosphate mining brings limited benefits, whether in terms of revenue, social spending by companies or employment opportunities. Similar dynamics prevail in the oilproducing region of Tataouine and other resource-producing areas. Political and institutional volatility has negatively impacted reform plans. The portfolio of the ministry in charge of extractive industries was modified or restructured five times and saw eight leadership changes between 2011 and 2016, including following corruption scandals. The ministry was restructured many time subsquently. These changes have contributed to faltering momentum and delayed reform. The pandemic has further exacerbated some of these challenges.
Topic:
Civil Society, Oil, Natural Resources, Gas, Arab Spring, and Activism
Political Geography:
North Africa and Tunisia

42. US Needs to Play Larger Role as Swing Producer of Oil and Gas in the Current Crisis

Author:
Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In response to Russian aggression in Ukraine, European nations have drastically reduced imports of crude oil, refined petroleum products, and natural gas from Russia. The 2021 levels of these energy imports were around 2.2 million barrels per day (mbd) of crude oil, 1.2 mbd of refined products, and 155 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas on an annual basis.In addition to extreme difficulties in obtaining new sources of natural gas and to a lesser extent oil, the price increases throughout Europe since the onset of the war have been of historic proportions. In the days following the invasion, natural gas prices shot up by 62 percent, and UK energy prices were up by 150 percent. The full impact of the war, along with the related need to rein in the highest inflation numbers in over 40 years, has pushed Europe into a recession that threatens households and small businesses as well as European manufacturers’ ability to remain competitive. As a result, if the region cannot quickly assemble alternative supplies, the European commitment to assist in containing Russian aggression may weaken.
Topic:
Economics, Oil, Gas, Crisis Management, Supply Chains, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

43. The Price Cap on Russian Oil Exports, Explained

Author:
Catherine Wolfram, Simon Johnson, and Łukasz Rachel
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
If you’ve taken an introductory economics class, you were probably left with the strong impression that price caps are bad – they distort demand and discourage producers from supplying the market. So, why has Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, the consummate economist, advocated so strongly for a price cap on Russian oil? The answer is that this price cap is different from the standard cap discussed in introductory economics classes. A standard price cap applies to all goods traded in a market. For example, in some countries there are price caps on bread for everyone or diesel for farmers or rent controls on housing. Such caps lead to excess demand for the good and insufficient supply, leading to shortages at the capped price. If prices are constrained, other non-price mechanisms, like first-come-first-served, are required to allocate the good. All too frequently, the result is empty bakery shelves or fuel shortages or difficulties finding housing. To understand why the cap on Russian oil is different, we first need to provide background on Russian oil trade and the proposed price cap.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, Oil, Exports, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

44. With energy at play in the Ukraine war, everybody pays

Author:
Izabela Surwillo and Veronika Slakaityte
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Despite sustained efforts to turn towards the West, as a major transit country dependent on cheap gas, Ukraine has been particularly vulnerable to Russian pressure. Now, with the outbreak of war in Ukraine, the EU’s problematic dependence on the Russian petrol state is under stress, as diversification of energy supply from non-Russian sources in the wake of war will incur high economic costs for the EU in the near future. The Russian attack on Ukraine has put the EU’s lenient policy towards Russia into question and has highlighted its problematic overdependence on Russian oil and gas. On the 12th day of the war in Ukraine, with Russia under tough Western sanctions, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak stated: ‘We have every right to take a matching decision and impose an embargo on gas pumping through the Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline.’ The International Energy Agency (IEA) has urged the EU neither to extend nor to sign new contracts with Gazprom. Meanwhile the EU is exploring policy options for diversification of gas supply. Russia currently supplies over 40% of the EU’s gas and nearly a third of its oil, leaving the EU exposed to economic and political pressure. Energy blackmail primarily concerns gas supply, as replacing Russian gas with other sources cannot be executed immediately due to insufficient gas infrastructure and market conditions (i.e. limited availability of liquified gas). While oil can be transported by land and sea, meeting the EU’s energy demand will nevertheless require both diversification of energy supply routes and speeding up of its energy transition. This process will prove challenging and costly. Phasing out the EU–Russia energy cooperation after the Russian invasion of Ukraine also marks a major shift in continental energy politics that affects all the parties. For Russia, the loss of the European market implies a huge loss of revenue and a deepening future dependence on China. Ukraine finds itself once again caught in the middle. For years Ukraine increasingly sought greater energy independence from Russia and deeper integration with the EU energy market. Meanwhile, the construction of pipelines such as Nord Stream 2, circumventing Ukraine as a transit state for Russian gas, made Ukraine even more vulnerable because it sent a clear signal to Moscow that energy trade with Europe would not cease, even following the annexation of some Ukrainian territories by Russia in 2014. During the current war, Moscow is claiming that Russia is doing ‘everything in its power’ to keep the flows through Ukraine to the EU stable. However, the damage being done to Ukrainian energy infrastructure and its economy at large is still hard to estimate.
Topic:
Oil, European Union, Gas, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

45. Reciprocal Pressures: Are Israel-Lebanon maritime border talks doomed to fail?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The future of talks between Israel and Lebanon on delineating a shared maritime border, mediated by US Special Envoy and Coordinator for International Energy Affairs, Amos Hochstein remains uncertain following an exchange of escalatory statements from Israel and Lebanon’s Hezbollah about the disputed Karish natural gas field. Both sides suggested that the tensions can escalate into an all-out war unless their conditions are met. However, Lebanese officials including President Michel Aoun stated that the negotiations to demarcate the border are in the final stages.
Topic:
Oil, Treaties and Agreements, Maritime, and Energy
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Lebanon

46. Borders and transit countries: the re-territorialization of Middle East pipelines

Author:
Nino Luis Maduerira
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:
Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:
Following the discovery of vast oil reserves in the Persian Gulf region, the Middle East became the main hub for the expansion and development of western pipeline technology. Contrary to the borderless world described in some accounts of globalization, what is observed after 1956 is the establishment of hard political borders, directly under the oversight of national governments, for pipeline deployment with minimal boundary crossings. In the Middle East, this minimal permeability of frontiers entailed fewer risks compared with the uncertainties arising from having to cross several countries: the sovereign state thus seemed the best container for oil transportation. The conclusion puts forward the concept of re-territorialization to explain the multi-level changes that took place, entailing shifts in geography, in business structures and in international relations.
Topic:
Oil, Science and Technology, Natural Resources, Borders, and Transition
Political Geography:
Middle East

47. KRI positioned in prominent role in global gas markets

Author:
Ahmed Tabaqchali
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) has proven gas reserves of over 25 trillion cubic feet—or 20 percent of Iraq’s total proven reserves. Its current gas production of 5.4 billion cubic meters per year could nearly triple production by 2030 and even sextuple by 2040. This increase would meet current and future domestic KRI demand and generate essential export revenue for the region. The report, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq’s Gas-Export Potential: Deja Vu All Over Again, authored by senior fellow Ahmed Tabaqchali considers the potential of the KRI’s proven and probable gas reserves.
Topic:
Environment, Markets, Oil, Gas, Economy, and Energy
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)

48. Securing alternative gas supplies and addressing critical infrastructure gaps in Europe

Author:
Richard L. Morningstar, András Simonyi, Olga Khakova, and Paddy Ryan
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The Kremlin’s weaponization of natural gas exports to Europe as winter approaches has shattered any illusions that Russia could be a reliable supplier. Europe urgently needs to import gas from other suppliers to heat its homes and power its industry. In doing so, Europe can build a more secure and sustainable energy system while cutting off funds for Moscow’s war machine. Painfully high energy prices are already having a serious impact on quality of life and economic development in Europe. New natural gas supplies and expanded interconnections to bring them to market will drive down the costs of energy and reduce the likelihood of social unrest over energy poverty. The surest means to end Russia’s energy leverage over Europe include accelerating the green transformation, curtailing gas demand, and boosting energy efficiency. However, the continent cannot implement these changes overnight. Gas remains instrumental in Europe’s transition from dirtier fossil fuels, electrification of power-hungry sectors, and integration of large-scale intermittent renewables. Natural gas will likely remain a critical part of Europe’s power baseload for at least the medium term. Procuring an adequate supply of gas in the short to midterm is not at odds with the energy transition. Europe must cultivate alternative suppliers, build non-Russian-oriented import infrastructure, and accelerate decarbonization in tandem to boost energy security and affordability. Sourcing gas from non-Russian suppliers will sustain longer-term decarbonization efforts and prevent regression back to dirtier fuels amid the energy crunch. To diversify their energy systems, European states must determine how much Russian gas can be replaced and from where, as well as what new infrastructure will be necessary to enable new imports. The European Union (EU) needs to clearly articulate the anticipated natural gas supply gap to identify investment opportunities for the relevant market players. This issue brief examines potential sources of alternative gas supplies, the infrastructure required to bring new supplies to European consumers, and the financial and regulatory mechanisms needed to support diversification efforts. It offers recommendations for measures that European countries decoupling their energy supplies from Russia should take to give themselves the best chances of succeeding.
Topic:
Environment, Markets, Oil, Gas, Energy, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
Europe

