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1. Regulating and Harmonizing Biometric Ecosystems: Addressing thew Full Spectrum of Risks Using Global Safety Models and Controls

Author:
Pam Dixon
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
The spectrum of biometric technologies today is expansive, encompassing many types, or modalities, of biometrics, from face recognition to iris to fingerprint to DNA, used singly or in combination. Biometrics are a significant category of technology; at least 104 countries use fingerprint and/or iris as part of national ID systems,** and uses for biometrics extend well beyond the national ID system context in both private and public sector use.*** Increasingly understood as a technology of concern based on scientific data, there is a growing body of law and regulations seeking to mitigate the risks associated with biometric technologies. Current approaches to biometric regulation thus far, however, have been insufficiently constructed, and do not address the full ecosyetm of biometric modalities and the risks that can rise from them.
Topic:
Regulation, Ecology, Biology, and Public Safety
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. Assessing national laws for the implementation of CITES

Author:
Pascal Blickle, Angela Min Yi Hou, and Laura Störi
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Trade and Economic Integration, The Graduate Institute (IHEID)
Abstract:
This TradeLab project analyses the domestic legislation of 14 developing countries in implementing the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). The present memo summarises the main findings across the 14 Parties. This memo finds that most assessed Parties have implemented the CITES' core requirements, and recommendations provided in the resolutions of the Conference of the Parties (CoP). The project identifies a minority of three African countries for which the CITES Secretariat may wish to review their Category 1 status. These Parties fall short of all or several of the following elements: they failed to appropriately designate Management and Scientific Authorities by law, circumscribe the Authorities' tasks and responsibilities, or – by exclusively regulating native species – appear not to comprehensively cover species listed in the Convention's three Appendices.
Topic:
Environment, International Trade and Finance, Science and Technology, Trade, Ecology, and Biology
Political Geography:
Africa and Global Focus

3. Scenarios for an impact assessment of global bioeconomy strategies: results from a co-design process

Author:
Ruth Delzeit, Tobias Heimann, Franziska Schunemann, and Mareike Soder
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
The replacement of fossil resources with renewable biomass in a bioeconomy is seen as a major contribution to climate change mitigation. This transformation will affect all members of society, making it crucial to consider the views of different stakeholders to ensure a socially acceptable transition towards a sustainable bioeconomy. To explore potential outcomes of bioeconomy strategies assuming different future pathways, a scenario analysis is a tool to inform decision-makers about policy impacts and trade-offs. The inter- and transdisciplinary research project “BioNex – The future of the biomass nexus” is the first project to develop bioeconomy scenarios together with stakeholders from politics, industry, and civil society in an iterative co-design process. As a result, three storylines describing diverging potential global futures are developed and quantified: Towards sustainability, business as usual, and towards resource depletion. The futures are driven by different assumptions on climate policy, cropland expansion, productivity growth in agriculture, prices of fossil energy, and consumption behaviour. Additionally, in the co-design process, three bioeconomy policies are developed: policy as usual, stronger development of the bioeconomy, and no policies. Besides presenting the results of the stakeholder workshops, this paper evaluates the strengths and shortcomings of a stakeholder approach in terms of policy-oriented research. According to the experience made within this study, it provides valuable insights for researchers and funding authorities they can use to optimise the employment of stakeholder-based research approaches.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Economy, Biology, and Models
Political Geography:
Global Focus

4. DART-BIO: A technical description

Author:
Ruth Delzeit, Tobias Heimann, Franziska Schunemann, and Mareike Soder
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
The goal of this technical paper is to present in a transparent way a detailed description of the DART-BIO model – the bioeconomy and land use version of the DART model. Key feature of the DART-BIO model is the explicit representation of the vegetable oil industry and the biofuel sector. The paper describes the construction and aggregation of the database used for the DART-BIO model. Further the theoretical structure of the model is elaborated. Thereby, crucial assumptions, elasticities and parameters embedded in the model are presented.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Oil, Biology, and Farming
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5. Technology Factsheet: Synthetic Biology

Author:
Colin O'Leary
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Synthetic biology (sometimes referred to as “SynBio”) is broadly defined as the application of engineering principles to biology, and in practice, refers to emerging technology that allows living organisms to be modified to serve user-defined purposes. While traditional biotechnology involves the transfer of smaller amounts of genetic material from one biological species to another, synthetic biology will permit the inten- tional construction of an entire organism.1 It has the potential to allow scientists to design living organisms distinct from any found in nature and to redesign existing organisms to have novel or enhanced qualities.2 The use cases of synthetic biology range from developing new therapeutics and vaccines for infectious disease to manufacturing novel biomaterials, biosensors, and biofuels. As scientists better understand biological systems, the potential applications of SynBio are anticipated to expand in scale and scope. The continued growth of the bioeconomy—defined as the “production, utilization and conservation of biological resources, including related knowledge, science, technology, and innovation, to provide information, products, processes and services across all economic sectors”—is giving space for synthetic biology technology to become a more significant part of the overall economic landscape.3 As with any technology that has a high potential for impact, SynBio presents a variety of pronounced opportunities, as well as risks. As the technology continues to mature and the number of market-ready applications grows, it is important for policymakers to consider how to promote the large number of opportunities the technology presents in the space of health and medicine, energy production, environmental recovery, food production, and more, while simultaneously protecting the public from foreseeable negative impli- cations and risks, such as weaponization, consumer safety, and ecological stability. Since synthetic biology bears significant similarities to previous biotechnology research on genetical- ly-modified organisms and recombinant DNA, existing regulations in the United States place the majority of synthetic biology products into the current biotechnology regulatory framework. As SynBio becomes more prominent though, it will be important for regulatory schemes to uniquely target the technology and its implications beyond those captured through biotechnology frameworks. Policymakers must continue to engage in the progression of the technology, understanding how regulation and governance must evolve to ensure the public can realize the opportunities, while being protected from the risks.
Topic:
Health, Science and Technology, and Biology
Political Geography:
Global Focus

6. Synthetic Biology and the Risks of Misuse

Author:
Gigi Gronvall
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Synthetic biology is a relatively new scientific field that aims to make biology easier to engineer and, thus, more useful. It is already delivering on its enormous promise, yielding FDA-approved chimeric antigen receptor (CAR) T-cell cancer therapeutics, as well as non-medical products such as laboratory-produced fabrics, flavorings, adhesives, and detergents.[1][2] Despite such progress, however, the rapid growth and democratization of synthetic biology — almost all of which is taking place in the private sector — brings security challenges. Like all areas of the life sciences, it is “dual-use” and able to be exploited. To make misuse more limited and difficult to en‐ force, the United States will need to partner with other nations, international organizations, and international businesses to govern areas of the synthetic biology field...
Topic:
Science and Technology, Biology, and Medicine
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

7. Biological Risks in India: Perspectives and Analysis

Author:
Shruti Sharma
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
India faces a host of biological risk factors. Drawing lessons from the coronavirus pandemic and prior biological disasters, India’s government should pursue new safety protocols and develop new institutions to manage future biological risk. Infectious diseases such as COVID-19, the disease caused by the novel coronavirus; severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS); Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS); and the diseases caused by the Ebola, Nipah, and Zika viruses have exposed countries’ susceptibility to naturally occurring biological threats. Even though scientists from multiple countries concluded that the virus responsible for the coronavirus pandemic shifted naturally from an animal source to a human host,1 the international community should not ignore the possibility of pathogens escaping accidentally from research labs and threats of deliberate manipulation to create more dangerous bioweapons. India is especially vulnerable to such infections because of its geographical position, large population, low healthcare spending, minimal expenditure on research that benefits public health, weak coordination between central and state health authorities, limited involvement of private actors, poor awareness of biosecurity, and the rickety state of public health infrastructure. Most recently, COVID-19 has revealed the deep fault lines in India’s public health infrastructure, including a shortage of healthcare workers, lack of trained epidemiologists, scarcity of medical equipment, poor access to healthcare facilities in rural areas, and inefficient disease reporting and surveillance in most states. The pandemic should therefore be a wake-up call for India to assess gaps in its public health infrastructure and divert its resources toward the healthcare sector to prepare itself for both natural and man-made biological emergencies. Like any country, India faces three major biological threats: naturally occurring infections in humans or animals, or agricultural infestations; infections arising from accidental release of pathogens into the environment; and possible outbreaks caused by deliberate weaponization of dangerous pathogens that affect humans, animals, or crops. These threats—either alone or together—will force India to strengthen its capacity to detect and respond to them.
Topic:
Health, Biology, and Non-Traditional Threats
Political Geography:
South Asia and India