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52. Democratization in Tunisia and Elite Theory
- Author:
- M. Hüseyin Mercan and M. Tahir Kilavuz
- Publication Date:
- 10-2017
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Uluslararasi Iliskiler
- Institution:
- International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
- Abstract:
- This study focuses on democratization process in Tunisia since January 14th, 2011, the date President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali left the country. The article examines democratization and normalization process of Tunisia as a starting point of the Arab Uprisings through the conceptual framework of elite choice theory. The theory postulates that if softliner regime and opposition elites cooperate, democratization process succeeds. Based upon this assumption, this paper seeks to answer how it was possible for Tunisia to follow a more successful transition path when compared to the other countries in the region through the steps and policies implemented by the representatives of the leading softliner actors in the Tunisian regime and opposition.
- Topic:
- Democratization, Politics, Arab Spring, Transition, and Elites
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, North Africa, and Tunisia
53. Sustaining Peace and peace Operations Mandates: The Liberia Transition
- Author:
- Gizem Sucuoglu
- Publication Date:
- 02-2017
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Global Peace Operations Review
- Abstract:
- On 14 December 2016, NYU’s Center on International Cooperation (CIC), the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation (DHF) and the International Peace Institute (IPI) organized the first in a series of workshops in support of efforts to better understand and implement sustaining peace. At this first workshop, participants discussed practical ways to improve the peacebuilding implications of peace operation mandates, drawing on the upcoming Liberia transition as a prime case, under the Chatham House rule. Participants included member states active in the Security Council and/or the Peacebuilding Commission; experts from different parts of the UN system including the Peacebuilding Support Office; the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; the Department of Political Affairs; the UN Development Program; and representatives from CIC, IPI, DHF, the Institute for Security Studies, and the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The discussion took place against the backdrop of the transition from the UNMIL mandate, voted on 21 December 2016 at the Security Council.
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, United Nations, Peace, and Transition
- Political Geography:
- Africa and Liberia
54. Selected Essays on the Transition to a New Nuclear Order
- Author:
- Judith Reppy and Catherine M. Kelleher
- Publication Date:
- 07-2016
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies
- Abstract:
- What conditions are needed for a stable transition to a new nuclear order, one in which the total number of nuclear weapons would be reduced to very low numbers, perhaps even zero? We have addressed the myriad issues raised by this question with funding from a grant on “Creating Conditions for a Stable Transition to a New Nuclear Order,” co-directed by Catherine Kelleher and Judith Reppy, from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation to the Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies at Cornell University. The essays collected here are a sample of the work supported by the grant. The goals of our project are three-fold: to take a fresh look at the theoretical underpinnings of the arguments about strategic security and nuclear doctrines; to encourage members of the younger generation (NextGen) scholars working on nuclear security issues to see themselves as part of a network that stretches from scholars in the field to active participants in the policy process; and to disseminate the products of the project to the policy community, in Washington and elsewhere. We have convened four workshops—in Berlin (December 2014); Ithaca, NY (November 2015); Monterey, CA (February 2016); and Washington, DC (May 2016)—and held several discussion dinners in Washington, DC. We received very welcome assistance in organizing these events from the German Marshall Fund, which hosted our Berlin workshop, and Bill Potter and Jeffrey Lewis at the Middlebury Institute for International Studies in Monterey. Elaine Scott and Sandra Kisner at Cornell provided invaluable support throughout, as did Ari Kattan, Jessica Gottesman, and Debak Das.A number of themes have emerged from these meetings, which we outline below. First, however, it is worth discussing the broader context in which the project has unfolded. In a very real sense, the seeds of our project were sown by the “Gang of Four” op-ed in the Wall Street Journal in January 2007 calling for worldwide nuclear disarmament. This call, coming from four highly respected individuals in the policy world, re-invigorated the debate over the usefulness and dangers of nuclear weapons around the world, and spurred a number of similar calls from diplomats and politicians in other countries. In April 2009, President Obama gave an important speech in Prague, in which he stated that the United States was committed “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”2 The shift in the political discussion encouraged scholars to return to the topics of strategic security and nuclear deterrence, topics that had fallen into neglect following the end of the Cold War. One such effort was a series of meetings organized by Catherine Kelleher under a grant from the Carnegie Corporation, which resulted in our co-edited book, Getting to Zero. In that volume the question of what a transition to nuclear zero would look like was broached, but not analyzed in detail. The current project is intended as a step toward filling that gap. The dangers that nuclear weapons pose—from accidents, miscalculation in times of crisis, or their acquisition by non-state actors—have persuaded many people that a nuclear-weapons free world is desirable. The optimism that nuclear disarmament might be feasible was based in large part on the success of European countries following World War II in building a zone of peace across the European continent, historically the site of so many bloody wars, and on the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Russian annexation of Crimea in spring 2014, however, ushered in a period of conflict in Ukraine and threw the validity of the European model into question. In Asia, stability has been threatened by North Korea’s detonation of nuclear devices and a more assertive international policy on the part of China. These shifts in the international situation have made it clear that a new nuclear order will have to be robust enough to weather unexpected political shocks, as well as the challenges arising from technological changes that can undercut strategic balances and other changes that we cannot foresee. As Harald Müller has cogently argued, global nuclear disarmament will not happen in a world that looks like the world of today, minus nuclear weapons. Instead, it will be the result of a step-by-step process of changing ideas, building new modes of cooperation and trust among states, and finding ways to respect regional differences within a global order. The essays in this Occasional Paper offer ideas for this process. We have selected them from the larger number of commissioned papers and commentaries produced by the participants in the project. We have confined our choices to papers by NextGen participants and included examples from each of the four workshops. The issues discussed include new ways to frame deterrence logics, important both for understanding the history of the Cold War and current questions of nuclear learning (Harrington; Akhtar). Security perspectives both within and between regions are analyzed (Zhao; Martin), and the importance of cooperative approaches to security addressed (Kühn; Gheorghe).
