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201. Appetite for Destruction: The Military Counter-Revolution in Sudan

Author:
Dan Watson
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
The military coup d’état in Sudan on 25 October 2021 sent shockwaves across the region and through diplomatic circuits. Following the arrest of the civilian Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and several prominent senior officials from the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), demonstrators took to the streets across Khartoum. They were confronted by soldiers from the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitaries in the capital, with reports emerging of Central Reserve Police paramilitaries also being deployed (Human Rights Watch, 29 October 2021). Over 10 people have reportedly been killed by state forces thus far and over 160 wounded (Radio Dabanga, 29 October 2021; UN OCHA, 28 October 2021), with at least some victims uninvolved in the demonstrations (Eye Radio, 27 October 2021). Demonstrations have since spread across much of Sudan.
Topic:
Violence, Coup, Counterrevolution, Demonstrations, and Military
Political Geography:
Africa and Sudan

202. Mavi Vatan, the "Blue Homeland": the Origins, Influences and Limits of an Ambitious Doctrine for Turkey

Author:
Aurélien Denizeau
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Turkey’s activism in the Eastern Mediterranean now appears to be guided by an ambitious legal and geopolitical doctrine, based on the claim of a vast maritime domain – the “Blue Homeland” or Mavi Vatan in Turkish. Developed by admirals of Turkey’s Navy, who are aware of the strategic importance of the sea, this approach is influential among Turkey's military, political, economic, and intellectual elites. Although it presents certain contradictions with the traditional vision of the Islamo-conservatives, Mavi Vatan has been adopted by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, offering him the opportunity to consolidate his alliance with nationalist movements and to provide a legal framework for his action in Libya. However, the success of this doctrine also depends on Turkey's ability to modernize its naval forces, an effort that will require the maintenance of strong international partnerships.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nationalism, Navy, Grand Strategy, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Military
Political Geography:
Turkey and Mediterranean

203. The French Military's Perception of the Turkish Military and Turkey's Expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean

Author:
Aris Marghelis
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
In the summer of 2020, the Central and Eastern Mediterranean became the center of unusual tensions between France and Turkey. Given that these tensions were also military, which is uncommon for the two countries, the perception that the French military has of Turkey’s army and its doctrine is particularly relevant to address. From the interviews that were conducted with French officers, it appears that for the French military, 2016 and 2020 are two milestones in the evolution of both Turkish political and military Turkish attitudes. From 2016 onwards, the Syrian and Libyan conflicts uncovered diverging interests between France and Turkey, with military implications for France. In the same year, Turkish military behavior in the Eastern Mediterranean started shifting, but was at first seen as of little consequence. Additionally, the failed coup attempt against President R. T. Erdogan decreased the level and quality of communication and cooperation between both militaries. In 2020, Turkish aggressiveness openly manifested itself in the Eastern Mediterranean, including directly against France with the Courbet incident. This attitude was criticized by the interviewees who specified that such behavior, along with unilateral actions and faits accomplis, would not be tolerated in the future. Yet, it also appears that the French military show respect for the Turkish armed forces. The latter are generally accredited with professionalism, reliability, efficiency, and determination. The interviews revealed no sign of animosity by the French officers towards their Turkish counterparts: sometimes, even the opposite was detected.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, Army, and Military
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, France, and Mediterranean

204. The Impact of the Situation in Afghanistan on Regional Security in Central Asia

Author:
Arkadiusz Legieć
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
From the perspective of Central Asian states, the potential for further destabilisation of Afghanistan is seen as a significant regional transnational threat. It would make these countries more susceptible to influence, primarily from Russia, which bases its policy in the region on military power. The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan is already being used by Russia, China, and Turkey in propaganda as an example of the lack of American credibility, as well as that of European countries. This situation will limit the prospects for cooperation between the Central Asian republics and the U.S. and the EU in the future.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Destabilization, and Military
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Central Asia

205. The Impact of the Situation in Afghanistan on Military Missions in Africa

Author:
Jędrzej Czerep
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The Taliban victory in Afghanistan was enthusiastically received by some armed Al-Qaida-affiliated jihadist groups in Africa with whom they share a sense of fighting for a common cause. Countries participating in international military operations in Somalia and the Sahel are limiting their involvement because of the growing political cost. In the case of Somalia, the risk of Islamists seizing power has increased. In Mali, the likelihood of the extremists’ participation in ruling the country has grown. To prevent a repeat of the Afghanistan scenario, EU states and the U.S. will modify their military engagement.
Topic:
Taliban, Violent Extremism, Al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Military
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Africa, South Asia, Mali, and Sahel

206. North Korea's Foreign Policy Towards South Korea and the U.S.

Author:
Oskar Pietrewicz
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In recent months, North Korea has intensified missile tests, while signalling the possibility of resuming talks with South Korea and the U.S. These signals of openness to dialogue indicate that North Korea wants the next South Korean president, who will be elected in March 2022, to be favourable to the inter-Korean dialogue. In turn, the demonstration of military capabilities serves to strengthen North Korea’s position ahead of possible negotiations with the U.S. to convince it to ease sanctions. The difficult domestic situation will not persuade North Korea to take a more conciliatory stance in the talks, however.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Dialogue, and Military
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

207. Hostile Harbors: Taiwan’s Ports and PLA Invasion Plans

Author:
Ian Easton
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
The scale of an all-out Taiwan (Republic of China, ROC) invasion by the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) military—the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—defies human comprehension and would likely eclipse any historical comparison. In this important contribution to the field, Senior Director Ian Easton analyzes Chinese military studies frameworks and internal PLA documents to answer pressing questions that will help Taiwan and the United States both understand and better plan for potential crisis scenarios. He highlights the centrality of ROC port facilities—and Taiwan’s ability to defend them—in the PLA’s potential invasion plans for Taiwan, illustrating likely operational strategies explored by PLA leadership. In addition to postulating ports likely targeted in a PLA invasion, he provides recommendations that the Taiwanese government could undertake to ensure its port infrastructure security, as well as recommendations for the United States on how to be a supportive partner to Taiwan in that effort.
Topic:
Conflict, Port, Military, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

208. Australia and the growing reach of China’s military

Author:
Thomas Shugart
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
China’s recent military development constitutes the greatest expansion of maritime and aerospace power in generations and is most obviously seen in its expanding long-range missile force, bomber force, and modernising blue-water navy. While Australia’s defence interests and territorial integrity are largely unthreatened for now, a future Indo-Pacific dominated by China would present a grave possibility of military coercion by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. The prospect of Chinese military action against Australia remains remote. But China has the military and industrial potential to field a long-range power projection capacity that would dwarf anything Japan threatened Australia with during the Second World War.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, Maritime, Military, and Aerospace
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Australia

209. The Pandemic Situation in Myanmar is Getting Worse Under the Military Government

Author:
Khine Win
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Amid the ongoing military rule in Myanmar, the public health crisis has been reaching new heights. According to Khine Win, founder and director of Sandhi Governance Institute, hopes were high among citizens in Myanmar for a healthcare system that could aptly combat the COVID-19 pandemic upon the election of the NLD in November 2020. However, progress has been reversed and is yet stalled under the elongated military rule. Despite dire civil health and poverty predictions issued by the UNDP, World Food Programme, and other international organizations, the military government turned a blind eye to their warnings, exacerbating the ongoing health crisis. COVID-19 cases have been increasing exponentially, with the number of actual COVID-19 cases expected to be higher than official numbers. News that military rule is expected to continue into 2023 paints a dull future for the public health situation in Myanmar.
Topic:
Governance, Democracy, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Military
Political Geography:
Myanmar and Asia-Pacific

