971. Taking Stock of NATO's Response Force
- Author:
- Jens Ringsmose
- Publication Date:
- 01-2010
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- "We are there", then NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, gleefully told reporters at the Riga summit in November 2006. Only four years after formally agreeing to the creation of a 25,000 strong deployable and technologically advanced allied force the NATO Response Force (NRF) the Atlantic Alliance thus declared its new military tool a "fully operational capability" (FOC). NATO, so it seemed, had created a potent instrument of power projection and a catalyst for transformation at record speed. However, the political enthusiasm surrounding the NRF was soon to evaporate and for good reasons: as a result of depressingly low fill rates and political differences as to what operational role the force should actually play, the Alliance has been propelled to agree to no less than two major overhauls of the concept since late 2006. Not even a year subsequent to the FOC declaration in October 2007 NATO policy-makers approved the first major revision of the NRF, diminishing the size of the rapid response force significantly. In June 2009, NATO decided to revise the concept for the second time. What was intended to be the Alliance's mailed fist and "a show-case of NATO resolve and collective commitment to military transformation" has thus become a force largely on paper. As pointed out by Hans Binnendijk, one of the NRF-concept's intellectual fathers: "The NRF is a force that should be on steroids, and instead it's on life support".
- Topic:
- NATO, Politics, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Atlantic Ocean