- Topic:
- National Security, Nuclear Power, Denuclearization, and Transition
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, China, Europe, Asia, and North America
55. The Making of a State: Transition in Montenegro
- Author:
- Igor Lukšic and Milorad Katnic
- Publication Date:
- 10-2016
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- The Cato Journal
- Institution:
- The Cato Institute
- Abstract:
- The first Montenegrin state started to take shape in the 8th century with the arrival of the Slavs and their mingling with the local population. Originally it was called Doclea, whose ruler received a royal insignia by the Pope Gregory VII in 1078 (Andrijaševi ´c and Rastoder 2006). Montenegro fell under the Ottomans in the late 15th century, but acted as a de facto independent state until formal recognition came at the Berlin Congress in 1878. Despite being on the victors’ side in the Balkan Wars and in World War I, it was annexed by Serbia and lost its sovereignty in 1918. After the Second World War it became a part of socialist Yugoslavia, where it remained until 1992. Montenegro’s political transition started in earnest after the Belgrade Agreement signed in March 2002. Montenegro held an independence referendum in 2006 and was subsequently admitted to the United Nations and other international organizations. Today Montenegro is engaged in accession talks with the European Union (EU).
- Topic:
- History, Elections, State, and Transition
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Montenegro
56. Facilitating a Political Transition in Syria
- Author:
- Omar Sheira
- Publication Date:
- 03-2016
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Global Political Trends Center
- Abstract:
- The Arab Spring shook the fragile foundation of Syria, effectively highlighting the pre-existing sentiments of conflict and separatism along sectarian, ethnic and tribal lines. Refusing to respond to the calls of nationwide protests, President Bashar al-Assad responded with unrestricted force, effectively plunging the country into a fully-fledged civil war, very similar to what Hobbes described as the state of nature. Five years later, the war has all but damaged Syria's security, political, economic and social domains, causing more than $200 billion of losses (Abdul Razzaq, 2015) and spilling over to cost nearby countries an estimated $35 billion (World Bank, 2016). In terms of human suffering, it has claimed the lives of 250,000-470,000, injured over 1-2 million Syrians, and forcefully displaced 54% of the pre-war population, including 4.6 million people who fled the country and 6.6 million others who were internally displaced by violence (UNOCHA, 2016). The intensifying conflict, coupled with the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), has transformed Syria into an international stage for the proxy confrontation between local, regional and international powers, including the United States, Russia, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Lebanon, as each of them supports various Syrian players in the conflict. This has led to the inability of any party to achieve an absolute military victory and prolonged the conflict, risking the expansion of its military dimensions and political consequences.
- Topic:
- Syrian War, Crisis Management, Proxy War, and Transition
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Syria
57. To Shoot or not to Shoot? Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern Militaries Respond Differently
- Author:
- James M Dorsey and Teresita Cruz-del Rosario
- Publication Date:
- 12-2015
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS)
- Abstract:
- An analysis of the Middle Eastern and North African militaries has produced a laundry list of literature, much of which was either valid for a specific post-World War II period or highlighted one of more aspects of military interest in the status quo or attitudes towards political change. Leaving aside the geopolitical differences between Southeast Asia and the Middle East and North Africa, a comparison of the transition in both regions brings into focus the building blocks that are needed for an armed force to embrace change. Southeast Asian nations succeeded whereas the countries in Middle East and North Africa, with the exception of Tunisia, have failed for several reasons.