210. Implementing Australia’s nuclear submarine program

Author:
Andrew Nicholls, Jackson Dowie, and Marcus Hellyer
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
On 16 September 2021, the Australian Government announced that it would acquire a nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) capability with support from the UK and the US as the first measure of business under the AUKUS technology sharing partnership. At the same time, it announced that it had established the Nuclear-Powered Submarine Taskforce, which would devote 18 months to determining the ‘optimal pathway’ to establishing this new capability. The taskforce has its work cut out for it, and the signing of an initial nuclear information sharing agreement only two months after AUKUS was announced suggests things are moving fast. Nevertheless this new enterprise will be a massive undertaking and probably the largest and most complex endeavour Australia has embarked upon. The challenges, costs and risks will be enormous. It’s likely to be at least two decades and tens of billions of dollars in sunk costs before Australia has a useful nuclear-powered military capability. Many commentators have suggested that the work of the taskforce is primarily about making a recommendation on the choice of submarine—either the US Virginia class or the UK Astute class. That’s misleading on two counts. First, the most important decision isn’t so much about the submarine, but about the strategic partner most able to work with us on our new SSN capability. Second, Australia will need to make many choices—about the strategic partner, about the submarine design, about the build strategy, about schedule, and more. Those choices will involve hard prioritisation decisions about what’s most important. Is it capability, schedule, Australian industry content, or something else? This report examines the decision space available to the government. The most important decision is the choice of our primary strategic partner. While both the US and the UK will need to provide us with assistance regardless of which submarine design we choose, there’s no point picking a boat if its parent nation doesn’t have the capacity to assist us with all of the fundamental inputs to capability needed to deliver military effects, or its industrial base doesn’t have the capacity to deliver. While we shouldn’t pre-empt the work of the taskforce, initial analysis suggests that the US has more capacity to assist us. Even once we choose a partner, we still have some difficult choices about the submarine design. Do we prioritise schedule and build our partner’s current design, with the result that we’re left with an orphaned and outdated fleet? Do we wait to get into step with our partner’s next class, exacerbating the risk of a capability gap? Or do we start with the current design and transition later to the partner’s future design, with the result that we have multiple classes of boat in our small fleet? Another area of choice is the amount of modification we do to the design. While some modifications will be necessary due to Australia’s regulatory and safety regimes—unless we recognise our partner’s regulatory approaches as fit for purpose and accommodate ours to theirs—others will be discretionary. Every effort must be made to limit the changes, whether they’re motivated by capability or Australian industry content, as every change drives cost and schedule risk regardless of how well intentioned it is. A fundamental choice is the build strategy. The government has stated that the SSNs will be built in Adelaide; however, it hasn’t committed to a continuous build. A continuous-build approach (one driven by a schedule designed to replace the first boat after around 30 years with no break in production) is appealing to Australian industry and current and future workers but would face many challenges—boats would be delivered on an inefficient three- or even four-year drumbeat, driving up cost and increasing the capability gap. Alternatively, an ‘economic’ approach that focused on the most efficient possible approach would deliver capability faster but require massive annual spending and produce the prospect of a ‘valley of death’ at the end of production. Either approach replicates a nuclear-submarine production capability in Australia as our own sovereign cottage-industry version of what the UK and the US already have. Underpinning all of those choices is the issue of schedule. We’re facing the looming spectre of a submarine capability gap as the Collins-class fleet ages out. The government’s stated schedule, delivering at least the first boat by the late 2030s, is feasible, if optimistic, if we build all the boats in Australia. But that may be too late to avoid a capability gap. An alternative that could accelerate delivery would be to open up the aperture of what ‘built in Adelaide’ should look like. One approach we consider is to build the initial boats overseas to accelerate delivery but also to train Australian workers on a mature production line to avoid a ‘cold start’ to local production. But there are also options that approach this enterprise as the embodiment of our AUKUS and alliance partnerships rather than as a large, but traditional, construction project. This could involve a ‘JSF’ (Joint Strike Fighter) approach of feeding components into a joint submarine enterprise that Australia enters with our primary enterprise partner. Such a joint enterprise would span more than just construction and enable Australia to be a ‘first line’ sustainment hub for our AUKUS partners’ submarines as well as for our own. When we consider that just the maintenance of Australia’s SSNs will be likely to require more workforce than the Attack-class build and Collins-class full-cycle dockings combined, there are ways to deliver submarines faster, sustain sovereign capability, contribute to our partnerships and still create jobs that don’t involve assembling submarines here. And this can’t be stated clearly or often enough: successful transition isn’t just about delivering boats but all of the elements of the capability. So, the choice of boat and build approaches aren’t just matters of capability or industry but must be informed by broader inputs to capability. Perhaps the most important of those is the challenge of how the Navy ramps up its uniformed workforce; solving that problem is just as crucial as delivering boats on time. Again, AUKUS has much to offer here. Finally, we’ve provided an estimate of the cost of the enterprise. Such an exercise is inherently hazardous at this stage of the process, with so many assumptions still open and untested. The government has been open in stating that the SSN program will cost more than the Attack-class program, which would have cost around $56–57 billion in current-day constant dollars. We agree: at an absolute minimum, an eight-boat SSN program will cost around $70 billion constant (or $116 billion in out-turned dollars, which account for inflation). However, it’s highly likely that it will cost substantially more once the cost drivers are more clearly understood. Those include both the US and UK moving to bigger submarine designs, our choice of build strategy, and the broader support system and infrastructure needed to operate nuclear submarines. To channel Donald Rumsfeld, there are things we know we don’t know, and things we don’t know we don’t know; both will drive up the estimate.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Military
Political Geography:
Australia