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251. La incidencia de la seguridad marítima en el golfo de Guinea sobre España

Author:
Francisco Delgado Urrutia
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Este artículo trata de demostrar que la situación de inseguridad en el golfo de Guinea constituye un problema de importancia para la seguridad de la Unión Europea, y más concretamente para la seguridad de España. En este sentido, se defiende que la forma en la que la Unión se ha aproximado a este problema de seguridad, no ha sido ni es el adecuado ya que, a pesar de reconocer la situación de inseguridad en esta región, no se han aplicado los mismos parámetros a la hora de evaluar la necesidad de implementar una operación militar en el Cuerno de África y en el golfo de Guinea. El resultado ha sido el mantenimiento de la operación “Atalanta” en una zona sin ataques piratas desde 2019 hasta finales del 2023, y la ausencia de una misión similar en el golfo de Guinea.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Piracy, European Union, Maritime, Cocaine, and Fisheries
Political Geography:
Europe and Spain

252. ¡Cómo hemos cambiado! La respuesta política de la Unión Europea ante la invasión rusa de Ucrania

Author:
Mercedes Guinea Llorente
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
La Unión Europea se ha visto fuertemente afectada por el conflicto derivado de la invasión rusa de Ucrania de 2022, que no solo amenaza su seguridad, sino que cuestiona su propio modelo. En este artículo analizamos los elementos de innovación que entraña la respuesta de la UE a la guerra en Ucrania. En una primera dimensión, estudiamos los aspectos institucionales relativos a las politics, donde puede verificarse un desarrollo de la PESC. En segundo lugar, analizamos las políticas formuladas para incidir en el conflicto, tanto las actuaciones políticas contra Rusia, como las medidas de apoyo a Ucrania. Se detectan muchos elementos de innovación que muestran una gran ambición, compromiso y determinación por parte de los Estados miembros que atestigua que son conscientes de que en Ucrania se juega su futuro.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

253. Evolution of Baltic Security: Analysis of Threats and Strategic Responses

Author:
Ricardo Rodríguez Cobos
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
This article explores the evolution of security in the Baltic region, focusing first on Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and analysing the key challenges posed by the Russian Federation since the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent security measures taken by NATO through the Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) mission. It details the strategic responses of the Baltic states, highlighting their military modernisation, defence cooperation with NATO and growing reliance on multinational exercises. The article also examines the role of Poland as a key player in NATO's eastern flank defence and the integration of Finland and Sweden into NATO, emphasising their contribution to strengthening the Baltic and Arctic security architecture. The analysis concludes with an examination of the multiple threats that characterise the region's security environment, underlining the importance of coherent multinational defence strategies.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Deterrence, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Europe and Baltic States

254. Security and Eastern Enlargement: Bridging the Gap for Wartime EU Accession

Author:
Monika Sus and Michał Matlak
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
Given the unprecedented situation of wartime accession and the significant security implications of Ukraine’s EU membership for the Union and its Eastern neighbourhood, the EU should consider aligning the enlargement process with its broader security policy toward the candidate country. Failure to do so risks stalling the enlargement agenda due to unresolved security challenges. While some experts argue that linking security and enlargement policies could further complicate an already complex negotiation process, the opposite needs to be discussed. This Policy Brief proposes three institutional ideas that would facilitate integrating security concerns into the enlargement process without risking prolonging it. This includes examining the enlargement methodology, better collaboration between relevant Directorates-General (DGs), commissioners responsible for security, defence and enlargement, and the European External Action Service, as well as advancing the debate about the operationalisation of Art 42.7 to provide Ukraine with security guarantees in coordination with NATO.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Russia-Ukraine War, and Enlargement
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

255. Beyond China's Black Box: Five Trends Shaping Beijing’s Foreign and Security Policy Decision-Making Under Xi Jinping

