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32. The European Green Deal, Three Years On: Acceleration, Erosion or Fragmentation?
- Author:
- Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega and Diana-Paula Gherasim
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
- Abstract:
- The European Green Deal (EGD) is the single most defining policy initiative of the von der Leyen Commission. Since its publication in December 2019, it has become the European Union’s (EU) new raison d’être: protecting the planet and Europeans from environmental degradation, through a holistic approach to the energy transition, while promoting sustainable growth and a just transition with no social group or territory left behind. The credibility of the EGD was secured by the European Climate Law, which makes the objectives of climate-neutrality by 2050 and a reduction of at least 55% in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030 legally binding at the EU level. This has given a strong mandate to the European Commission (EC) to propose an overhaul of European energy and climate policies. The EC has lived up to the task remarkably, resolutely sticking to an accelerated policy and legislative timeline, featuring around 30 strategies and action plans, in addition to emblematic, coherent legislative packages like Fit for 55. The European Parliament has also positioned itself as a key stakeholder, finding consensus on overall targets and objectives. While all Member States (MSs) finally subscribed to the EGD ambition and agenda, they remain torn between a discourse that is largely supportive of the energy transition, but which in reality suffers from insufficient implementation efforts and mounting difficulties. Three years since the EGD set the direction of travel for the EU for the next 30 years, the EU finds itself in the midst of a storm not seen since World War II, coming just after it successfully weathered the Covid-19 pandemic. The war in Ukraine is a tectonic game changer with profound implications that are yet to be fully grasped. For energy and climate policies, these new realities require reviewing many assumptions about the energy transition, energy security, social acceptance, economic competitiveness, and hence, decarbonization strategies and policies going forward.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, European Union, Gas, Fossil Fuels, Nuclear Energy, Green Deal, and Energy
- Political Geography:
- Europe
33. New Perspectives for Nuclear Energy in the EU
- Author:
- Maciej Zaniewicz and Zuzanna Nowak
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- EU countries opposing nuclear energy, mainly Austria and Germany, are trying to limit its development in the Union by using the dispute over the details of the “green taxonomy”. The Russian aggression against Ukraine, however, has strengthened the arguments of supporters of this technology. They present nuclear energy as a way to make Europe independent of Russian gas and oil imports while reducing CO2 emissions. The final shape of the delegated act supplementing the taxonomy and the date of its entry into force will significantly affect the future of new nuclear projects in the EU, including in Poland.
- Topic:
- Energy Policy, European Union, Carbon Emissions, and Nuclear Energy
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Germany, and Austria
34. Comparing Government Financing of Reactor Exports: Considerations for US Policy Makers
- Author:
- Matt Bowen and Alec Apostoaei
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
- Abstract:
- Decarbonizing the world’s energy supply by 2050 will require financing low-carbon energy projects at a cost of upwards of trillions of dollars. Nuclear energy is one of the few dispatchable low-carbon energy resources, and studies by the International Energy Agency have estimated a possible doubling of nuclear power as part of scenarios for achieving net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by midcentury. Large, capital-intensive projects such as nuclear power plants can be challenging for some countries to finance, however. As a result, countries wishing to build nuclear reactors look for attractive financing from supplier nations in the form of loans and equity. This report, part of wider work on nuclear energy at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, compares the financing terms offered between 2000 and 2021 by the world’s major exporters of nuclear power plants: Russia, France, the Republic of Korea (ROK), China, and the United States. Russia dominated this period, with 11 reactors connected to power grids in six countries, in part due to the attractive state-backed financing offers it made. At the beginning of 2022, Russia had 13 of its reactors under construction in other countries, more than all other countries’ reactor exports combined. The US government has been actively developing advanced reactor technologies, partly with the intention of exporting them to other countries to help them address their energy and environmental goals. However, for numerous reasons, the US government has not financed a new US reactor export in decades, even though the US Export-Import Bank (EXIM) and the new International Development Financing Corporation (DFC) are capable of supporting exports of this scale. Given the recent absence of US financing, this report analyzes the earlier activities of EXIM related to nuclear energy and their relevance for potentially reviving such financing efforts in the near or medium term. A key factor shaping reactor vendor competitions is a nuclear arrangement by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in which France, the ROK, and the United States are members but China and Russia are not. This arrangement places limitations on OECD members regarding key loan terms for their reactor exports, including minimum interest rates and loan repayment terms, that can put them at a disadvantage compared to state-owned vendors from Russia and China. The arrangement does not restrict equity investments in reactor exports, posing an additional disadvantage for private vendors in the United States as they compete with larger, state-owned vendors in France and the ROK. As other countries develop their civil nuclear energy programs or begin new ones, the US government will need to decide whether it will assist in financing US reactor exports. The federal government has a variety of potential rationales for doing so, including creating jobs, assisting other countries in overcoming their energy and environmental challenges, and limiting Chinese and Russian influence. On the other hand, financing from EXIM or the DFC will come with financial risk, as some individual projects may not have successful outcomes.
- Topic:
- Energy Policy, Carbon Emissions, Decarbonization, and Nuclear Energy
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
35. Deep Borehole Disposal of Radioactive Waste: Next Steps and Applicability to National Programs
- Author:
- Peter Swift and Andrew Newman
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
- Abstract:
- Deep borehole disposal of high-level radioactive waste has been proposed repeatedly and in multiple countries over the last several decades, but the concept remains unproven in the field. A straightforward research, development, and demonstration test program could provide answers to basic questions about the viability of the concept. This program would involve the construction of two or perhaps more boreholes to test disposal concepts using surrogate, nonradioactive waste. Field tests would focus on the engineering and operational feasibility of deep borehole disposal, the availability of favorable rock types at depth, appropriate designs for waste forms and waste packaging, and the long-term performance of borehole repositories. Because of the scale of the project, it might best be undertaken as an international collaboration, perhaps led by the US Department of Energy but with participation from multiple national programs to ensure it meets a wide range of needs. Mined geologic repositories, which have been the preferred approach for permanent disposal of high-level radioactive wastes for most national programs for many decades, will likely remain the preferred disposal option for countries with large inventories of commercial spent nuclear fuel. If deep borehole disposal can be demonstrated as a viable concept, however, it may be an attractive alternative disposal option for countries with small inventories of materials requiring permanent geologic isolation. For example, national programs with limited amounts of waste from research or medical isotope production reactors may not need to incur the cost of a full-scale mined repository. Other countries may find borehole disposal a useful option for permanently disposing of small quantities of waste that could otherwise pose security risks, including both fissile materials and high-activity sealed radioactive sources used in industrial and medical applications. For programs committed to disposing of large inventories of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste in mined repositories, deep boreholes may provide options for prompt disposal of small volumes of specialty wastes that may otherwise have to wait for repository construction. This report reviews the borehole disposal concepts proposed to date, identifies potentially suitable waste forms worldwide, and proposes a field-testing program that could resolve many remaining technical questions and inform future programmatic decisions. The report also summarizes the potential benefits of borehole disposal in terms of public acceptance, cost, and security.
- Topic:
- Energy Policy, Nuclear Waste, Nuclear Energy, and Borehole
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
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