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81. Nuclear Notes

Author:
Sarah Weiner
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Twenty years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia is experiencing the most significant level of public dissatisfaction with Vladimir Putin since he assumed power a decade ago. While the sizeable street protests in Russia may well signal a political and social watershed moment for the country, a more minor political event a few months ago provided a telling sign regarding one of the regime's most important projects—a massive program for military modernization.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Europe

82. Weapons Tracing and Peace Support Operations: Theory or Practice?

Author:
Glenn McDonald and James Bevan
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
Weapons tracing is a set of methods used to identify weapons and ammunition and track their origins. It has an established role in criminal investigations, where it is typically used not only to prove a firearm-related offence, but also to uncover the source of illicit supplies to criminals. By contrast, weapons tracing in conflict and post-conflict situations—for example, by peace support operations (PSOs)— remains a matter of theory, not practice. To date, the only bodies that have traced conflict and post-conflict weapons (and ammunition) in any quantity are UN Groups of Experts, specifically for purposes of detecting and confirming arms embargo violations.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Crime, United Nations, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Law Enforcement

83. Dividing the Korean Peninsula: The Rhetoric of the George W. Bush Administration

Author:
Sarah Teo
Publication Date:
08-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
This paper suggests that an examination of the discourse and rhetoric of the George W. Bush administration offers a more comprehensive understanding of the developments that occurred during the years of South Korea's Sunshine policy (1998-2008). Such an approach supplements the traditional neorealist perspective and helps to account for the direction of certain policies. The paper argues that in its inter-Korean discourse, the Bush administration framed South Korea as an ally and partner against North Korea, while imagining the North as part of the “axis of evil” and a threat to international security. Since the US occupies an essential role in inter-Korean affairs, its framing of North and South Korea as unalterable opposites impeded inter-Korean reconciliation under the Sunshine policy. Rhetoric from two events will illustrate this point –the 2001 US-South Korea summit and the 2004 US Presidential Elections campaign.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States and Korea

84. Setting a Standard for stakeholdership. Industry Contribution to a strengthened Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

Author:
Jean Pascal Zanders (Ed.)
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, more commonly known as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), was opened for signature on 10 April 1972. Upon entering into force on 26 March 1975, it was the first treaty ever to ban completely a whole category of weapons. Together with the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the BTWC forms one of the pillars through which the international community deals with weapons of mass destruction.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Arms Control and Proliferation, Peace Studies, Treaties and Agreements, War, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Europe

85. A new Geography of European power?

Author:
James Rogers
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The naval historian and geostrategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan, understood the utility of military power perhaps better than anyone before or since. In an article called The Place of Force in International Relations – penned two years before his death in 1914 – he claimed: 'Force is never more operative then when it is known to exist but is not brandished' (1912). If Mahan's point was valid then, it is perhaps even more pertinent now. The rise of new powers around the world has contributed to the emergence of an increasingly unpredictable and multipolar international system. Making the use of force progressively more dangerous and politically challenging, this phenomenon is merging with a new phase in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, many European governments are increasingly reluctant – perhaps even unable – to intervene militarily in foreign lands. The operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that when armed force is used actively in support of foreign policy, it can go awry; far from re-affirming strength and determination on the part of its beholder, it can actually reveal weakness and a lack of resolve. Half-hearted military operations – of the kind frequently undertaken by democratic European states – tend not to go particularly well, especially when there is little by way of a political strategy or the financial resources needed to support them. A political community's accumulation of a military reputation, which can take decades, if not centuries, can then be rapidly squandered through a series of unsuccessful combat operations, which dent its confidence and give encouragement to its opponents or enemies.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Political Violence, Arms Control and Proliferation, War, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Europe

86. North Korea and the Politics of Visual Representation

Author:
Dirk Nabers and David Shim
Publication Date:
04-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Abstract:
Within international discourses on security, North Korea is often associated with risk and danger, emanating paradoxically from what can be called its strengths—particularly military strength, as embodied by its missile and nuclear programs—and its weaknesses—such as its ever-present political, economic, and food crises—which are considered to be imminent threats to international peace and stability. We argue that images play an important role in these representations, and suggest that one should take into account the role of visual imagery in the way particular issues, actions, and events related to North Korea are approached and understood. Reflecting on the politics of visual representation means to examine the functions and effects of images, that is what they do and how they are put to work by allowing only particular kinds of seeing. After addressing theoretical and methodological questions, we discuss individual (and serial) photographs depicting what we think are typical examples of how North Korea is portrayed in the Western media and imagined in international politics.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Politics, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and International Affairs
Political Geography:
Israel and North Korea

87. Gambit or Endgame? The New State of Arms Control

Author:
Alexei Arbatov
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The pursuit of nuclear arms control has enjoyed something of a renaissance recently, with the signing of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in spring 2010 in Prague. Whether that momentum will dissipate after New START or lead to further nuclear arms control agreements depends on several factors: The new U.S. and Russian nuclear doctrines. While there is always some distance between a state's declared policy and that policy's implementation, both documents show that, behind their more ambitious disarmament rhetoric, the United States and Russia maintain conservative nuclear policies that make radical nuclear disarmament unlikely—to say nothing of a nuclear-weapon-free world. The peculiarities of the recently signed and ratified New START agreement. Among these are the modest cuts stipulated by the treaty relative to its predecessors; the acrimonious ratification debates in both the U.S. and Russian legislatures; and the dim prospects for a follow-on agreement (in sharp contrast to the mood prevailing after past START agreements). The dynamics of obsolescence and modernization of U.S. and Russian strategic offensive forces. The United States should have little problem cutting its forces to get below New START's limits. Russia, however, will have problems, not in reducing its numbers, but in raising them to treaty ceilings, due to their removal of obsolete weapons from service and slow deployment of new systems. Either Russia can negotiate a New START follow-on treaty with even lower ceilings or it can accelerate the development and deployment of new systems. While the former is obviously a more attractive alternative, it would require the United States and Russia to resolve many thorny arms control issues, such as ballistic missile defense, conventional strategic weapons, and tactical nuclear weapons. Ballistic missile defense. President Obama's decision to modify the Bush administration's ballistic missile defense plans in Central Europe opened the way for New START and eased Russian concerns, even if they could never have been allayed entirely. Moscow believes that U.S. ballistic missile defense programs are ultimately designed to degrade Russia's nuclear deterrent, and it is far from clear that U.S. proposals to jointly develop such capabilities with Russia would allay those concerns—or that the idea even makes any sense. Russia's perceptions of U.S. conventional strategic weapons. Russian officials are especially concerned about the U.S. Prompt Global Strike concept and do not trust American assurances that such capabilities are only directed at terrorists and rogue states. There has already been some progress made in dealing with these weapons in negotiations, and future progress on this issue will likely depend on legal agreements and confidence-building measures to scale U.S. capabilities in ways that would threaten Russia's (or China's) strategic deterrent. Joint development of ballistic missile defenses with Russia. This issue could seriously complicate Washington's and Moscow's strategic relations with China and India. Officials on both sides would do well to start small and proceed step-by-step, using incremental successes to build the momentum necessary to work through more difficult issues. Non-strategic—that is, tactical—nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, the United States and Europe relied on tactical nuclear weapons to counterbalance Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional forces in Europe; today, the situation is reversed, with Moscow relying on tactical nuclear weapons as a counterbalance not only to NATO conventional superiority but also to U.S. strategic nuclear superiority and long-range precision-guided weapons. No one now knows which weapons systems should be categorized as non-strategic, and how limits across regions could be accounted for and verified. In addition, reviving the moribund Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty is essential to dealing with the issue of tactical nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, Washington, and Moscow

88. A Middle East Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction: For a Comprehensive and Incremental Approach

Author:
Marc Finaud
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The 2010 Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference reaffirmed “the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference”, which had been “an essential element of […] the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended”. Indeed, Arab countries had joined consensus in exchange for a call on “all States in the Middle East” (including Israel) “to take practical steps […] aimed at making progress towards […] an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of [WMD] and their delivery systems”, and on “all States party to the [NPT], and in particular the nuclear-weapon States […] with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of [such a zone]”. Fifteen years later, the 2010 Review Conference could understandably “regre[t] that little progress ha[d] been achieved”.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, War, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Middle East and Arabia

89. After the Fall: Leaders, Leadership and the Challenges of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding

Author:
Alan Doss
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Post-conflict peacebuilding efforts have largely focused on policy prescriptions for peacebuilding rather than the leadership qualities required for success. This paper by contrast looks at the leadership dimension of peacebuilding based largely on the author's experiences over the last decade in four, conflict-ridden African states: Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). It offers some insights into the role played by the national leaders of these four coun-tries in adapting and shaping the peacebuilding environment and draws some conclusions about the context and the personal qualities – and failings – that may contribute to success or failure in peacebuilding. The paper also considers leadership within the international community and makes some suggestions on what kind of international leadership can best help the peacebuilding process.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, International Cooperation, Peace Studies, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Liberia

90. Israel and Iran's Nuclear Weapon Programme: Roll Back or Containment?

Author:
Massimiliano Fiore
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The latest IAEA Report suggests that Iran is seeking a nuclear weapon capability. Preventing the Islamic Republic from becoming nuclear is the most important issue on Israel's agenda, and Jerusalem will do everything it can to prevent Tehran from acquiring a nuclear capability. Considering the limited impact of international sanctions and covert operations, it is therefore possible that at some point in the next 12-15 months Israel's policy-makers and military officials will decide whether or not to act militarily to destroy Iran's nuclear facilities. Though the probability of successfully destroying all of Iran's nuclear targets is not very high, Israeli policy-makers and military officials would nevertheless still be extremely satisfied with delaying Iran's nuclear programme. But would it be worth all the trouble it would inevitably unleash? While Israeli fears are understandable, given the heavy costs and poor chances for success of the military option, containment still represents the most sensible policy for Israel.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Sanctions, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Israel