Author:
Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
China’s foreign and security policymaking apparatus is often described as a metaphorical black box about which analysts know little. That is true to an extent, but at the same time, it is possible to develop a better understanding of the people, institutions, processes, and pressures that go into making China’s policies toward the world during Xi’s “new era,” that is, his time as the country’s top leader. This report pursues that objective by identifying five major trends mostly internal to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) party-state system that shape its foreign and security policymaking. In addition, the paper describes the effects that each trend generates, from bureaucratic incentives to behavioral patterns. The first trend is personalization of the system around Xi. It reduces the influence of various interest groups and therefore the need to bargain with and among them, raises the prospect of groupthink among the loyalists Xi has surrounded himself with, and potentially increases the importance of achieving certain goals for China on Xi’s watch. In addition, Xi’s centrality creates a major management bottleneck that could hamper the system during even brief absences. The second trend is empowering the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over the state. That trend has made more officials into policy-implementers rather than policymakers, even on issues below the level of strategy. It has also increased central demands for ideological activities, such as Xi Jinping Thought study sessions. At the same time, while the leadership wants to improve coordination and might be making some progress, it stops short of actions that could allow government organs to coordinate horizontally if doing so might plausibly jeopardize the center’s control. The third trend is domestic policy headwinds and the search for alternative forms of political legitimacy for the CCP. This creates two contradictory pressures: China’s reaching out and trying to improve ties with the world, and its turn to an assertive and at times even aggressive form of nationalism to counteract stalling economic growth. It also dents the power and influence China gained through its rapid rise and its role as a massive market driving global economic growth. The fourth trend is further elevation of regime security over other concerns. This trend negatively affects Beijing’s ties with foreign countries by worsening the experience of foreigners visiting and living in China, exporting repressive political ideas and techniques to the world, and complicating how China’s foreign and security bureaucracy interacts with its counterparts. The fifth and final trend is diplomatic and military assertiveness and seeking an active global leadership role, which feeds a self-reinforcing cycle of growing tensions, requires PRC diplomats to shoehorn any activities into Xi’s marquee frameworks, and leads Beijing to build out structures of an alternative international order. Examining these trends helps illuminate the macro pressures shaping China’s foreign and security policy decision-making. Still, aspects of how the party-state makes decisions about its foreign and security policies—“known unknowns” —remain particularly opaque. These include information flows to senior leaders, the dynamic among Xi and his top advisors, and the structure and frequency of important meetings. More knowledge in those areas might shed light on larger questions related to whether there are informal constraints on Xi’s power and how Xi is thinking about eventual transfer of power.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Xi Jinping, and Decision-Making
Political Geography:
China and Asia

