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131. Artificial Intelligence and Arms Control

Author:
Paul Scharre and Megan Lamberth
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) pose immense opportunity for militaries around the world. With this rising potential for AI-enabled military systems, some activists are sounding the alarm, calling for restrictions or outright bans on some AI-enabled weapon systems.1 Conversely, skeptics of AI arms control argue that as a general-purpose technology developed in the civilian context, AI will be exceptionally hard to control.2 AI is an enabling technology with countless nonmilitary applications; this factor differentiates it from many other military technologies, such as landmines or missiles.3 Because of its widespread availability, an absolute ban on all military applications of AI is likely infeasible. There is, however, a potential for prohibiting or regulating specific use cases. The international community has, at times, banned or regulated weapons with varying degrees of success. In some cases, such as the ban on permanently blinding lasers, arms control has worked remarkably well to date. In other cases, however, such as attempted limits on unrestricted submarine warfare or aerial bombardment of cities, states failed to achieve lasting restraint in war. States’ motivations for controlling or regulating weapons vary. States may seek to limit the diffusion of a weapon that is particularly disruptive to political or social stability, contributes to excessive civilian casualties, or causes inhumane injury to combatants. This paper examines the potential for arms control for military applications of AI by exploring historical cases of attempted arms control, analyzing both successes and failures. The first part of the paper explores existing academic literature related to why some arms control measures succeed while others fail. The paper then proposes several criteria that influence the success of arms control.4 Finally, it analyzes the potential for AI arms control and suggests next steps for policymakers. Detailed historical cases of attempted arms control—from ancient prohibitions to modern agreements—can be found in appendix A in the pdf available for download. For a summary table of historical attempts at arms control, see appendix B. History teaches us that policymakers, scholars, and members of civil society can take concrete steps today to improve the chances of successful AI arms control in the future. These include taking policy actions to shape the way the technology evolves and increasing dialogue at all levels to better understand how AI applications may be used in warfare. Any AI arms control will be challenging. There may be cases, however, where arms control is possible under the right conditions, and small steps today could help lay the groundwork for future successes.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Artificial Intelligence, and Military
Political Geography:
Global Focus

132. Assessing Russian State Capacity to Develop and Deploy Advanced Military Technology

Author:
Samuel Bendett, Richard Connolly, Jeffrey Edmonds, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, and Michael Kofman
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, many analysts and policymakers viewed Russia as a declining power. This mindset, formed by the sharp juxtaposition between the seeming strength of the Soviet Union and the chaos and weakness of Russia in the 1990s, has been an enduring heuristic for how Russia today is understood. The country’s stagnant and resource-dependent economy, declining population, and substantial brain drain have fed a sense that Russia’s days as a global power are numbered. The war in Ukraine has only accelerated some of these trends, further reinforcing such views. The Russian military’s poor performance, the degradation of its forces, and the imposition of sanctions and export controls that will restrict Russia’s ability to regenerate its forces have already led some to dismiss the country as a Potemkin power and pronounce the end of its great power status.1 Russia undoubtedly will emerge from its war on Ukraine as a weaker power. But even during the post-Soviet period of sustained economic stagnation, brain drain, and demographic decline, the Russian state developed a new generation of hypersonic missiles, air and missile defenses, and nuclear weapons with novel means of propulsion. Russia has demonstrated that it is able not only to bring to fruition late-Soviet designs, but also to develop a follow-on generation of capabilities. Likewise, the Kremlin has continued to modernize and expand its nuclear capabilities. Despite economic constraints, the Kremlin prioritized the development of its strategic nuclear forces by investing significant resources into developing and deploying new nuclear warheads and launchers, upgrading all legs of the nuclear triad, completing work on a hypersonic glide vehicle, and building a new intercontinental, nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered undersea autonomous torpedo. Of course, Russia’s past performance was under a different set of conditions. Moving forward, as a result of its invasion of Ukraine, Russia will face new and more significant constraints on its ability to modernize its military. But it is too soon to count Russia out. Policymakers need a more nuanced assessment of the nature of the future Russian threat. This report provides such an assessment, focusing on Russia’s ability to develop and deploy its nuclear capabilities through 2030. To that end, this report first identifies Russia’s own stated goals and objectives for the development of its nuclear forces looking out to 2030. Because Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the resulting military degradation and economic sanctions and export controls introduce critical uncertainties about the Kremlin’s ability to execute these objectives, this report adopts a scenarios approach to forecasting Russia’s future nuclear capabilities. The report identifies two drivers that the authors view as most critical in shaping Russia’s ability to fulfill its stated objectives: the impact of Western sanctions on Russia’s government revenue and ability to access critical technology, and the extent of the degradation of the Russian military in Ukraine, which will force choices on the Kremlin about how to prioritize military expenditures. This report uses these two drivers to describe two scenarios that define the upper and lower boundaries of expectations for Russia’s nuclear capabilities, along with the implications of each of these scenarios for the United States and its allies. The scenarios, in other words, describe both a worst- and best-case state of affairs for Russia, and thus they help frame the problem for U.S. policymakers and planners. The report concludes with an assessment of key findings that emerge from the analysis and associated recommendations for the United States and Europe.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Sanctions, Military, Russia-Ukraine War, and Policymaking
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

133. They melted down our tanks, we are creating the strongest power in the region – militarist narratives serving the purpose of state capturing

Author:
Luka Steric
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)
Abstract:
In this publication, BCSP researcher Luka Šterić analyzes how are the militarist narratives used for the legitimising in public the capturing of the state. Defence system capturing is done in various ways. The authorities are using the procurement of armament from different parties to achieve foreign policy goals in order to reduce the external pressure on the authoritarian regime. Insisting on military neutrality and foreign policy balancing, Serbia is trying to keep access to both the Eastern and Western armament markets. Also, through non-transparent contracts, individuals and companies close to the government opulently profit at the expense of the military industry, as well as through exporting weapons oftentimes conducted in contravention of both domestic and international law and norms. However, the focus of this analysis shall be on the militarist narratives constructed by the authorities to legitimise in public the capturing of the state and its defence system. In this publication, we shall present three major militarist narratives used by the authorities to capture the state: the narrative of the personal power of the “commander-in-chief“, the narrative of non-transparent armament in order to defend the country from the external enemy and the narrative of discrediting criticism and political opponents on topics of defence. The narrative of efficient personal power in the defence system has got a dual function. On the one hand, building the cult of a leader as the only guarantor of the state’s success, thus the Army’s success, justifies the non-constitutional concentration of power in the hands of the President. On the other hand, it normalises the military hierarchy as the most efficient model for civilian authorities’ structure, too, whereby the institutional and other mechanisms of government control are discredited. The narrative about the external enemy and the necessity of armament serves to justify the reduced transparency and scandals related to the defence system. The narrative about the inept and non-patriotic former government is used for settling the political accounts with political opponents, as well as for suppression of any criticism against the regime regarding the topics of defence.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Military
Political Geography:
Global Focus

134. Cyberattacks Integral to Russia's Political and Military Strategies

Author:
Aleksandra Kozioł
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
To destabilise democratic countries that support Ukraine, Russia employs cyberattacks on the target state’s public institutions and critical infrastructure. These activities have clearly intensified since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022 and is in line with the implementation of Russian military strategy. In this context, it would be beneficial within the EU and NATO to develop joint action plans to respond to future threats in cyberspace.
Topic:
NATO, Infrastructure, European Union, Cybersecurity, Cyberspace, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

135. Sahel: 10 Years of Instability. Local, Regional and International Dynamics

Author:
Giovanni Carbone and Camillo Casola
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
Ten years after the start of the Malian crisis, political and security instability in the Sahel have changed in scale and nature, and spilled over across national frontiers. The border region between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger has become the new epicentre of insecurity. The comeback of military actors on the political scene, and the support provided by large parts of the population to post-coup military juntas is evidence of poor governance and a severe deterioration in the legitimacy of elected authorities. In this complex scenario, the initiatives of external partners affect regional balances, making the Sahel a major theatre for power competition. How did the crisis evolve over the past decade? What are the main drivers behind local, regional and international dynamics? What prospects for regional stability?
Topic:
Security, Politics, Territorial Disputes, Borders, Instability, and Military
Political Geography:
Africa, Mali, Sahel, Niger, and Burkina Faso

136. Military Coups in Africa: A Continuation of Politics by Other Means?

Author:
Nana Amoateng
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Conflict Trends
Institution:
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:
The military has been an important institution for protecting States from external threats since antiquity. In fulfilling this fundamental role, military institutions have also posed security risks to their own governments, given that the ‘ability to use coercive force, though necessary to defend the nation against threats, creates the danger that the military will turn its weapons on the very regime that empowered its existence’.[1] Military personnel can fuel civil conflicts and undermine the stability of political regimes mostly in States with loose political control of the military. As Douglass North, John Wallis and Barry Weingast have argued, ‘Societies experiencing a civil war, by definition, do not have consolidated control of the military’.[2] In Africa, military institutions have, on one hand, helped to protect States from both internal and external threats, including local insurgencies. On the other hand, they have destabilised several political regimes through coup d’états. Military coups – ‘when the military, or a section of the military, turns its coercive power against the apex of the state, establishes itself there, and the rest of the state takes its orders from the new regime’[3] – have been relatively common in post-independent African States,[4] thereby raising several issues, including how to understand the relationship between politics and military coups. This article contributes to the discussion by highlighting how coups are a continuation of politics by other means, particularly in West Africa.
Topic:
Politics, Governance, Leadership, Coup, and Military
Political Geography:
Africa

