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Begin New Search Topic Arms Control and Proliferation Publication Year within 3 Years

61. Everything Counts: Building a Control Regime for Nonstrategic Nuclear Warheads in Europe

Author:
Miles A. Pomper, William Alberque, Marshall L. Brown Jr., William M. Moon, and Nikolai Sokov
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Biden administration insisted in arms control talks with Russia that a follow-on agreement to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) should cover all nuclear weapons and that such an agreement should focus on the nuclear warheads themselves. This would represent a significant change from previous agreements, which focused on delivery vehicles, such as missiles. The United States has been particularly interested in potential limits on nonstrategic nuclear warheads (NSNW). Such weapons have never been subject to an arms control agreement. Because Russia possesses an advantage in the number of such weapons, the US Senate has insisted that negotiators include them in a future agreement, making their inclusion necessary if such an accord is to win Senate approval and ultimately be ratified by Washington. In the wake of Russian nuclear threats in the Ukraine conflict, such demands can only be expected to grow if and when US and Russian negotiators return to the negotiating table.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

62. A Perfect Recipe for the Next Escalation on the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Lorenzo Mariani and Manuel Herrera
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
North Korea has been conducting regular missile tests as part of its weapons development programme over the past year. Put bluntly, this reflects the complete stalemate in denuclearisation talks following Biden’s election in the US and a stark reminder of the meagre results of the conciliatory strategy carried out by the former South Korean President Moon Jae-in. Hypersonic as well as short-range, intermediate-range and long-range ballistic missiles have all been part of this latest series of tests. On 24 March, North Korea claimed to have successfully launched a new modern intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), denominated Hwasong-17. While the entity of the vector has yet to be confirmed, if this allegation is proven true it would mark the first time an ICBM has been fired since 2017, breaking Pyongyang's self-imposed moratorium on such tests. The volley of tests has fuelled speculations that North Korea is gearing up for the launch of a larger weapon theoretically capable of reaching the US mainland.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, Nonproliferation, and Conflict Management
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

63. The Mian Channu Incident and the Enduring Risk of Nuclear Escalation between India and Pakistan

Author:
Manuel Herrera
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In an international context characterised by increasing concern over the risk of nuclear war triggered by the conflict in Ukraine, it is worth noting that incidents in other regions could also lead to nuclear escalation, either by design or miscalculation. A recent incident involving India and Pakistan is a case in point, albeit the event did not receive ample coverage, overshadowed by the news of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Escalation
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, and India

64. Stalemate in Talks with Iran on a Return to the Nuclear Agreement

Author:
Sima Shine and Eldad Shavit
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
The talks in Vienna between the United States and Iran ended with the text of the agreement almost complete. Conclusion of the deal rests on political decisions in Washington and Tehran, mostly concerning the Iranian demand to remove the Revolutionary Guards from the State Department’s list of terror organizations. At this stage the chances of finalizing the deal are equal to the chances of the talks collapsing. How should Israel act at this sensitive time?
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

65. Will Russia Use Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine?

Author:
Helit Barel
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
One month into the war in Ukraine, the nuclear threat remains. Will Russia’s President decide to use nuclear weapons on the battlefield, and thereby shatter the 77 years of nuclear deterrence? From a rational perspective, there is little likelihood of this occurring, but thus far Putin has not succeeded in realizing his goals in the Ukrainian theater – and Russia has a large arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

66. The Need and Hope for Arms Control

Author:
Michael Krepon
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:
An Interview with Nick Madoff and Luka Willett
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Interview, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Global Focus

67. Extracting Evidence: Opportunities and Obstacles in Assessing the Gendered Impacts of Diverted Ammunition

Author:
Emile LeBrun, André Desmarais, Kheira Djouhri, and Nicolas Florquin
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
Ammunition diverted from legal to illicit markets is a central concern in small arms control, but its impact is understudied. A new Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs explores how authorities can go about better monitoring the role it plays in violent crime. Extracting Evidence: Opportunities and Obstacles in Assessing the Gendered Impacts of Diverted Ammunition unpacks the challenges involved in trying to assess the true costs of ammunition diverted from official stockpiles. The study describes contextual background, notes the limitations of ammunition profiling research to date, and presents findings from a pilot case study on ammunition profiling in Kosovo* as well as insights from ammunition marking policy in Brazil. It finds that authorities struggle to identify what materiel among seized ammunition has been diverted from official stockpiles, which in turn prevents the ability to truly assess the impact it has on men, women, boys, and girls. The study identifies measures for overcoming such monitoring challenges, including special marking practices for state-destined ammunition, headstamp data collection guidelines, and information sharing protocols between relevant agencies for ammunition recovered from crime scenes.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Crime, Trafficking, Gender, and Ammunition
Political Geography:
Europe and Kosovo

68. Adapting the Missile Technology Control Regime for Current and Future Challenges

Author:
Kolja Brockmann, Mark Bromley, and Lauriane Héau
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a cornerstone of the non-proliferation architecture for missiles and other uncrewed aerial vehicles. However, geopolitical and technical developments and operational challenges threaten the regime’s effectiveness and create a need for reform in several areas. The MTCR partners should develop a clear strategy for determining if and how to expand MTCR membership. To increase the number of adherents, partners should pursue reinforced outreach and expand and promote the benefits offered. By improving the transparency of its procedures and deliberations, the regime can make them more understandable for non-partners. The partners can also improve the MTCR’s legitimacy by emphasizing that it provides public goods and helps states to meet their international obligations. The regime can also address the challenges of emerging technologies by focusing on technical deliberations and sharing information and good practices. Through all this, the MTCR must ensure its continued functioning in the face of geopolitical tensions and armed conflict between partners.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Science and Technology, Geopolitics, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Global Focus

69. Arms-production Capabilities in the Indo-Pacific Region: Measuring Self-reliance

Author:
Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, Xiao Liang, Siemon T. Wezeman, and Ming Sun
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
Armed forces in the Indo-Pacific region remain dependent on weapon systems imported from foreign suppliers. This is despite the efforts of many governments in the Indo-Pacific to implement policies that support the development of local arms industrial capabilities with the aim of increasing self-reliance. This report develops three indicators to give a score and regional ranking of self-reliance in arms production to 12 jurisdictions in the Indo-Pacific region: Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Viet Nam. Overall, this report contributes to knowledge and debates on armament trends and military modernization in the Indo-Pacific. In a region where tensions among neighbours are rising, it further contributes to transparency with regard to levels of self-reliance in domestic arms production, allowing for an independent assessment of the region’s respective arms industries.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Arms Trade, and Imports
Political Geography:
China, Australia, and Indo-Pacific

70. Preparing for the Final Collapse of the Soviet Union and the Dissolution of the Russian Federation

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev as president of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the start of the USSR’s collapse—but not the collapse itself. While the USSR ceased to exist as a legal entity after 1991, the collapse of the USSR is still happening today. The two Chechen Wars, Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, the on-and-off border skirmishes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and the 2020 Second Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan are just a few examples showing that the Soviet Union is still collapsing today. However, future historians will likely describe Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine as the most consequential moment, if not the final moment, of the Soviet Union’s collapse. When the war in Ukraine will end is unknown, but it will likely mark the dissolution of the Russian Federation (the legal successor of the Soviet Union) as it is known today. Russia has undeniably suffered a major blow to its economy, devastation to its military capability, and degradation of its influence in regions where it once had clout. The borders of the Russian Federation will likely not look the same on a map in 10 or 20 years as they do now. As the final collapse of the Soviet Union plays out and as the Russian Federation faces the possibility of dissolving, policymakers need to start planning for the new geopolitical reality on the Eurasian landmass. The goal of this policy memo is not to advocate for regime change in Russia—this will be a matter for the Russian people. Nor does this paper predict exactly how Russia and the broader Eurasian region will emerge after the final collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Russian Federation. Instead, it establishes realistic goals for Western policymakers, outlines assumptions on which these goals are based, and highlights the questions that decision-makers should ask now to better prepare for the future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and History
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia