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21. The Future of Arms Control: Ready to (Dis)Agree?

Author:
Tõnis Idarand, Kalev Stoicescu, and Ian Anthony
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Having been crumbling already for years, international arms control architecture is now in a perilous state. Existing arrangements have either been losing their effectiveness or outright failing due to Russia’s non-compliance, whilst Russia’s aggression against Ukraine might have delivered the final blow to this system. Even after the war in Ukraine has ended, it will take years to re-establish the level of trust necessary to, again, engage with Russia on arms control. The return to the pre-war ‘business as usual’, where the dialogue will resume as if never interrupted, is unlikely. Arms control dialogue with Russia ‘at any cost’ cannot produce an acceptable result. Arms control as we have known it, with its legally binding and verifiable agreements, may have come to an end. The trends emerging from the expert discussions are more focused on a different set of instruments, such as political commitments, risk reduction, or transparency and confidence building measures. Development of new technologies, proliferation of new weapon systems, the rise of China as a global player, and increasing role of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Russian and Chinese military doctrines will all have an impact on global arms control. The fate of the New START Treaty will have a decisive effect on the future of arms control and the prospects of the nuclear non-proliferation regime already under immense pressure. This report attempts to summarise the developments in arms control architecture over the last decades and accentuate the trends that might be consequential when designing the arms control system of the future. The year 2023 has already demonstrated that arms control is less relevant in Russia’s security thinking. Moscow exploits the existing arrangements mainly as leverage to influence the US and NATO’s policy towards Ukraine or obtain concessions regarding its proposals on the new European security arrangements. The role of arms control in European security might be in decline, but the key elements of European security architecture are still in place, and most states continue to implement them. NATO allies – when discussing and designing arms control or confidence-building measures – shall consider how these instruments advance the security of allies. Under the current circumstances, the priority is to strengthen defence and deterrence of the Alliance. This is the only way to lay the groundwork for a constructive arms control dialogue with Russia.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Weapons, Nonproliferation, Trade, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

22. Why the West Should Stick with Conventional Arms Control in Europe for Now

Author:
Gabriela Iveliz Rosa-Hernandez and Alexander Graef
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
After Russia’s withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Arms Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) formally enters into force on November 7, 2023, the remaining twenty-nine member states need to decide whether they want to keep the Treaty or dissolve it for good. The CFE Treaty no longer corresponds to the present state of European security, but its transparency and verification regime can still provide limited security advantages for NATO members and strengthen deterrence. A formal dissolution of the Treaty would undermine Western normative commitments to military transparency. In the long run, it could lead to a loss of expertise on how to conduct inspections and information exchange, which might become relevant again in the context of ending Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Topic:
NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

23. Developing Good Practices in Export Control Outreach to the NewSpace Industry

Author:
Kolja Brockmann and Lauriane Héau
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
NewSpace is changing the nature of the space industry, exacerbating missile proliferation risks and posing challenges for the effective implementation of export controls. NewSpace companies develop, test, produce, use and market missile-related emerging and dual-use technologies, including small and micro launchers. One of the measures states can take to address these developments is to step up targeted outreach to NewSpace actors, raising awareness of such risks to strengthen compliance with export controls and foreign direct investment (FDI) screening mechanisms. Key elements of an effective outreach strategy for the NewSpace sector include tailored use of established outreach tools, mapping stakeholders, incentivizing participation in outreach activities, consistently engaging with launch vehicle manufacturers, inter-agency cooperation and raising awareness of FDI-related risks. The Missile Technology Control Regime, the Hague Code of Conduct and the Wiesbaden Process provide multilateral forums through which states can begin sharing experiences and develop good practices for outreach to the NewSpace industry.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Weapons, Nonproliferation, Space, Exports, Industry, and Dual-use Technologies
Political Geography:
Global Focus

24. The Role of Umbrella States in the Global Nuclear Order

Author:
Tytti Erästö
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
This paper focuses on countries under extended nuclear deterrence arrangements, or ‘umbrella’ states. The paper explores the ways in which umbrella states both in the Asia-Pacific region and in Europe have supported prevailing nuclear deterrence practices or distanced themselves from such practices. While there is a tendency for these countries to side with their nuclear-armed patron on matters related to nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament norms, at times they have taken steps away from the allied mainstream position by advocating for anti-nuclear weapon policies. As long as extended deterrence has a nuclear dimension, allies will need to balance between normative pressures to support nuclear disarmament and alliance commitments that require at least passive support for nuclear deterrence practices.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Alliance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe and Asia-Pacific

25. Verifying Nuclear Disarmament: Lessons Learned in South Africa, Iraq and Libya

Author:
Robert E. Kelley
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
Inspections in the 1990s and early 2000s in South Africa, Iraq and Libya were designed to discover the details of nuclear weapon programmes and destroy any remnants. As the global norm against nuclear weapons strengthens, the international community may once more require verification of a state’s denuclearization. But success in the three earlier cases does not guarantee success in the next similar task—any future inspection mission must learn from the lessons of the past. This report draws on the unique experience of Robert E. Kelley, a participant in all three past denuclearization efforts. In it, he gives an account of the unique scale and circumstances of each investigation and the different tools and approaches required. By publicly documenting and comparing obstacles and successes in the three cases for the first time, this report gives meaningful and practical insight into the difficult work of disarmament and its verification. It is an essential resource for future inspectors—and all others interested in what real disarmament looks like on the ground.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, and Transparency
Political Geography:
Africa, Iraq, Middle East, Libya, South Africa, and North Africa

26. America’s Response after Russian Suspension of New START

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs and Marshall Billingslea
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This week’s news that Russia will suspend participation in the New START nuclear treaty follows the State Department’s January announcement that Russia is in breach of New START and its obligation to allow inspection activities on its territory. Since the Cold War, the United States has led efforts to promote nuclear non-proliferation and to create a transparent and stable dynamic between Moscow and Washington regarding our nuclear weapons forces. But the Russians have repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to violate the terms of our agreements. While the United States has sought to decrease our reliance on nuclear weapons in our military strategies, Russia has gone the other way. Russia is developing, testing, and fielding new delivery systems within traditional categories like road-mobile and silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. But it has also developed novel systems like nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicles that raise questions about their intent. And its large arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons remains outside the bounds of any treaty. As we’ve seen in Ukraine, Russia uses the threat of nuclear employment to coerce nations in wars of aggression that Russia has chosen. Moscow appears to have lowered the nuclear threshold. The best path for peace is for the United States to maintain credible deterrence options. This provides incentives for our adversaries to engage in diplomacy.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, Military, and New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)
Political Geography:
Russia, North America, and United States of America

27. Nuclear energy and proliferation in Turkey’s Asian Politics

Author:
Eliza Gheorghe
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
The share of nuclear power in Asia’s electricity generating capacity has grown significantly over the last two decades. China is one of the dominant players in Asia, developing a robust nuclear power program. In the Middle East, Iran and the United Arab Emirates have introduced nuclear power into the region, with Turkey planning to follow in their footsteps in 2023. The adoption of nuclear power spurs concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear latency. Some countries use their civilian nuclear programs to develop a robust infrastructure that allows them to acquire nuclear weapons in a relatively short period of time. Such dynamics are likely to have a destabilizing effect on international affairs in the Middle East and Asia. The current international situation makes it unlikely that the nuclear non-proliferation regime will become stronger in the near future. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the need for a new generation of negative security assurances and collective defense that protects countries from nuclear blackmail.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Politics, Electricity, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Asia

28. Dominating the Superpower: A Bounded Rationality Approach to Nuclear Proliferation and Inhibition in the U.S. / North Korea Dyad

Author:
Sercan Canbolat and Stephen Benedict Dyson
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
Why was the United States, despite its overwhelming superiority in power, unable to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons? Why did North Korea persist in its nuclear pursuit in the face of U.S. opposition? In this article, we represent nuclear proliferation and counter-proliferation as situations of subjective strategic interaction between states. We measure preferences over strategies and outcomes using operational codes of the leaders of each country, derived via linguistic analysis. Our results indicate that neither the U.S. nor North Korea accurately understood the other side’s preference ordering, and that their operational codes interacted in such a way as to produce an outcome favorable to North Korea – the weaker party - and unfavorable to the U.S. – the stronger. The wider contribution is to show that (mis)perceptions of the goals and resolve of the opponent play a crucial role in the success or failure of strong states to compel weak states and vice versa.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Politics, Leadership, and Perception
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

29. Iran’s Nuclear Endgame Warrants a Change in U.S. Strategy

Author:
Michael Singh
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Recently, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency discovered that Iran had enriched uranium to a level just shy of what is generally considered weapons grade. Like many findings before it, this revelation underscores the need for a new U.S. and European policy toward Iran. The two most important and immediate steps in that process are clear by this point: Washington and its partners need to move on from any remaining plans they might have to resurrect the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), namely by activating that accord’s “snapback” mechanism; and governments must heighten their efforts to deter Iran through credible threats of military force.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

30. Iran’s Misunderstood Nuclear Law

Author:
Henry Rome
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
This summer, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei delivered his most detailed remarks in years on Iran’s nuclear trajectory. While his comments on a potential agreement with the West drew the most attention, he also called on Iranian officials to follow a controversial 2020 law that ordered rapid steps to escalate the nuclear program and reduce international monitoring. “Some people think that this law creates problems for the country,” he stated. “They are wrong. This law is a good law...And it must be followed.” Indeed, the 2020 legislation has played a prominent role in Iranian debates about nuclear advances, and Khamenei’s comments suggest this will remain the case. Yet the law is widely misunderstood; more important, it has not been the primary driver of Iran’s actual nuclear activity over the past three years. The governments of Hassan Rouhani and Ebrahim Raisi each sidestepped key provisions of the legislation while also escalating the program in ways the law does not require. Despite Khamenei’s sentiment, neither the existing law nor potential successor legislation is likely to compel escalation or constrain diplomacy.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Legislation, Nuclear Energy, and Military
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East