137. Russia´s comprehensive approach and the increased use of the Wagner Group challenges the West in Africa

Author:
Karen Philippa Larsen and Flemming Splidsboel Hansen
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
In the 2010s, Russia gradually returned to the African continent, where the Soviet Union was an influential actor for decades. The culmination of Russia’s public reorientation to Africa so far has been the high profile Russia-Africa Summit held in Sochi in October 2019. In his opening address to the Summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin noted how “representatives of all 54 African states and leading regional organizations are gathered here. This is indeed the first meeting of such a scale, and this is a convincing testament to the mutual desire to develop contacts in all directions, to strengthen the multifaceted partnership”. Russia has many interests in Africa. One fundamental interest relates to the international distribution of power. As a self-defined great power with an ambition to extend its influence still further beyond its immediate regional setting, Russia is almost compelled to attempt to gain a stronger presence in Africa. Both trade and the exploration of energy and minerals support this ambition, but its other tools include economic support (including by writing off debt), military support (for instance through the provision of training assistance or even the deployment of troops), as well as political support (for instance by using Russia’s weight as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council to publicly defend regimes under pressure or even to prevent the passing of critical statements or the introduction of sanctions). To illustrate, in January 2022, the Russian delegation to the United Nations strongly opposed the introduction of new sanctions against the interim government in Mali, noting that “we have always been guided by the principle of African solutions to African problems”. Other interests relate to trade (with a turnover of USD 20bn in 2020) and to the exploration of natural resources. Within the field of trade, Russian arms exports stand out. In the years 2016-2020, Russian arms exports to African states accounted for 18 per cent of all Russian arms exports, a 23 per cent increase over the period of 2011-2015. By contrast, Russia’s share of the global arms market decreased by 22 per cent in the decade of 2011-2020. This latter development is a clear sign of a very competitive market, and it suggests that emerging markets, such as Africa, will become increasingly important to Russian arms producers. The main importers are Egypt, Algeria, and Angola (where Russian producers supply 41 per cent, 69 per cent, and 64 per cent, respectively, of national imports).
Topic:
Wagner Group, Military, and Private Military Companies (PMCs)
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Eurasia, and Denmark

138. The Taiwan Factor: Why Is China seeking a larger military might?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Chinese President Xi Jinping, who is also the head of Central Military Commission, told the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held from October 16 to October 22, to speed up efforts to modernize the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to transform it into a world-class military. He also underscored the need for winning regional wars.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Conflict, Borders, Strategic Interests, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

139. The Russian Role! The domestic and regional dimensions of the military coup in Burkina Faso

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
In January 24, 2022, members of the army in Burkina Faso announced their seizure of power and the dismissal of Burkinabé President Roch Marc Kaboré. One of the officers who seized power delivered a statement on state television, signed by Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, Head of the Patriotic Movement for Safeguard and Restoration (MPSR), announcing the overthrow of the government, thus joining Burkina Faso to Mali and Guinea, in the third military coup in West Africa in just eight months.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, Coup, and Military
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, France, and Burkina Faso

140. An Alternative Approach to U.S. Sahel Policy

Author:
Alex Thurston
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The Sahel region of Africa is in freefall. Upwards of 19 million people need humanitarian assistance, five coups have occurred since 2020, jihadists and militias are killing thousands, and security forces and Russian mercenaries abuse civilians with impunity. The Sahel’s primary external actor, France, pursues intensive counterterrorism with the aim of helping Sahelian national authorities to reassert legitimacy; France also seeks to retain influence over its former colonies. But French policy has floundered. Anti-French sentiments drove France mostly out of Mali, one epicenter of the Sahel crisis, and many other Sahelians resent perceived French encroachments on their sovereignty. The United States lacks a real policy for the Sahel. Rather, U.S. policy drifts and reacts. Important humanitarian and development programs are overshadowed by securitized rhetoric and undermined by the considerable U.S. military activity in the Sahel, including vestiges of the “War on Terror.” The White House’s 2022 National Security Strategy, its Africa Strategy, and a forthcoming Sahel Strategy envision diverse efforts going beyond counterterrorism, but they read as laundry lists of priorities rather than as concrete plans of action. The vagueness of existing policy risks allowing obsolete assumptions and programs to continue.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Counter-terrorism, and Military
Political Geography:
Africa, France, Mali, and Sahel