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31. The Maritime Fulcrum of the Indo-Pacific: Indonesia and Malaysia Respond to China’s Creeping Expansion in the South China Sea

Author:
Scott Bentley
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
China now is attempting to expand its control to the southernmost extent of its nine-dash-line claim in the South China Sea, in waters ever closer to Indonesian and Malaysian shores. This area of the South China Sea, spanning from Indonesia’s Natuna Islands to the South Luconia Shoals, has greater strategic importance than the Spratly or Paracel Island chains farther to the north. Whereas the Spratlys have for centuries been regarded as “dangerous ground” and commercial mariners have avoided them, the vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs) connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans flow through this part of the southern South China Sea. Therefore, these areas are far more vital to international commerce and navigation than the dangerous grounds closer to China’s Spratly Islands outposts.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Armed Forces, Maritime, Commerce, and Expansion
Political Geography:
China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Asia, Indo-Pacific, and South China Sea

32. Rewriting the Future of America’s Maritime Industry to Compete with China

Author:
Michael Roberts
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
For decades, companies outside the United States have dominated the international commercial shipping and shipbuilding industries. At various times since World War II, Japan, Korea, and certain European countries have been able to leverage their export-driven manufacturing economies and government support to become world leaders in commercial shipbuilding and major players in international shipping. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has taken that strategy to a new level and now produces more than half the large commercial ships delivered annually, controls scores of seaports in dozens of foreign countries, and owns almost one-fifth of the global commercial fleet. American commercial shipbuilders and US flag shipping companies have long faced fierce headwinds in international markets and have seen support from the US government dwindle. The US reset its maritime policies in the 1990s when America was the sole superpower and the security benefits of a robust commercial maritime industry were in doubt. By the end of 2022, Americans owned only 3 percent of the 55,000 ships in the global commercial fleet, including just 178 large US flag cargo ships, 85 of which are committed to international trade (see tables 1 and 2 below for a breakdown of US and global commercial fleets). The emergence of the PRC as a challenger to America’s global leadership has forced sweeping changes in US policy and spending priorities to boost America’s economic and military security. This report recommends that the US reform its policies governing America’s commercial maritime industries because shipping and shipbuilding are core components of national power. These industries remain especially crucial in the twenty-first century, as international trade is more important to a healthy American economy today than ever before. Yet Americans have almost no control over the maritime logistics systems that feed the US economy. The pandemic-induced supply chain crisis showed how much damage can be done when those systems break down.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, National Security, Maritime, Industry, Domestic Policy, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

33. Fighting into the Bastions: Getting Noisier to Sustain the US Undersea Advantage

Author:
Bryan Clark and Timothy A. Walton
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Airpower enthusiasts concluded after World War I that “the bomber will always get through.”1 Fast, high-flying aircraft seemed to hold a decisive edge over air defenses and offered commanders the assurance they could attack targets deep inside an opponent’s territory. But airpower advocates’ spirits were quickly dampened during World War II by the advent of interceptor fighters, radar-guided artillery, and electromagnetic warfare (EW), which together demonstrated that bombers could be stopped—often with devastating results. Air forces adapted, adding escort fighters, radar jammers and decoys, and higher-altitude bombers to sustain their ability to strike behind enemy lines. During the Cold War, this move-countermove competition continued. New surface- and air-launched missiles targeted bombers, and countries developed specialized aircraft and weapons to suppress and destroy enemy air defenses or use stealth to avoid detection and targeting altogether. Today, the US submarine force faces a similar challenge. The US fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) has long been considered an asymmetric advantage against potential adversaries like the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia, which lacked robust and effective anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. Relying on this advantage, the US Department of Defense (DoD) has increasingly relied on SSNs to compensate for the impact of improved air defenses on the ability of bombers and strike fighters to execute attacks.2 However, the unfailing ability of US SSNs to reach their targets is eroding as emerging technologies and weapons proliferation combine in new approaches to ASW that could neutralize America’s undersea advantage. During the last decade, the PRC and Russian Federation began fortifying their undersea defenses in the South and East China Seas and Arctic Ocean, respectively. Leveraging geographic constraints, US adversaries have instrumented these bastions with networks of fixed and mobile acoustic and non-acoustic sensors, complemented by aircraft and ships capable of pouncing on contacts or deploying dense mine barriers.3 Improved adversary defenses could degrade or defeat US undersea operations, preventing US submarines from conducting critical missions such as sinking a Chinese invasion fleet or tracking Russian ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). To sustain its offensive undersea advantage, the US Navy will need to take some lessons from air warfare and begin supporting submarines with systems designed to suppress or destroy enemy undersea defenses. This imperative will fundamentally shift the paradigm for US submarine operations from “alone and unafraid” to “it’s all about team.” Moreover, the emergence of new generations of capable long-range active sonars will demand that the US undersea force increasingly rely on jamming and deception to counter enemy sensors, much as their counterparts already do above the water. The US submarine force will need to learn how to use noise, rather than avoid it. The Navy should pursue four lines of effort, outlined below, to sustain its offensive undersea advantage. Except for features to be incorporated into the next-generation nuclear-powered attack submarine, the SSN(X), the concepts and capabilities proposed in this report leverage mature or maturing technologies and can be fielded within five years. Implementing these recommendations will require the US Navy to refine its use cases for offensive undersea warfare to use available uncrewed vehicle technologies, rather than continue pursuing purpose-built systems that may take a decade or more to be fielded.4
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

34. The battle for the Indian Ocean: How the EU and India can strengthen maritime security

Author:
Frédéric Grare and Manisha Reuter
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Over the last decade, China has gradually expanded its presence in the Indian Ocean, combining its military modernisation and cooperation with partners with active diplomacy towards the island and coastal states of the region. China’s presence and capabilities threaten the freedom and influence of other actors in the area, including India and the EU. Europe’s key maritime trade routes to Asia run through the Indian Ocean, making the security of the region and freedom of navigation crucial for European interests. Many of the island and coastal states in the Indian Ocean have limited economic resources to exercise effective control at sea and are therefore dependent on extra-regional powers. As part of their approach to respond to China’s growing assertiveness in the region, the EU and India should jointly establish a regional maritime capacity building programme for island and coastal states in the Indian Ocean.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Maritime, Trade, Modernization, and Military
Political Geography:
China, Europe, India, and Indian Ocean

35. Naval rearmament, European perspectives

Author:
Nicolas Mazzucchi
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The increase in international crises, particularly since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and the continuing rhetoric of future Sino-American confrontation in the Indo-Pacific, are resulting in a period of profound geopolitical upheaval, with rising maritime and naval challenges. Several trends are thus interlinked, between the strengthening of the transatlantic nexus, the continuous increase in the importance of the Indo-Pacific and the wish for strategic rebalancing on the part of the countries of the South. Faced with these multiple challenges, underscored by an unprecedented trend in naval rearmament, the European Union is seeking a new strategic-military balance at sea. Between the strengthening of the European Union-NATO link, the resolve of member states to invest more in their naval assets and the need to work to defend and enforce respect for international law, the European Union must show determination and also support this effort to rearm. The various institutional frameworks, as well as cooperation formats, have meant that defence equipment projects have been developed in a more flexible way in recent years, notably with the progressive maturity of the European Defence Fund. Interoperability, joint operations and new capabilities are needed jointly, so that Europe can continue to play its part in the global naval game.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Navy, Maritime, Crisis Management, and Armament
Political Geography:
Europe

36. European Union’s Role in the Maritime Security in Africa

Author:
António Gonçalves Alexandre
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:
Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:
The European Union depends on safe oceans for economic development, free trade, transport, energy security, tourism and a good marine environment. Maritime security stresses the importance of protecting the maritime domain from numerous threats, including disputes between states and various forms of transnational crime, but also the need to ensure a good order at sea, which is mandatory for the wellbeing and prosperity of the citizens. This paper aims to analyze the global maritime security production strategy followed by the European Union in Africa in the last decade and how it has influenced the protection of its member states’ interests in two of the most relevant maritime regions – the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. We argue that the EU has, in recent years, become a relevant global coproducer of maritime security in Africa and has even sought to strengthen its role in this area.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Africa, Horn of Africa, and Gulf of Guinea

37. China’s Use of Force in Territorial Disputes: Discontinuities Between Land and Sea

Author:
Benjamin Jebb
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:
School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:
When does China use force to settle territorial disputes? This paper leverages data from the Correlates of War project and Stanford’s Mapping Interstate Territorial Conflict repository to demonstrate that China takes different approaches to settling terrestrial and sea-based disputes. While China has tacitly accepted the territorial status quo and generally used force only after a rival challenged extant terrestrial boundaries, it has initiated revisions to the territorial status quo in the maritime domain. This paper contends that China takes different approaches to its terrestrial disagreements and maritime disputes due to the Chinese Communist Party’s internal risk calculus. While land-based disputes can stoke unmanageable levels of escalation, factors specific to the maritime domain are more likely to keep militarized incidents contained.
Topic:
Security, Territorial Disputes, Maritime, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China and Asia

38. An Australian maritime strategy: resourcing the Royal Australian Navy

Author:
Jennifer Parker
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Australia is a maritime nation. The sheer scale of our sovereign maritime territory and responsibilities, our dependence on maritime trade for our prosperity and the increasing value of activity in the maritime environment must all be recognised in our maritime strategy. In a highly interconnected world, we face fundamental vulnerabilities from the realities of our geostrategic situation. In this report, the author argues that the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) lacks the resources to adequately protect Australia’s vast maritime interests. This concern isn’t unique to our time: maritime strategists have long lamented that, despite being uniquely an island, a continent and a nation, Australia struggles to understand the central importance of a maritime strategy to our defence and security. The underappreciation of Australia’s dependence on the maritime domain and that domain’s significance for the nation’s prosperity and security has consistently produced a RAN that’s overlooked and under-resourced. In this report, the author examines whether the bipartisan thesis of a structural change in our strategic circumstances, as articulated in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR), also requires a structural change and an expansion of the RAN. The author argues that both are needed, through both an increased surface-combatant fleet that’s designed on the principle of a balanced fleet and a review of the RAN’s structure. Such a structural review should include consideration of bold changes, including reconsideration of a fleet auxiliary, a coastguard or forward basing of assets to support the workforce requirements of an expanded fleet. This report looks mainly at the structure of the surface-combatant fleet, noting the recent finalisation of the surface-combatant fleet review. In the light of the Australian Government’s consideration of that review’s recommendations, the report makes eight recommendations for government consideration. The author also argues that the status quo of 11–12 major surface combatants is insufficient for Australia. That was the case even when the force was structured around the concept of Australia having 10 years warning time of military conflict. That problem has become more acute today, given the new era of strategic competition and the capability and size of our potential adversaries, in particular China, as recognised in the DSR. The report recommends that a major surface-combatant fleet structure of 16–20 ships is needed.
Topic:
National Security, Armed Forces, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Australia

39. Counter-piracy in the Gulf of Guinea must not overlook local struggle and suffering

Author:
Hans Lucht
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Climate change, illegal fishing, and environmental damage all contribute to the lack of security that coastal populations in the Gulf of Guinea suffer from. To Denmark, as well as several other European countries, the Gulf of Guinea remains an important region for commercial shipping. To enhance responses to piracy and crime at sea it is necessary to take a holistic approach which also considers the lack of opportunities for making a legal and sustainable living in the region.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Piracy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Denmark, and Gulf of Guinea

40. China Maritime Report No. 33: China's Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent: Organizational, Operational, and Strategic Implications

Author:
David C. Logan
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
China’s development of a credible sea-based deterrent has important implications for the PLAN, for China’s nuclear strategy, and for U.S.-China strategic stability. For the PLAN, the need to protect the SSBN force may divert resources away from other missions; it may also provide justification for further expansion of the PLAN fleet size. For China’s nuclear strategy and operations, the SSBN force may increase operational and bureaucratic pressures for adopting a more forward-leaning nuclear strategy. For U.S.-China strategic stability, the SSBN force will have complex effects, decreasing risks that Chinese decisionmakers confront use-or-lose escalation pressures, making China less susceptible to U.S. nuclear threats and intimidation and therefore perceiving lower costs to conventional aggression, and potentially introducing escalation risks from conventional-nuclear entanglement to the maritime domain.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Navy, Maritime, Deterrence, Submarines, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America