- Topic:
- Politics, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Transition
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Middle East, Asia, North Africa, and Southeast Asia
58. The Role of the Military in the Constitution-making Process as a part of Democratic Transition: The Comparative Cases of Turkey and Egypt
- Author:
- Merve Ince
- Publication Date:
- 12-2013
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Bilgi
- Institution:
- Değişim Yayınları
- Abstract:
- The role of the military in the politics in the developing or socalled “Third World” countries has always been fundamental in order to comprehend the historical process of democratization movements in these countries. To be able to fully grasp the politics, particularly democratic transitions, in the Middle East, it is indispensable to look at the role of the military within the transition process. However, because the democratic transition processes involves different practices, in my research paper, I will focus on the role of military within the constitution-making processes in order to narrow down my research. I have chosen the constitution-making process because, as argued by Özbudun, constitution-making, especially during democratic transitions, is an excellent opportunity to build political institutions that will enjoy broad support from society and its political elites. Both the constitution-making process and its outcome are crucial aspects of the transition to and consolidation of democracy. In this regard, in this study, I have chosen to study Egypt and Turkey comparatively in terms of their military involvement in the constitution making process. It should be noted that in both Turkey and Egypt, previous constitutions were made directly by the military or under military influence through various means, which I will evaluate in my research paper in detailed way. I have chosen these two countries due to two reasons. My initial inspiration is derived from that currently, these two significant countries of the region are in the constitution-making process. When we look at current situation of Turkey, it can be argued that Turkey is in constitution-making process, which is supposed to be totally civilian without the influence of the military. On the other hand, in terms of Egypt, it is argued that following to the Arab Spring, Egypt’s new constitution will be the roadmap to a second republic that most Egyptians hope will be free from the tyranny, corruption, and nepotism, which were the trademarks of Egypt’s political life. The second reason is that despite the fact that Egypt and Turkey differ from each other in terms of longevity of their democratic experiences, the militaries of two countries demonstrate some core similarities, which is noteworthy in terms of comparing the two. Considering all of these, the aim of this study is to see how the military can be a part of the political system, especially in the making of constitution, and to understand the current situation and changing position of the militaries in these countries.
- Topic:
- Military Affairs, Democracy, State Building, and Transition
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Europe, Turkey, Asia, and Egypt
59. Time for the Strategy of Coevolution: How South Korea Can Shape the Future of the Kim Jong-un Regime
- Author:
- EAI Security Net
- Publication Date:
- 01-2012
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- 2012 is a critical time for North Korea as it has proclaimed that from this year it will achieve the status of a “strong and prosperous nation.” With Kim Jong-il’s death in December 2011, this immense task now falls upon the shoulders of Kim Jong-un. For the past seventeen years under Kim Jong-il’s rule, North Korea has tried to seek a way to ensure its regime’s survival and guarantee its national security through Songun or military-first politics and the possession of nuclear weapons. Yet, this has actually resulted in international isolation, economic hardships, and an overdependence on China. For North Korea, it was “lost two decades”. It is natural to wonder about what kind of impact Kim Jong-il’s sudden death will have on North Korea in the short run. However, it is more important now to think carefully about what lies ahead for North Korea over the next 20 years under Kim Jong-un’s rule. Upon such a consideration it is also critical to prepare necessary measures in terms of this long-term perspective. The most urgent priority for the newly established Kim Jong-un regime is domestic stability, which means that the regime will have to pursue the legacy of Kim Jong-il’s rule. In this respect, it will continue to possess nuclear weapons, seek economic gains from negotiations over its nuclear program, and attempt to accelerate its economic development under the banner of a “strong and prosperous nation” to gain political legitimacy. So long as Kim Jong-un sticks to “rule by his deceased father’s will,” then North Korea will face the inevitable dilemma it has faced for the last seventeen years. Pursuing regime security by huddling onto nuclear weapons will only continue to ensure Pyongyang’s international isolation. This isolation in turn brings about economic hardship, which consequently has a negative effect on the stability of the Kim Jong-un regime as its legitimacy is still rather weak. These interlinked problems of domestic politics, diplomacy, and economics can be easily locked in a vicious circle. The Kim Jong-un regime must deal with these pending issues in line with a long-term strategy that will guarantee its survival and help North Korea pursue reforms to meet the norms of the twenty-first century civilization. The first stage of this long-term strategy is to seek a policy shift. At some point in the future, Kim Jong-un has to make the strategic decision to give up nuclear weapons and switch from the current military-first politics to economy-first politics. Of course, such a shift is an extremely difficult decision to make, but it would be a good chance to prove the strength of Kim Jong-un’s leadership internally and externally. The second stage is transition and reform. With this step, North Korea will finally take measures toward peaceful development under the basis of a more enlightened Suryong or Great Leader Direct Rule system. Those measures include overcoming the demands for excessive security, moving forward to establish a security system without nuclear weapons, and plan for a North Korean-way of reforms and opening. In order to achieve these goals, North Korea will truly require support from South Korea and the international community. The third stage is the transformation of North Korea to meet the international standard of advancement. In this stage, it is crucial to find a way to encourage North Korea to transform into a nation that seeks moderate security capabilities as well as a new momentum for economic development, democracy, and normal diplomacy. If it succeeds, North Korea could then become a model country which serves for peace and unification on the Korean Peninsula and contribute toward development and stability in Northeast Asia. During this delicate period, it is an imperative to get over single-minded approaches to focus only on the collapse of North Korea or to call for the one-sided effort of either North Korea or the international community to resolve all the issues. Furthermore, it is time to understand the broad range of problems of North Korea and seek a path of coevolution which takes in a bigger picture of peace and stability for not only the Korean Peninsula but also East Asia.
- Topic:
- Regime Change, Authoritarianism, Leadership, Dictatorship, Totalitarianism, and Transition
- Political Geography:
- Asia and North Korea
60. A Path Never Taken: The Options for Kim Jong-un and the Future of the Korean Peninsula
- Author:
- EAI Security Net
- Publication Date:
- 10-2010
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- Since Kim Jong-il’s health deteriorated in the summer of 2008, the question of his succession has drawn attention from all over the world. Finally, on September 28 2010, Kim Jong-un, Kim Jong-il’s third son, rapidly emerged with his guardianship group made up of the close personnel of the “dear leader” at the Third Meeting of the Workers Party of Korea (WPK) Representatives. The future direction of the succession process has generated tremendous interest from all over the world, because it is not only related to internal power transition in North Korea but also directly linked with the future of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. The political and diplomatic decisions of Kim Jong-il’s successor will crucially affect his own future, as well that of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis, Inter-Korean relations, and the international order of Northeast Asia. Kim Jong-un was promoted to the rank of daechang, the equivalent of a four-star general, and appointed vice chairman of the Party’s Central Military Commission, in essence holding the de facto post of second-in-command. He was named right after the four members of the politburo standing committee by North Korea's official news agency, Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), and his picture was revealed to the public for the first time. This formulated that he became the successor to his father. All in all, he was named as general on the 27th, appointed vice chairman of the party’s Central Military Commission on the 28th, and his picture released on the 29th, which shows precisely the elaborated staging and even hastiness on the part of the North Korean regime. On October 10, Kim Jong-il effectively declared his heir apparent at home and abroad when he attended a massive military parade with Kim Jong-un, commemorating the 65th anniversary of the founding of the Workers Party of Korea. This remarkable event was broadcasted live in North Korea with even foreign correspondents invited to attend. The succession process was a lot faster than expected, particularly when compared to Kim Jong-il, whose succession process only got off the ground six years after he was designated a member of the Politburo in 1974. It is premature to say which direction Kim Jong-un will go, but it cannot but be seen that his emergence puts more emphasis on ‘continuation’ rather than ‘severance’ or ‘transformation’ from the existing songun or military-first politics. Above all, it is noteworthy that Kim Jong-un took the position of vice chairman of the Party's Central Military Commission rather than positions within its Politburo or Secretariat. This is groundwork to make Kim Jong-un become the “royal” successor of the military-first politics system. Like his father, he will likely exercise the power to interpret the ruling ideology as the sole successor to the “bloodline of Mount Baekdu.” Holding onto the banner of military-first politics, Kim Jong-un will establish it as a “revolutionary” tradition that will form the basis of his succession. Secondly, it is also noticeable that Kim Jong-un’s guardianship group is filled with his father’s people. They were appointed to be heavyweights in the Party and military during the Meeting of Party Representatives. Kim Jong-il’s sister Kim Kyong-hui became a member of the Politburo, her husband Jang Song Thaek became an alternate member of the Politburo, member of the Central Military Commission, and a department director of the Party’s Central Committee, while Vice-Marshal Ri Yong Ho became a Standing Member of the Politburo and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. It is hard to find anyone that could be considered as Kim Jong-un’s people, which is to be understood considering his age and inexperience. There is a dilemma for Kim Jong-un in that he cannot completely rely on the military-first politics. Currently, Kim has not even been officially designated as successor; that will only come when he assumes position as a Standing Member of the Politburo. Such a move can only be possible if he accumulates considerable achievements as he has nothing to his name so far. Presumably, this process needs to be completed before the 7th Party Congress in 2012, leaving Kim Jong-un with little time. Establishing North Korea as an ‘economically strong power,’ one of the three pillars of gangseongdaeguk or strong and prosperous country is something that has yet to be achieved. Pyongyang has already claimed to have achieved the other two pillars of a strong political power and a strong military power. However, as long as the military-first politics is sustained, it is almost impossible for North Korea to pursue the path to economic recovery by itself.
- Topic:
- Authoritarianism, Leadership, Succession, and Transition
- Political Geography:
- Asia and North Korea