256. AI and the Evolution of Biological National Security Risks: Capabilities, Thresholds, and Interventions

Author:
Bill Drexel and Caleb Withers
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Not long after COVID-19 gave the world a glimpse of the catastrophic potential of biological events, experts began warning that rapid advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) could augur a world of bioterrorism, unprecedented superviruses, and novel targeted bioweapons. These dire warnings have risen to the highest levels of industry and government, from the CEOs of the world's leading AI labs raising alarms about new technical capabilities for would-be bioterrorists, to Vice President Kamala Harris’s concern that AI-enabled bioweapons “could endanger the very existence of humanity.”1 If true, such developments would expose the United States to unprecedented catastrophic threats well beyond COVID-19’s scope of destruction. But assessing the degree to which these concerns are warranted—and what to do about them—requires weighing a range of complex factors, including: The history and current state of American biosecurity The diverse ways in which AI could alter existing biosecurity risks Which emerging technical AI capabilities would impact these risks Where interventions today are needed This report considers these factors to provide policymakers with a broad understanding of the evolving intersection of AI and biotechnology, along with actionable recommendations to curb the worst risks to national security from biological threats. The sources of catastrophic biological risks are varied. Historically, policymakers have underappreciated the risks posed by the routine activities of well-intentioned scientists, even as the number of high-risk biosecurity labs and the frequency of dangerous incidents—perhaps including COVID-19 itself—continue to grow. State actors have traditionally been a source of considerable biosecurity risk, not least the Soviet Union’s shockingly large bioweapons program. But the unwieldiness and imprecision of bioweapons has meant that states remain unlikely to field large-scale biological attacks in the near term, even though the U.S. State Department expresses concerns about the potential bioweapons capabilities of North Korea, Iran, Russia, and China. On the other hand, nonstate actors—including lone wolves, terrorists, and apocalyptic groups—have an unnerving track record of attempting biological attacks, but with limited success due to the intrinsic complexity of building and wielding such delicate capabilities. Today, fast-moving advancements in biotechnology—independent of AI developments—are changing many of these risks. A combination of new gene editing techniques, gene sequencing methods, and DNA synthesis tools is opening a new world of possibilities in synthetic biology for greater precision in genetic manipulation and, with it, a new world of risks from the development of powerful bioweapons and biological accidents alike. Cloud labs, which conduct experiments on others’ behalf, could enable nonstate actors by allowing them to outsource some of the experimental expertise that has historically acted as a barrier to dangerous uses. Though most cloud labs screen orders for malicious activity, not all do, and the constellation of existing bioweapons norms, conventions, and safeguards leaves open a range of pathways for bad actors to make significant progress in acquiring viable bioweapons. But experts’ opinions on the overall state of U.S. biosecurity range widely, especially with regard to fears of nonstate actors fielding bioweapons. Those less concerned contend that even if viable paths to building bioweapons exist, the practicalities of constructing, storing, and disseminating them are far more complex than most realize, with numerous potential points of failure that concerned parties either fail to recognize or underemphasize. They also point to a lack of a major bioattacks in recent decades, despite chronic warnings. A more pessimistic camp points to experiments that have demonstrated the seeming ease of successfully constructing powerful viruses using commercially available inputs, and seemingly diminishing barriers to the knowledge and technical capabilities needed to create bioweapons. Less controversial is the insufficiency of U.S. biodefenses to adequately address large-scale biological threats, whether naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberate. Despite COVID-19’s demonstration of the U.S. government’s inability to contain the effects of a major outbreak, the nation has made limited progress in mitigating the likelihood and potential harm of another, more dangerous biological catastrophe. New AI capabilities may reshape the risk landscape for biothreats in several ways. AI is enabling new capabilities that might, in theory, allow advanced actors to optimize bioweapons for more precise effects, such as targeting specific genetic groups or geographies. Though such capabilities remain speculative, if realized they would dramatically alter states’ incentives to use bioweapons for strategic ends. Instead of risking their own militaries’ or populations’ health with the unwieldy weapons, states could sabotage other nations’ food security or incapacitate enemies with public health crises from which they would be unlikely to rebound. Relatedly, the same techniques could create superviruses optimized for transmissibility and lethality, which may considerably expand the destructive potential of bioweapons. Tempering these fears, however, are several technical challenges that scientists would need to overcome—if they can be solved at all. The most pressing concern for biological risks related to AI stems from tools that may soon be able to accelerate the procurement of biological agents by nonstate actors. Recent studies have suggested that foundation models may soon be able to help accelerate bad actors’ ability to acquire weaponizable biological agents, even if the degree to which these AI tools can currently help them remains marginal.2 Of particular concern are AI systems’ budding abilities to help troubleshoot where experiments have gone wrong, speeding the design-build-test-learn feedback loop that is essential to developing working biological agents. If made more effective, emerging AI tools could provide a boon to would-be bioweapons creators by more dynamically providing some of the knowledge needed to produce and use bioweapons, though such actors would still face other significant hurdles to bioweapons development that are often underappreciated. AI could also impact biological risks in other ways. Technical faults in AI tools could fail to constrain foundation models from relaying hazardous biological information to potential bad actors, or inadvertently encourage researchers to pursue promising medicinal agents with unexpected negative side effects. Using AI to create more advanced automated labs could expose these labs to many of the risks of automation that have historically plagued other complex automated systems, and make it easier for nonspecialists to concoct biological agents (depending upon the safety mechanisms that automated labs institute). Finally, heavy investment in companies and nations seeking to capitalize on AI’s potential for biotechnology could be creating competition dynamics that prioritize speed over safety. These risks are particularly acute in relation to China, where a variety of other factors shaping the country’s biotech ecosystem also further escalate risks of costly accidents.
Topic:
Security, National Security, Biosecurity, Artificial Intelligence, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

257. The Chinese Migrant Workers in Indonesia: A Contested Security Issue

Author:
Ali Maksum
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
The influx of Chinese migrant workers in Indonesia has become a contentious debate and is perceived publicly as a threat. Chinese migrant workers are accused of seizing local occupational employment amidst high local unemployment. The government has repeatedly told people that Chinese workers are not a threat. In fact, several issues involving Chinese workers have arisen, for example, related to residence permits, involvement in smuggling, involvement in crime, even suspicion that Chinese workers were members of security forces. This article examines two competing representations of Chinese migrant workers in Indonesia. First, a public representation which is negative and strongly attempts to securitize Chinese migrant workers. Second, the government representation that views Chinese migrant workers in a more positive light and that acts as a form of counter-securitization. The paper argues that the failure of securitization of Chinese migrant workers by the public is due to staunch counter-securitization carried out on a massive scale by the government through political apparatus, mainstream media and social media influencers.
Topic:
Security, Smuggling, Labor Market, Migrant Workers, and Securitization
Political Geography:
China, Indonesia, and Southeast Asia

258. India’s Strategic Choices in the Multipolar World

Author:
Surendra Kumar Yadawa
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
The post-World War II landscape underwent a seismic shift, crystallising into a bipolar structure with the US-led West facing off against the Soviet Union, instigating the Cold War. However, the USSR's collapse in 1991 shattered this bipolarity, ushering in an era of American dominance (unipolarity). Yet, this once unassailable US-led global order is undergoing rapid contraction. In its wake, a fresh paradigm is unfolding as novel power centres coalesce to address shared dissatisfactions. Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran forge convergences, beckoning others to unite against US-led supremacy. Astonishingly, Saudi Arabia aligns with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as a dialogue partner, relegating its erstwhile oil-for-security doctrine to antiquity. Simultaneously, the Brazilian President advocates terminating dollar supremacy. In a bold affront, Russia challenges the US world order through its Ukrainian incursion. Notably, Emmanuel Macron declares Taiwan beyond the West's scope, potentially puncturing American hegemony. This paper fervently explores how the burgeoning multipolar world order engenders arenas for regional powers, scrutinising the prospects and hurdles that confront New Delhi as it navigates India’s foreign policy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Cold War, History, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

259. Lessons from battlefield Ukraine: With Ukraine’s former defense minister Oleksii Reznikov

Author:
Oleksii Reznikov, Mariana Budjeryn, Carol Saivetz, and Elizabeth Wood
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Lessons from battlefield Ukraine: A conversation with Ukraine’s former defense minister Oleksii Reznikov: Thursday, October 17th, 2024. Speaker: Oleksii Reznikov, Ukraine’s former defense minister, led Ukraine’s defense establishment in the lead up to Russia’s full-scale invasion and during the first year and a half of the war. Mr. Reznikov will discuss the successes and challenges of Ukraine’s defense effort, the role of technology and uncrewed systems, and the evolution of the battlefield in the Russo-Ukrainian war. Discussant: Mariana Budjeryn, PhD, is a senior research associate with the Project on Managing the Atom (MTA) at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. She is the author of "Inheriting the Bomb: The Collapse of the USSR and the Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine." Co-Chairs: Carol Saivetz is a senior advisor in the MIT Security Studies Program. She is the author and contributing co-editor of books and articles on Soviet and now Russian foreign policy issues. Elizabeth Wood is the Ford International Professor of History at MIT. She is the author most recently of "Roots of Russia's War in Ukraine," as well as articles on Vladimir Putin, right-wing populism in Russia and Turkey, and more.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Ukraine

260. Less Than a State

Author:
Sean Lee
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
Without a new framework that ensures true sovereignty and security for a future Palestinian state, the two-state solution will remain a farce
Topic:
Security, Sovereignty, State, Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, and Two-State Solution
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine