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Begin New Search Topic Illiberalism Publication Year within 3 Years

1. Illiberalism in International Relations

Author:
Alexander Dugin
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
There are two main schools in the theory of international relations --- realism and liberalism. Realists believe that human nature is inherently flawed (the legacy of Hobbes’s anthropological pessimism and, on an even deeper level, the legacy of the Christian idea of the Fall, or lapsus in Latin) and cannot be fundamentally corrected, which means that selfishness, predation, and violence are impossible to eradicate. This leads to the conclusion that man (who, according to Hobbes, is a wolf to another man) can only be restrained and regulated by means of a strong state. The state is inevitable and is the bearer of supreme sovereignty. At the same time, the predatory and egoistic nature of man is projected onto the state; therefore, the nationstate has its own interests. These interests take into account only their own state, while the will to violence and greed mean war is always a possibility. Realists believe that this has always been and always will be. International relations are therefore based only on a balance of power between wholly sovereign entities. No world order can exist in the long term; there is only chaos, which changes as some states weaken and others strengthen. At the same time, the term “chaos” in this theory is not bad in itself; it is merely a statement of the actual state of affairs, derived from taking the concept of sovereignty very seriously. If there are several truly sovereign powers, no supranational order can exist between them to which all would submit. Were such an order to exist, sovereignty would not be complete, in fact, it would not exist at all, and only this supranational authority itself would be sovereign. The school of realism has traditionally been very strong in the US, starting with its first founders: Hans Morgenthau and George Kennan in the US, and Edward Carr in the UK.
Topic:
International Relations, Realism, Multipolarity, Illiberalism, and Posthumanism
Political Geography:
Russia and Global Focus

2. Between Tradition and Transformation: The Impact of Illiberal Populism on Georgia’s Democratic Aspirations

Author:
Giorgi Iakobishvili
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
The article examines the role of Georgian far-right illiberal populist groups in Georgian politics and their influence on Georgia’s foreign policy and the ongoing democratization process, emphasizing Euroscepticism, liberal institutional development, and the pro-Russian narrative. Using qualitative research methodology, we analyzed the programs, manifestos, and public speeches of well-known groups active in Georgian politics, such as People's Power, Georgian March, Georgian Idea, Unity, Essence, Hope (ERI), and Alliance of Patriots of Georgia. Analysis of the mentioned material, as well as various scientific studies, shows that the discourse of these groups is dominated by xenophobic, nationalist, populist, and racist rhetoric, which represents a significant challenge to Georgia’s European integration path and in the direction of democratization of its governance system. In the long term, we concluded that the existence and development of these illiberal populist actors threaten Georgia’s aspirations for European integration and democratic development. This study contributes to a broader discourse about populism and illiberal views in the Georgian reality, focusing on the influence of these ideologies on the formation of the country’s foreign policy and orientation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Democracy, Populism, Domestic Politics, Illiberalism, and Euroskepticism
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Caucasus, and Georgia

3. Georgia at a Crossroads: An Increasingly Illiberal Domestic Policy is Becoming an Obstacle to EU Accession

Author:
Reinhold Brender
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Georgia faces a defining moment. The recent adoption of a Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, modelled on Russian legislation, clashes with Georgia’s goal of EU accession. The law allows for extensive control and elimination of civil society and critical voices, which contradicts the democratic principles required for EU membership. The ruling Georgian Dream party nonetheless claims that EU accession, a goal shared by most Georgians, remains achievable by 2030. As the parliamentary elections on 26 October approach, the party seeks to maintain its grip on power by projecting an image of commitment to democracy and EU integration. But opposition parties, civil society organisations and the media have rallied against the law, which many believe reflects a deeper issue: the efforts of a small elite around billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili to consolidate power and push Georgia towards authoritarianism under the guise of democratic governance. An increasing alignment with Russia has accompanied this trend, potentially enabling Russia to exert some level of control over Georgia through a local proxy instead of direct military intervention. This policy brief argues that the EU should implement the steps that High Representative Josep Borrell announced after the Foreign Affairs Council on 24 June 2024. In light of further developments, consideration should be given to additional measures, including targeted EU sanctions on anti-democratic actors similar to those imposed by the US. Continued EU support for Ukraine’s resistance to Russian aggression will also be vital for the sovereignty of both Ukraine and Georgia, as well as for regional stability.
Topic:
European Union, Democracy, Regional Integration, Domestic Policy, and Illiberalism
Political Geography:
Eurasia and Georgia

4. Illiberal Populism as a Polarizing Factor of Regional Cooperation in Central Europe

Author:
Ladislav Cabada
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Central European identity and regionality are very traditional and deeply rooted discourses. Over the past 35 years, a number of regional cooperation formats have emerged, among which the Visegrad Group has acquired a special position. This weakly institutionalised and thematically selective regional organisation has nevertheless established itself in the last 15 years as one of the visible actors of socalled populist regionalism. The (partial) transformation of the V4 towards populist foreign policy, national conservatism and Euroscepticism is the subject of our analysis. Using the concepts of populist regionalism and illiberal populism, it focuses on the formation of a monolithic discourse of the V4 as a group opposed to the international liberal order and the "Brussels agenda" in terms of values and public policies. We also examine the negative implications of this populist appropriation of the V4 for the region's position within the EU.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Populism, Polarization, Russia-Ukraine War, and Illiberalism
Political Geography:
Europe and Central Europe

5. War has returned to Europe: Three reasons why the EU did not see it coming

Author:
Corina Stratulat
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
Before 24 February, Europe decidedly defined itself as 'post-war'. But since Putin's full-scale, cold-blooded invasion of Ukraine, war again defines the Union's reality. Damage control is the main priority now — but knee-jerk reactions and moral outrage do not amount to a strategy, argues Corina Stratulat. To create a future that stops perpetuating the past, the Union and its member states must also start to critically contemplate how they got into the current predicament and change course. Three lessons stand out: First, since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, overconfidence in its own allure and model has skewed the EU's perspective of itself and the rest of the world. While freedom, pluralism and liberal democracy remain attractive, liberal expectations that the Union would be able to convert even its immediate neighbourhood – let alone the world – to its image have proven illusory. Despite almost two decades of European integration, democratic performance has still not acquired a positive dynamic in the Balkans. And yet the membership card has now been confidently and imprudently put on the table for Ukraine and other eastern countries, posing as a solution to the current crisis. Without practising humility, the EU stands to persevere in its confirmation biases and continue to evade learning. Second, the EU's unrealistic aspirations to global hegemony have long been concealing a policy of double standards both at 'home' and abroad, piling up accusations of hypocrisy. While the EU was pretending to be a shining example of liberal democracy, several member states have taken full pages from Putin's autocratic playbook or put their own interests ahead of the Union's 'sacred' democratic values — faults easily exploited by illiberal actors, like Putin. Dressing up the EU's foreign policy ambitions as efforts to revive global democracy will remain a hypocrisy trap, including in Ukraine now. Third, a misplaced acceptance of the status quo has prevented the EU from getting to the bottom of the many crises it has been grappling with for decades. But the Union cannot wish away systemic risks or escape the fact that dealing with today's enormous challenges will require deep and brave reforms across the board. The stresses of cumulative crises, crowned now by the ongoing war, give the Union a chance to plan the future. The choices that the EU will make in the coming years will determine what the Union truly values and whether it will be able to preserve its own way of life. If the EU is keen to maintain the normative power of its liberal values in an increasingly illiberal environment, it should obsessively focus on making liberalism its sign of distinction from the outside world, not a model to transform others. The Union has to learn to live by example and will have to work hard to become exemplary.
Topic:
European Union, Norms, Russia-Ukraine War, and Illiberalism
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

6. What should the EU do about Hungary’s illiberal turn?

Author:
Perle Petit
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
Since 2010, Hungary’s government has followed a clear and deliberate trajectory away from EU democratic principles, turning the country into the first illiberal state in the Union. Before Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Hungary’s illiberal turn remained relatively self-contained at the national level. Since the start of the war, however, this illiberalism has spread to the international arena, dramatically impeding EU institutional decision-making processes. Despite the urgency of the matter, the EU’s failure to address the country’s democratic decline has been evident. The EU institutions need to address the national and international impact of Hungary's flouting of democratic norms by proposing both short- and long-term solutions. To do so, the institutions should take the following actions: The EU Commission should stand fully behind the triggering of the rule of law conditionality mechanism against Hungary and insist that the country implements all proposed remedial measures in a legislatively binding way. A periodic review system must be put in place to avoid any reversal of these measures or manipulation of independent public bodies in the coming years. The rule of law conditionality mechanism should be triggered against other infringing countries, to demonstrate a zero-tolerance approach to democratic backsliding. The suspension of EU funds should be harmonised across different funding schemes. In this way, the Commission can avoid becoming compromised by disconnected conditionality mechanisms. Increased capabilities and powers should be conferred to independent EU organisations, such as the European Anti-Fraud Office and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. These should review the strength of democratic institutions in backsliding countries and provide recommendations for reform. The institutions should look into the regional disbursement of EU budgets, bypassing central governments to allocate funds on a regional basis. The Council should consider replacing the unanimity rule with qualified majority voting to render EU decision-making processes more effective and to prevent single member states from holding EU decisions ‘hostage’. As Hungary’s leadership shows no signs of changing course, the EU should change tactics to actively preserve and protect democracy within its borders. The EU institutions should use the full toolbox at their disposal to halt Hungary’s illiberal turn, restore the independence of democratic institutions, and take long-term steps to prevent any further backsliding within the Union.
Topic:
European Union, Rule of Law, European Commission, Illiberalism, and Viktor Orbán
Political Geography:
Europe and Hungary