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162. Iraq: Fixing Security in Kirkuk
- Author:
- International Crisis Group
- Publication Date:
- 06-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Crisis Group
- Abstract:
- Federal forces now patrol Kirkuk, the diverse, oil-rich province disputed between the central and Kurdish regional governments. The arrangement is unsettling communal relations, with Kurds feeling excluded. With outside help, Baghdad and Erbil should design a joint security mechanism including a locally recruited multi-ethnic unit. What’s new? In October 2017, the Iraqi army restored central government control over the disputed Kirkuk governorate and its oil fields in the country’s north. Since then, multiple federal forces including paramilitaries have policed the area. The new arrangement reassured the province’s Arabs and Turkmen but left local Kurds feeling abandoned. Why did it happen? The federal government’s move into Kirkuk was triggered by a Kurdish independence referendum staged the previous month, which raised Baghdad’s concerns that the Kurdistan Regional Government in Erbil would declare Kurdish statehood and annex Kirkuk, other disputed territories and their petroleum riches. Why does it matter? Finding an equilibrium that satisfies Kirkuk’s three main ethnic groups by ensuring that none dominates the security apparatus at the others’ expense is a fundamental condition for the area’s stability. Only such a configuration will ensure peaceful coexistence and help prevent a resurgence of the Islamic State. What should be done? With international support, Baghdad and Erbil should establish joint security management in Kirkuk that includes a locally recruited multi-ethnic force under federal command. This arrangement would help protect the area from renewed insurgency, contribute to intercommunal peace and lay the foundations for an eventual settlement of Kirkuk’s status in Iraq.
- Topic:
- Security, Oil, and Kurds
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Middle East, and Kirkuk
163. Oil Prices and Stock Prices in Clean Energy: New Evidence from Chinese Subsectoral Data
- Author:
- Dong Weijia
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Abstract:
- The International Energy Agency (IEA) believes that the world needs a clean energy revolution to break its dependence on fossil fuels. Clean energy consists of not just the new energy but also the vehicles that use them,2 including renewable energy, nuclear power, and biofuels. In this context, many studies discuss whether clean energy could have a significant substitution effect on traditional fossil fuels, especially oil.
- Topic:
- Energy Policy, Oil, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
164. Evaluating the impact of fossil fuel vehicles exit on the oil demand in China
- Author:
- Ziru Feng, Tian Cai, Kangli Xiang, Chenxi Xiang, and Lei Hou
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Abstract:
- Vehicle ownership is one of the most important factors affecting fuel demand. Based on the forecast of China's vehicle ownership, this paper estimates China’s fuel demand in 2035 and explores the impact of new energy vehicles under the scenarios of slow, medium, and rapid substitution. The main contribution of this paper is making a more detailed estimation on the main parameters such as the saturation level and growth rate of the vehicle ownership by taking into account the heterogeneity of provinces when using the Gompertz model to forecast the future vehicle ownership. On that basis, the fuel demand of each province in 2035 is calculated. The results show that: ①The vehicle ownership rate of each province conforms to the S-shape trend with the growth of real GDP per capita. At present, most provinces are at a stage of accelerating growth. However, the time for the vehicle ownership rate of each province to reach the inflection point is quite different. ②Without considering the replacement of new energy vehicles, China's auto fuel demand is expected to be 746.69 million tonnes (Mt) in 2035. Guangdong, Henan, and Shandong are the top three provinces in fuel demand due to the economic and demographic factors, with the expected fuel demand of 76.76, 64.91 and 63.95Mt respectively. ③Considering the replacement of new energy vehicles, China’s fuel demand in 2035 will be 653, 615 and 578 Mt respectively under the scenarios of slow, medium and fast substitution. Even under the scenario of slow substitution, the reduction in fuel demand will be 94 Mt, accounting for 26.3% of China's net oil imports in 2016. Therefore, the withdrawal of fuel vehicles will greatly reduce the oil demand and the dependence on foreign oil of China. Faced with the dual pressure of environmental crisis and energy crisis, the forecast results of this study provide practical reference for policy makers to rationally design the future fuel vehicle exit plan and solve related environmental issues.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Oil, and Fossil Fuels
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and United States of America
165. Turkey and Greece: pouring gas on the eastern Mediterranean dispute
- Author:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Publication Date:
- 09-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Abstract:
- The Turkish-Greek conflict over maritime borders is unlike any other in the world. Not only does it involve potentially vast wealth under the seabed in the Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean, it relies on diverse and competing legal sources and interpretations.
- Topic:
- Oil, Bilateral Relations, Natural Resources, Maritime, and Borders
- Political Geography:
- Turkey, Greece, and Mediterranean
166. Seven Ironies of Reconstructing a New Security Paradigm in the Gulf
- Author:
- Mohammed Cherkaoui
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Abstract:
- During the month of January 2020, most world capitals, diplomats, and think tanks sought to evaluate the status of the already-fragile balance of power in the Gulf. The U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to assassinate the Iranian general Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad has triggered the most acute escalation between Washington and Tehran since 1979. The White House’s pursuit of neutralizing the second most important figure in Iran, after the spiritual leader Ayatollah Khamenei, has shifted the US-Iranian rivalry into a fierce confrontation between Washington’s “maximum pressure” and Tehran’s “maximum resistance”. There have been several interpretations and predictions of Iran’s possible direct or indirect acts of retaliation vis-à-vis Trump’s threats of targeting 52 sites, which have political and cultural significance for the Iranians. Some Washington-based analysts have been wary that “the U.S. and Iran are now in a traditional escalatory slope, and although neither side wants war, there is a real risk that it might happen.”(1) Anthony H. Cordesman, leading analyst at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, has cautioned that the new US-Iran crisis “has now led to consistent failures in the U.S. strategy when dealing with Iraq and the Middle East for the last two decades – and has already turned two apparent ‘victories’ into real world defeats.”(2) In Doha, two research institutions, Aljazeera Centre for Studies and Qatar University’s Gulf Studies Centre, hosted a two-day conference, “Toward a New Gulf Security Order: Abandoning Zero-sum Approaches” at Qatar University January 19 and 20, to formulate new perspectives of the waning regional security order, and explore how to construct an alternative paradigm. As a point of entry, the Conference concept highlighted two manifestations of the failure of the existing security order, formally adopted by all Gulf States, since the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) May 25, 1981: First, to prevent the invasion, and later liberation, of Kuwait in the early 1990s. GCC established a coalition land force, “the Peninsular Shield Force”, with the objective of defending the six nation states, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Second, the decision of three member states - Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain - to impose a blockade on Qatar, a founding member of GCC since June 2017.(3) In this turbulent part of the world, Iran’s pursuit of creating a regional security order, but on the parsuit of the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the region—a condition rejected by Gulf states, which see the United States as the principal guarantor of their national security. Moreover, Iran still considers its own foreign interventions in the Gulf and Arab region as part of its revolutionary identity, to which it has devoted resources and agencies.(4) This paper “Seven Ironies of Reconstructing a New Security Paradigm in the Gulf” is a summary of the presentation I delivered at the Conference’s fifth panel “The Gulf and the US-Gulf Conflict”. It probes into several challenges of deconstructing the status quo, before envisioning an alternative framework of mutual security cooperation among several actors in the Gulf and the Middle East.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Foreign Policy, Oil, and Donald Trump
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, North America, United States of America, and Gulf Nations
167. Why Trump Rejects the Need from Middle Eastern Oil
- Author:
- James M Dorsey
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Abstract:
- It is the geopolitics rather than the economics of energy that will drive US interest, particularly as it regards efforts to change Iranian policies, if not the Iranian regime, as well as the longer-term power balance in the Middle East.
- Topic:
- Energy Policy, Oil, Natural Resources, Geopolitics, and Donald Trump
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
168. Gulf Economic Outlook 2020 - Q3 Update
- Author:
- Hiba Itani
- Publication Date:
- 08-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Conference Board
- Abstract:
- The Conference Board estimates the Gulf region’s GDP growth to fall at -5.7 percent in 2020 compared to 2019. The slight improvement in oil prices in Q3 along with the easing of production cuts as of August will give oil GDP a small boost. As worries of a possible second wave of coronavirus in Q4 mount, consumer demand will weaken further, netting the rise in oil GDP.
- Topic:
- Oil, GDP, Economy, and Coronavirus
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Gulf Nations
169. Gulf Economic Outlook 2020 - Q1 Update
- Author:
- Hiba Itani
- Publication Date:
- 05-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Conference Board
- Abstract:
- The Gulf countries face a somber outlook, with the GDP of the region expected to contract by 5.9% in 2020 compared to 2019. The Gulf countries whose economies remain highly dependent on hydrocarbon are ahead of “perfect storm” like scenario: a humanitarian crisis, that morphed into a global demand shock and pushed oil prices into a free-fall. A historical oil production cut agreement barely managed to improve prices.
- Topic:
- Oil, Natural Resources, GDP, and Economy
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Gulf Nations
170. Do Commodity Price Shocks Cause Armed Conflicts? A Meta-Analysis of Natural Experiments
- Author:
- Graeme Blair, Darin Christensen, and Aaron Rudkin
- Publication Date:
- 09-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Empirical Studies of Conflict Project (ESOC)
- Abstract:
- Scholars of the resource curse argue that reliance on primary commodities destabilizes governments: price fluctuations generate windfalls or periods of austerity that provoke or intensify civil conflict. Over 350 quantitative studies test this claim, but prominent results point in different directions, making it difficult to discern which results reliably hold across contexts. We conduct a meta-analysis of 46 natural experiments that use difference-in-difference designs to estimate the causal effect of commodity price changes on armed civil conflict. We show that commodity price changes, on average, do not change the likelihood of conflict. However, there are cross-cutting effects by commodity type. In line with theory, we find price increases for labor-intensive agricultural commodities reduce conflict, while increases in the price of oil, a capital-intensive commodity, provoke conflict. We also find that price increases for lootable artisanal minerals provoke conflict. Our meta-analysis consolidates existing evidence, but also highlights opportunities for future research.
- Topic:
- Agriculture, Oil, Natural Resources, Commodities, and Armed Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus