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31. Congress’s Hidden Strengths: Wielding Informal Tools of National Security Oversight

Author:
Richard Fontaine and Loren DeJonge Schulman
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
On matters of peace and war, virtually no one seems satisfied with Congress. Constitutionally coequal to the executive, the Congress often appears more an uneasy junior partner. During the past two decades, the executive branch has expanded its authority to launch, conduct, and conceal military activity. In response, Congress—despite its formal powers to declare war, appropriate funds, and organize the armed forces—has largely deferred, putting up more of a rhetorical fight than engaging in a deliberative effort to shape American wars. Congress, even lawmakers complain, postures more than it prescribes, overlooks more than it oversees, and passes time more than it passes laws. Conventional wisdom and political consultants offer congressmen good rationale: foreign policy does not typically drive elections, Americans are increasingly disconnected from both their military and the costs of war, and there are few political incentives to dig deeply into matters of war and peace. Today the “imperial presidency” is accepted as a given division of labor rather than seen as a counter-constitutional anomaly. And yet with the nation involved in military operations across multiple countries, and with debates about possible military interventions in Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela reaching the White House, congressional attention to the use of force should today be at a premium. The Founders were correct to vest national security decisionmaking in not only one branch of government, and history shows numerous examples of Congress positively influencing matters of war and peace. An inactive or indifferent legislature leaves power overconcentrated in the executive, while an engaged Congress may not just check presidential reach but can actively improve the conduct of American conflicts.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, National Security, and Armed Forces
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

32. United Kingdom Veteran Landscape

Author:
Emma Moore, Kayla M. Williams, and Zachary Jaynes
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
Aclose history of collaboration in national security and diplomacy between the United States and United Kingdom leads to many similarities between military personnel of both countries, both during and following service. These similarities mean both countries have much to learn from one another regarding best practices for supporting the military community broadly, despite differences in political systems, governance, and cultural norms. The United Kingdom’s veteran support landscape is sometimes considered behind that of the United States, in part due to the sector’s smaller size; however, the robust nature of the U.K.’s welfare state, combined with renewed engagement from the government, have led to significant progress in recent years. U.K. charities fill gaps in areas the government does not serve, while corporations look to recognize veteran skill sets and challenge existing societal narratives of service. The unique role of the Royal Family and Royal Foundation adds a nationwide focus on mental well-being with a key focus on the armed forces community. This landscape analysis provides an overview of support for veterans in the United Kingdom to better understand how the United States’ closest ally supports veterans from a government, charity, and corporate perspective. In addition to examining the efforts of each sector’s support for veterans, this analysis examines the status of veterans across the United Kingdom’s devolved nations.
Topic:
Diplomacy, National Security, Military Affairs, and Veterans
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

33. Open Future: The Way Forward on 5G

Author:
Martijn Rasser and Ainikki Riikonen
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
Communication networks are the central nervous system of the 21st century economy. The fifth generation of wireless—5G—will be essential to and inseparable from all we do. In many ways, we are already there. What for most was an abstract concept became all too real during the COVID-19 crisis. The coronavirus pandemic has underscored the critical importance of communication networks: They are integral to our daily lives and our ability to function economically and as a society. Shutdowns of offices, schools, and stores have meant turning to apps to work, learn, and buy. Frontline medical workers and vaccine researchers have consulted colleagues via teleconference to get the latest insight and advice on combating the virus. Being connected means resilience, coping, surviving. Getting 5G right is all the more urgent. Next-generation 5G networks will enable telemedicine, self-driving cars, and a proliferation of Internet of Things devices to fuel the future digital economy. Secure, reliable 5G networks will be essential elements of national infrastructure. Policymakers in Australia, Japan, and Vietnam understood this early on and took decisive action to secure their 5G networks. U.S. officials, slower out of the gates, are now the loudest voice on the risks of having equipment from untrusted vendors in 5G networks. The spotlight is brightest on the risks that Huawei poses to national security, including the threat of espionage or disruption. Given the Chinese Communist Party’s ability to exercise control over Huawei, there is justifiable concern over data integrity on networks that deploy Huawei equipment. More serious is the potential to use 5G equipment as a vector to cripple critical infrastructure. Such risk is not only about communications—5G will be the backbone of controls needed for power grids, water supplies, and transportation infrastructure. Despite this, the United States has had only limited success convincing its allies to join it in banning Huawei. The United States has the opportunity to regain momentum by taking a fresh approach to 5G in the aftermath of the pandemic. In addition to the broader appreciation for the criticality of reliable communication networks, Beijing’s coronavirus cover-up and clunky attempts at soft power have hardened public opinion toward China around the world. The economic fallout of the pandemic will likely slow 5G deployments globally, curtailing the urgency with which many operators approached the issue. At the same time, the first commercial projects centered on technological alternatives to the predominant 5G approach are being deployed. This confluence of events presents the United States and like-minded countries an opening to promote an alternative approach that could lead to a paradigm shift in the industry: wireless infrastructure built on a modular architecture with open interfaces. A modular architecture allows an operator to choose multiple vendors for a range of offerings, rather than being locked in with a single large integrated vendor. Open interfaces—the ability of equipment from any vendor to work with that of another—make that possible. Such a shift means upending the industry status quo that is dominated by four telecommunications equipment providers: China’s Huawei, Finland’s Nokia, Sweden’s Ericsson, and South Korea’s Samsung. Whereas other proposed responses to the Huawei dilemma and the problematic current state of competition in the telecommunications industry fiddle at the margins, switching to an industry centered on open interfaces would change the game altogether. A restructured industry based on open interfaces would directly address the prevailing concerns over untrusted vendors such as Huawei and the broader inefficiencies of the industry. There are distinct advantages to be gained in security and interoperability, supply chain resiliency, probable cost savings, and the opportunity to stimulate much-needed competition in the sector. Taken together, these advantages do much to blunt Beijing’s industrial policies that have enabled Huawei’s predatory anti-competitive practices.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Communications, COVID-19, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

34. Strengthening the Relationship Between Embassies and U.S. Special Operations Forces: Part 1, the Current Environment

Author:
Carter Wilbur
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
The release of the National Security Strategy (NSS)[i] in 2017 and related National Defense Strategy (NDS)[ii] in 2018 shifted the United States’ strategic focus to what has become known as Great Power Competition (GPC). These strategies acknowledge that the almost 20-year long fight against violent extremist organizations (VEOs) will continue, but add the need to address emerging and enduring threats from near-peer competitors such as Russia and China, and those approaching that status, such as Iran and North Korea. To address these authoritarian competitors requires the seamless integration of all aspects of U.S. power. Specifically, this article seeks to examine the current status of the relationship between U.S. embassies and U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF), while Part 2 will propose some specific ways to improve that working relationship.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, National Security, Armed Forces, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America