49. PLUS Politics: Tackling the EIA Impact Gap

Author:
Columbia Centre on Sustainable Investment
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
Oil, gas, and mining projects can be profoundly disruptive to lives and livelihoods and damaging to air, water, soil, and vegetation. Evidence of this abounds across the world, from the Niger Delta and the Gulf of Mexico to Brumadinho, Brazil, and Porgera, Papua New Guinea. Understanding and addressing the social and environmental repercussions of EI development projects is crucial for avoiding or effectively managing such negative outcomes and fostering sustainable development. To date, environmental impact assessment (EIA) processes have been the cornerstone of efforts to identify and address social and environmental impacts of proposed development projects, including extractive industry projects and associated infrastructure. In practice, however, crucial aspects of these processes — the production of EIAs, consultations around the findings and implications of reports, and the actual use of the content of reports to inform key project decisions — are at times considerably distorted by power and incentive dynamics rooted in the political economy of a given context. The result is too often watered-down “box-ticking” exercises in which the impact of the EIA process on actual social and environmental protection can be greatly reduced. Technocratic approaches that emphasize best practices and capacity will not improve the performance of EIA processes on their own. Politically savvy approaches are needed to address the political challenges associated with EIAs, as even the most technically sound and capacitated EIA processes can be derailed by political factors. This brief is based on a longer chapter on the topic produced for a United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) publication on development corridors.1 It aims to present the gaps between various aspects of the theory and practice of EIAs, explore some of the ways in which political factors may be contributing to these gaps, and suggest how future work on social and environmental protection and management might better account for political context in hopes of achieving greater impact.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Environment, Oil, Natural Resources, Gas, and Mining
Political Geography:
Global Focus

50. New Producer Contract Terms and Uncertainty: Lessons From the Recent Past

Author:
Patrick Heller, Perrine Toledano, Tehtena Mebratu-Tsegaye, and David Mihalyi
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
The petroleum industry is volatile, and governments in “new producer” countries have operated at a significant information disadvantage when negotiating with international oil companies. This challenge is growing today; new producer countries face intensifying questions around whether to offer fiscal incentives to maintain investment in the face of 1) the pandemic-induced volatility in oil prices and 2) long-term questions about the future of the industry in the face of the climate crisis and the global energy transition. This confluence of short-term and long-term uncertainty is prompting a reexamination of the narrative that once took hold in many new producer countries. The traditional story was one of linear progression from being non-producers to small levels of production to ultimately having oil and gas become a major economic contributor over the long term. This notion of progression was associated with a commonly held theory: After a country’s first major discovery, the geological risk that wells will be dry was expected to decrease. Countries could therefore shift from a position of having to grant tax breaks (and other concessions) to international investors, to taking a tougher stance in laws and negotiations for new projects going forward. In this paper we examine whether this theory has been borne out in practice and make recommendations to support new producers in their navigation of the uncertainty associated with the energy transition. Among the eight “new producer” countries, for which we analyzed a total of 26 contracts signed before and 25 contracts signed after discovery events (all occurring between 2001 and 2014), the evidence is mixed. Only three of the eight countries in our sample—Ghana, Mozambique and Uganda—demonstrated a clear pattern in the direction of more stringent terms in post-discovery contracts. They featured definitive steps to increase some of the obligations of contractors to the state, and no significant terms that became less stringent. Five out of eight countries did not meaningfully alter their approach to gain greater concessions from their company partners.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Oil, Governance, Gas, and Private Sector
Political Geography:
Uganda, Africa, Mozambique, and Ghana