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271. Whose Bomb is it Anyway? Public opinion and perceptions about Nuclear Weapons and Policy in the Post-Explosions Phase in Pakistan

Author:
Haider K. Nizamani
Publication Date:
01-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Social Science Research Council
Abstract:
The Pakistani society is rid with fissures on almost every issue and aspect concerning the nature of political system, nation-building, the meaning of the national identity and the means to ensure it. When it comes to the nuclear issue mid this cacophony and chaos, General Pervez Musharraf asserts that there is complete national consensus on Pakistan's nuclear program. Leaders of Jamaat-E-Islami, the most vocal political party in espousing the cause of nuclear Pakistan, argue that barring few individuals who are against nuclear weapons, the overwhelming majority of Pakistanis consider nuclear weapons essential for the country's security. Is there really a consensus in Pakistan regarding the nuclear option? Have people thought about their country's nuclear weapons program and policy? Have they thought about the likely costs of their country's nuclear program? Do they know who is in the control of the country's nuclear infrastructure? Such questions address the perceptual, doctrinal, command and control, and future dimensions of Pakistani nuclear weapons and policy.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Pakistan and Brazil

272. Is South Asian Nuclear Politics Different?

Author:
Rajesh Basrur
Publication Date:
05-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Social Science Research Council
Abstract:
The central question before us is whether it is appropriate for South Asians to learn from the US-Soviet experience of the Cold War. This raises other questions: Are the two sets of relationships comparable? Is there in South Asia a "cold war" essentially similar to the Cold War? Should the theoretical lenses we use for both sets be the same? Can we learn from the one about the other? Is the thinking and practice relating to nuclear weapons in the two sets comparable?
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, South Asia, and Soviet Union

273. The European Union: Tackline the threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction

Author:
Gerrard Quille and Stephen Pullinger
Publication Date:
11-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Security Information Service
Abstract:
This is the first in a series of Discussion and Policy Papers - published by ISIS Europe and Saferworld - that will trace, analyse and contribute towards developments in the European Union's emerging strategy against the proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction (WMD). This first paper has been written for circulation at the EU's Inter - Parliamentary Conference on the 'Non - proliferation and Disarmament Co - operation Initiative' within the framework of the G8 'Global Partnership against Materials and Weapons of Mass Destruction', launched in Kananaskis, Canada in July 2002. The authors welcome the initiative by the European Commission to promote Parliamentary interest in this important area of non - proliferation.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Europe and Canada

274. Unproven: The Controversy over Justifying War in Iraq

Author:
David Cortright, Alistair Millar, George A. Lopez, and Linda Gerber
Publication Date:
06-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame
Abstract:
The failure of U.S. and British forces in Iraq to find evidence of weapons of mass destruction has sparked controversy on both sides of the Atlantic and in the wider international community. Two contending explanations have been offered for why the Bush administration made apparently questionable claims about weapons of mass destruction. The first alleges an intelligence failure. The best analysts in the CIA simply had no foolproof way of discerning what Saddam had. They gave the administration a wide-ranging set of estimates, from benign to worst-case, and, given the way bureaucracies behave, the president's advisors adopted the worse case scenario. The second claim, more odious in form and substance, is that the administration inflated and manipulated uncertain data, possibly even requesting that material sent to it be redone to fit preconceived notions. The Bush administration has gone to great pains to reassert that it stands by its previous pronouncements that prohibited weapons will be located in due time.
Topic:
Defense Policy and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Middle East

275. Contested Case: Do the Facts Justify the Case for War in Iraq?

Author:
David Cortright, Alistair Millar, George A. Lopez, and Linda Gerber
Publication Date:
02-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame
Abstract:
The United States, the United Kingdom, and other nations claim that Iraq poses an imminent threat to international security because it has weapons of mass destruction and operational connections to the Al Qaeda terrorist network. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell asserted in his presentation to the Security Council on 5 February that Iraq has made no effort to disarm and is concealing efforts to redevelop weapons of mass destruction. Powell restated old allegations that the United States had made prior to the 8 November passage of Resolution 1441. He presented new intelligence about Iraqi efforts to conceal its weapons capabilities, and he reiterated previous information about the likely existence of chemical and biological agents from the 1990s, but he did not prove that there is a grave new threat from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Nor did he show a link between Iraq and September 11, or an operational connection between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda.
Topic:
Terrorism, United Nations, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, United Kingdom, and Middle East

276. UN Weapons Inspections in Iraq: A Progress Report

Author:
Alistair Millar, George A. Lopez, Linda Gerber, and David Cortwright
Publication Date:
01-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame
Abstract:
In their first two months of activity inspectors with the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have received unfettered access to Iraqi facilities and have been able to conduct more than 350 on-site inspections. To date no weapons of mass destruction have been discovered. UNMOVIC chairman Dr. Hans Blix told the Security Council on 9 January, "If we had found any 'smoking gun' we would have reported it to the Council . . . We have not submitted any such reports." IAEA director general Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei was more explicit in reporting that 'no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear-related activities has been detected.
Topic:
United Nations and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

277. National Missile Defense, Proliferation, Arms Control, Russia, and the United States

Author:
Joshua Handler
Publication Date:
08-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
The history of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defenses is long and controversial. From the late 1990s and until today, what to do about missile defenses and the 1972 ABM Treaty has been one of the central problems in U.S.-Russian relations. Several times the United States and Russia appeared to have been on the verge of a new Cold War over this question. This paper reviews the history of the missile defense debate and offers some observations on a way forward. On balance, it may be best for the international community to downplay the Bush administration's missile defense plans and instead focus on promoting diplomatic solutions to the missile proliferation problem. Moreover, the international community should examine the possibilities of banning long-range ballistic missiles. This would make U.S. plans for a national missile defense (NMD) redundant, while at the same time improving international security in general.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia and United States

278. Biological Weapons Threats from the Former Soviet Union

Author:
Sonia Ben Ouagrham
Publication Date:
08-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
Since September 11th, the American anthrax-laced letters and the war in Afghanistan have revived the interest of government officials, researchers and the general public to the state and security of former biological weapon (BW) facilities in the Former Soviet Union (FSU). In the popular press, reports of the general economic crisis and the political unrest that characterize FSU countries tend to emphasize the proliferation threat from these countries. Very little is said, however, about the nuances of this threat, its nature and degree of probability. Some reports tend to overestimate the number of employees at former BW facilities, thus inflating the risks of brain drain. While at the same time, other major sources of proliferation, such as the diversion of pathogens or the illicit transfer of specialized equipment are usually ignored. The present paper aims to characterize more precisely the threat stemming from former BW facilities in the FSU by determining what type of resources are available at former BW facilities and to what extent they are accessible to states of concern or terrorist groups. Although the existing open source information enables us to determine more clearly the categories of personnel, the type of equipment and material that pose the greatest proliferation threat, it does not measure properly the extent of the threat, i.e. an inventory of past and present facilities, expertise, equipment and material. Nevertheless, we can conclude that specialized knowledge, equipment and dangerous pathogens are available at former BW facilities in the FSU and can become accessible to state or non-state actors wishing to start or develop covert BW programs. This is particularly true in Central Asia, where economic and security factors, associated with the geographic characteristics of this region all converge to form a chain of proliferation: seekers of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their related technologies, potential suppliers and deliverers.
Topic:
Sovereignty and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, America, and Central Asia

279. Non–Compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention: Lessons from and for Iraq

Author:
Jean Pascal Zanders, John Hart, Frida Kulah, and Richard Guthrie
Publication Date:
10-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Since the end of military action in Iraq and the formation of the Coalition Provisional Authority in May 2003, most debate on the future of Iraq has focused on the short-term problems of governance, internal security and economic reconstruction in that country. In addition to the immediate problems, there is also a need to address long-term issues, such as what role Iraq will play in multilateral bodies. Although some issues can only be resolved in the long term, others will require initial decisions to be taken in the near future. In the very long term (measured in terms of decades) there is no option other than for Iraq to be involved in multilateral controls on chemical weapons (CW). However, in the medium term (measured in years) it is unclear what the best method would be to take Iraq from its current situation—as an occupied state with, at the very least, a past CW programme of which knowledge is incomplete—to a new situation where an Iraqi Government commits Iraq to membership of and adherence to multilateral disarmament regimes.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Human Welfare, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Iraq and Arab Countries

280. A First-hand Report: Cuban Biotechnology

Author:
Glenn Baker
Publication Date:
05-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Defense Information
Abstract:
John Bolton, U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, triggered a furor when on May 6, 2002, he stated, “The United States believes that Cuba has at least a limited offensive biological warfare research and development effort.” Two days later, I was meeting with a representative from the Cuban Interests Section on an unrelated matter when I posed the question, “How would Cuba respond if CDI asked to bring a group of experts down to learn more about these charges?” I had no expectations of hearing any more about it. But less than two weeks later, I was told that not only was there an interest, but that we were invited to bring anyone, come anytime, and visit anywhere we wanted. Clearly, Bolton's comments had struck a nerve in Havana.
Topic:
Security, Human Welfare, Science and Technology, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Caribbean, and Havana